JUDGMENT : VIBHU BAKHRU, C.J. 1. The appellant is a sports person and a life member of the Karnataka State Cricket Association [ KSCA ]. She has filed the present appeal, impugning an order dated 29.11.2025 [ impugned order ] passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.35584/2025 (GM-RES). 2. The said petition was filed by respondent No.1 [ writ petitioner ], inter alia, impugning an order dated 24.11.2025 passed by respondent No.2 [ Electoral Officer ], rejecting the writ petitioner's nomination to contest the elections for the post of the President of KSCA. The learned Single Judge had allowed the said writ petition and had directed the Electoral Officer to declare the writ petitioner's nomination as 'valid' for the purpose of contesting the aforesaid election. 3. The writ petitioner states that he is the President of M/s. Deccan Herald and Prajavani Sports Club [ DHPSC ] for the last two decades. He states that he is a philanthropist and avid sportsman, and is interested in sporting activities. He has also held the office of the President of the Karnataka Olympics Association. It is stated that DHPSC is one of the Founder Institutional Members of KSCA. The writ petitioner's nomination was rejected by the Electoral Officer on the ground that the said Founder Institutional Member – DHPSC – was in arrears of fee of Rs.200/-, and in terms of Rule 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws of KSCA [ the Bye-laws ], the writ petitioner was not allowed to attend/ contest or vote at any meeting. 4. The learned Single Judge found that on being informed of the arrears, the writ petitioner had immediately cleared the arrears. Thus, at the time of scrutiny and the decision on his nomination, the arrears had been paid. The learned Single Judge held that the embargo under Rule 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws would not be applicable any further so as to invalidate the writ petitioner's candidature for the post of the President of KSCA. 5. It is stated in the Memorandum of Appeal that the appellant had also filed her nomination and is one of the contenders for the post of President of KSCA. However, at the outset, it was pointed out that the appellant has since withdrawn her candidature and therefore, is not one of the rival candidates for the post of President of KSCA. However, at the outset, it was pointed out that the appellant has since withdrawn her candidature and therefore, is not one of the rival candidates for the post of President of KSCA. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant is seeking to maintain the present appeal as a Member of KSCA. 6. The material facts necessary to address the controversy, are not in dispute. It is pointed out that this Court had, by an order dated 21.11.2025 passed in W.P No.34890/2025 c/w W.P No.34902/2025 (GM-KSR), directed the Electoral Officer to conduct elections on 07.12.2025 in accordance with the Bye-laws and also to set out the Calendar of Events in compliance with the Bye-laws. We are also informed that in terms of the said order, the Court has appointed a former Judge of this Court to supervise the same and to ensure smooth conduct of elections. 7. It is to be noted that the elections were originally to be conducted on 30.11.2025. The writ petitioner being desirous of contesting the elections for the post of President of KSCA, had filed his nomination on 15.11.2025. 8. The writ petitioner states that he was not aware at that time that there were any outstanding dues payable by the Founder Institutional Member, DHPSC, of which he is the President. 9. The writ petitioner further submitted that DHPSC had participated in Group 2, 2 nd Division matches held in Season 2024- 25. It had also paid a sum of Rs.5,034/- on 11.02.2025 for participating in the said matches. The writ petitioner contented that if there is any issue of arrears, the DHPSC would not have been permitted to participate in the sporting events. The writ petitioner also stated that no list of defaulters had been published. Therefore, the writ petitioner was not aware of any such arrears. 10. It is not disputed that on being informed as to the arrears, the writ petitioner had taken immediate steps to ensure the same were paid. Undisputedly, an amount of Rs.500/- was paid at 03.06 P.M. on 24.11.2025. And, the proceedings for scrutiny of nomination were not completed at the material time. The Electoral Officer had rejected the writ petitioner's nomination at 05.30 P.M on 24.11.2025, notwithstanding that prior to that the arrears had been settled. Undisputedly, an amount of Rs.500/- was paid at 03.06 P.M. on 24.11.2025. And, the proceedings for scrutiny of nomination were not completed at the material time. The Electoral Officer had rejected the writ petitioner's nomination at 05.30 P.M on 24.11.2025, notwithstanding that prior to that the arrears had been settled. According to the appellant, the Electoral Officer had orally informed the writ petitioner regarding his rejection on account of arrears. There is some controversy in this regard, however, it is not disputed that the rejection order was passed at 05.30 P.M. on 24.11.2025. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contented that the impugned order suffered from perversity and that the learned Single Judge had erred in referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Prabakaran vs. P.Jayarajan : (2005) 1 SCC 754 as the same was rendered in the context of the provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1951 [ the RP Act ] and not in context with the Bye-laws of any Association or Society. She also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mangoo Singh vs. Election Tribunal , Bareilly and others: AIR 1957 SC 871 On the strength of the said decision, she submitted that the disqualification subsisting as on the date of filing of the nomination would not cease to subsist on subsequent payment of arrears. She further contented that the learned Single Judge had erred in passing the impugned order on account of being persuaded on the grounds of equity. However, in election matters, the provisions were required to be strictly construed. She submitted that on a plain reading of Rule 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws, the writ petitioner was disqualified from participating in the ensuing elections of KSCA. She also referred to the nomination form and submitted that the same clearly indicated that the nomination would be valid if there was no arrears of fee. 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, at length. 13. Rule 6 of the Bye-laws contains a provision regarding election, term and qualification of office bearers. We consider it apposite to set out the relevant clauses of Rule 6A and 6B of the Bye-laws which provide for the qualification and disqualification of the office bearers of the Managing Committee: "6. 13. Rule 6 of the Bye-laws contains a provision regarding election, term and qualification of office bearers. We consider it apposite to set out the relevant clauses of Rule 6A and 6B of the Bye-laws which provide for the qualification and disqualification of the office bearers of the Managing Committee: "6. ELECTION, TERM & QUALIFICATION: A. OFFICE BEARERS:- i. Qualifications of the Office Bearers:- Any Life Member whose name is on the rolls of the Association or President/Secretary, as per the records of the Association of a Founder Institutional Member on the rolls of the Association, who has completed the age of thirty years and who is not suffering from any legal disabilities, subject to the disqualifications and restrictions contained here under may be elected as an Office Bearer. Provided, President / Secretary of a Founder Institutional member shall be eligible to contest for the post of the Office bearer only if that person, as per the Association records, has completed at least two terms or six years (whichever is higher), serving as the President/Secretary of that respective Founder Institutional member. Note - The cut-off date for being on the rolls/records of the association shall be reckoned as on 30 th June of the election year. Disqualifications for Office Bearers- A person shall be disqualified from being an Office Bearer, a member of the Governing Council in BCCI or any Committee/ Sub-Committee or a representative to the BCCI or any similar organization if he or she: a) is not a citizen of India; b) has attained the age of 70 years; c) is declared to be insolvent, or of unsound mind; d) is a Minister or Government Servant; e) has been an Office Bearer of the BCCI for a cumulative period of "9 years" or of the Association for a cumulative period of 9 years; Explanation:- The period of "9 years" contemplated above for the BCCI and the Association is mutually exclusive, thus it is clarified that a person may be able to serve for a period of nine years in the BCCI and 9 years in the Association. Or; f) has been convicted by a Court of Law for commission of a criminal offence and sentenced to imprisonment. Or; f) has been convicted by a Court of Law for commission of a criminal offence and sentenced to imprisonment. g) due to deletion of earlier clause (e) [holds any office or post in a sports or athletic association or federation apart from cricket] and because of which the clauses (a) to (b) are renumbered hence this clause (g) stands deleted, h) (a) An Office Bearer who has held any post of an Office Bearer for two consecutive Terms in the Association shall not be eligible to contest any further election in the Association without completing a cooling off period of three years. During this cooling off period, such an Office Bearer shall not be a member of the Managing Committee or of any committee whatsoever of the Association. The expression 'Office Bearer' should not be permitted to be circumvented by being a member of any other committee or of the Managing Committee of the Association. (b) If a person has served two consecutive Terms each, in the Association and in the BCCI (or vice versa) continuously without any break, such person shall not be eligible to contest any further election in the Association or in the BCCI, without completing a cooling off period of three years. During this cooling off period, such an Office Bearer shall not be a member of the Managing Committee or of any committee whatsoever of the BCCI or of the Association. The expression. 'Office Bearer' should not be permitted to be circumvented by being a member of any other committee or of the Governing Council in the BCCI or any state association, as the case may be xxx xxx xxx B. MEMBERS OF THE MANAGING COMMITTEE: 1) QUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF THE MANAGING COMMITTE i) Any Life Member or an authorized representative of a Founder Institutional Member whose name is on the rolls of the Association, and who is not suffering from any legal disabilities and subject to the disqualifications and restrictions contained hereafter may be as elected Managing Committee member (Founder Institutional Members shall be represented by its President/Secretary/authorized representative) Note: The cut-off date for being on the rolls/records of the association shall b reckoned as on 30th June of the election year. xxx xxx xxx 2) DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE MANAGING COMMITTEE: i) A person shall be disqualified from being an Elected Managing Committee Member or a Nominated Managing Committee Member or representative on the Managing Committee of any Founder Institutional Member or a member of any other Committee/ Sub- Committee of the Association if he or she: a) is not a citizen of India; b) has attained the age of 70 years c) is declared to be insolvent, or of unsound mind; d) is a Minister or a Government Servant (other than the Nominated Managing Committee Member who is nominated by the Accountant General of Karnataka); e) has been an Office Bearer of the BCCI for a cumulative period of "9 years" or an Office Bearer of the Association for a cumulative period of 9 years; Explanation: The period of "9 years" contemplated above for the BCCI and the Association is mutually exclusive, this it is clarified that a person may be able to serve for a period of 9 years in the BCCI and 9 years in the Association. f) has been convicted by a Court of Law for commission of a criminal offence and sentenced to imprisonment; or g) Has already completed a cumulative period of 9 years either as an Office Bearer or as an Elected Managing Committee Member or a Nominated Managing Committee Member or representative of a elected (including the period prior to Founder Institutional Member these Rules coming into force)." xxx xxx xxx" 14. There is no dispute that the writ petitioner was qualified to be an office bearer and did not suffer with any disqualification as set out in Rule 6A or 6B of the Bye-laws. Thus, we are unable to accept that the writ petitioner was disqualified from filing his nomination or that the same is required to be rejected. 15. As noted above, the controversy is regarding interpretation of Rule 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws. Thus, we are unable to accept that the writ petitioner was disqualified from filing his nomination or that the same is required to be rejected. 15. As noted above, the controversy is regarding interpretation of Rule 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws. We consider it apposite to reproduce Clause 3B(D) of the Bye-laws, the same is set out below: " (D) ARREARS:- (a) If any payment of more than Rs.100/- from any Life Member, Associate, Cricketer Associate or Stand Donor Associate (as the case may be) remains unpaid for more than two months from 1 st April of every year and if the annual subscription or any payment of more than Rs.100/- from any Founder Institutional Member or Associate (as the case may be) remains unpaid for more than two months from 1 st April of every year, the Managing Committee may at its discretion remove the name of such Member or Associate from the list of Members or Associates as a defaulter after due notice of thirty days. (b) In case of a Life Member whose any payment of more than Rs.100/- is in arrears and a Founder Institutional Member whose subscription or payment of more than Rs.100/- is in arrears, such Life Members or Founder Institutional Members shall not be allowed to attend / contest or vote at any meeting or be allowed to enjoy the privileges of the Association as long as they are in arrears. (c) In case of Institutional Associates whose payment of more than Rs.100/- or subscription is in arrears, such Institutional Associates shall not be allowed to enjoy the privileges of the Association as long as they are in arrears. (d) Any Member, Associate, Cricketer Associate or Stand Donor Associate removed from the list of Members, Associates, Cricketer Associates or Stand Donor Associates, under this rule, may at the discretion of the Managing Committee be admitted with or without entrance fee, if all the amounts due to the Association are paid." 16. (d) Any Member, Associate, Cricketer Associate or Stand Donor Associate removed from the list of Members, Associates, Cricketer Associates or Stand Donor Associates, under this rule, may at the discretion of the Managing Committee be admitted with or without entrance fee, if all the amounts due to the Association are paid." 16. Rule 3B(D)(b) stipulates that a Life Member whose payment of more than Rs.100/- is in arrears and a Founder Institutional Member whose subscription or payment of more than Rs.100/- is in arrears, such a member would not be allowed "to attend/contest or vote at any meeting or be allowed to enjoy any privileges of the association as long as they are in arrears." The import of Bye-laws is to exclude the Life Member or Founder Institutional Member from attending or contesting or voting at any meeting of the KSCA, as long as they are in arrears. The words “as long as they are in arrears” are of some significance. The same indicate that the embargo to participate is transient and would be lifted the moment arrears are paid. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant had also referred to the nomination form and had drawn the attention to Note No.3 which reads as under: "Only Life Member and Authorised Representatives of Founder Institutional Member will have the right to participate and vote at the above meeting, provided they are not in arrears of any fees." 18. In our view, the import of the said note is that a Life Member or authorised representatives of the Founder Institutional Member would have a right to participate and vote at the meeting, provided they are not in arrears of any fees. Thus, the writ petitioner would not be permitted to vote or contest the elections if the arrears were not settled. The note to the nomination form does not indicate that the nomination form could not be filled. The aforementioned note added a note of caution that the member would not be permitted to attend or vote if there were arrears. The inference that we can draw is whilst the nomination could be filed, the member would not be permitted to participate if there were arrears. Thus, the member had a window to clear the arrears and lift the restriction. The inference that we can draw is whilst the nomination could be filed, the member would not be permitted to participate if there were arrears. Thus, the member had a window to clear the arrears and lift the restriction. In the present case, as stated above, at the time of taking the decision on the scrutiny of the nominations, there was no disability for the writ petitioner to contest the elections. 19. We are unable to accept that the impugned order suffers from any perversity as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Although the learned counsel is correct that the decision in the case of K. Prabhakaran (supra) was rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the context of the RP Act, the reference to said decision cannot be considered as perverse as contended. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the said decision are of some significance. We consider it apposite to set out the following extracts from the said decision: "30. Under sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 100 of RPA the improper acceptance of any nomination is a ground for declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void. This provision is to be read with Section 36(2)(a) which casts an obligation on the returning officer to examine the nomination papers and decide all objections to any nomination made, or on his own motion, by reference to the date fixed for the scrutiny of the nominations. Whether a candidate is qualified or not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat, has to be determined by reference to the date fixed for the scrutiny of nomination. That is the focal point. The names and number of candidates who will be in the fray is determined on the date of the scrutiny of the nomination papers and the constituency goes to polls. Obviously, the decision by the returning officer has to be taken on the facts as they exist on that day." [emphasis added] 20. Under Section 36(2)(a) of the RP Act, the Returning Officer is required to consider whether he can reject the nomination on the ground that the candidate was not qualified or is disqualified on the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations. Under Section 36(2)(a) of the RP Act, the Returning Officer is required to consider whether he can reject the nomination on the ground that the candidate was not qualified or is disqualified on the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations. However, we note that Section 36(2)(a) was amended by virtue of the Representation of People (Amendment) Act, 1961, prior to the said date, the provision did not mention that the qualification or disqualification was required to be considered with reference to the date of scrutiny of nominations. The said section was amended to remove any ambiguity. In the present case, as noted above, the writ petitioner was not disqualified as he complied with all the qualification criteria and did not suffer any disqualification as stipulated in Rule 6A of the Bye-laws. 21. We may also note that Rule 3B(D) of the Bye-laws relates to arrears and the consequences if the arrears are not cleared. In terms of Rule 3B(D)(a), the Managing Committee has a discretion to remove the name of the member or an associate from the list of members or associates if there is default, which continues after due notice of thirty days. Thus, a defaulter would have the window of thirty days to clear the arrears, failing which he could be removed. Indisputably, the list of defaulters mentioning the name of DHPSC was not published. The import of Rule 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws must be read in its context and the object of the said Rule, which is to disable participation till the arrears are cleared. The said provision cannot be considered as a punitive measure to inflict a penalty, which has a lasting effect for not paying the fees in time. Thus, we are not persuaded to accept that the said Rule ought to be read as imposing disqualification for voting, contesting or attending a meeting notwithstanding that the arrears are settled. 22. In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly construed Rule 3(B)(D)(b) of the Bye-laws. Since the arrears had been settled prior to the Electoral Officer rendering a decision on the nomination, the nomination of the writ petitioner could not be rejected on that ground. 23. The decision in the case of Mangoo Singh (supra) was rendered in the context of Section 13-D of the UP Municipalities Act, 1916 which set out the disqualifications for a membership of a board. 23. The decision in the case of Mangoo Singh (supra) was rendered in the context of Section 13-D of the UP Municipalities Act, 1916 which set out the disqualifications for a membership of a board. The Supreme Court had held that if a person was disqualified on the date of filing of the nomination, he could not shake off the pre-existing disqualification by acquiring a new right between the date of scrutiny and the polls. Once the decision on the nominations is taken, the same cannot be relooked. Thus, it may not be permissible for a candidate to contest after his nomination is rejected on account of arrears. 24. As noted in the present case, Rule 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws cannot be construed as a rule for disqualification. The provisions for qualification and disqualification are set out in Rule 6A and 6B of the Bye-laws. Rule 3B(D)(b) merely imposes a temporary restriction on account of arrears which is lifted once the arrears are paid. Clearly, the crucial date would be the date of scrutiny of nominations. If on the examination of nomination it is found that the candidate is required to be excluded from contesting, the Returning Officer is required to reject the nomination. However on the date of examination, if it is found that there is no embargo, the nomination cannot be rejected. 25. In the present case, the writ petitioner had also pointed out that neither the defaulters list had been published nor had the KSCA indicated that the DHPSC was in arrears. On the contrary, DHPSC had participated in matches and had paid the entrance fee without any protest. However, the learned Single Judge had not examined this aspect as it was not necessary to do so in view of his interpretation of Rule 3B(D) of the Bye-laws. We have also not examined this issue. But the issue raised is not insubstantial. We say so because, prima facie, the existence of arrears cannot be used as a stealth instrument to spring up a disqualification to curtail participations of persons if they are otherwise entitled for participating in the affairs of KSCA. A candidate must have minimal notice to clear the same. However, as noted above, we do not consider it necessary to examine this aspect any further, in view of the interpretation of clause 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws. 26. A candidate must have minimal notice to clear the same. However, as noted above, we do not consider it necessary to examine this aspect any further, in view of the interpretation of clause 3B(D)(b) of the Bye-laws. 26. We concur with the decision of the learned Single Judge and find no ground to interfere with the impugned order. 27. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 28. The pending interlocutory application also stands disposed of.