JUDGMENT K.V. ARAVIND, J. 1. Heard Sri. Aditya Vikram Bhat, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the petitioners, Sri. G. Shivadass, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. Prashanth S. Shivadass, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in RP No.447/2024, Smt. Tanmaye Rajkumar, learned counsel for the respondent in CRP Nos.116/2025, 114/2025 and 165/2025, Sri. Shivadass, learned Senior Counsel for Sri. Prashanth S. Shivadass, learned counsel for the respondent in CRP Nos.175/2025 and 186/2025, and Sri. M. Thirumalesh, learned counsel for the respondent in CRP Nos.122/2025 and 148/2025. 2. Revision Petition No.447/2024 has been filed by the State seeking review of the order passed in Civil Revision Petition Nos.88/2014 and 196/2014 by the Division Bench of this Court on 19.06.2023. 2.1 Civil Revision Petition Nos. 116/2025 and 114/2025 have been filed by the State challenging the order dated 30.09.2022 passed in STA No.502/2015 by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru. Civil Revision Petition No.122/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order dated 30.09.2022 passed in STA No.117/2017 by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Civil Revision Petition No.148/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order dated 30.08.2023 passed in STA Nos.118–122/2017 by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Civil Revision Petition No.165/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order dated 30.09.2022 passed in STA Nos.2395–2398/2014 by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Civil Revision Petition No.175/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order dated 30.09.2022 passed in STA No.207/2019 by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. Civil Revision Petition No.186/2025 has been filed by the State challenging the order dated 30.08.2023 passed in STA Nos.794–795/2016 by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. 3. The Review Petition and the Civil Revision Petitions involve common questions. Therefore, the learned counsel for the parties have advanced common and identical submissions. Accordingly, the Review Petition and the Civil Revision Petitions are being disposed of by this common order. 4. Civil Revision Petitions have raised following common questions of law for consideration of this Court: "a) Whether the Hon'ble Karnataka Appellate Tribunal erred in holding that 'Denatured Anhydrous Ethyl Alcohol' is different from 'ethyl alcohol' and is not covered in Notification No.FD 11 CET 2002 (I) dated 30-03-2002? (b) Whether the Hon'ble Karnataka Appellate Tribunal has failed to consider the legislative intent behind the broad classification of 'spirits and alcohol' under the KTEG Act, which includes 'ethyl alcohol' in all its forms? (b) Whether the Hon'ble Karnataka Appellate Tribunal has failed to consider the legislative intent behind the broad classification of 'spirits and alcohol' under the KTEG Act, which includes 'ethyl alcohol' in all its forms? (c) Whether the levy of interest under Section 7(2) of the KTEG Act is justified as a compensatory measure for delayed payment of the entry tax on 'denatured anhydrous ethyl alcohol'?" Submissions on both Review and Civil Revision Petitions: 5. Sri Aditya Vikram Bhat, learned Additional Government Advocate, in support of the application for condonation of delay, submitted that the order under review dated 19.06.2023 was contrary to the statutory provisions. Steps were initially taken to file a Special Leave Petition, and for that purpose the file was processed through the administrative hierarchy, culminating in approval on 22.11.2023. Learned AGA submits that, thereafter, it was considered appropriate to file a review petition instead of an appeal, and the said recommendation again had to pass through the hierarchical process, which received approval on 13.12.2023. Subsequently, the matter was processed, and approval was granted by Government Order dated 31.01.2024. Learned AGA further submits that thereafter necessary correspondence ensued, and the review petition ultimately came to be filed on 07.08.2024. It is submitted that the delay of 374 days has been satisfactorily explained. 5.1 Learned AGA submits that the Tribunal has recorded concurrent findings of the fact and that no question of law arose for consideration. Hence, the appeal filed by the respondent-Oil Corporations was not maintainable. Learned AGA further submits that the findings recorded in the order under review are purely factual and are without any basis. Referring to the Indian Standard ‘Anhydrous Ethanol for Use in Automotive Fuel – Specification,’ learned AGA contends that ethyl alcohol and ethanol (denatured spirit) are classified as anhydrous ethanol and, therefore, are one and the same. In this regard, he also relies upon the tender document issued by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Learned AGA further submits that the order under review is contrary to the provisions of Section 15A (4)(a) of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979. 5.2 In support of the prayer for condonation of delay, the learned Additional Government Advocate has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. 5.2 In support of the prayer for condonation of delay, the learned Additional Government Advocate has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and Other s (1996) 3 SCC 132 , to contend that ‘sufficient cause’ must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, and that general delays in preferring appeals ought to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or lack of bona fide is attributable to the party seeking condonation. He further submits that the Government must be afforded a certain degree of latitude in such matters. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through legal representatives and Others Vs. Union of India and Others (2023) 10 SCC 531 , to contend that when the State seeks condonation of delay, a limited leeway may be provided. 6. Sri G. Shivadass, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.1 in R.P.No.447/2024 and for the respondents in CRP.Nos.175/2025 and 186/2025, submits that the delay in filing the review petition has not been explained. Learned Senior Counsel submits that although a list of events has been set out in the application, no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming for the delay. He further submits that when the proposal for filing a Special Leave Petition had already been made, and the decision was subsequently altered from filing an SLP to filing a review petition, the authorities nevertheless took more than ten months to file the review petition. Learned Senior Counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. , 3[(2025) SCC OnLine SC 1969 to contend that when the State is a litigant, the same yardstick for condonation of delay applicable to any other litigant must be applied. 6.1 Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the revision petition was decided after framing the questions of law with the consent of both parties, and the admitted questions have been duly answered in the order under review. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the grounds and substantial questions of law were permitted by way of amendment and on additional grounds. 6.1 Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the revision petition was decided after framing the questions of law with the consent of both parties, and the admitted questions have been duly answered in the order under review. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the grounds and substantial questions of law were permitted by way of amendment and on additional grounds. 6.2 Learned Senior Counsel submits that Entry Tax is paid when blended petrol is sold and, therefore, levying Entry Tax at the point of entry would amount to double taxation, which is impermissible. He further submits that the tax on sale already includes Entry Tax, and this position has not been disputed by the Revenue. Learned Senior Counsel contends that in earlier years the Department had accepted and approved the procedure of paying Entry Tax at the point of sale of blended petrol, and the present change in stand is without any basis. In support of the limited scope of review, learned Senior Counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through Legal representatives and Others Vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others , (2021) 13 SCC 1 7. Learned Senior Counsel submits that Section 3 imposes a levy of tax on the entry of goods specified in the First Schedule into a local area for the purpose of consumption. 8. The First Schedule, at Entry 86 under the heading ‘Spirits and Alcohols,’ includes (i) denatured spirit, (ii) rectified spirit, and (iii) ethyl alcohol. The rate of tax was notified by the State Government vide Notification dated 30.04.1992 at 2%, treating denatured spirit, rectified spirit, and ethyl alcohol as distinct products. The Notification dated 30.04.1992 was thereafter cancelled by Notification dated 31.03.1994. Subsequently, another Notification dated 30.03.2002 was issued in exercise of powers under Section 3 (1) of the KTEG Act, prescribing a rate of 4% on rectified spirit, neutral spirit, and ethyl alcohol. 8.1 It is submitted that no rate of tax has been prescribed for denatured spirit. The Notification dated 30.04.1992 was thereafter cancelled by Notification dated 31.03.1994. Subsequently, another Notification dated 30.03.2002 was issued in exercise of powers under Section 3 (1) of the KTEG Act, prescribing a rate of 4% on rectified spirit, neutral spirit, and ethyl alcohol. 8.1 It is submitted that no rate of tax has been prescribed for denatured spirit. Therefore, when denatured spirit and ethyl alcohol are treated as distinct items under Entry 86 of the First Schedule, and the earlier Notification dated 30.04.1992 had separately provided the rate of tax for each, the Notification dated 30.03.2002 cannot be interpreted as including denatured spirit within the expression ‘ethyl alcohol.’ 8.2 Learned Senior Counsel submits that when the First Schedule distinguishes denatured spirit and ethyl alcohol as separate products, and when no rate of tax has been notified for denatured spirit, the expression ‘ethyl alcohol’ cannot be read to include denatured spirit for the purpose of determining the applicable rate of tax. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that, as relied upon by the learned Additional Government Advocate, the Indian Standard ‘Anhydrous Ethanol for Use in Automotive Fuel – Specification’ issued by the Bureau of Indian Standards itself classifies ethyl alcohol and denatured spirit as two distinct products, both in terms of their chemical composition and their usage. It is therefore submitted that, in the absence of a prescribed rate of tax for denatured spirit, the charging provision fails, and no tax under the KTEG Act can be levied on denatured spirit. 9. Smt. Tanmaye Rajkumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, concurs with the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel on both the aspects, delay as well as merits. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 10. Having considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration of this Court in addition to substantial questions of law framed hereinabove: (i) Whether the delay in filing the review petition is reasonably explained? (ii) Whether the review petition merits consideration? (iii) Whether delay in filing civil revision petitions are explained? 11. The above points are independent of the questions of law that have been raised and admitted in the Civil Revision Petitions. ANALYSIS Reg. Point No. 1: 12. The order under review is dated 19.06.2023. (ii) Whether the review petition merits consideration? (iii) Whether delay in filing civil revision petitions are explained? 11. The above points are independent of the questions of law that have been raised and admitted in the Civil Revision Petitions. ANALYSIS Reg. Point No. 1: 12. The order under review is dated 19.06.2023. According to the list of dates forming part of the affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of delay, the petitioner initially considered filing a Special Leave Petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The list of dates indicates the movement of the file within the hierarchy of the petitioner from 20.07.2023, when the order was downloaded, until 22.11.2023, when the recommendation to file a review petition before this Court was considered. Thereafter, a series of procedural steps culminating in the filing of the review petition on 07.08.2024 have been set out. 12.1 However, there is no explanation for the period between 31.01.2024 and 17.05.2024, and between 21.05.2024 and 09.07.2024, which together constitute a delay of more than six months. When a grievance is raised against the order under review, and the process of considering an SLP has consumed four months, the subsequent decision to file a review petition which involves only a change in forum has taken nearly eleven months. This delay is sought to be explained as reasonable. 12.2 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (supra has held as under: "88. It follows, that such appeals or applications, are generally preferred as continuation of proceedings already instituted or within proceedings already ongoing before a forum. In such instances, the degree of vigilance that is expected is much higher, a party is required be prompt in making all possible endeavours to take the next step by filing the appeal or application. The inaction or laxity of the party in making such endeavours is all the more significant for deciding if delay should be condoned or not, as, by the time the stage of preferring the appeal or application, arises, it already has the necessary knowledge to act upon quickly, by virtue of the prior or ongoing proceedings. If despite it, a party chooses to wait till the very last date, it may in all probability be the result of a deliberate action to dilate the proceedings or the lack of any modicum of respect for the prescribed period of limitation. 89. If despite it, a party chooses to wait till the very last date, it may in all probability be the result of a deliberate action to dilate the proceedings or the lack of any modicum of respect for the prescribed period of limitation. 89. Thus, the notion that a party who failed to timely avail its remedies, by way of appeal or application, despite having sufficient awareness of the original proceedings should be shown due deference in condonation of delay, and is entitled to wait, without being questioned, till the last day of limitation, is preposterous. 142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting. 171. The next submission that was advanced on behalf of the respondents herein is that, in matters pertaining to condonation of delay, a certain degree of leeway ought to be accorded to the Government and Public Authorities owing to the innate complexities in the way the State apparatus functions. The argument is that due to the inherent bureaucracy and involvement of various departments of different hierarchy which are endemic to the functioning of the State and its instrumentalities, unavoidable delays tend to crop up even without any deliberate intention, and thus, the courts ought to be pragmatic and liberal where the State or any of its instrumentalities is seeking condonation of delay in the filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore , (1988) 2 SCC 142 . 177. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra), this Court observed that public interest suffers if appeals brought by the Government are thrown out due to the lapse of the limitation period. Accordingly, it held that a certain amount of latitude towards the Government is, therefore, not impermissible, for the purpose of condonation of delay. 177. In G. Ramegowda, Major (supra), this Court observed that public interest suffers if appeals brought by the Government are thrown out due to the lapse of the limitation period. Accordingly, it held that a certain amount of latitude towards the Government is, therefore, not impermissible, for the purpose of condonation of delay. The relevant observations made therein read as under:— “15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffeed owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. […]” (Emphasis supplied) 182. The ultimate test that was evolved whether substantial justice would suffer if condonation were denied. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. […]” (Emphasis supplied) 182. The ultimate test that was evolved whether substantial justice would suffer if condonation were denied. Thus, the balance was tilted in favour of condonation when the litigant was the State, as denial could prejudice public interest, frustrate legitimate claims, or impact the public exchequer. The jurisprudence therefore evolved to give primacy to public interest over procedural rigidity. 191. Even in the decisions of Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra) where this Court recognized the necessity for drawing a demarcation between a State or any of its instrumentalities, on the one hand and a private individual, on the other, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this Court simultaneously observed that such differential treatment cannot continue for all times to come. We say so, because this Court, in the latter parts of the aforesaid decisions, conveyed an emphatic message to all the States and its instrumentalities to constitute legal cells for the timely scrutiny of its cases, to explore the possibility of settlement instead of pursuing belated claims, wherever possible and to ensure that filing of appeals or application as the case may be, is undertaken expeditiously, and the officer responsible for pursuing such action is made personally liable for lapses, if any. 249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration." 12.3 If the principle laid down in the above judgment is applied to the present case, it is evident that the petitioner, having had a grievance against the order under review, initially processed the proposal for filing an SLP, which was actively considered for nearly five months. Thereafter, a decision was taken to file a review petition. However, the finalisation of the review petition has consumed almost eleven months, which, though projected as a continuous process, reflects substantial delay. Thereafter, a decision was taken to file a review petition. However, the finalisation of the review petition has consumed almost eleven months, which, though projected as a continuous process, reflects substantial delay. 12.4 From the list of dates, it is apparent that there were periods of inaction and laxity on the part of the petitioner in taking timely decisions. The conduct of the petitioner does not indicate prompt or bona fide action. The time taken in first considering the filing of an SLP, and thereafter in filing the review petition, cannot be regarded as fair or reasonable. This Court is unable to appreciate the time consumed between 22.11.2023 and 07.08.2024 for filing the review petition, particularly when five months had already been taken for considering the filing of an SLP against the very same order. 12.5 It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of delay. No doubt, it is not the length of delay but the explanation for the delay that is material. However, in the present case, no cause, much less a reasonable or satisfactory cause has been shown. An attempt was made to persuade this Court to condone the delay having regard to the alleged merits of the matter. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, the merits cannot be a basis for condonation; only the cause for delay is to be considered and nothing more. 13. The learned Additional Government Advocate has also urged this Court to take a lenient view on the ground that the petitioner is the State. This aspect, however, has already been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment referred to above. It has been held that no differential treatment can be afforded in the matter of condonation of delay merely because the State is a party. The Supreme Court has further held that once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that govern any ordinary litigant. To permit the State to escape the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lies with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigor of limitation statutes and defeating their very object. Such an approach would not only unjustly privilege the State over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration. Such an approach would not only unjustly privilege the State over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration. 14. We are constrained to observe, upon examining the list of dates annexed to the application, that the authorities concerned have not acted responsibly in the discharge of their duties. It appears that the petitioner has proceeded in a leisurely manner, seemingly under the expectation that differential treatment would be extended merely because the petitioner is the State. The reasons assigned, presented only in the form of a list of dates, do not explain the delay, they merely chronicle events. The recurring nature of the issue involved cannot serve as a ground to overlook the unreasonable delay. 15. In light of the above discussion, the delay of 374 days in filing the review petition cannot be condoned. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1/2024 is rejected. Reg. Point No. 3: 16. The order in the STA is dated 30.09.2022, whereas the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed on 13.02.2025. As per the affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of delay, the CRP has been filed with a delay of 680 days. The affidavit merely states that a copy of the impugned order was received on 06.12.2022, and that administrative procedures consumed time, culminating in the Government Order authorising the filing of the revision petition on 17.10.2023, which was communicated to the Government Advocate on 26.10.2023. Thereafter, the Government Advocate addressed a letter dated 13.12.2023 to the Litigation Conducting Officer seeking relevant documents, which were furnished only on 16.01.2025. The CRP was thereafter presented on 13.02.2025. These reasons are projected as sufficient cause for condonation of 680 days’ delay. 16.1 Having regard to the manner in which the litigation has been conducted by the State and its authorities, we are constrained to make certain observations. The issue involved in the impugned order is identical to the one decided in CRP.No.88/2014 on 19.06.2023. Although the identical issue had been pending before this Court since 2014, no substantial decision-making was required for filing an appeal. Even assuming the petitioner awaited the outcome in CRP.No.88/2014, the same was decided on 19.06.2023. The said order was processed for filing an SLP from 20.07.2023, indicating that the impugned order dated 30.09.2022 was not acceptable to the petitioner. Although the identical issue had been pending before this Court since 2014, no substantial decision-making was required for filing an appeal. Even assuming the petitioner awaited the outcome in CRP.No.88/2014, the same was decided on 19.06.2023. The said order was processed for filing an SLP from 20.07.2023, indicating that the impugned order dated 30.09.2022 was not acceptable to the petitioner. There was thus no impediment in simultaneously processing the filing of a CRP against the order dated 30.09.2022. 16.2 The subsequent decision to pursue a review petition, in place of an SLP, was taken during the period between 22.11.2023 and 07.08.2024. Even during this period, no action is forthcoming from the petitioner to initiate the filing of a CRP against the order dated 30.09.2022. The review petition itself was belatedly filed on 07.08.2024. The petitioner was fully aware that the issue was recurring in nature. 16.3 Coming to the affidavit explaining the delay, the Government Order authorising the filing of the CRP was issued after a period of ten months. Although the Government Advocate sought relevant documents on 13.12.2023, the same were provided only on 16.01.2025, after a delay of thirteen months. The affidavit is conspicuously silent about the delay between 13.12.2023 and 16.01.2025. 16.4 The overall conduct of the petitioner leaves the unmistakable impression that neither the State nor its authorities exercised due diligence. On the contrary, the record reveals clear administrative lethargy and laxity. Administrative lethargy can never constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. When the bona fides expected in litigation involving public interest are absent, the State cannot claim any differential treatment. The conduct demonstrated amounts to a failure in the discharge of public duties. 16.5 It is also surprising that after the impugned order, this Court rendered a decision in another matter involving the same issue, against which a review petition-albeit belated was filed. Despite this, the present petitions were filed nearly six months after the filing of the review petition. Acceptance of the petitioner’s plea for a lenient approach would amount to granting differential treatment to the State, which the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (supra) has categorically held to be impermissible. 16.6 In the present case, the conduct of the authorities is undeniably lethargic. Condonation of such delay would only encourage irresponsibility on the part of officers entrusted with litigation involving public money, which deserves to be deprecated. 16.6 In the present case, the conduct of the authorities is undeniably lethargic. Condonation of such delay would only encourage irresponsibility on the part of officers entrusted with litigation involving public money, which deserves to be deprecated. The petitioner has not acted as a model litigant. The application for condonation of delay is not only liable to be rejected, but also warrants the imposition of heavy costs. The question of costs shall be considered at a later stage of this judgment while dealing with the remaining issues. 17. The questions of law have been admitted. The issue involved is straightforward. Section 3 of the KTEG Act imposes tax on the entry of any goods specified in the First Schedule into a local area for consumption, use, or sale at such rates not exceeding 5% of the value of the goods as may be specified by the State Government by notification, with the power to prescribe different rates for different goods, classes of goods, or local areas. 18. Section 3 (1) reads as under: 3. Levy of Tax.- (1) There shall be levied and collected a tax on [entry of any goods specified in the First Schedule] into a local area per cent of the value of the goods as may be specified [retrospectively or prospectively by the State Government by Notification, and different dates] and different rates may be specified in respect of different goods or different classes of goods or different local areas. Note . Sub-section (1) as it stood prior to the first day of May, 1992, after the proviso, the following proviso shall be and shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from the Twenty-seventh day of November, 1984, namely: - Provided further that no tax shall be payable on cast iron castings when used as raw material, component part or any other input which may be used in the manufacture of an intermediate or finished goods. Note . After sub-section (1), the following proviso shall be deemed to have inserted with effect from the first day of May, 1992 and shall be deemed to have been omitted with effect from the First day of September, 1993, namely:- Provided that no tax shall be payable on cast iron castings when used as raw material, component part or any other input which may be used in the manufacture of an intermediate finished goods." 19. Entry 86 of First Schedule reads as under: "86. Spirits and alcohol, that is to say.- (i) denatured spirit; (ii) rectified spirit; (iii) ethyl alcohol." 20. Sl.No.66 of Notification dated 30.04.1992 reads as under: Sl. No. Description of Scheduled goods 1st Schedule Item No. Rate of Tax ……. 66 Spirits and alcohol, that is to say:- [86] 2% (i) Denatured spirit; [86(i)] 2% (ii) Rectified spirit; [86(ii)] 2% (iii) Ethyl alcohol; [86(iii)] 2% 21. The notification dated 30.04.1992 came to be cancelled by Notification dated 31.03.1994. Fresh notification came to be issued on 30.03.2002 in exercise of powers under subsection (1) of Section 3 of KTEG Act. Entry 1 (vii) of Notification dated 30.03.2002 reads as under: Sl. No. Commodity Rate of Tax …… (viii) Rectified Spirit, Neutral Spirit, Ethyl Alcohol 4% 22. From the above, it is evident that denatured spirit and ethyl alcohol are treated as distinct products in the First Schedule. A similar distinction is maintained in the Notification dated 30.04.1992, which prescribes a rate of tax at 2%. In view of the cancellation of the said Notification by the subsequent Notification dated 30.03.1994, there was no levy until the Notification dated 30.03.2002 came into force. The Notification dated 30.03.2002 includes rectified spirit, neutral spirit, and ethyl alcohol; however, denatured spirit is notably absent. 23. The State seeks to contend that ethyl alcohol and denatured spirit are one and the same, and therefore, the levy of 4% on ethyl alcohol should equally apply to denatured spirit. This contention is untenable. As of today, Entry 86 of the First Schedule to the KTEG Act distinctly identifies denatured spirit and ethyl alcohol as separate commodities. A similar distinction is evident in Item No.6 of the Notification dated 30.04.1992 prescribing the rate of tax. 24. When denatured spirit is not included in the Notification dated 30.03.2002, it is impermissible to contend that ethyl alcohol includes denatured spirit. When both products are treated differently in the First Schedule, it is difficult to accept that they are to be regarded as the same for the purposes of the Notification dated 30.03.2002, particularly when the earlier Notification dated 30.04.1992 expressly treated them separately. 25. Even the Indian Standard: Anhydrous Ethanol for Use in Automobile Fuel – Specification issued by the Bureau of Indian Standards distinguishes ethyl alcohol from denatured spirit based on their function and usage. 25. Even the Indian Standard: Anhydrous Ethanol for Use in Automobile Fuel – Specification issued by the Bureau of Indian Standards distinguishes ethyl alcohol from denatured spirit based on their function and usage. This aspect has been rightly considered by the Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order. The view taken by this Court in the order under review also proceeds on the same reasoning. 26. This Court, in the order under review, has undertaken a detailed analysis of Section 3 (Levy of Tax), the entries in the First Schedule, and the effect of the Notifications dated 30.04.1992, 31.03.1994, and 30.03.2002, and has arrived at the conclusion that the Notification dated 30.03.2002 does not apply to impose entry tax on denatured spirit. The order under review has considered all submissions and contentions sought to be urged in the present review petition. 27. We find no justifiable or demonstrable grounds to take a view different from that taken by this Court in CRP.No.88/2014 dated 19.06.2023. 28. The above questions of law stand fully answered and are squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in CRP.No.88/2014. Accordingly, the questions are answered in the same terms. Reg. Point No.2: 29. The review petitioner seeks to re-agitate issues already considered and decided by the Co-ordinate Bench in the order under review. The scope of review jurisdiction is exceedingly narrow. A review may be entertained only when a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record is clearly demonstrated. An error that requires a process of reasoning to be discerned cannot be regarded as an “error apparent on the face of the record” so as to attract the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Under the guise of review, the Court may correct an apparent mistake, but it cannot revisit or substitute the view earlier taken. 29.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Inderchand Jain v. Motilal , , (2009) 14 SCC 663 has laid down the scope of review petition. Relevant paras extracted are as under: "8. An application for review would lie inter alia when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai18 this Court held: (SCC p. 514, para 6) '6. The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. An application for review would lie inter alia when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai18 this Court held: (SCC p. 514, para 6) '6. The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.' 9. The power of review can also be exercised by the court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. An application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason. 10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order." 29.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Kamal Sengupta and another , (2008) 8 SCC 612 has held as under: "22. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision." 29.3 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmed Ishaque , AIR 1955 SC 233 has held as under: "23.... It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? The learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated." 29.4 In Shri Ram Sahu (supra), the following conclusions were noted: "35. The principles which can be culled out from the abovenoted judgments are: (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason" appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier." 29.5 In the case of S . Madhusudhan Reddy Vs. V. Narayana Reddy and Others , (2022) 17 SCC 255 , referring to the principles laid down in Shri Ram Sahu (supra), it is held as under: "26. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been consistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements that the Court's jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as "for any other sufficient reason". The said phrase has been explained to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule" 29.6 Similarly, in the case of M/s. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court examining the grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC reiterated the following conclusions: "19. This Court has laid down the following principles on the exercise of review jurisdiction: a. Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC; b. Error on the face of record must be an error which must strike one on a mere perusal and must not on a long drawn process; C. The power of review must not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits; d. The phrase "any other sufficient reason" means a reason that is analogous to the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC; and e. The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review." 30. In light of the settled legal position, the contentions urged in support of the review petitions amount to nothing more than a re-argument of points already advanced and considered by this Court. In light of the settled legal position, the contentions urged in support of the review petitions amount to nothing more than a re-argument of points already advanced and considered by this Court. No error apparent on the face of the record is demonstrated; what is sought is merely a rehearing of the matter. We are, therefore, not inclined to entertain the review petition. In light of our finding on questions of law framed in Crp's, the review petition is not entertainable even on its merits. 31. Before we close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make certain observations. The entire exercise undertaken in the present case is futile and amounts to an abuse of the process of law. This exercise has not only consumed the precious time of this Court but has also resulted in unnecessary wastage of the time and resources of the State machinery. The conduct and manner in which the litigation has been handled by the concerned authorities do not reflect responsible behaviour. The officer who approved the filing of the review petition and the belated civil revision petitions has failed to act in the manner expected of a public servant. Fairness in action is conspicuously absent. 32. This case warrants stricter action against all officials involved in initiating and processing these litigations, which could either have been avoided or timely acted upon. The belated filing with unreasonable delay appears to be an attempt to create an impression that necessary steps were taken, though devoid of bona fides. Such conduct cannot be countenanced. 33. Although the circumstances merit the imposition of heavy costs on the concerned officials and initiation of disciplinary proceedings; as a measure of caution, and in the hope that matters involving public interest will hereafter be dealt with seriousness, we refrain from issuing further directions in this regard. However, we direct the Registry to forward a copy of this order to the Finance Secretary, State of Karnataka with the expectation that appropriate steps will be taken to set the administrative machinery in order, thereby ensuring the protection of public money and public interest. 34. In the light of the above, the following: ORDER (i) I.A. No.1/2024 in R.P. No.447/2024 is rejected. Consequently, R.P. No.447/2024 stands dismissed both on the ground of delay and on merits. (ii) I.A. No.1/2025 in CRP Nos.116/2025, 114/2025, 122/2025, 175/2025 and 186/2025 is rejected. 34. In the light of the above, the following: ORDER (i) I.A. No.1/2024 in R.P. No.447/2024 is rejected. Consequently, R.P. No.447/2024 stands dismissed both on the ground of delay and on merits. (ii) I.A. No.1/2025 in CRP Nos.116/2025, 114/2025, 122/2025, 175/2025 and 186/2025 is rejected. (iii) Consequently, the civil revision petitions are dismissed by answering the questions in favour of the assessee and against the petitioner.