ORDER : 1. This criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been filed for quashing the FIR No. 0251 dated 31.08.2025 registered at Police Station Ashok Nagar District Jaipur City (South) under Sections 316 (2), 318(4), 336(2), 338, 340(2) and 61(2) of Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that giving a civil dispute colour of criminal case, the instant FIR has been lodged. He submits that acting pursuant to a development agreement entered between the parties, he had got issued pattas from JDA, sold the plots to various persons and deposited the amount so received in the escrow account. He further submits that all the documents, referred to in the FIR, have already been examined by the Arbitrator. He, therefore, prays that the criminal misc. petition be allowed and the subject FIR be quashed and set aside. 3. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the prayer. 4. Heard. Considered. 5. A perusal of the contents of the subject FIR reflects commission of cognizable offence by the petitioner. Although, the genesis of the allegations is a development agreement entered between the parties; but, there are specific allegations in the FIR against the petitioner of fabricating and forging the documents as also of dishonest misappropriation of money. The FIR contains following specific allegations: 6. From the aforesaid allegations in the FIR, it cannot be reckoned as a dispute of civil nature. While laying down succinctly the scope of interference by the Constitutional Court in the ongoing investigation, Their Lordships have held in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335 as under: 102. While laying down succinctly the scope of interference by the Constitutional Court in the ongoing investigation, Their Lordships have held in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 335 as under: 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima- facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 106. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. 7. After going through the contents of the subject FIR, this Court is not satisfied that the instant case falls under any of the aforesaid criteria so as to warrant its quashing. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held, in the case of Dr. Monica Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 2008 SCC 2781, as under:- "30. We may reiterate and emphasise that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury (1992) 4 SCC 305 ; Raghubir Saran Dr. v. State of Bihar 1964 (2) SCR 336 ; Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451 ; and Zhandu Pharmaceuticals Works Limited and Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Another 2005 (1) SCC 122 ]." 9. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Bajjoori Kanthaiah and Ors. , AIR 2009 SCC 671 , it was held as under:- "8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.(See: The Janata Dal etc. v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, etc. ( AIR 1993 SC 892 ), Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another ( AIR 1964 SC 1 )). v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, etc. ( AIR 1993 SC 892 ), Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another ( AIR 1964 SC 1 )). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/F.I.R. is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding. (See : Mrs. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding. (See : Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and others ( AIR 1990 SC 494 ), State of Bihar and another v. P. P. Sharma, I.A.S. and another (1992 Suppl (1) SCC 222), Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another ( 1995 (6) SCC 194 ), State of Kerala and others v. O.C. Kuttan and others ( 1999 (2) SCC 651 ), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma ( 1996 (7) SCC 705 ), Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada ( 1997 (2) SCC 397 ), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and another ( 1999 (8) SCC 728 ), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others AIR 1999 SC 1216 ), State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 )." 10. In the case of M. Krishnan Vs. Vijay Singh and Another , (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 645 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with a case wherein, the FIR contained elements of civil nature as well, held as under:- “5. Accepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case, the allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. The proceedings could not be quashed only because the respondents had filed a civil suit with respect to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal court the allegations made in the complaint have to be established independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil court. Had the complainant failed to prove the allegations made by him in the complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but not otherwise. In a criminal court the allegations made in the complaint have to be established independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil court. Had the complainant failed to prove the allegations made by him in the complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but not otherwise. If mere pendency of a suit is made a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, the unscrupulous litigants, apprehending criminal action against them, would be encouraged to frustrate the course of justice and law by filing suits with respect to the documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such proceedings. Such a course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting separate yardsticks. The onus of proving the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, in criminal case, is not applicable in the civil proceedings which can be decided merely on the basis of the probabilities with respect to the acts complained of. The High Court was not, in any way, justified to observe: "In my view, unless and until the civil court decides the question whether the document are genuine or forged, no criminal action can be initiated against the petitioners and in view of the same, the present criminal proceedings and taking cognizance and issue of process are clearly erroneous.” 11. Further, in Kamladevi Agarwal Vs. State of West Bengal and Others , (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 555 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “7. This Court has consistently held that the revisional or inherent powers of quashing the proceedings at the initial stage should be exercised sparingly and only where the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR, even if taken it at the face value and accepted in entirety, do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence. Disputed and controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab this Court held: (AIR p.869, para 6) "It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab this Court held: (AIR p.869, para 6) "It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter of merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of the cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of the cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an inquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any part to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contended that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions of the point [Vide: Shripad G. Chandavarkar In re AIR 1928 Bom 184, Jagar Chandra Mozumdar V. Queen Empress. ILR (1899) 26 Cal 786, Shanker Singh (Dr.) v. State of Punjab 56 Punj LR 54: AIR 1954 Punj 193, Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Gobinda Bandhu Majumdar: AIR 1924 Cal 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar ILR (1924) 47 Mad 722] 8. This judgment was reiterated and following in Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad: AIR 1972 SC 484 , State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy: AIR 1977 SC 1489 , State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal: AIR 1992 SC 604 and various other pronouncements. 9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also pending. This judgment was reiterated and following in Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad: AIR 1972 SC 484 , State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy: AIR 1977 SC 1489 , State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal: AIR 1992 SC 604 and various other pronouncements. 9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also pending. After referring to judgments in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal: AIR 1992 SC 604 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi: (1999) 3 SCC 259 this Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal: (1999) 8 SCC 686 held: (SCC p.690, paras 7-8) "7.Time and again this Court has been pointing out that quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions [vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal: AIR 1992 SC 604 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi: (1999) 3 SCC 259 ] 8. In the last referred case this court also pointed out that merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. We quote the following observations: (SCC p.263, para 10) "10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating were committed in the course of commercial and also money transaction." 10. .In Medchl Chemical & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd.: (2000) 3 SCC 269 this Court again reiterated the position and held: (SCC pp.272 & 278, paras 2 & 14) "2. Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have the complaint or the charge- sheet quashed is an exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution. With the lodgment of first information report the ball is set to roll and thenceforth the law takes its own course and the investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions of law. The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and its undue expansion is neither practicable nor warranted. With the lodgment of first information report the ball is set to roll and thenceforth the law takes its own course and the investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions of law. The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and its undue expansion is neither practicable nor warranted. In the event, however, the court on a perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the allegations levelled in the complaint or charge-sheet on the face of it does not constitute or disclose any offence as alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise up to the expectation of the people and deal with the situation as is required under the law. 14. Needless to record however and it being a settled principle of law that to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint and the High Court at that stage has no authority or jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. But the offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. But the offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint. The observations in Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi: (1976) 3 SCC 736 lend support to the above statement of law: (SCC p.741, para 5) "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process in capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defect, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like." The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings." 11. In Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar: (2001) 2 SCC 17 this Court held: (SCC p. 19, para 8) "8. There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does not make out an offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed." 15. We have already noticed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required in both matters is different and distinct. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed." 15. We have already noticed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required in both matters is different and distinct. Whereas in civil proceedings the matter can be decided on the basis of probabilities, the criminal case has to be decided by adopting the standard of proof of "beyond reasonable doubt". A Constitution Bench of this court. dealing with the similar circumstances, in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras: AIR 1954 SC 397 held that where civil and criminal cases are pending, precedence shall be given to criminal proceedings. Detailing the reasons for the conclusions, the court held: (AIR p.399, paras 15-16) "15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence of damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment. 16.Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it expedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have furnished." 17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings. 18. In the result the appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and resorting the order of the Magistrate with direction to proceed with the trial of the case in accordance with the provisions of law and decide the same on merits.” 12. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1618/2015: Basant Raj Mehta vs. State of Rajasthan and Others decided on 01.03.2016 , held as under: 8. The question whether criminal proceedings cango simultaneously where civil proceedings are pending has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana alias Hari Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 765 relevant part of the decision is reproduced hereunder: “11. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case. (see M.S.Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 , Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Assn. of Chartered Certified Accountants, (2005) 12 SCC 226 ). 12. It is furthermore trite that Section195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted where a forged document has been filed. It was so held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah stating: (SCC pp.387-88, paras 25-26) "25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the barcreated by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh,(1998) 2SCC 493 after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large. 26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in Clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non- filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), Para313, the principle has been stated in the following manner: "The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.” In regard to the possible conflict of findings between civil and criminal court, however, it was opined: (SCC pp.389-90, para 32) "32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein." It was concluded: (SCC p.390, para 33) "33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. "13. Filing of an independent criminal proceeding, although initiated in terms of some observations made by the civil court, is not barred under any statute.” 9. From the perusal of above quoted paragraphs, it is clear that civil as well as the criminal proceedings can go simultaneously if the allegation of criminality exists in the FIR. 13. "13. Filing of an independent criminal proceeding, although initiated in terms of some observations made by the civil court, is not barred under any statute.” 9. From the perusal of above quoted paragraphs, it is clear that civil as well as the criminal proceedings can go simultaneously if the allegation of criminality exists in the FIR. 13. In the conspectus of aforesaid precedential law, this Court is not persuaded to quash the subject FIR on the premise that the allegations are civil in nature. As already held, there are specific allegations of forging and fabricating the documents by the petitioner in order to cheat the complainant and gain undue financial advantage onto himself as also of dishonest misappropriation of money. 14. Insofar as submission of learned counsel for the petitioner qua appreciation of the subject documents by the Arbitrator is concerned, nothing has been brought into notice of this Court wherein, the Arbitrator has recorded his finding in favour of the petitioner qua the alleged forged and fabricated documents as also dishonest misappropriation of money, except a bald assertion. Therefore, contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced. 15. Resultantly, this criminal misc. petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. 16. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of accordingly.