ORDER : REKHA BORANA, J. 1. The present appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment dated 21.09.2024 passed by District Judge, Jodhpur Metropolitan in Civil Misc. Case No.13-A/2013 (NCV No.340/2014) whereby the application as filed by the appellant-applicant under Sections 270 , 276 & 278 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1925’) for grant of probate qua Will dated 20.12.1994, stood rejected. 2. A preliminary objection regarding the court fee paid by the appellant on the present appeal, has been raised by counsel for the respondents. 3. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the present appeal has been filed on a court fee of Rs.10/- only which clearly is deficient. Counsel submitted that even the court fee as deposited by the applicant before the learned Trial Court was deficient and although an objection qua the same was raised by the respondents but the said objection stood rejected and the learned Trial Court erroneously observed that the applicant shall be required to pay the complete court fee only if ultimately his application is allowed and a probate is issued in his favour. 4. Counsel submitted that Section 51 of the Rajasthan Court- Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1961’) specifically provides that the fee chargeable for grant of probate shall be calculated at the rate prescribed in Article 6 of Schedule I and as per Article 6 of Schedule I, when the amount or value of the estate exceeds five thousand rupees, the court fee payable is three per centum on such amount or value. So far as the present appeal is concerned, as per Article 4 of Schedule I of the Act of 1961, an amount equal to one-half the fee at the scale prescribed in Article 1 on the market value of the subject-matter, shall be payable. 5. The argument of counsel for the respondents is therefore two-fold: firstly, the court fee on the application before the learned Trial Court itself ought to have been paid in terms of Section 51 of the Act of 1961 and secondly, court fee in terms of Article 4 of Schedule I ought to have been paid on the present appeal. 6. The argument of counsel for the respondents is therefore two-fold: firstly, the court fee on the application before the learned Trial Court itself ought to have been paid in terms of Section 51 of the Act of 1961 and secondly, court fee in terms of Article 4 of Schedule I ought to have been paid on the present appeal. 6. In the alternate, counsel submitted that if not in terms of Section 51 , the court fee in terms of Proviso to Article 11(j) of Schedule II of the Act of 1961 was definitely payable on the application before the learned Trial Court. 7. Responding to the above preliminary objection, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that it is the settled proposition of law that in cases of Probate/Letters of Administration, the court fee as per Section 51 of the Act of 1961 is payable only after an order of Probate/Letters of Administration been passed in favour of the applicant. So far as the application is concerned, the court fee is payable in terms of Article 11(j)(ii)(2) of Schedule II of the Act of 1961. As per Article 11(j)(ii)(2), the court fee payable for the value exceeding Rs.1,000/- is Rs.5/- which has been paid by the applicant. Hence, in terms of Section 15 of the Act of 1961, it is the said court fee only which was required to be paid on the present appeal and the same remains paid. 8. So far as the Proviso to Article 11(j) is concerned, counsel submits that the application as filed by the applicant was not registered as a suit and hence, the said proviso shall not apply to the present matter. 9. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even otherwise the respondents are estopped from raising the above objection as it was raised by them before the learned Trial Court too which stood rejected and the said order having become final, cannot be permitted to be raised again at this stage. 10. Learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted that the learned Trial Court, keeping into consideration Article 11(j) of Schedule II, entertained the application as filed by the applicant with a specific observation that the complete court fee shall be required to be paid only if the court grants a probate in his favour. 10. Learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted that the learned Trial Court, keeping into consideration Article 11(j) of Schedule II, entertained the application as filed by the applicant with a specific observation that the complete court fee shall be required to be paid only if the court grants a probate in his favour. The same observation deserves to be made by this Court too and the appeal as filed by the appellant deserves to be heard on merit. 11. Heard learned counsels on the preliminary objection. 12. Before proceeding on to adjudicate the issues involved, reproduction of the relevant provisions would be apt. 13. Section 51 of the Act of 1961 provides as under : “ 51. Levy of fee.- (1) The fee chargeable for the grant of Probate or Letters of Administration shall be calculated at the rate or rates prescribed in Article 6 of Schedule I,- (a) Where the application is made within one year of the date of death of the deceased, on the market value of the estate on such date; or (b) Where the application is made after the expiry of one year from such date, on the market value of the estate on the date of the application: Provided that property held in trust not beneficially or with general power to confer a beneficial interest shall not be liable to any fee under this Chapter. Explanation.- Any member of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law who applies for Probate or Letters of Administration in respect of the estate of a deceased member of the joint family shall pay a fee on the value of the share in the joint property which the deceased would have received if a partition of the property had been made immediately before his death. (2) for the purpose of the computation of fee,- (a) the value of the items mentioned in Annexure B to Part I of Schedule III shall be deducted from the value of the estate: Provided that, when an application is made for Probate or Letters of Administration in respect of part only of an estate, no debt, no expenses connected with any funeral rites or ceremonies and no mortgage encumbrance on any part of the estate other than that in respect of which the application is made shall be deducted: Provided further that when, after the grant of a certificate under Part X of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (Central Act 39 0f 1925) in respect of any property included in an estate, a grant of Probate or Letters of Administration is made in respect of the same estate, the fee payable in respect of the latter grant shall be reduced by the amount of the fee payable in respect of the former grant; (b) the power of appointment which the deceased had over a property or which was created under a Will shall be taken into account, the value of the property forming the subject-matter of the power.” 14. Article 4 of Schedule I of the Act of 1961 provides as under: “Memorandum of appeal against An amount equal to one-half order in proceedings under the the fee at the scale prescribed Indian Succession Act, 1925 in Article 1 on the market value (Central Act XXXIX of 1925) of the subject-matter.” 15. Article 6 of Schedule I of the Act of 1961 provides as under: “6. Probate of a Will or Letters of Administration with or without Will annexed- When the amount or value of the estate in respect of which Two per centum on such amount the grant of probate or letters or value. is made exceeds one thousand rupees. When such amount or value Three per centum on such exceeds five thousand rupees. amount or value.” 16. is made exceeds one thousand rupees. When such amount or value Three per centum on such exceeds five thousand rupees. amount or value.” 16. Article 11(j) of Schedule II of the Act of 1961 provides as under : “(j)(i) Application for Probate or Twenty Five Rupees Letters of Administration to have effect throughout India; (ii) application for Probate or Letters of Administration not falling under clause (i)- (1) if the value of the estate does One Rupee not exceed Rs.1,000; (2) if the value exceeds Rs.1,000; Five Rupees Provided that if a caveat is entered and the application is registered as a suit, one-half the scale of fee prescribed in Article 1 of Schedule I the market value on the estate less the fee already paid on the application shall be levied.” 17. The first issue which arises is- Whether the court fee in terms of Section 51 of the Act of 1961, that is, the complete court fee on the market value of the estate, is/was payable? 18. There is no quarrel on the settled position of law that court fee in terms of Section 51 of the Act of 1961 is payable only after a probate/letters of administration been granted in favour of an applicant. The court fee in terms of is not payable on an application at the first instance. The said ratio has been settled vide various judgments of this Court and reiterated in Vasudeo vs. Lal Singh and Ors. ; AIR 1992 Raj 133 . Therein, the Court while dealing with Article 11(j) of Schedule II and Article 6 of Schedule I observed and held as under : “A bare reading of the two entries goes to show that court-fee payable on application for probate is different from court-fee payable on the probate . If the legislature intended that the entire fees payable on probate should be collected along with application for probate, then it would not have made a provision for the application in entry 11(j) of Schedule II of the Act and another for probate under entry 6 in Schedule I of the Act. 7. Now coming to the practice, I would like to observe that a uniform practice has to be observed throughout the State and no separate practice can be established for one judgeship. 7. Now coming to the practice, I would like to observe that a uniform practice has to be observed throughout the State and no separate practice can be established for one judgeship. Moreover, learned counsel for the appellant states at the Bar that the practice in this Court is to collect fee on probate after order for grant for probate has been made. This statement has not been controverted by learned counsel on the other side. In my opinion, practice prevalent in the judgeship has nothing to commend itself and it should give way to the practice prevailing in this Court. Payment of entire court-fee on probate at the stage of making an application for probate places a heavy financial burden on the applicant. The Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act is a fiscal statute and its provisions have to be construed strictly. This is true that in Mundrika Prasad Singh’s case (AIR 1955 Patna 362)(supra) a view has been taken that court-fee is payable before the hearing of the probate proceedings. But, in my opinion, this view is not in accord with the two provisions of the Act which have been reproduced above. The two provisions make a clear-cut distinction between court-fees payable on an application for probate and fee payable on grant of probate . The view in that case turned upon the wordings of the particular rule in force in that State. Moreover, this ruling has been dissented to in A.G. Hariharan’s case (AIR 1983 Kant 213) (supra), wherein it has been held that the relevant date for purpose of calculating the court-fee payable on probate is the date on which order granting probate has been passed.” 19. Keeping in line with the above ratio, it is hereby held that neither Section 51 nor Article 6 of Schedule I would apply to the present matter as the application for probate as filed by the applicant stood rejected. 20. Coming on to the next issue – Was the court fee as paid by the appellant applicant on the application before the learned Trial Court, sufficient ? 21. A bare perusal of Article 11(j) of Schedule I reflects that a different court fee is provided for applications which are contested and those which are not contested. 20. Coming on to the next issue – Was the court fee as paid by the appellant applicant on the application before the learned Trial Court, sufficient ? 21. A bare perusal of Article 11(j) of Schedule I reflects that a different court fee is provided for applications which are contested and those which are not contested. In application where a caveat has been entered or the same is registered as a suit, one-half of the fee prescribed in Article 1 of Schedule I is leviable. 22. Therefore, the relevant factor to decide the issue would be- Whether the application in question was a contested one or not/registered as a suit or not ? 23. Explanation to Section 286 of the Act of 1925 defines ‘Contention’ as under : “ ‘Contention’ means the appearance of any one in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf, to oppose the proceeding.” 24. Meaning thereby, in any matter where an appearance is given by any person, his recognised agent or by his pleader to oppose the proceeding, the same would be termed to be a contentious matter. A bare perusal of order impugned dated 21.09.2024 reflects that it was seriously contested by the respondents. Further, the application was not only registered but the complete proceedings were conducted as a regular suit in so far as the issues were framed, evidence was led by the parties and the learned Trial Court proceeded on to decide the application as a regular suit while recording its finding on all the issues. Therefore it cannot be held that the application was not registered as a suit. A mere difference in nomenclature of registration, that is to say, registered with an application number and not as a civil suit shall not make any difference so far as the nature of the application is concerned. It is evident that the case was tried as a regular suit. As held in Smt. Shanta Bai vs. Kishen Gopal ; 1970 RLW 183 even though the application was not registered as a suit, the Court was bound to try the case as nearly as if it were a regular suit. It is evident that the case was tried as a regular suit. As held in Smt. Shanta Bai vs. Kishen Gopal ; 1970 RLW 183 even though the application was not registered as a suit, the Court was bound to try the case as nearly as if it were a regular suit. Therein, the Court specifically held that the court fee in a contentious case for grant of probate or letters of administration is payable in terms of Proviso to Article 11(j) of Schedule II. The same view was reiterated in Bhagwandas and Ors. vs. Bhagwandas ; AIR 2000 Raj 67 25. In the specific opinion of this Court, the above ratio squarely applies to the present matter. The application in question was not only registered in terms of Section 295 of the Act of 1925, the proceedings were even conducted as a regular civil suit. Therefore the court fee definitely was payable in terms of Proviso to Article 11(j) of Schedule II. This Court is therefore of the clear opinion that the court fee as paid by the applicant before the learned Trial Court was deficient. 26. Section 11 (4)(a), (b) & (c) of the Act of 1961 provides as under : “(4)(a) Whenever a case comes up before a Court of Appeal, it shall be lawful for such Court, either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties, to consider the corrections of any order passed by the lower Court affecting the fee payable on the plaint or written statement or in any other proceeding in the lower Court and determine the proper fee payable thereon. Explanation.- A case shall be deemed to come before a Court of Appeal even if the appeal relates only to a part of the subject-matter of the suit. (b) If the Court of Appeal decides that the fee paid in the lower Court is not sufficient, the Court shall require the part liable to pay the deficit fee within such time as may be fixed by it. (b) If the Court of Appeal decides that the fee paid in the lower Court is not sufficient, the Court shall require the part liable to pay the deficit fee within such time as may be fixed by it. (c) If the deficit fee is not paid within the time fixed and the default is in respect of a relief which has been dismissed by the lower Court and which the appellant seeks in appeal, the appeal shall be dismissed, but if the default is in respect of a relief which has been decreed by the lower Court, the deficit fee shall be recoverable as if it were an arrear of land revenue.” 27. In view of the above provision when once this Court has reached to a conclusion that the court fee as computed and paid by the applicant before the learned Trial Court was deficient, this Court is required to direct the appellant to pay the deficit court fee and it is only after the payment of the said deficit court fee, the appeal can be heard on merit. 28. In view of the overall analysis and findings as recorded hereinabove, the preliminary objection as raised by the respondents is partly allowed . The appellant is directed to compute the court fee payable on the application as filed before the learned Trial Court afresh, and pay the same in terms of Proviso to Article 11(j) of Schedule II of the Act of 1961, within a period of thirty days from the receipt of copy of the present order. 29. The appellant is further directed to compute the valuation of the present appeal afresh and pay the requisite court fee on the appeal in terms of Article 4 of Schedule I of Act of 1961, within a period of thirty days from the receipt of copy of the present order. 30. If the requisite court fee, both, qua the application and the appeal is deposited within the stipulated period, let the present appeal be listed for admission. 31. If the requisite court fee as directed above is not deposited within the stipulated period, the present appeal shall stand dismissed without reference to the Court. 32. Needless to observe that the respondents shall be at liberty to raise the valid objections if any, regarding the valuation made by the applicant/appellant, and the court fee as paid thereupon. 33. 31. If the requisite court fee as directed above is not deposited within the stipulated period, the present appeal shall stand dismissed without reference to the Court. 32. Needless to observe that the respondents shall be at liberty to raise the valid objections if any, regarding the valuation made by the applicant/appellant, and the court fee as paid thereupon. 33. Preliminary objection stands disposed of.