ORDER : M. NAGAPRASANNA, J. 1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking the following prayer. A. Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the communication dated 07.11.2024 issued by the 3 rd respondent which is produced at Annexure-C; B. Issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent no.1 to 3 to consider the representation dated 10.03.2025 which is produced at Annexure-D and grant regularization of the petitioner’s service for the post of librarian, taking into account her long tenure and eligibility; C. Pass such other writ or order or direction as deemed fit in the interest of justice and equity. 2. Heard the learned counsel Ms. Gayatri S.R. appearing for the petitioner, learned AGA Smt. Girija S. Hiremath representing respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Smt. Chetana S. Biraj for respondent No.4. 3. Facts in brief germane are as follows. The petitioner is appointed as a clerk cum typist on 01.01.2001 at the South Konkan Society's G.S. Sai College, Belgavi. It transpires later the petitioner on acquisition of the requisite qualification in Library Sciences is appointed as a Librarian. In the interregnum it transpires that the notification was issued, but there was no selection process initiated. 4. Be that as it may, the petitioner continued to work as a librarian in the said college and is working even today in the said post. Therefore, the petitioner initially as clerk cum typist and librarian later has rendered close to 24 years of service. 5. In the light of the said circumstance, the petitioner submits a representation seeking regularisation of services on 10.03.2025. The institution forwards the same to the State Government. The non-consideration of the representation is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled to be regularised in the services as 24 years have passed by from the date on which the petitioner is appointed initially as a clerk cum typist and later as a librarian. The learned counsel would submit only to the fact that the government has communicated to the institute to initiate process of recruitment and the incidental challenge is to a communication of the State Government to the institution that they should follow the ratio of 1:5 while calling for applications in change to 1:10 that was called earlier. The learned counsel would submit only to the fact that the government has communicated to the institute to initiate process of recruitment and the incidental challenge is to a communication of the State Government to the institution that they should follow the ratio of 1:5 while calling for applications in change to 1:10 that was called earlier. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that would not have any bearing if a direction is issued to the respondent to consider the case of the petitioner for regularisation. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Chetna Biraj representing the institution submits that they have enclosed the representation and communicated it to the State. It is for the State to take a decision in the matter as it is an aided institution. 8. The Learned HCGP submits that the representation of the petitioner is submitted only on 10.03.2025 and would merit consideration in accordance with law, if reasonable time is granted. 9. Though the petition could be disposed with a direction to consider the representation in accordance with law, I deem it appropriate to amplify the direction by quoting a judgment rendered by this Court with regard to regularization of a similarly situated librarian in different organization in W.P. No.101459/2023. This Court has held as follows. “The petitioner at the relevant point in time had possessed Master Degree in Library and Information Science. Owing to her qualification, the fourth respondent appointed the petitioner as a Librarian in the fifth respondent - College run by the fourth respondent, on 19.07.2004. The petitioner then acquires degrees of M.Phil and Ph.d during her service and now holds M.Lib., M.Phil. and Ph.D. The petitioner has been in continuous employment from 19.07.2004. In the year 2010, the fourth respondent – Society communicates to the State bringing it to the notice of the State that the petitioner has been working as a Librarian in the fifth respondent aided Institution, since then, for over six years and recommends that her case could be considered for regularization against the sanctioned vacant post. The State does not pass any order and the time passes by. A notification for direct recruitment for various posts in the fourth respondent’s College is issued, which includes a post for Librarian. Issuance of the recruitment notification dated on 08.02.2023, has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 4. The State does not pass any order and the time passes by. A notification for direct recruitment for various posts in the fourth respondent’s College is issued, which includes a post for Librarian. Issuance of the recruitment notification dated on 08.02.2023, has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 4. This Court had passed several orders protecting the interest of the petitioner and the matter is heard. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is appointed against a sanctioned vacant post. She is fully qualified to hold the post as a Librarian and has been in uninterrupted continuous service since 2004 to this day and therefore, she has put in 21 years of service as a Librarian. The State directs the Society to issue a recruitment notification on the score that the post of Librarian can be filled up only by direct recruitment. Therefore, the notification is issued. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner now cannot participate in the said selection process as she is close to 50 years and the cut off age is 40 years in terms of the notification dated 08.02.2023 and would submit that she will be left high and dry if recruitment process is permitted. 6. Per contra, learned High Court Government Pleader would refute the submissions to contend that the regularization in the service cannot be sought as a matter of right; even if the petitioner is working against a sanctioned vacant post, she is working in a post, which has to be filled up only by direct recruitment. Therefore, he would submit that there is no merit in the petition and the petition should be dismissed. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 8. The dates and link in the chain of events, require reiteration. The petitioner qualified with B.Com, M.Lib and M.Phil, was chosen to be appointed as a Librarian in the fifth respondent – Institution, run by the fourth respondent - Society. The order of appointment reads as follows: “17-July-2004 MEMO Sub: Appointment as Librarian on temporary basis in our aided college. The dates and link in the chain of events, require reiteration. The petitioner qualified with B.Com, M.Lib and M.Phil, was chosen to be appointed as a Librarian in the fifth respondent – Institution, run by the fourth respondent - Society. The order of appointment reads as follows: “17-July-2004 MEMO Sub: Appointment as Librarian on temporary basis in our aided college. Smt. Nirmala S. Hiremath is appointed as Librarian with effect from 19-07-2004 on temporary basis in our aided college in the clear vacancy caused by retirement till regular appointment is done as per rule To, Nirmala S. Hiremath C/O. G.K.Bhat Soori Post: Hegde Taluk: Kumta. Sd/- KANARA COLLEGE SOCIETY (REGD.) KUMTA (N.K.) 581-343” (Emphasis added) The order of appointment clearly indicates that she is appointed on temporary basis, in a clear vacancy, caused by retirement, till the regular appointment is done as per the rule. What is discernable is, that the petitioner was appointed against a sanctioned vacant post caused by the retirement of the incumbent. 9. Six years passed by, the Society communicates to the third respondent seeking regularization of the services of the petitioner as special case owing to the aforesaid circumstance, on the score that the petitioner is qualified, working against a sanctioned vacant post and by then, completed six years. The communication dated 22.11.2010, reads as follows The State does not reply to the said communication. By another communication, the petitioner is transferred to another Institution run by the same Society, which is also communicated to the State. This happens on 28.07.2016. 10. At a later point in time, the State Government appears to have communicated to the Society to fill up all vacant posts. Then comes the notification dated 08.02.2023, impugned in the subject petition, which includes a post of the Librarian. The age limit in the notification is as follows: “Age Limit: Maximum 40 years for GM, 43 years for OBC and 45 years for SC/ST/CAT-1 candidates on the last day of submission of application.” (Emphasis added) In terms of the afore-quoted age limit of the applications, the maximum age limit is, 40 years to a general merit, 43 years to an other backward class and 45 years for an scheduled caste/scheduled tribe/category- 1, as on the last date of submission of the application. As on the date of the application, the petitioner was 49 years and therefore, becomes ineligible even to participate against the impugned notification. Let alone, not only this recruitment process, she is now ineligible to participate in any recruitment process, as the petitioner is now over aged. Therefore, the petitioner submits representations to the third and fourth respondents, both dated 14.02.2023. They read as follows: Noticing that the fact, the fourth respondent – Society is proceeding with the recruitment process, approaches this Court in the subject petition. Just before approaching this Court, the State issues an endorsement indicating that the case of the petitioner cannot be considered owing to the representations as afore-quoted. 11. The issue now would be whether the petitioner is entitled for consideration of her service in the fifth respondent - Institution for regularisation. 12. The service history of the petitioner requires reiteration. The petitioner gets appointed on 19.07.2004, against a clear vacancy caused of a retirement of a Librarian. Therefore, it was a sanctioned vacant post as on the date the petitioner was appointed. In 2010, it is brought to the notice of the State by the Society to consider her case for regularization. Time and age both pass by as it is trite that time and age will wait for none. The petitioner today, is 51 years old and as on the date of the impugned notification, she was 49 years old. As on the date of the impugned notification, the petitioner had put in 19 years of continuous uninterrupted service against a sanctioned vacant post, albeit, on temporary basis. Today, she has put in 21 years of service and 51 years old. Even if she wants to participate in any direct recruitment process, the age that has advanced would undoubtedly come in her way. Therefore, permitting the process of recruitment to the post of Librarian to go on, would be leaving the petitioner in the lurch and her fate to hang in thin air, after having served for 21 years in an aided Institution, against a sanctioned vacant post. 13. The State ought to have taken note of these factors with little empathy, as regularization is undoubtedly available in posts where they are sanctioned and personnel working in those posts on vacancy created. 13. The State ought to have taken note of these factors with little empathy, as regularization is undoubtedly available in posts where they are sanctioned and personnel working in those posts on vacancy created. The petitioner fits into all the parameters necessary for regularization as is held by the Apex Court in the aftermath of the judgment rendered in the case of SECRETARY, STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. UMADEVI (3) , (2006) 4 SCC 1 , rendered on 10.04.2006 . Considering the said judgment, the Apex Court in the case of SHRIPAL v. NAGAR NIGAM , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221 , has held as follows: “ 3. The factual matrix leading up to the appeal before us is as follows: 3.1. The Appellant Workmen claim to have been engaged as Gardeners (Malis) in the Horticulture Department of the Respondent Employer, Ghaziabad Nagar Nigam, since the year 1998 (in some instances, since 1999). According to them, they continuously discharged horticultural and maintenance duties— such as planting trees, maintaining parks, and beautifying public spaces—under the direct supervision of the Respondent Employer. They further allege that no formal appointment letters were ever issued to them, and that they were persistently denied minimum wages, weekly offs, national holidays, and other statutory benefits. 3.2. In 2004, the Appellant Workmen, along with many other similarly situated employees, raised an industrial dispute (C.B. Case No. 6 of 2004) before the Conciliation Officer at Ghaziabad, seeking regularization of their services and the requisite statutory benefits. They contend that, upon learning of this demand, the Respondent Employer began delaying their salaries and subjected them to adverse working conditions. Eventually, around mid-July 2005, the services of numerous workmen were allegedly terminated orally, without any notice, written orders, or retrenchment compensation. 3.3. Since the above termination took place during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings, the Appellant Workmen argue it violated Section 6E of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Consequently, the State Government referred the disputes concerning both (i) regularization and (ii) legality of the alleged termination, to the Labour Court, Ghaziabad for adjudication. 3.4. The Labour Court proceeded to decide the references vide two orders: (i) Order dated 03.06.2011 : In numerous adjudication cases (e.g., Adjudication Case Nos. Consequently, the State Government referred the disputes concerning both (i) regularization and (ii) legality of the alleged termination, to the Labour Court, Ghaziabad for adjudication. 3.4. The Labour Court proceeded to decide the references vide two orders: (i) Order dated 03.06.2011 : In numerous adjudication cases (e.g., Adjudication Case Nos. 448, 451, 467 of 2006, etc.), the Labour Court passed awards holding the terminations illegal for want of compliance with Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and directed reinstatement with 30% back wages. (ii) Order dated 11.10.2011 : However, in about 41 other adjudication cases (e.g., Adjudication Case Nos. 269, 270, 272, etc.), the Labour Court arrived at a contrary conclusion, dismissing the claims on the finding that the concerned workmen had not been engaged directly by the Nagar Nigam but rather through a contractor, and hence had no enforceable right to reinstatement or regularization against the Respondent Employer. 3.5. Aggrieved by the adverse portion of the awards (i.e., those granting reinstatement), the Respondent Employer, Ghaziabad Nagar Nigam, filed several writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, challenging the Labour Court's findings. On the other hand, the workmen whose claims were dismissed by the other set of awards also approached the High Court by filing their own writ petitions. All these writ petitions were heard together, culminating in the common judgment dated 01.03.2019, which partly modified the Labour Court's conclusions. 3.6. Through the impugned judgment, the High Court held that while the Labour Court was correct in exercising jurisdiction under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (since municipalities could be treated as “industry”), there remained factual complexities as to whether the workmen were genuinely on the rolls of the Nagar Nigam or were provided by contractors. The High Court also noted that the State Government had, by notifications/orders, placed a ban on fresh recruitments in Municipal Corporations, thereby restricting direct appointments to any post. Ultimately, the High Court partially modified the relief granted, directing re-engagement of the workmen on daily wages, with pay equivalent to the minimum in the regular pay scale of Gardeners, while allowing future consideration of their regularization if permissible by law. 4. Both the Appellant Workmen and the Respondent Employer have now approached this Court by way of Special Leave Petitions. 4. Both the Appellant Workmen and the Respondent Employer have now approached this Court by way of Special Leave Petitions. The workmen primarily seek full reinstatement with back wages and a direction to secure their regularization, whereas the Respondent Employer seeks to quash the modifications ordered by the High Court on the ground that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting partial relief akin to regular employees, contrary to constitutional provisions and the State's ban on recruitment. 5. Learned counsel for the Appellant Workmen made the following submissions: I. Continuous Service & Comparable Duties : The Appellant Workmen had continuously discharged horticultural and maintenance duties— like planting trees, upkeep of public parks, and general beautification—under the direct supervision and control of the Respondent Employer for periods often exceeding a decade. They insist such longstanding, continuous work parallels that of permanent Gardeners. II. Direct Engagement & Wage Disbursement : They aver that their wages, though inadequate, were paid directly by the Horticulture Department of the Respondent Employer, nullifying the Employer's claim of contractual hiring. Muster rolls and internal notes are cited to show direct employer-employee relations. III. Illegal Termination : Alleging violation of Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Appellant Workmen maintain their abrupt termination in July 2005 (during pendency of conciliation proceedings) was devoid of due process and statutory payments, rendering it patently illegal. IV. Entitlement to Reinstatement & Regularization : Given their long service and the principle of “equal pay for equal work,” the Appellant Workmen submit they deserve full reinstatement with back wages and a legitimate pathway to regularization, as opposed to the partial relief of mere daily-wage re-engagement prescribed by the High Court. 6. On the other, the learned counsel for the Respondent Employer, Ghaziabad Nagar Nigam made the following submissions: I. Compliance with Constitutional Requirements : Emphasizing the constitutional scheme of public employment, it is urged that there was (and remains) a ban on fresh recruitment in Municipal Corporations, and no proper selection process was ever followed to appoint the Workmen on any sanctioned posts. II. No Direct Employer-Employee Relationship : The Respondent Employer contends that all horticulture work was carried out through independent contractors appointed via tender processes. It claims any partial wage documentation cited by the Workmen fails to establish direct engagement. III. II. No Direct Employer-Employee Relationship : The Respondent Employer contends that all horticulture work was carried out through independent contractors appointed via tender processes. It claims any partial wage documentation cited by the Workmen fails to establish direct engagement. III. Inapplicability of Regularization : Relying on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi 1 , it is asserted that no daily wager can claim permanent absorption without adherence to constitutional requirements and availability of duly sanctioned vacancies. IV. Inadequate Proof of 240 Days' Service : The Respondent Employer points out that the Workmen did not convincingly demonstrate they completed 240 days of continuous work in any calendar year, thus undermining the assertion that their cessation from service was illegal. V. Challenge to Modified Relief : Finally, it argues that the High Court's direction to pay minimum-scale wages and to consider the Workmen for future regularization oversteps legal boundaries, disregards the recruitment ban, and fosters an impermissible avenue of public employment. The Respondent Employer, therefore, seeks the quashing of the impugned judgment. 7. Having heard the arguments and submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the nature of engagement of the Appellant Workmen, the admitted shortage of Gardeners, and the circumstances under which their services were brought to an end, merit closer scrutiny. 8. It is undisputed that, while the Appellant Workmen were pressing for regularization and proper wages through pending conciliation proceedings, the Respondent Employer proceeded to discontinue their services, without issuing prior notice or granting retrenchment compensation. At this juncture, it is to have a look at the requirements of Section 6E of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which has been reproduced hereunder:— “6E. [Conditions of service, etc. to remain unchanged in certain circumstances during the pendency of proceedings. At this juncture, it is to have a look at the requirements of Section 6E of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which has been reproduced hereunder:— “6E. [Conditions of service, etc. to remain unchanged in certain circumstances during the pendency of proceedings. [Inserted by U.P. Act No. 1 of 1957.] (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a Conciliation Officer or a Board or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall, - (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in such dispute save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute, - (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) no employer shall during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute, - (a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceeding, or (b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman, such with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Explanation. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, a ‘protected workman’ in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being an officer of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognized as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf. (4) In every establishment, the number of workmen to be recognized as protected workmen for the purposes of sub-section (3) shall not exceed one per cent of the total number of workmen employed therein subject to a minimum number of five protected workmen and a maximum number of one hundred protected workmen and for the aforesaid purpose, the State Government may make rules providing for the distribution of such protected workmen among various trade unions, if any, connected with the establishment and the manner in which they may be chosen and recognized as protected workmen. (5) Where an employer makes an application to a Board, Labour Court or Tribunal under the proviso to sub-section (2) for approval of the action taken by him, the authority concerned shall, without delay, hear such application and pass, as expeditiously as possible, such order in relation thereto as it deems fit.” 9. On a plain reading of this section, we can deduce that any unilateral alteration in service conditions, including termination, is impermissible during the pendency of such proceedings unless prior approval is obtained from the appropriate authority. The record in the present case does not indicate that the Respondent Employer ever sought or was granted the requisite approval. Prima facie, therefore, this conduct reflects a deliberate attempt to circumvent the lawful claims of the workmen, particularly when their dispute over regularization and wages remained sub judice. 10. The Respondent Employer consistently labelled the Appellant Workmen as casual employees (or workers engaged through an unnamed contractor), yet there is no material proof of adherence to Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which mandates a proper notice or wages in lieu thereof as well as retrenchment compensation. In this context, whether an individual is classified as regular or temporary is irrelevant as retrenchment obligations under the Act must be met in all cases attracting Section 6N. Any termination thus effected without statutory safeguards cannot be undertaken lightly. 11. xxxx 12. xxxx 13. xxxx 14. In this context, whether an individual is classified as regular or temporary is irrelevant as retrenchment obligations under the Act must be met in all cases attracting Section 6N. Any termination thus effected without statutory safeguards cannot be undertaken lightly. 11. xxxx 12. xxxx 13. xxxx 14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or temporary employees cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing such absorption. However, as frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are “irregular,” the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record which shows no true contractor-based arrangement and a consistent need for permanent horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh recruitment, though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices. 15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously rendered their services over several years, sometimes spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the Employer's failure to furnish such records—despite directions to do so—allows an adverse inference under well-established labour jurisprudence. Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to recall the broader critique of indefinite “temporary” employment practices as done by a recent judgment of this court in Jaggo v. Union of India , in the following paragraphs: “xxxxxxxxx” 16 . xxx 17 . xxx 18. The impugned order of the High Court, to the extent they confine the Appellant Workmen to future daily-wage engagement without continuity or meaningful back wages, is hereby set aside with the following directions: I. The discontinuation of the Appellant Workmen's services, effected without compliance with Section 6E and Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is declared illegal. All orders or communications terminating their services are quashed. In consequence, the Appellant Workmen shall be treated as continuing in service from the date of their termination, for all purposes, including seniority and continuity in service. II. All orders or communications terminating their services are quashed. In consequence, the Appellant Workmen shall be treated as continuing in service from the date of their termination, for all purposes, including seniority and continuity in service. II. The Respondent Employer shall reinstate the Appellant Workmen in their respective posts (or posts akin to the duties they previously performed) within four weeks from the date of this judgment. Their entire period of absence (from the date of termination until actual reinstatement) shall be counted for continuity of service and all consequential benefits, such as seniority and eligibility for promotions, if any. III. Considering the length of service, the Appellant Workmen shall be entitled to 50% of the back wages from the date of their discontinuation until their actual reinstatement. The Respondent Employer shall clear the aforesaid dues within three months from the date of their reinstatement. IV. The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a fair and transparent process for regularizing the Appellant Workmen within six months from the date of reinstatement, duly considering the fact that they have performed perennial municipal duties akin to permanent posts. In assessing regularization, the Employer shall not impose educational or procedural criteria retroactively if such requirements were never applied to the Appellant Workmen or to similarly situated regular employees in the past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies for such duties exist or are required, the Respondent Employer shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to ensure these long-time employees are not indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary to statutory and equitable norms. 19. In view of the above, the appeal(s) filed by the workmen are allowed, whereas the appeal(s) filed by the Nagar Nigam Ghaziabad are dismissed.” (Emphasis supplied) In the afore-quoted judgment, the Apex Court observes that such employment would become exploitative engagement, if regularization would not ensue. Those were the cases of workmen covered under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the case of hand is that of a Librarian, who is in the position of a teacher. 14. If the case at hand is considered on the touch stone of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, what would unmistakably emerge is that, the fate of the petitioner cannot be left to be marooned in thin air or leave her life in the lurch. 14. If the case at hand is considered on the touch stone of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, what would unmistakably emerge is that, the fate of the petitioner cannot be left to be marooned in thin air or leave her life in the lurch. At the time, when the petitioner was appointed, was 28 years old; in the prime youth, the petitioner has toiled for the development of the fifth respondent - Institution qua Library and the service rendered cannot be brushed aside and regularisation in such cases cannot be declined to the considered. In view of the preceding analysis and also the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SHRIPAL supra, the petition deserves to succeed. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER a. The writ petition is allowed. b. The notification dated 08.02.2023, issued by the fourth respondent – Society only insofar as it concerns the post of Librarian, stands quashed. c. Mandamus issues to respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 to consider the case of the petitioner for regularisation of her services in the post of Librarian, owing to and bearing in mind the observation made in the course of the order. d. The order shall be complied with, within an outer limit within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, if not earlier. 10. Therefore, the representation of the petitioner shall bear consideration at the hands of the respondent bearing in mind the observations made in the order quoted supra. 11. The consideration shall be in accordance with law within an outer limit of 4 months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order if not earlier. Ordered accordingly.