ORDER : ARUN KUMAR RAI, J. 1. Heard Mr. Praveen Shankar Dayal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Jitendra Pandey, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.01.2005 passed by learned 1 st Additional Sessions Judge, Seraikella in S.T. No. 28 of 1998, whereby and whereunder, the appellants have been convicted for the offence punishable u/s 325/34 of IPC and have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for four years and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- and in default in payment of fine the appellants were to undergo further R.I. for one month. 3. The prosecution case is based on an F.I.R. which came into existence on the written report of Revati Majhian wife of late Bilom Majhi, resident of Village – Kathgoda, P.S. – Ichagarh, who stated therein that yesterday i.e. on 13.04.1997 at about 08:00 P.M. in the night his husband was standing with her in the courtyard, then the villagers namely, Kishan Majhi, Ratan Majhi, Kamal Majhi, Indu Majhi and Kali Majhi, all of sudden came and they caught hold of her husband given fist and lathi blows to him. Informant tried to save her husband but she could not succeed, then she started calling other persons then above said miscreants fled away. It is also stated by the informant that the house of the miscreants is in front of the house of informant and on account of mar-pit her husband Bilom Majhi received injury on his mouth, cheek, waist and leg and was also having body-ache and he could not able to speak. Informant stated that on trivial issue such incident took place, but she has no knowledge of the same. 4. An F.I.R. being Ichagarh P.S. case No. 16 of 1997 dated 14.04.1997 for the offence u/s 143,341,323 of IPC has been instituted. 5. From record it transpires that during course of treatment injured Bilom Majhi succumbed to injury at T.M.H., Jamshedpur and thereafter Section 302 of IPC was added in the aforesaid F.I.R. 6. On the completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted and thereafter cognizance was taken, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions where it was registered as S.T. Case No. 28 of 1998. On the completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted and thereafter cognizance was taken, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions where it was registered as S.T. Case No. 28 of 1998. Charge was framed against the accused u/s 302/34 of IPC which was read over and explained to them in Hindi to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. Prosecution has examined as many as five witnesses in support of its case. They are:- P.W. -1 Fulchand Majhi and P.W.-2 Som Majhi who are neighbourers, P.W.-3 Dhasu Majhi is brother of deceased, P.W. -4 Revati Majhian is the wife of deceased and the informant of the present case, and P.W.-5 Sripati Majhi is the nephew of the deceased. 8 . Statement of appellants under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., was taken in which the accused persons simply denied the incident and claimed to be innocent. 9 . There is no evidence led on behalf of the defense. 10 . After analyzing evidence available on record, learned trial court convicted the accused persons under Section 325 /34 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo R.I. for four years and Rs. 3,000/- as fine. 11 . Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that only P.W.-4 (Revati Majhian) was said to be the eye-witness of the present case who happens to be the wife of the deceased but even she has not supported the case of prosecution as she has categorically stated that the persons who did mar-pit with the deceased, she could not identify them. It is further pointed out that apart from P.W.-4 (Revati Majhian) other witnesses are hearsay in nature and no credence ought to be given to their testimony who has categorically stated that they were not present at the time of alleged incident rather, they were conveyed/informed by the informant that the appellants have committed the said offence. 12 . Learned counsel further pointed out the fact that P.W.-4 (Revati Majhian) who herself has stated in her testimony that she does not know who did mar-pit with the deceased. So, question of conveying/informing the name of assailants to other witnesses does not arise at all and learned Sessions Judge by invoking Section 6 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT had erroneously convicted the appellants in the present case. So, question of conveying/informing the name of assailants to other witnesses does not arise at all and learned Sessions Judge by invoking Section 6 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT had erroneously convicted the appellants in the present case. Learned counsel further pointed out that I.O. has not been examined in the present case and apart from that no post- mortem report or any injury report of the deceased have been brought on record on behalf of prosecution. 13 . Mr. Jitendra Pandey, learned A.P.P. for the State submitted that the impugned judgment is very speaking and reasons assigned for conviction of the appellants is based on legal principle and also invoking by Section 6 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , therefore, no interference is required by this Appellate Court. 14. From perusal of the record, it transpires that the prosecution has examined as many as five witnesses in the present case. Out of these five witnesses, P.W.-4 (Revati Majhian), who happens to be the informant and the wife of the deceased, is the eyewitness. During the course of her evidence, she has categorically stated that a few persons entered her house and did mar-pit with her husband, causing injuries on his cheek and mouth, but she could not identify the assailants. She was declared hostile by the Court, but despite cross-examination by the prosecution, nothing could be extracted from her mouth to support the case of prosecution. 15. As far as P.W.-1 (Fulchand Majhi) is concerned, he stated that the informant came to his house on the day of the incident and called him. He saw the deceased in an injured condition and the informant divulged the name of the appellants as the persons who caused the injury to the deceased. He also stated that the injured was taken to Ichagarh Police Station, then to Ichagarh Hospital, and finally to T.M.H., Jamshedpur, where he died during the course of treatment. 16. P.W.-2 (Soma Majhi) has stated that when he returned to his house, he came to know that the deceased had been beaten by five persons, and he took the name of the appellants. In his cross-examination, at one point, he stated that he was informed about the incident by Dhasu Majhi (P.W.-3). He also stated that the informant had told him that five persons had beaten her husband with lathi. In his cross-examination, at one point, he stated that he was informed about the incident by Dhasu Majhi (P.W.-3). He also stated that the informant had told him that five persons had beaten her husband with lathi. However, at a later stage of his cross-examination, he admitted that he had not stated before the police that the informant had named the persons who had given beating to her husband. He also spoke about the injuries on the person of the deceased. 17. P.W.-3 (Dhasu Majhi), who is brother of the deceased, stated that on the day of the incident, his bhabhi (P.W.-4 - Informant) came to his place and informed him that the appellants did mar-pit with his brother. Thereafter, he went to the informant’s house and saw injuries on the head and cheek of the deceased and he was senseless at that time. He further stated that the deceased was taken to Ichagarh Police Station, then to T.M.H., Jamshedpur, and was also admitted to a government hospital for four days. In his cross-examination, he stated that he used to live separately from his brother, Bilom Majhi. 18. P.W.-5 (Sripati Majhi) is the nephew of the deceased and was a witness to the death inquest report prepared by the police official. 19. It is also apposite to discuss herein the principle enshrined under section 6 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT . The said provision is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: “6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.—Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.” 20. The principle on which the provision referred above is based is popularly defined as res gestae. It has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows: “(Latin:„things done?) The events at issue, or other events contemporaneous with them. In evidence law, words and statements about foe res gestae are usually admissible under a hearsay exception (such as present sense impression or excited utterance).” 21. Section 6 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT is thus an exception to the general rule whereunder hearsay evidence, which is otherwise inadmissible, becomes admissible. In evidence law, words and statements about foe res gestae are usually admissible under a hearsay exception (such as present sense impression or excited utterance).” 21. Section 6 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT is thus an exception to the general rule whereunder hearsay evidence, which is otherwise inadmissible, becomes admissible. However, for bringing such hearsay evidence within the ambit and scope of Section 6 what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there could not be any interval which would allow fabrication. In other words, the statement forming part of res gestae must be made contemporaneously with the act or immediately thereafter. 22. In the matter of Badruddin Rukonddim Karpude v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1981 Supp SCC 1 , it is held by the Supreme Court that where in a prosecution for murder apart from the witnesses whose testimony could not be relied on there was evidence of other witnesses also, supported by the testimony of a wholly independent witness, that the names of the accused were mentioned to him as the assailants of the deceased while beating of the deceased was in progress the information conveyed to such witness being part of the res gestae was admissible and the accused in question could be convicted on the basis of corroboration furnished by the evidence of such witness. 23. In the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Javed Alam v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2009) 6 SCC 450 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the principle to hold thus in paragraph-19: “19. Section 6 of the EVIDENCE ACT is an exception to the rule of evidence that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The test for applying the rule of res gestae is that the statement should be spontaneous and should form part of the same transaction ruling out any possibility of concoction. In Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A.P.3, it was held in para 15 as follows: (SCC pp.246-47) Section 6 of the EVIDENCE ACT and some of the succeeding sections embody the rule of admission of evidence relating to what is commonly known as res gestae. They are in the nature of exception to “hearsay” rule. Section 6 permits proof of collateral statements which are so connected with the facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction. They are in the nature of exception to “hearsay” rule. Section 6 permits proof of collateral statements which are so connected with the facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction. Whether the statement made by a witness was a part of the same transaction or not is to be considered in the light of the circumstances of each case. The principle is that it should be so intimately connected with the fact in issue as to be a spontaneous utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion or a spontaneous reaction thereof, there being no opportunity for deliberately fabricating the statement. In other words, the statement which is a part of res gestae does not narrate a past event, but it is the event itself speaking through a person thus excluding the possibility of any design behind it.” 24 . The principle of res gestae is thus well settled that hearsay evidence, which is otherwise inadmissible, becomes admissible when the facts are informed to the witness during the course of the incident or immediately thereafter so that not much time is left in the interregnum to fabricate the evidence. The evidence in the nature of res gestae can also be used as corroboration to the statements of any other evidence whether circumstantial or direct. 25. As far as the injuries on the person of the deceased are concerned, it has come from the mouth of all the four witnesses, i.e., P.W.-1, P.W.-2, P.W.-3, and P.W.-4. However, the evidence in the nature of res gestae is concerned P.W.-4 the informant of the present case who happens to be wife of deceased has not uttered a word in her testimony before the Court regarding the involvement of the appellants in the present case. The other witnesses, who named the appellants as the assailants, stated that this information was told to them by the informant. The informant (P.W.-4) of the present case has neither uttered in the FIR nor did make statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that these above witnesses were informed about the incident immediately after occurrence and as such, testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-3 failed to support the case of prosecution in the nature of res gestae. 26. The informant (P.W.-4) of the present case has neither uttered in the FIR nor did make statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that these above witnesses were informed about the incident immediately after occurrence and as such, testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-3 failed to support the case of prosecution in the nature of res gestae. 26. As far as evidence of P.W.-2 is concerned, he has categorically stated that he came to know about the incident and name of assailants from P.W.-3 who happens to be brother of deceased and he also got information about the above said incident from his bhabhi Revati Majhian (P.W.-4), therefore, evidence of P.W.-2 does not fall within the arena of res gestae enshrined under Section 6 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT and is not reliable. 27 . This Court on the basis of aforesaid discussion is of the considered view that as the P.W.-4 Revati Majhian, in her testimony, has not named the appellants as the assailants of her husband, no credence ought to be given to the uncorroborated testimonies of the other witnesses who stated the name of the appellants as the assailants of the deceased as divulged by P.W.-4. 28 . The aforesaid aspect has not been considered by the learned trial court, and only taking the support of Section 6 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , the learned trial court convicted the accused, which is not legally permissible under the law, considering the fact that the person who allegedly informed the other witnesses about the commission of the crime by the appellants has not, in her own testimony, stated that the appellants were the assailants in the present case. 29 . Consequently, this Court is inclined to set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 17.01.2005 passed by learned 1 st Additional Sessions Judge, Saraikella in S.T. No. 28 of 1998. 30 . Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. 31 . Since the appellants are on bail, they are discharged from the liability of their respective bail bonds. 32. Let trial court record be sent back to the court concerned forthwith.