ORDER : PRADEEP SINGH YERUR, J. Heard learned counsel Sri.Umesh.S, on behalf of learned counsel Sri.Shivakumar.V for the petitioner, and learned counsel Sri.Paramesh Aradhya for the respondent. 2. At the stage when the matter is being argued, learned counsel Sri.Paramesh Aradhya states that he wants to retire from the case for want of instructions from the respondent /defendant. 3. The present petition is filed by the petitioner/plaintiff being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 23.05.2025 on IA.No. 2 filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC in OS No. 97/2025. 4. The parties shall be referred to as per their status before the trial court as plaintiff and defendant. 5. Plaintiff is before this court. He has filed a suit for the relief of permanent injunction and other consequential reliefs. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC in IA. No.2 seeking an ad-interim order of temporary injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession, lawful physical possession, enjoyment of the suit schedule property against the defendants, his henchmen, or agents till disposal of the suit. 6. On the said application, the learned trial judge has passed the following order on IA No.2 "As the plaintiff has filed the suit for bare injunction against defendant, hence it is just and necessary to hear the defendant before passing any ad interim orders on IA No. 2 hence issue emergent notice on IA No. 2 to defendant and issue suit summons to defendant." 7. It is against this order that the plaintiff is before this Court. It is submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is illegal, perverse and arbitrary and the same is not the correct procedure to be followed, as the Court ought to have granted an ad-interim order of temporary injunction prior to issuance of notice to the defendant, which it has not done and has merely issued notice by stating that the defendant has to be heard, which is contrary to the proviso to Order No. XXXIX Rule 3. 8. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that plaintiff is the absolute owner and a bona fide purchaser, and he has continued in peaceful possession, actual and physical and enjoying the suit schedule property. 8. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that plaintiff is the absolute owner and a bona fide purchaser, and he has continued in peaceful possession, actual and physical and enjoying the suit schedule property. He has purchased the suit schedule property from one Sri.Appannarao for a valuable sale consideration by a registered sale deed dated 05.08.2024. The registered sale deed has been ignored and not considered by the learned trial judge. The learned trial judge has also failed to take into consideration that the defendant is an utter stranger and a land grabber taking undue advantage of the situation. The defendant and his supporters have been making illegal interference with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. It is also the contention that the defendant has illegally tried to trespass and interfere with the plaintiff’s possession of the suit schedule property high-handedly despite having the knowledge that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property. All these aspects have been ignored, which are stated in the plaint and the application annexed to the application, and the trial Court instead of granting an ad interim ex parte order has merely issued notice which is not the correct procedure to be followed; therefore, he is before this Court seeking to set aside the order and consequently grant an interim order of temporary injunction. 9. It is further contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff that after he had approached this Court, by order dated 16.06.2025, he stated that this Court granted an order: "There shall be an interim order of stay, as prayed for, till the next date of hearing. Therefore, he contends that this Court has granted him a temporary injunction order, which is now violated by the defendant, thereby causing financial loss, irreparable injury, hardship and also the defendant has demolished some portions of the compound wall. The defendant has appeared before this Court and filed an application for vacating the interim order and also filed a statement of objections along with verifying affidavits and also certain documents and papers. Voluminous documents are produced along with the statement of objections to which again the plaintiff has filed a rejoinder with again several documents to describe the status, nature of the suit schedule property and the demolition. 10. Voluminous documents are produced along with the statement of objections to which again the plaintiff has filed a rejoinder with again several documents to describe the status, nature of the suit schedule property and the demolition. 10. Learned counsel for the defendant submits that he has no instructions in the matter, and he wants to retire from the case. But he has not produced any material before this Court with regard to having sent any letter of communication to the defendant for retirement, nor is the defendant present before the Court. 11. Having heard learned counsel for petitioner and defendant, the point that arises before this Court for consideration is whether the impugned order passed by the trial Court on the application Item No. 2 filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC, whereby the trial Court has not passed any order for either grant or rejection of the application but has passed an order issuing notice to the defendant to hear the defendant before passing such an ad interim order, is sustainable and whether any interference is called for in this petition. Admittedly, the plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent injunction and for other consequential reliefs. He has filed IA No.2 under Order XXXIX and Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC for grant of an ad- interim order of temporary injunction by showing urgency for the application to be considered in view of the interference by the defendant. 12. In fact, the present suit was filed during the vacation. He has also filed an application under IA No. 1 under Section 28 of the Karnataka Civil Court Act seeking leave and permission of the Court to institute the suit before the vacation court which was permitted. Under the circumstances, it was all the more the obligation and duty cast on the trial Court to have considered the application and passed a reasonable order either to grant or reject the prayer of ad interim order of temporary injunction which was not done in the present case and it has merely passed an order that the defendant has to be heard before any order on IA No.2 which is absolutely perverse and the same is contrary to the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 and the proviso contained therein. 13. 13. It is relevant to mention that while an application is filed under order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC, it is the duty and obligation of the trial Court to consider the application upon the merits and on the urgency addressed by the plaintiff in the application and in the plaint and so also in the affidavit annexed along with the application and with regard to other documents filed along with the plaint and the application, considering the nature of urgency, and decide the matter. It is the duty and obligation of the trial Court to pass an order either granting or rejecting the application. However, proper reasoning will have to be provided by the trial Court when dealing with such an application, either in granting or rejecting the said application prior to issuance of notice to the defendant as is contemplated under the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3, which is not done in the present case on hand. 14. The present case is entertained in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kishore Kumar Khaitan and Another V/s Praveen Kumar Singh reported in (2006) 3 SCC 312 , whereby this Court invokes Article 227 to entertain this petition where no proper reasoning is provided by the trial Court on the orders made on the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in several catena of judgments held as to how the trial Court has to deal with the application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC. Few of the judgments are hereunder: 16. It is relevant to extract the observation at paragraph Nos.32, 33, 34 and 35 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha - vs- Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others reported in (1993) 3 SCC 161 : "32. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code requires that in all cases the court shall, before grant of an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite-party, except where it appears that object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said rule saying that “where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay…”. 33. It has come to our notice that in spite of the aforesaid statutory requirement, the courts have been passing orders of injunction before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons for passing such orders. It is said that if the reasons for grant of injunction are mentioned, a grievance can be made by the other side that court has prejudged the issues involved in the suit. According to us, this is a misconception about the nature and the scope of interim orders. It need not be pointed out that any opinion expressed in connection with an interlocutory application has no bearing and shall not affect any party, at the stage of the final adjudication. Apart from that now in view of the proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, there is no scope for any argument. When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant. 34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. 34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. Before the proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said “the court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite-party”. The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the court “shall record the reasons” why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch D 426 : 45 LJ Ch 373] and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor [ AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) : 63 IA 372 : 37 Cri LJ 897] . This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare [ (1975) 1 SCC 559 : AIR 1975 SC 915 ] . 35. As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. But any such ex parte order should be in force up to a particular date before which the plaintiff should be required to serve the notice on the defendant concerned. In the Supreme Court Practice 1993, Vol. 1, at page 514, reference has been made to the views of the English Courts saying: “Ex parte injunctions are for cases of real urgency where there has been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion…. An ex parte injunction should generally be until a certain day, usually the next motion day….” 17. 1, at page 514, reference has been made to the views of the English Courts saying: “Ex parte injunctions are for cases of real urgency where there has been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion…. An ex parte injunction should generally be until a certain day, usually the next motion day….” 17. In the case of Time City infrastructure and Housing Limited Lucknow V/s State of U.P. and others reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1674, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph 5 as under: 5. Looking to the scheme of Order 39, CPC it is clear that ordinarily an order of injunction may not be granted ex parte. The opposite party must be issued a notice and heard before an injunction may be granted. Rule 3 carves out an exception in favour of granting an injunction without notice to the opposite party where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay. Conferment of this privilege on the party seeking an injunction is accompanied by an obligation cast on the court to record reasons for its opinion and an obligation cast on the applicant to comply with the requirements of Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. Both the provisions are mandatory. The applicant gets an injunction without notice but subject to the condition of complying with Clauses (a) and (b) above said. 18. In the case of Vedant Fashions Pvt. Ltd., V/s Smt. Rajul Devi reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 7191, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has held at paragraph No.9 as under: "A bare reading of the said rule makes it clear that normally, the court, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party. The exception is, where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, in such an event, the proviso which has been inserted with effect from 01/02/1977 comes into operation, where the court is empowered to grant an ad interim injunction dispensing with notice provided reasons are recorded for its opinion to the effect that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay if notice is to be served on the respondent. The impugned order is extracted supra in order to ascertain as to whether the trial court had complied with the requirements of the proviso while dispensing with the notice to the defendant while grant an exparte order of temporary injunction. From a reading of the impugned order, it is clear that, nowhere reasons have been recorded as to why the trial Court was of the opinion that the injunction had to be granted by dispensing notice to the respondents or that non-grant of an injunction would be defeated by delay if notice is to be ordered on respondents. The impugned order is bald, laconic and bereft of any reason. The learned Trial Judge has not even made a brief reference to the facts of the case to arrive at a conclusion that there is a prima facie case for consideration and about balance of convenience being in favour of the plaintiff and whether she would suffer any reparable loss in case of refusal of exparte injunction. Mechanically, the impugned order has been passed. In that view of the matter, the impugned order has to be quashed on the short ground of there being non-compliance of Rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the CPC. It is noted form the impugned order that the next date of hearing is 31.07.2014." 19. It is the obligatory function of the trial Court and not an optional one while dealing with an application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC to necessarily pass an order based on the materials produced by providing reasons to either grant or reject the application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC for an ad- interim order of ex-parte against the defendant on the basis of the urgency expressed by the plaintiff in the application and the arguments if so put forth. 20. The trial Court would have to opine for grant of such an interim order by providing its reasons and also for granting the order and the delay in the notice that would be served may cause hardship and injustice and damage to the person or property of the plaintiff. 20. The trial Court would have to opine for grant of such an interim order by providing its reasons and also for granting the order and the delay in the notice that would be served may cause hardship and injustice and damage to the person or property of the plaintiff. In the present case, no such thing has been done by the trial Court except a three sentence order stating that the defendant requires to be heard before passing an order on IA.No.2, which is not the correct procedure to be followed. There is an obligation cast upon the trial Court to either grant or reject the application. The trial Court can issue notice to the defendant and hear the defendant after the notice is served when it comes to a conclusion that the delay would not cause any hardship, injustice or harm or threat or damage to the person or property of the plaintiff. In case the trial Court comes to a conclusion that there is urgency and there is a threat of interference and damage to the property, the trial Court is duty bound to dispense notice and prior to the issuance of notice, it can grant an ad interim order of temporary injunction on the basis of urgency and the threat so stated and exhibited before the Court. In the present case, no such order is passed. Therefore, this matter requires interference and indulgence of this Court. 21. Now, pursuant to the defendant having appeared before this Court, filed statement and the rejoinders being filed by the plaintiff, it is apparent that the matter requires to be dealt with in an expeditious manner. Therefore, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the trial Court to dispose of the application in IA No. 2 filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of copy of the order as the defendant has already appeared before the trial Court; he shall be heard. The objections if any filed shall be taken into consideration. All other materials that are placed before this Court could be placed before the trial Court by both parties. The matter could be argued before the trial Court for grant of an order on the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC. The objections if any filed shall be taken into consideration. All other materials that are placed before this Court could be placed before the trial Court by both parties. The matter could be argued before the trial Court for grant of an order on the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of CPC. The trial Court shall take an independent decision on the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 by considering all materials that are placed before it. Be that as it may, this order passed by the trial Court is not sustainable. The same will have to be remitted back for reconsideration afresh. Accordingly, I pass the following order. ORDER The petition is disposed of. 2. Matter is remitted to the trial Court. The trial Court shall decide the matter. Application Item No. 2 on Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of copy of the order. 3. The trial Court shall decide the matter even if there is no appearance of counsel of the defendant as the counsel for the defendant has expressed that he wants to retire from the case. 4. Since the defendant has already filed vakalath before the trial Court, he can either argue it himself or engage a counsel to address arguments on the application. Nevertheless, the trial court shall dispose of the application within 15 days. 5. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.