ORDER : PRADEEP SINGH YERUR, J. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This petition is filed by petitioner/defendant No.2 seeking to set aside the impugned order passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM, in O.S.No.155/2018 dated 24.03.2025 on I.A.No.1. 3. The parties to the proceedings shall be referred to as plaintiff and defendant No.2, for the sake of brevity. 4. The brief facts of the case are as under: Plaintiff filed a suit for partition and separate possession of his legitimate share in the suit schedule property by metes and bounds and to declare the registered sale deeds dated 22.05.2013 and 29.09.2014 to be null and void and not binding and for other consequential reliefs. 5. Defendant No.2 filed an application requesting the Court to permit him to file written statement by condoning the delay of six years. The said application filed by defendant No.2 upon contest came to be rejected by the trial Court by imposing a cost of Rs.500/-. It is this order that is questioned by the learned counsel for petitioner/defendant No.2. 6. It is the vehement contention of learned counsel for defendant No.2 that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory, and the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. It is further contended by the counsel for defendant No.2 that the suit filed by the plaintiff is for partition and separate possession, to declare the sale deeds to be null and void and not binding on him. He has further contended that the trial Court ought to have given permission and an opportunity to defendant No.2 to file the written statement and to defend the case effectively, as the suit is for partition and the rights of defendant No.2 would be affected without any defence on record. It is further contended that the trial Court has failed to appreciate that the plaintiff filed the suit on 26.06.2018, led the evidence on 09.03.2021 and further evidence on 18.07.2022 and thereafter, nearly took four years time to lead evidence of the plaintiff. It is further contended that the trial Court has failed to appreciate that the plaintiff filed the suit on 26.06.2018, led the evidence on 09.03.2021 and further evidence on 18.07.2022 and thereafter, nearly took four years time to lead evidence of the plaintiff. Therefore, the learned counsel for defendant No.2 contends that the plaintiff himself was at fault for protracting and prolonging the proceedings and the trial Court has failed to take these aspects into consideration and has mechanically rejected the application for condonation of delay of defendant No.2 in filing the written statement. Along with the application defendant No.2 filed the written statement as well. It is further contended by learned counsel for defendant No.2 that the plaintiff has also got amended the plaint on 28.02.2024, bringing legal representatives of defendant No.8 on record and as the defendant No.8 died during the pendency of the suit and where the plaintiff took nearly 2 years' time to bring the legal representatives of defendant No.8 on record. Therefore, he blames the entire delay on the plaintiff for prolonging and protracting the proceedings in leading evidence and in delay in bringing the legal representatives of deceased defendant No.8 on record. Therefore, he contends that the impugned order passed by the trial Court is perverse, illegal, arbitrary. 7. Learned counsel for the defendant No.2 contends that in exceptional circumstances the delay can be condoned. He also contends that the Courts have held that delay should be condoned and a pragmatic approach has to be taken by the Courts while condoning the delay and costs could be imposed rather than disallowing the filing of the written statement solely on the ground of delay. He submits that he has made out sufficient cause and bona fide grounds for the delay. Therefore, learned counsel for the defendant No.2 contends that in a suit for partition there is some delay. The trial Court should consider the relief sought in the suit and appreciate whether to allow or not to allow, and in the present case the suit being for the partition, the trial Court ought to have condoned the delay and permitted the filing of the written statement, which was annexed along with the application. On these grounds, he seeks to allow his petition to consequently permit him to file the written statement before the trial Court. 8. On these grounds, he seeks to allow his petition to consequently permit him to file the written statement before the trial Court. 8. Per contra, learned counsel representing the respondent No.1/plaintiff vehemently contends that there is no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the trial Court. She also contends that there is absolutely no satisfactory explanation with regard to the delay. There is no bona fide reason stated, so also there is no diligence of the defendant No.2 in conducting the case. When the defendant No. 2 had come on record through his counsel on 29.09.2018 itself, when the matter was posted for filing of written statement on 30.10.2018, no such diligence was shown by the defendant No.2 and even in the affidavit annexed to the application, very vague and bold statements are made at paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 of the affidavit. Therefore, when the defendant No.2 has not made out any good ground to show satisfactory explanation to condone the delay, sufficient cause, or bonafide reasons, except for stating that due to non-availability of some documents and some personal inconvenience was unable to meet the counsel, it would not be a ground to condone the delay as it would be totally against the intent of the legislature in bringing in amendment to restrict the filing of the written statement within a certain period of time with the intent to dispose of the suit expeditiously. Therefore, the reasons assigned are bald and vague and the same cannot be condoned, and rightly the trial Court has rejected, which does not call for interference. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1/plaintiff relies upon a judgment in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs and Others Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 513 in support of her case. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent. The fact remains that the suit is filed by the plaintiff for the relief of partition and separate possession. The suit is filed on 26.06.2018. The defendant No.2 has appeared through his counsel on 29.09.2018. The matter was listed for filing of written statement on 30.10.2018. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent. The fact remains that the suit is filed by the plaintiff for the relief of partition and separate possession. The suit is filed on 26.06.2018. The defendant No.2 has appeared through his counsel on 29.09.2018. The matter was listed for filing of written statement on 30.10.2018. Despite granting sufficient opportunity to the second defendant, no written statement was filed and subsequently, left with no option, the trial Court noted that defendant No.2's written statement has not been filed vide order dated 27.11.2018. 11. The present application is filed by the defendant No.2 along with the written statement on 28.11.2024, which is exactly 6 years later. In the application filed and the affidavit annexed thereto, there is no proper explanation with regard to reasons for delay, sufficient cause for delay or satisfactory explanation for the delay. No bonafide reasons are mentioned for the delay having been caused or why it has been caused or why it should be condoned. 12. Therefore, when the defendant No.2 has not clearly made out in his affidavit annexed to the application the reasons for the delay, it would be relevant to note the exact statement made in the affidavit annexed to the application where the defendant No.2 in paragraph No.2 has stated, "But, on the previous occasions, due to non availability of some documents and due to some personal inconvenience, I am not able to meet my counsel to give details to file the written statement and I could not file my written statement. Hence, this Hon'ble Court treated that, I have no defence." 13. He has further stated that the non-filing of the written statement is due to the reasons stated herein above. Apart from making these statements which are absolutely vague, bald and an irresponsible statement of the defendant No.2, there is no cogent reason or satisfactory explanation with regard to the delay having been caused and the purpose for which the delay is caused and sufficient reasons or bona fide reasons to condone the delay. Apart from making these statements which are absolutely vague, bald and an irresponsible statement of the defendant No.2, there is no cogent reason or satisfactory explanation with regard to the delay having been caused and the purpose for which the delay is caused and sufficient reasons or bona fide reasons to condone the delay. The trial Court has considered all these aspects and has held that a person who sleeps over the matter who is not diligent in conducting the case and has not filed the written statement for nearly 6 years and having not shown diligence in conducting the case, has no sufficient cause or bona fide reason. He is not entitled to any benefit for filing the written statement. Though, he loses his right of filing the statement. Accordingly has rejected it by imposing a cost of Rs.500/-. 14. It would be relevant at this stage to extract some of the paragraphs of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs stated here in Supra. 23. In Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression 'sufficient cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 26. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. 30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. 30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in Basawaraj (supra). 32. Moreover, the High Court, in the facts of this case, has not found it fit to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. There is no occasion for us to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the High Court for the reasons recorded. First, the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed appeal. Secondly, most of the claimants have accepted the decision of the reference court. Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not been substituted and made party to the reference before its decision, they could have applied for procedural review which they never did. Thus, there is apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing the matter. Accordingly, in our opinion, High Court is justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the affidavit filed along with the application and having perused the impugned order, I do not find any good ground or cogent reason to differ with the finding arrived at by the learned trial judge so also in view of the Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs , stated herein supra. Under the circumstances, I pass the following order. ORDER The petition is dismissed. 2. In view of dismissal of this petition, pending application, if any, would pale into insignificance.