ORDER : BIRENDRA KUMAR, J. 1. By order dated 10.02.2010 passed in Civil Original Suit No.282/2004 (58/97), the learned trial Judge has rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. Since rejection of plaint is a ‘decree’ as defined in Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this appeal has been filed under Section 96 of C.P.C. challenging the aforesaid rejection. 2. A brief background of the case is that respondent No.1 herein namely Pushpchand, who was defendant No.1 of the suit entered into an agreement to purchase Khasra No.310 in village Kudi Bhagtasani, District and Tehsil Jodhpur from Original Defendant No.2-Late Kalu Ram @ Kalia and Original Defendant No.3- Late Pabu Ram @ Pabuda, both sons of late Chaila. On agreement not being performed by Original Defendant Nos.2 and 3, the respondent No.1-Pushpchand brought a suit for specific performance of contract vide Civil Suit No.71/1991 on 30.05.1991. During pendency of the suit, the said Kalu Ram sold his share in Khasra No.310 to 63 persons including the appellants on 29.06.1992 and the sale deed was registered on 07.10.1992. The purchasers got mutated in revenue record on 24.2.1993. Late Kalu Ram appeared in Suit No.71/1991 and filed written statement but did not disclose in the written statement that he had sold the suit property to the present appellants and others. However, by a separate petition, Kalu Ram informed the Court that he is an illiterate person and when the plaintiff was not performing his part of the contract, he already sold his share in the aforesaid Khasra to 63 persons. 3. Thereafter, plaintiff-Pushpchand filed an application for disclosure of the name of lis pendens purchasers but late Kalu Ram could disclose name of a few and stated in the petition that since the sale-deed is a registered document, plaintiff can obtain certified copy and get name of the purchasers. But the course adopted by the trial Court was that defence of Kalu Ram was rejected. 4. Pabu Ram filed separate written statement denying his signature on the separate agreement claimed by plaintiff- Pushpchand and clearly stated that he had not sold his share in the property to the plaintiff, however left the pairvi of the case and suit was decided ex parte against him. 4. Pabu Ram filed separate written statement denying his signature on the separate agreement claimed by plaintiff- Pushpchand and clearly stated that he had not sold his share in the property to the plaintiff, however left the pairvi of the case and suit was decided ex parte against him. Since Kalu Ram had not disclosed the name of the lis pendens purchaser, his defence was struck down and thereafter Kalu Ram did not contest the suit. 5. Consequently, the suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff- Pushpchand by judgment and decree dated 18.04.1996. 6. For execution of the decree, Misc. Execution Case No.29/1996 was filed. The sale deed was executed in pursuance of the decree and the Executing Authority of the Court effected delivery of possession to the plaintiff on 21.06.1997 on paper in absence of Kalu. In the present suit, the plaintiffs/appellants have stated that cause of action arose on 21.06.1997 when the plaintiff attempted to forcefully dispossessed them. 7. Thereafter, almost all the 63 purchasers by different petitions filed under Order I Rule 10 C.P.C. desired to be impleaded in the execution proceeding as party. But all the petitions were rejected on 31.7.1997 on the ground that neither they were decree holder nor judgment debtor. 8. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and performa respondents filed Civil Suit No.58/1997 re-numbered as Civil Suit No.282/2004 praying therein for declaration that judgment and decree dated 18.04.1996 passed in Civil Suit No.71/1991 was collusive, invalid and void obtained by playing fraud and is not binding on the plaintiffs to the extent of their interest. Further prayer was for injunction against the defendants not to disturb possession of the plaintiffs. 9. In the suit, respondent No.1 filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint and the plaint was rejected by the order under challenge on the ground that the plaintiffs/appellants herein had remedy under Order XXI Rule 97 and 99 C.P.C. before the Execution Court and not by a separate suit, hence, the plaint was barred under the law. 10. Mr. Sajjan Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the appellants contends that in fact no remedy was available to the appellants in the execution proceeding. Assuming any remedy was available, their prayer for impleadment as party in the execution proceeding was already refused by the Execution Court. 10. Mr. Sajjan Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the appellants contends that in fact no remedy was available to the appellants in the execution proceeding. Assuming any remedy was available, their prayer for impleadment as party in the execution proceeding was already refused by the Execution Court. Learned counsel submits that since the appellants and other purchasers were not party to the earlier suit, they had three remedies available in law against the judgment and decree passed in earlier suit. (a) They could have challenged the said judgment in appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C. (b) They could have asserted their right, title and interest over the property in a separate suit as has been done in the present case. (c) They could have contested the matter before the Execution Court if the law permits and the Execution Court would have permitted them to contest. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants next contends that an agreement to sale does not create any title, rather a weak right is created by the said agreement. Since the appellants were bonafide purchaser for consideration without notice of the earlier agreement, their right is protected under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act against any direction for specific performance of contract in respect of the same property. If the appellants would have been impleaded in the first suit, they could have placed the entire things on the record and the trial Judge could have awarded alternative remedy to the plaintiff of the first suit as prayed for by the plaintiff. The relevant portion of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act is being reproduced below : “19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title.- Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against- (a) either party thereto; b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract;” Evidently, specific performance of contract may not have been ordered against a transferee for value, who had paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract, as claimed by the appellants herein. 12. Dr. 12. Dr. Sachin Acharya, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contends that since the appellants were transferee pendent lite, their right was subject to result of the suit as stipulated under Section 52 of the Transfer of the Property Act. If the suit would have been decided in favour of their transferor, they could have claimed their right as they entered into the shoes of their transferor. In case the suit was decided against the transferor of the appellants, as in the present case, they have nothing to assert and establish especially by filing a separate suit for the same property and cause. 13. Learned senior counsel next contends that there were 63 purchasers. Many others did not challenge the decree passed in the first suit and some others left the company of the appellants in this appeal though they were plaintiffs in the suit. The vendors of the appellant was conscious about the earlier agreement, therefore, the appellants have no cause in this matter. Only for the reason that some of the purchasers left to pursue their claim, it cannot be thrust upon the present appellants to not to pursue their genuine cause. 14. Learned Senior Counsel next contends that the only remedy available to the appellants, the purchasers pendent lite is to be adjudicated before the Execution Court and the Execution Court shall decide the claim in the way as adjudicable in the suits after framing of the issues, as separate suit is already barred under Rule 101 of Order 21 CPC. 15. Learned Senior Counsel has drawn attention of this Court to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary Vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal & Ors. , reported in (1997) 3 SCC 694 . In the said judgment in para-5, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows : “5. In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order XXI lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. In the said judgment in para-5, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows : “5. In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order XXI lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which comes to be noted by the Executing Court as well as by the decree-holder the remedy available to the decree-holder against such an obstructionist in only under Order XXI Rule 97 sub- rule (1) and he cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on re- issuance of warrant for possession under Order XXI Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course would amount to bypassing and circumventing the procedure laid down under Order XXI Rule 97 in connection with removal of obstruction of purported strangers to the decree. Once such an obstruction is on the record of the Executing Court it is difficult to appreciate how the Executing Court can tell such obstructionist that he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order XXI Rule 99, CPC and pray for restoration of possession. The High Court by the impugned order and judgment has taken the view that the only remedy available to a stranger to the decree who claims any independent right, title or interest in the decretal property is to go by Order XXI Rule 99. This view of the High Court on the aforesaid statutory scheme is clearly unsustainable. It is easy to visualise that a stranger to the decree who claims an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property can offer his resistance before getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing possession as per Order XXI Rule. Order XXI Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder. Order XXI Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder. While Order XXI Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent stage in the execution proceedings where a stranger claiming any right, title and interest in the decretal property might have got actually dispossessed and claims restoration of possession on adjudication of his independent right, title and interest dehors the interest of the judgment-debtor. Both these types of enquiries in connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly contemplated by the aforesaid scheme of Order XXI and it is not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the picture only at the final stage after losing the possession and not before it if he is vigilant enough to raise his objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession gets actually executed against him. With respect the High Court has totally ignored the scheme of Order XXI Rule 97 in this connection by taking the view that only remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order XXI Rule 99 and he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings. The view taken by the High Court in this connection also results in patent breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance would not be considered or heard or merits and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the Executing Court, therefore, would fail also on the ground of non- compliance with basic principles of natural justice. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the Executing Court, therefore, would fail also on the ground of non- compliance with basic principles of natural justice. On the contrary the statutory scheme envisaged by Order XXI Rule 97, CPC as discussed earlier clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the decree- holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the Executing Court and it is that adjudication which subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order XXI Rules 97 and 103 would remain a complete code and the sole remedy for the concerned parties to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves.” 16. As noticed, the appellants filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleadment in the execution proceedings aforesaid but the learned Execution Court rejected their separate petitions only for the reason that Order 1 Rule 10 CPC would apply at the stage of suit and not at the execution proceedings. The Execution Court should have considered the resistance and the reasons for resistance made by the appellants which was to be decided first before proceeding with the execution of the decree. Once the Execution Court declined to hear the plaintiffs/appellants, the only course left open to the appellants was to file the present suit. 17. Since the trial Judge has rejected the plaint on the ground of availability of remedy before the Execution Court, the first point for consideration is whether really the appellants had effective remedy before the Execution Court. 18. The provisions of Order XXI Rule 97 to 102 are being reproduced below : “97. 17. Since the trial Judge has rejected the plaint on the ground of availability of remedy before the Execution Court, the first point for consideration is whether really the appellants had effective remedy before the Execution Court. 18. The provisions of Order XXI Rule 97 to 102 are being reproduced below : “97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property.- (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. [(2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.] [98. Orders after adjudication-. (1) Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. (2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days.] [99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser.- (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser.- (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.] [100. Order to be passed upon application complaining of dispossession.- Upon the determination of the questions referred to in rule 101, the Court shall, in accordance with such determination,- (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into the possession of the property or dismissing the application; or (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit.] [ 101. Question to be determined.- All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application, and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions.] [102. Rules not applicable to transferee pendente lite.- Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. Explanation. In this rule, "transfer" includes a transfer by operation eration of law.]” 19. Evidently, under Rule 97 aforesaid, only the decree holder or purchaser of a property sold in execution of the decree can approach the Court. Under Rule 99, any person other than the judgment debtor dispossessed by the decree holder or purchaser of the property sold in execution of the decree may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. Under Rule 99, any person other than the judgment debtor dispossessed by the decree holder or purchaser of the property sold in execution of the decree may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. Rule 102 specifically stipulates that nothing in Rule 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction made by a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. The reason is obvious that purchasers pendente lite enter into the shoes of their vendor and their interest in the property would be subject to the result of the suit as per Section 52 of the Transfer of the Property Act. Hence, they cannot approach under aforesaid Rules or any other Rules of Order 21 CPC at the stage of execution of the decree. 20. This issue was considered in several cases by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case of Jini Dhanragir and Anr. Vs. Shibu Mathew and Anr. reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 643 relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered earlier judgments referred in Para Nos.18 to 23, which are being reproduced hereunder : “ 18. In Bhanwar lal v. Satyanarain (1995) 1 SCC 6 , this Court held that when any person, whether claiming derivative title from the judgment-debtor or sets up his own right, title or interest de hors the judgment debtor, the executing court whilst executing the decree, in addition to the power under Rule 35(3), is empowered to conduct an enquiry whether the obstruction by that person is legal or not. 19. This Court in Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand (1995) 1 SCC 242 reiterated that the executing court was bound to adjudicate the claim of an obstructionist and to record a finding allowing or rejecting the claim which was laid before the executing court, the person being neither a party to the earlier proceedings nor the decree being passed against him. 20. Yet again, in Babulal v. Raj Kumar (1996) 3 SCC 154 , this Court after setting aside the order impugned held that a determination is required to be conducted under Order XXI Rule 98 before removal of the obstruction caused by the objector and a finding is required to be recorded in that regard. 20. Yet again, in Babulal v. Raj Kumar (1996) 3 SCC 154 , this Court after setting aside the order impugned held that a determination is required to be conducted under Order XXI Rule 98 before removal of the obstruction caused by the objector and a finding is required to be recorded in that regard. It was also held that the executing court was required to determine the question relating to when the appellants had objected to the execution of the decree as against those appellants who were not parties to the decree for specific performance. 21. The decision in Brahmdeo Chaudhary (1997) 3 SCC 694 cited by Mr. Chitambaresh, is also to the same effect. 22. Considering the scheme of Order XXI Rules 97 to 106, this Court in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust (1998) 3 SCC 723 found it difficult to agree with the High Court that resistance or obstruction made by a third party to the decree put to execution cannot be gone into under Order XXI Rule 97. Referring to Rules 97 to 106, this Court further held that they were intended to deal with every sort of resistance or obstruction raised by any person and that Rule 97(2) made it incumbent on the court to adjudicate upon such complaint in accordance with the procedure laid down. This Court also proceeded to observe: "It is clear that executing court can decide whether the resistor or obstructer is a person bound by the decree and he refuses to vacate the property. That question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21, Rule 97(2) of the Code. The adjudication. mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. Court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resistor. Of course, the Court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination if the Court deems it necessary". 23. The long line of precedents notwithstanding, it is indeed true that in terms of the ordainment of Rule 102 of Order XXI, Rules 98 and 100 thereof would not apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of Immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed”. 21. 21. In subsequent paragraph, the Supreme Court cautioned when transfer was during the period when the suit was dismissed for default and prior to restoration, the transfer was affected when there was no pending lis. Evidently, in the case on hand, the transfer in favour of the plaintiff-appellant was during pendency of the earlier suit, hence, the provisions of the execution proceeding and remedy there at would not be available to the plaintiff-appellant in view of Rule 102 CPC. Even if it was available, after rejection of their prayer for impleadment in execution proceedings, fresh suit was not barred under the law. 22. Furthermore, the prayer made in the present suit for declaration that the decree passed in the earlier suit was collusive and ineffective one and not binding on the plaintiff could not have been gone into by an Execution Court as Execution Court cannot go beyond the decree. While considering executability of the decree, the Execution Court could have only seen whether the decree was void for being passed against a dead person or it was passed by a Court having inherent lack of jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the suit as such the decree being nullity but the Execution Court cannot examine the correctness of the decree as Appellate Court by considering evidence on collusiveness etc. 23. In the case of Dr.M. Parvathi and Others Vs. Sri Penumatcha Satyanarayana Raju and Others (Appeal Suit No.530/2011 decided on 09.04.2013), a Division Bench of Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court observed in Para 21 as follows : “21. Before the trial Court as well as this Court, the appellants pleaded that the decree obtained by the 1st respondent in O.S.No.326 of 1998 is a collusive and fraudulent one. If that were to be so, they could have filed a separate suit challenging that very decree. Mere taking of a plea that the decree rendered by a Court of competent jurisdiction is collusive or fraudulent would not sub-serve that purpose. Unless specifically challenged before it, no Court can address that issue. Therefore, points framed in this appeal are answered against the appellants.” 24. Therefore, evidently the trial Court has erred in law in rejecting the plaint, which was not barred by any law. 25. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the following judgments in support of his assertion that the plaintiff-appellants had remedy before the execution Court. Sr. Therefore, points framed in this appeal are answered against the appellants.” 24. Therefore, evidently the trial Court has erred in law in rejecting the plaint, which was not barred by any law. 25. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the following judgments in support of his assertion that the plaintiff-appellants had remedy before the execution Court. Sr. No. Parties Citation Reference Para 01 Brahmdeo Chaudhary v Rishikesh Prashad Jaiswal and ors. (1997) 3 SCC 694 Para 5 02 Prabhudayal v Susheel Kumar and ors. (2000)1 RLW 277 Para 11 03 Ved Kumari v Municipal Corporation of Delhi. (2023)13 SCC 651 Para 24 Onwards 04 Asgar and ors. V Mohan Varma and ors. (2020) 16 SCC 230 Para 42 onwards 26. In none of the cases aforesaid, the issue involved was whether a transferee pendent lite can resist the execution of the decree under Order XXI Rule 97 and Rule 99 of the C.P.C. in view of the specific bar contended under Rule 102 C.P.C. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent next relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable & Ors. Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner & Ors. , reported in (2004) 3 SCC 137 . Para 10 to 18 of the judgment is being reproduced below : “10. In Saleem Bhai and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. ( 2003 (1) SCC 557 ) it was held with reference to Order VII Rule 11 of the Code that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial Court can exercise the power at any stage of the suit - before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the averments in the plaint are the germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. 11. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and Ors. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the averments in the plaint are the germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. 11. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and Ors. ( 1998 (2) SCC 70 ) it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. 12. The trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr. ( 1977 (4) SCC 467 ) 13. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill ( 1982 (3) SCC 487 ), only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected. 14. In Raptakos Brett & Co.Ltd. v. Ganesh Property ( 1998 (7) SCC 184 ) it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII was applicable. 15. There cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. 15. There cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair- splitting technicalities. 16. Submission of learned counsel for respondent No.2- trust was that requirement of law being reading the plaint in its totality, the appellants cannot take the plea that they would give up or relinquish some of the reliefs sought for. That would not be permissible. The plea clearly overlooks the basic distinction between statements of the facts disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for. The reliefs claimed do not constitute the cause of action. On the contrary, they constitute the entitlement, if any, on the basis of pleaded facts. As indicated above, Order VI Rule 2 requires that pleadings shall contain and contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim. If the plea of Mr. Savant, learned counsel for the respondent-trust is accepted the distinction between the statement of material facts and the reliance on them for the claim shall be obliterated. What is required in law is not the piecemeal reading of the plaint but in its entirety. Whether the reliefs would be granted on the pleaded facts and the evidence adduced is totally different from the relief claimed. All the reliefs claimed may not be allowed to a party on the pleadings and the evidence adduced. What is required in law is not the piecemeal reading of the plaint but in its entirety. Whether the reliefs would be granted on the pleaded facts and the evidence adduced is totally different from the relief claimed. All the reliefs claimed may not be allowed to a party on the pleadings and the evidence adduced. Whether part of the relief cannot be granted by the Civil Court is a different matter from saying that because of a combined claim of reliefs the jurisdiction is ousted or no cause of action is disclosed. Considering the reliefs claimed vis-a- vis the pleadings would not mean compartmentalization or segregation, in that sense. The plea raised by the respondent-trust is therefore clearly unacceptable. 17. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles the reliefs sought for in the suit as quoted supra have to be considered. The real object of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits. Therefore, the Order X of the Code is a tool in the hands of the Courts by resorting to which and by searching examination of the party in case the Court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the court in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised. 18. As noted supra, the Order VII Rule 11 does not justify rejection of any particular portion of the plaint. Order VI Rule 16 of the Code is relevant in this regard. It deals with 'striking out pleadings'. It has three clauses permitting the Court at any stage of the proceeding to strike out or amend any matter in any pleading i.e. (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or, (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or, (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.” 28. There is no dispute in the legal principles laid down in the above judgment, however, on the facts of this case it does not appear that the present suit is frivolous and vexatious, having imaginary cause of action, therefore, the case is not helping in the facts and circumstances of this case. 29. There is no dispute in the legal principles laid down in the above judgment, however, on the facts of this case it does not appear that the present suit is frivolous and vexatious, having imaginary cause of action, therefore, the case is not helping in the facts and circumstances of this case. 29. Learned counsel for the respondent has next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Machado Brothers & Ors., reported in (2004) 11 SCC 168. In Shipping Corporation’s case, the appellant had appointed the respondent as the steamship agent of the appellant for the purpose of handling tankers, bulk carriers and tramp vessels, calling at the port of Tuticorin. It was the contention of the appellant that the said agreement provided for termination of the contract. On being dissatisfied with the conduct of the respondent, invoking the clause of termination in the contract and for the reasons mentioned therein, by a notice dated 23.2.1995, the appellant terminated the said contract of agency. The respondent challenged the said termination by way of a suit seeking declaration that the order of termination was illegal, void and unenforceable. In that case, the suit was disposed of and the interlocutory application was kept pending. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once the suit was disposed of there was lack of bonafides after dismissal of an infructuous suit and continuation of an interlocutory application. 30. Learned counsel for the respondent next relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh Bogarh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2004) 11 SCC 180 . In that case, the defendant no.3 moved an application that he does not want to press the issue of adoption and in a subsequent suit, the defendant no.3 as plaintiff raised the said grievance of genuineness of adoption. On facts of that case, the present one is distinguishable. 31. To conclude, the appellants who are not party to the previously instituted suit, can challenge the judgment and decree passed in the previous suit in a separately instituted suit asserting their own title including the claim of title derived from a party to the previously instituted suit, especially when the third party (appellants) claims to be bonafide purchaser for consideration without notice of any existing agreement. The right of the appellants to bring fresh suit is fortified by the situation of their non-impleadment in the suit or the execution proceeding and providing opportunity of hearing. The rejection of prayer for impleadment in the execution proceeding deprived and left the appellants without remedy. 32. Moreover, the Execution Court could not have gone into the collusiveness of the decree under execution. The Execution Court could have looked into whether the judgment and decree was void ab initio for being without jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the suit or for the reason of being passed against a dead person. 33. In the result, the impugned order/decree suffers from the error of law and facts. Consequently, the same is set aside and the plaint is directed to be restored to its position holding on the date of rejection. The trial Judge shall proceed with the trial according to law and expeditiously.