Kanta Rani Sharma, wife of Late Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Ajit Kumar Gupta, son of Late Chhatrapati Gutpa
2025-08-06
ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants. 2. Nobody has entered appearance on behalf of the respondents in spite of service of notice. 3. This second appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 26.07.2019 (decree signed on 03.08.2019) passed by the learned District Judge-XIV, Dhanbad in Civil Appeal No. 49 of 2018 whereby the civil appeal has been dismissed. The trial court judgment is dated 28.02.2018 (decree signed on 14.03.2018) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) II, Dhanbad in Title (Eviction) Suit No. 04 of 2006. The learned trial court decreed the suit on contest with cost. 4. This appeal was admitted for final hearing vide order dated 28.11.2024 on the following substantial questions of law: - “(i) Whether the learned first appellate court has committed perversity by not considering the bonafide of the landlord, in not occupying the alternative accommodation and whether the landlord unreasonably refused to accept the alternative occupation to satisfy his needs claimed by him; in view of paragragph-14 the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta reported in (1999) 6 SCC 222 (ii) Whether the learned first appellate court failed to re-appreciate and reconsider the judgment of the trial court in exercise of its power under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the principle of law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph -60 of the case Murthy & Others vs. C. Saradambal & Others reported in (2022) 3 SCC 209 ?” 5. This Court while framing 1 st substantial question of law has specifically referred to paragraph 14 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta reported in (1999) 6 SCC 222 and in 2 nd substantial question of law has referred to paragraph 60 of the judgment of passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Murthy & Others vs. C. Saradambal & Others reported in (2022) 3 SCC 209 . However, the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to paragraph 60 and 62 of the judgment passed in the case of Murthy (supra) , which are quoted as under: - “ 60.
However, the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to paragraph 60 and 62 of the judgment passed in the case of Murthy (supra) , which are quoted as under: - “ 60. Before parting with this case, we would like to reiterate that in this case, the High Court has dealt with the judgment of the learned trial Judge in a shortcut method, bereft of all reasoning while reversing the judgment of the trial court both on facts as well as law. It is trite that the appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse, affirm or modify the findings and the judgment of the trial court. However, while reversing or modifying the judgment of a trial court, it is the duty of the appellate court to reflect in its judgment, conscious application of mind on the findings recorded supported by reasons, on all issues dealt with, as well as the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. No doubt, when the appellate court affirms the judgment of a trial court, the reasoning need not to be elaborate although reappreciation of the evidence and reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court are necessary concomitants. But while reversing a judgment of a trial court, the appellate court must be more conscious of its duty in assigning the reasons for doing so. 62. In B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle in these words: “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 and Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756 ). 6. Paragraph 14 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta(supra) is quoted as under: - “ 14. The availability of an alternative accommodation with the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to the bona fides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable the court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another principal ingredient of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14, which speaks of non-availability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available then the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need.
Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available then the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may convince the court that the alternative residential accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family members would be relevant factors. While considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come.” Arguments of the appellants 7. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the original appellant is the tenant in the premises and the sole plaintiff had filed suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity and also default in payment of rent. The learned trial court decreed the suit on both the grounds, but so far as learned 1 st appellate court is concerned, the point of default was reversed and still the direction to evict was sustained on the ground of personal necessity. 8. While referring to 1 st substantial question of law , the learned counsel has submitted that it was the specific case of the defendants that the plaintiff had alternative vacant accommodation available, but this aspect of the matter has not been property considered by both the courts particularly the learned 1 st appellate court. The learned counsel has referred to the findings recorded in last part of paragraph 14 of the 1 st appellate court’s judgment and has submitted that the learned 1 st appellate court straightaway concluded that there is evidence on record to prove that the plaintiff needs the suit property for his bonafide and personal requirement, but in order to arrive at this conclusion, there is no discussion of the evidences on record. He has referred to only paragraph 13 and 14 of the 1 st appellate court’s judgement. 9.
He has referred to only paragraph 13 and 14 of the 1 st appellate court’s judgement. 9. While referring to the judgment in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) , the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the manner in which the availability of alternative accommodation is to be considered has been laid down in the said judgment, but the learned 1 st appellate court has not exercised its powers in accordance with law while holding that the landlord required the suit property for his bonafide and personal use. 10. The learned counsel has submitted that the findings recorded by the learned 1 st appellate court is cryptic and perverse and therefore, the 2 nd substantial question of law is required to be answered in favour of the appellants as the learned 1 st appellate court has not followed the principles of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC. The learned counsel referred to the judgment passed in the case of Murthy (supra) and has submitted that it is not open to the 1 st appellate court to decide the case in a shortcut method bereft of reasons and the application of mind is also required to be reflected even by upholding the findings of the learned trial court. 11. So far as the point regarding default in payment of rent is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants has no grievance as the learned 1 st appellate court has ultimately recorded the finding in favour of the appellants, but so far as bonafide requirement of landlord is concerned, it is the argument of the appellant that necessary exercise has not been done in line with paragraph 60 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Murthy (supra) . The learned counsel has referred to paragraph 62 of the aforesaid judgment to submit that as per Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC, the judgment of the 1 st appellate court shall state: - (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 12.
12. The learned counsel has submitted that although the point for determination has been framed but the decision thereon is bereft of reasons and therefore the mandate of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC has not been complied. Findings of this Court 13. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellants, upon going through the impugned judgments and the materials placed on record, this Court finds that so far as 1 st substantial question of law is concerned, the specific case of the landlord with respect to bonafide requirement was that family members of the plaintiff have enormously increased and all of them have become adult, as such there is scarcity of accommodation and as such the tenanted premises was urgently required for the plaintiff for his personal bonafide requirement and in good faith. It was his further case that for the purposes of fulfillment of his personal requirement, he had requested the defendants on 05.09.2005 to vacate the suit premises and the defendants assured the plaintiff that he would vacate the suit premises within two months. The defendants failed to vacate and ultimately on 10.12.2005, the defendants refused to vacate. 14. The defendants denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and also denied the allegation of default in payment of rent. They specifically stated that the personal requirement of the plaintiff shall not be considered in the present suit since several portions of the building premises adjacent north to the tenanted premises in occupation of the defendants and two more flats of upper floor of the building were vacant at that moment which had caused disentitlement of any decree for personal necessity. It was also stated that the defendants invested huge money in the tenanted premises for construction of electricity wiring, kitchen etc. and it was stated that the only intention of the plaintiff was that to evict the defendants and there was no need or requirement of tenanted premises and the plaintiff and his brothers were regularly quarrelling amongst themselves with regard to the suit premises. 15. The learned trial court framed as many as 9 issues which are as under:- I. “Is the suit maintainable in its present form? II. Is there any cause of action of the present suit? III. Is the suit barred under the principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence? IV. Is the suit barred by law of limitation?
15. The learned trial court framed as many as 9 issues which are as under:- I. “Is the suit maintainable in its present form? II. Is there any cause of action of the present suit? III. Is the suit barred under the principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence? IV. Is the suit barred by law of limitation? V. Is there any relationship of landlord and tenants between the plaintiff and defendant? VI. Whether the defendant faulted in the matter of payment of house rent and as such liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises? VII. Whether the plaintiffs have required the suit premises reasonable and good faith for their own use and occupation and personal necessity? VIII. Whether the partial eviction will meet the requirement of landlord? IX. To what relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to? 16. The issue Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 framed by the learned trial court were taken up together. Witnesses and the other materials on record were duly discussed by the learned trial court. The learned trial court after considering the materials on record held that the suit premises was required for the bonafide purposes of the plaintiff as because his family members had enormously increased and all of them have become adult and as such there is scarcity of accommodation. However, perusal of the judgment of the learned trial court reveals that no specific finding as such was recorded in connection with availability of alternative suitable accommodation for the landlord. 17. So far as the learned 1 st appellate court is concerned, the points for determination have been framed in paragraph 9 of the judgment which are as follows: - “ Point no. I : Whether the defendant/appellant is defaulter in payment of rent for two months and liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises? Point no. II : Whether the plaintiff/respondent required the suit premises for his own occupation and personal use?” 18. The learned 1 st appellate court considered both the points altogether vide paragraph 10 onwards and the findings starts from paragraph 11 of the judgment.
Point no. II : Whether the plaintiff/respondent required the suit premises for his own occupation and personal use?” 18. The learned 1 st appellate court considered both the points altogether vide paragraph 10 onwards and the findings starts from paragraph 11 of the judgment. The learned 1 st appellate court has extensively referred to the evidence of PW-2, the plaintiff himself, and has recorded that he has stated that there was no room vacant in the suit premises; in the upstairs of the house Late Mohan Lal Chouhan lives with his family; Barku Lal Solanki also lives there and presently the plaintiff was residing with his family in another house near DAV School Katras. Mahesh Chandra Gupta (PW-3) had supported the case of the plaintiff and stated that his house was about 200-250 yards away from the disputed property which belonged to Ajit Kumar Gupta, the plaintiff, and Ajit Kumar Gupta had four brothers and one of his brothers had died in childhood and that there has been no partition amongst the family members of the Ajit Kumar Gupta. 19. This Court further finds that the learned 1 st appellate court ultimately held in paragraph 14 that the plaintiff required the suit premises for his bonafide personal requirement. This Court further finds that the specific case of the defendants that on the upper floor of the suit premises, there were vacant rooms stood specifically negated by the evidence of P.W.-2, the plaintiff, as he has stated clearly that there was no room vacant in the suit premises and the manner in which the upper floors were occupied was also mentioned. 20. This Court is of the view that the specific plea of the defendants with regard to availability of vacant rooms in the suit premises was not proved in view of the statements made by PW-2 in his evidence and as discussed by the learned 1 st appellate court in paragraph 11 of the judgment. This Court is of the view that paragraph 14 of the judgment cannot be in isolation as the findings of the learned 1 st appellate court begins right from paragraph 10 of the judgment and the discussion with regard to availability of vacant rooms in the suit premises is reflecting from paragraph 11 of the judgment. 21.
This Court is of the view that paragraph 14 of the judgment cannot be in isolation as the findings of the learned 1 st appellate court begins right from paragraph 10 of the judgment and the discussion with regard to availability of vacant rooms in the suit premises is reflecting from paragraph 11 of the judgment. 21. In view of non-availability of any vacant room in the suit premises, the learned 1 st appellate court has recorded a finding that the plaintiff needed the suit premises for his bonafide and personal requirement. This Court has also gone through the evidence of PW-2, the plaintiff, who has deposed on two different dates i.e. 25.04.2006 and then on 26.06.2007. On 25.04.2006, PW-2 has clearly stated in paragraph 12 that in his family there is his wife and two sons and they have only one room for accommodation which is not enough for them and in his cross-examination at paragraph 20 he has clearly stated that there is no vacant room in the suit premises. 22. This Court finds that the learned 1 st appellate court has considered the materials on record and has found that the plaintiff had stated that there were no vacant rooms in the suit premises and ultimately recorded a finding of bonafide requirement in favour of the plaintiff. This Court is of the considered view that while considering the bonafide requirement of the plaintiff, the learned 1 st appellate court has not committed any illegality or perversity so far as availability of alternative accommodation is concerned, inasmuch as, the learned 1 st appellate court specifically considered evidence of P.W-2 to come to a finding that there were no vacant rooms in the suit premises as alternative accommodation. This court finds that the learned 1 st appellate court has not committed any perversity in considering the bonafide of the landlord and the plea of alternative accommodation. 23. Accordingly, the 1 st substantial question of law is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants-appellants 24.
This court finds that the learned 1 st appellate court has not committed any perversity in considering the bonafide of the landlord and the plea of alternative accommodation. 23. Accordingly, the 1 st substantial question of law is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants-appellants 24. So far as 2 nd substantial question of law is concerned, this Court finds that the appellants has no grievance, so far as decision with regard to other issues are concerned and has particularly no grievance with regard to the allegation of default in payment of rent, inasmuch as, the learned 1 st appellate court after thoroughly considering the materials on record has found that the defendants were not a defaulter in payment of rent and has upset the judgment passed by the learned trial court on this point . 25. So far as the bonafide requirement of landlord is concerned, the records reveal that the requirement of the landlord is not in dispute, inasmuch as, the fact that the family members of the plaintiff-landlord had increased and he needed more accommodation has been duly considered by both the courts and so far as the plea of alternative accommodation is concerned, the learned trial court has not returned any specific finding on this, but the learned 1 st appellate court being the final court on fact and law has clearly considered the evidence of the plaintiff that no room was vacant in the suit premises and consequently has recorded a finding that the landlord had bonafide requirement and sustained the order of eviction on the point of bonafide requirement of the landlord. This Court is of the view that the learned 1 st appellate court has done the needful in terms of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC by formulating points for determination and by dealing with each and every core issue involved in the case and has decided the same by citing reasons and referring to the materials on record. Accordingly, the 2 nd substantial question of law is also decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants-appellants 26. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. 27. Pending I.A., if any, is closed. 28. Let this order be communicated to the courts concerned through ‘e mail/FAX’.