ORDER : 1. These appeals have been filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, read with Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, assailing the order dated 13.09.2022 passed by the Commercial Court No. 4, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, Jaipur, whereby the common arbitral award dated 18.02.2015 and the subsequent order dated 17.05.2015 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator were set aside. The operative portion of the order reads as follows: 2. At this juncture, it is pertinent to clarify that the present batch of appeals has been preferred by two sets of parties, firstly, the Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (hereinafter referred to as “the RRVUNL”), and secondly, the cement companies, namely Mangalam Cement Limited, Birla Corporation Limited, Shree Cement Limited, ACC Limited, and Ultratech Cement Limited, (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the claimants”) 3. Since the factual matrix, contractual framework, and the controversy involved in all these appeals are substantially identical, this Court considers it appropriate to decide the entire batch by a common judgment. Accordingly, for the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition, the facts and reliefs are being referred to from D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 3106/2022, Mangalam Cement Limited v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited and D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 3192/2022, Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited v. Mangalam Cement Limited . The findings and conclusions recorded herein shall mutatis mutandis govern all other connected appeals filed by both sides. 4. D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 3106/2022 has been preferred by the claimant, seeking the following reliefs: “The humble Appellant most respectfully craves for grant of the following reliefs: 1. This appeal may kindly be taken on record and allowed; 2. The Objection Petition No. 191/2018 (C.I.S. No. 369/2019), titled Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited v. Mangalam Cement Limited , filed by the Respondent before the learned Commercial Court below, may kindly be dismissed; 3. The Counter-Claim filed by the Respondent before the learned Sole Arbitrator may kindly be dismissed; 4. The amount received by the Respondent from the Appellant for supply of dry fly ash at the rate of Rs. 245/- per metric ton may kindly be directed to be refunded to the Appellant; 5. The Counter-Claim filed by the Respondent before the learned Sole Arbitrator may kindly be dismissed; 4. The amount received by the Respondent from the Appellant for supply of dry fly ash at the rate of Rs. 245/- per metric ton may kindly be directed to be refunded to the Appellant; 5. Such other and further orders directions, or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case may kindly also be passed in favour of the humble Appellant.” 5. D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 3192/2022 has been preferred by the Nigam, seeking the following relief: “It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to accept and allow the present appeal and be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned common order/judgment dated 13.09.2022 passed in Arbitration Application Case No. 19/2018, C.I.S. No. 368/2019, ( Mangalam Cement Limited v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited ) by the learned Commercial Court No. 4, Jaipur Metropolitan–II, Jaipur, Rajasthan; and consequently, be pleased to allow the Arbitration Application filed by the Appellant–RRVUNL before the learned Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Any other order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly also be passed in favour of the Appellant.” 6. The present dispute arises out of a Notification dated 14.09.1999 issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, mandating that all coal or lignite-based thermal power plants, including those operated by Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (RRVUNL), shall make dry fly ash available free of cost for a period of ten years from the date of publication of the notification. The said notification was issued with the object of promoting the utilization of fly ash in the manufacture of ash-based products such as cement, concrete blocks, bricks, and panels, as well as in construction activities including roads, embankments, dams, and dykes. The measure was intended to reduce environmental pollution and encourage sustainable industrial practices through effective management of fly ash generated by thermal power plants. 7. In pursuance of the aforesaid directive, RRVUNL, which generates fly ash at its Kota Super Thermal Power Station (KSTPS), invited proposals from cement manufacturers for the collection and utilization of fly ash. The measure was intended to reduce environmental pollution and encourage sustainable industrial practices through effective management of fly ash generated by thermal power plants. 7. In pursuance of the aforesaid directive, RRVUNL, which generates fly ash at its Kota Super Thermal Power Station (KSTPS), invited proposals from cement manufacturers for the collection and utilization of fly ash. Pursuant thereto, the claimant, Mangalam Cement Limited, entered into an agreement dated 14.10.2004 with RRVUNL, whereby RRVUNL agreed to supply dry fly ash free of cost for a period of five years from the date of commissioning of the system developed under the said agreement. The said system was established for the collection, transportation, and utilization of fly ash in the manufacture of cement, and the supply arrangement was to operate in accordance with the terms mutually agreed between the parties under the said contract. 8. The cement companies, namely (1) UltraTech Cement Limited, (2) Mangalam Cement Limited, (3) Shree Cement Limited, (4) M/s Birla Corporation Limited, and (5) M/s ACC Limited (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Claimants”), asserted a legitimate expectation for the continued supply of fly ash at low or no cost, citing substantial investments made in infrastructure for its collection and utilization. 9. However, the position changed when RRVUNL, by a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) dated 24.08.2011, proposed to sell fly ash through a competitive bidding process, a move that was contested by the Claimants. This shift was based on a subsequent notification dated 03.11.2009 issued by the Government of India, which allowed thermal power plants to sell dry fly ash to cement manufacturers, subject to the condition that 20% of the fly ash be provided free of cost. 10. The disputes arising therefrom culminated in arbitration proceedings. Upon applications filed by the Claimants under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1996'), registered as S.B. Civil Misc. Arbitration Application Nos. 14/2012, 7/2012, 8/2012, 39/2012, and 45/2012, this Court, vide order dated 04.02.2014, appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.M. Kasliwal (Retd.) as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties. 11. Arbitration Application Nos. 14/2012, 7/2012, 8/2012, 39/2012, and 45/2012, this Court, vide order dated 04.02.2014, appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.M. Kasliwal (Retd.) as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties. 11. During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, the cement companies filed applications under Section 9 of the Act of 1996, seeking to restrain RRVUNL from proceeding with the sale of fly ash, and by a judgment dated 18.02.2012, this Court allowed the said applications, directing that status quo be maintained with respect to the sale and supply of fly ash until the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings; though the said order was challenged, it ultimately attained finality. 12. Subsequently, in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 37702/2013, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its order dated 31.01.2014, directed that no sale of fly ash shall take place without the leave of the Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further permitted RRVUNL to continue with supply of the fly ash to the cement companies at an interim rate of Rs. 250 per metric ton, while keeping the final determination of the applicable rate open, to be decided in accordance with the final arbitral award. 13. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered a common award dated 18.02.2015, adjudicating the disputes between RRVUNL and the cement companies. Dissatisfied with certain findings and the rate determination, both parties filed petitions under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, seeking modification of the rates and other consequential reliefs. 14. In addition, the cement companies filed applications under Section 33 of the Act of 1996 contending that certain claims had been inadvertently left unaddressed in the award dated 18.02.2015 and thus sought an additional award. The Arbitral Tribunal, upon consideration, passed a separate order on 17.05.2015 disposing of these applications. This order was also challenged by RRVUNL under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, resulting in multiple proceedings concerning the same arbitral award and its supplementary order. 15. The Section 34 applications filed by both RRVUNL and the cement companies were decided by the Court on 13.09.2022. The Court held that modification of an arbitral award was not permissible in law under the scheme of the Act of 1996, thereby declining to alter the terms or findings of the award. Aggrieved by this decision, both parties preferred appeals, assailing the judgment passed under . 16. The Court held that modification of an arbitral award was not permissible in law under the scheme of the Act of 1996, thereby declining to alter the terms or findings of the award. Aggrieved by this decision, both parties preferred appeals, assailing the judgment passed under . 16. Today, detailed submissions were advanced by the learned counsel for both parties, who placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 15336-15337 of 2021 decided on 30 th April 2025). In Gayatri Balasamy (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the scope of judicial intervention under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly the extent to which a court may modify an arbitral award. The Court, while acknowledging that arbitral proceedings are designed to ensure minimal judicial interference, observed that the supervisory jurisdiction of domestic courts must be exercised to further the ends of justice where necessary. 17. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: “IV. A Limited Power of Modification Can Be Located in Section 34 40. A core principium of arbitration, an Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism, is to provide a quicker and cost- effective alternative to courtroom litigation. While this suggests minimal judicial interference, the role of domestic courts remains crucial, as they function in a supportive capacity to facilitate and expedite the resolution of disputes. Therefore, it follows that judicial intervention is legitimate and necessary when it furthers the ends of justice, including the resolution of disputes. 41. To deny courts the authority to modify an award— particularly when such a denial would impose significant hardships, escalate costs, and lead to unnecessary delays— would defeat the raison d’être of arbitration. This concern is particularly pronounced in India, where applications under Section 34 and appeals under Section 37 often take years to resolve. 42. Given this background, if we were to decide that courts can only set aside and not modify awards, then the parties would be compelled to undergo an extra round of arbitration, adding to the previous four stages: the initial arbitration, Section 34 (setting aside proceedings), Section 37 (appeal proceedings), and Article 136 (SLP proceedings). In effect, this interpretation would force the parties into a new arbitration process merely to affirm a decision that could easily be arrived at by the court. In effect, this interpretation would force the parties into a new arbitration process merely to affirm a decision that could easily be arrived at by the court. This would render the arbitration process more cumbersome than even traditional litigation. 43. Equally, Section 34 limits recourse to courts to an application for setting aside the award. However, does not restrict the range of reliefs that the court can grant, while remaining within the contours of the statute. A different relief can be fashioned as long as it does not violate the guardrails of the power provided under . In other words, the power cannot contradict the essence or language of . The court would not exercise appellate power, as envisaged by Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 44. We are of the opinion that modification represents a more limited, nuanced power in comparison to the annulment of an award... Read in this manner, the limited and restricted power of severing an award implies a power of the court to vary or modify the award. It will be wrong to argue that silence in the 1996 Act, as projected, should be read as a complete prohibition. 45. We are thus of the opinion that the Section 34 court can apply the doctrine of severability and modify a portion of the award while retaining the rest. This is subject to parts of the award being separable, legally and practically, as stipulated in Part II of our Analysis. 46. Mustill and Boyd have observed that an order varying an award is not equivalent to an appellate process. The authors suggest that a modification order would only be appropriate where the modification, including any adjustment of costs, follows inevitably from the tribunal’s determination of a question of law.40 This approach would be beneficial, as it would reduce costs and delays. The courts need not engage in any fact-finding exercise. By acknowledging the Court’s power to modify awards, the judiciary is not rewriting the statute. We hold that the power of judicial review under Section 34 , and the setting aside of an award, should be read as inherently including a limited power to modify the award within the confines of .” 18. By acknowledging the Court’s power to modify awards, the judiciary is not rewriting the statute. We hold that the power of judicial review under Section 34 , and the setting aside of an award, should be read as inherently including a limited power to modify the award within the confines of .” 18. From the above observations, it is evident that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified that while courts ordinarily do not exercise appellate jurisdiction under Section 34 , the power to “set aside” an award can, in appropriate cases, be read to include a limited power to modify or sever parts of an award, provided such modification does not amount to a reappraisal of evidence or factual findings. The said principle underscores that the object of the Act of 1996 is to achieve finality, efficiency, and justice, without compelling parties to undergo repetitive rounds of arbitration on separable issues. 19. The outcome of the detailed submissions advanced by both sides was that this Court was faced with two possible courses of action — either to remand the matter for appropriate adjudication under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in accordance with the precedent laid down in Gayatri Balasamy (supra), or, alternatively, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 , to resolve the entire controversy by adjudicating the matter afresh. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that certain issues raised before the Arbitral Tribunal were left unadjudicated, thereby necessitating further reference or adjudication. Thus, it was submitted that the petitioner has initiated separate proceedings under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 seeking appointment of an arbitrator for the unresolved claims. 21. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposed any final adjudication on merits, contending that the scope of Section 34 is sufficiently broad to enable the Court to consider all such contentions and that remand for appropriate consideration within a stipulated timeframe would subserve the ends of justice. 22. Having considered the rival submissions and upon a comprehensive appraisal of the legal position emerging from Gayatri Balasamy (supra), this Court finds that it would be appropriate be remand the matter to the court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 . 22. Having considered the rival submissions and upon a comprehensive appraisal of the legal position emerging from Gayatri Balasamy (supra), this Court finds that it would be appropriate be remand the matter to the court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 . The purpose of remanding the matter to the S ection 34 stage is to ensure a comprehensive and legally sustainable adjudication of all issues arising from the arbitral award within the statutory framework of the Act of 1996. It enables the learned Commercial Court to exercise its jurisdiction with reference to the principles enunciated in Gayatri Balasamy (supra), particularly the recognition of a limited power of modification or severance under . The remand, therefore, seeks to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, ensure that unadjudicated or overlapping claims are appropriately addressed, and balance procedural propriety with substantive justice. 23. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 13.09.2022 is set aside. The proceedings under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, are restored to their original stage. The learned Court below is directed to decide the same afresh, strictly in accordance with law and keeping in view the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gayatri Balasamy (supra), preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 24. It is further observed that any residual or subsequently arising issues between the parties shall remain open for appropriate adjudication in accordance with law. 25. In view of the foregoing, the appeals stand disposed of accordingly. It is made clear that this order shall not prejudice any rights of the appellants and respondents in the ongoing litigation under Section 11 of the Act of 1996 which shall remain open to be adjudicated after hearing both the parties, strictly in accordance with law.