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2025 DIGILAW 164 (MP)

Gokul Singh Mandot v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2025-03-04

SUBODH ABHYANKAR

body2025
ORDER : 1. This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the constitution of India seeking following relief:- “7.1 That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ/order/direction to quash the order dated 30.5.2024 and 20.11.2024 (P/1& P/2) passed by the respondent no.3 and 3. 7.2 That this Hon’ble Court may further please to direct that respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service and grant all consequential benefits including the monitory benefits. 7.3. That allow the petition with cost. 7.4 That any other relied this Hon’ble Court may think fit may grant.” 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the orders dated 30.5.2024 and 20.11.2024, passed by the respondent no.4 and 3 respectively. Vide order dated 30.5.2024, the order of termination has been passed by the respondent no.4/Deputy Inspector General of Police, District Ujjain, whereas, vide order dated 20.11.2024, the appeal preferred by the appellant has also been rejected by respondent no.3/Inspector General of Police, District Ujjain. 3. The petitioner’s case is that he was posted as Sub Inspector of Police, at Bhatpachlana, Ujjain wherein, on 30.6.2020, an FIR was registered against the petitioner u/ss. 376, 376(2)(n), 605 and 323 of IPC (Annexure P-3) by a female constable pursuant to which a charge sheet was also issued to him on 8.5.2020. Whereas a charge sheet was also issued against him in the departmental enquiry, alleging minor misconduct that the petitioner had kept in contact with the victim and had also assaulted her, which has tarnished the reputation of police department in the public domain. 4. Since both the cases had arisen out of the same set of facts, with a view to stay the proceedings before the department, the petitioner also filed W.P. No. 19417/2020 (Annexure P-5) which was disposed of by the coordinate Bench of this Court on 27.2.2023, directing the petitioner to file an application for stay of the departmental proceeding before the respondent and observing that in case such an application is filed by the petitioner, then, before proceeding further for recording of evidence, the application be decided by passing a reasoned and speaking order. However, the said application was rejected by the department on 6.4.2023 and continued with the enquiry which led the petitioner to file another writ petition No.14575/2024 challenging the aforesaid order. However, the said application was rejected by the department on 6.4.2023 and continued with the enquiry which led the petitioner to file another writ petition No.14575/2024 challenging the aforesaid order. However, since the enquiry report was already prepared, the coordinate Bench of this Court, in W.P.No.14575/2024 vide order dated 31.5.2024,by way of interim measure, directed that no final order shall be passed in the departmental enquiry. However, according to the petitioner the final order was already passed on 30.5.2024, and subsequently, W.P.No.14575/2024 was dismissed as withdrawn on 15.7.2024 with liberty to the petitioner to challenge the order dated 30/5/2024 in accordance with law. 5. The aforesaid final order dated 30.5.2024 was challenged in an appeal dated 24.7.2024,which was dismissed by the respondent no.3 Inspector General vide its order dated 20.11.2024, which is also challenged before this Court. 6. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that during pendency of the appeal, the criminal case which was registered under Section 376 of IPC was also decided vide judgment dated 23.10.2024, whereby, the petitioner was acquitted of all the charges on merits, and the order of acquittal was also filed before the appellate authority on 6.11.2024, regarding which no observations were made by the appellate authority, and even the reference of which has not been made. 7. Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that the appellant Authority has erred in not taking into account the fact that in both the cases viz., the departmental enquiry as also the criminal case which was filed in the criminal Court, has arisen out of the same set of facts which led to the incident, however, in the departmental enquiry regarding minor misdemeanor was alleged against the petitioner whereas in the criminal case the story of prosecution was exaggerated, and section 376 of IPC which is an offence of rape, was also added. However, the learned judge of the trial Court has acquitted the petitioner after appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix/victim and has come to a conclusion that she has made false allegation against the petitioner. 8. Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to paragraphs no.29 to 32 of the judgment of the acquittal passed by the trial Court on 23.10.2024. 9. 8. Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to paragraphs no.29 to 32 of the judgment of the acquittal passed by the trial Court on 23.10.2024. 9. Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that so far as the departmental enquiry is concerned, three witnesses were common, including victim, her father and a police officer, whereas other 14 witnesses were not examined in the criminal case, as in all 11 witnesses were examined in the criminal case whereas 25 witnesses were cited. Whereas in the departmental enquiry as many as 10 witnesses have been examined. 10. It is further submitted that in the criminal case, the star witness was victim only and whose deposition had been minutely dealt with by the criminal court to arrive at a conclusion that her version of story cannot be treated to be true, and although the petitioner has been acquitted on the ground of benefit of doubt, in fact he has been acquitted on merits after appreciating the evidence of the victim. Whereas, in the departmental enquiry, the statement of other witnesses as also the victim has been considered for awarding the punishment/dismissal of the petitioner despite the fact that for the reasons best known to the prosecution, the other witnesses who were examined in the departmental enquiry were not examined in the criminal Court. 11. Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 , Ramlal Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2024) 1 SCC 175 . 12. Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that excessive punishment has been awarded to the petitioner of dismissal from service despite the fact that minor allegations were made in the departmental enquiry of contacting the victim and the assault on her whereas no evidence of assault is enviable on record and only the oral evidence of victim has been considered. In support of his submission that the punishment is excessive, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision rendered by the division Bench of this Court in the case of Hemant Verma Vs. Home Department and others passed in W.P. No. 4488/2015 dated 5.9.2024 wherein also the petitioner was a police constable. 13. In support of his submission that the punishment is excessive, counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision rendered by the division Bench of this Court in the case of Hemant Verma Vs. Home Department and others passed in W.P. No. 4488/2015 dated 5.9.2024 wherein also the petitioner was a police constable. 13. Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that even in the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was not given proper opportunity to adduce evidence in his favour whereas the petitioner had sought time by submitting medical papers but the same were not taken into consideration. 14. On the other hand, Shri Bhuwan Deshmukh, learned counsel for the respondent/State has vehemently opposed the prayer, and it is submitted that no case for interference is made out as the departmental enquiry and the criminal trial have proceeded in two different spheres and apart from that, in the departmental enquiry, the witnesses were different and the charges were also different, in such circumstances, the petitioner cannot take any benefit of acquittal in the criminal trial. 15. Counsel for the respondent/State has further submitted that the petitioner was an acquaintance of the father of the victim and has taken undue advantage of his position, and thus, no leniency should be shown to the petitioner. 16. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 17. From the record, it is found that so far as the charge 8.5.2020 (Annexure P-4), framed in the departmental enquiry are concerned, the same read as under:- 18. Whereas, in the criminal trial S.T. No. 122/2023,the charges were framed under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 506 of IPC which were denied by the petitioner. Whereas the learned judge of the trial Court has formulated the following questions which required consideration of the Court:- 19. The perusal of the aforesaid question posed by the trial Court and vis-a-vis the charges framed in the departmental enquiry, it is found that the trial Court has also taken into account the allegation levelled against the petitioner of threat and assault, and after a detailed examination of evidence, has acquitted the petitioner. The relevant paragraphs 29 to 33 of the judgment are relevant which read as under:- 20. So far as the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of GM Tank (supra) is concerned, the relevant paras of the same read as under :- “31. The relevant paragraphs 29 to 33 of the judgment are relevant which read as under:- 20. So far as the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of GM Tank (supra) is concerned, the relevant paras of the same read as under :- “31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case [ (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. 32. In the instant case, the appellant joined the respondent in the year 1953. He was suspended from service on 8-2-1979 and got subsistence allowance of Rs 700 p.m. i.e. 50% of the salary. On 15-10-1982 dismissal order was passed. The appellant had put in 26 years of service with the respondent i.e. from 1953-1979. The appellant would now superannuate in February 1986. On the basis of the same charges and the evidence, the department passed an order of dismissal on 21- 10-1982 whereas the criminal court acquitted him on 30-1-2002. However, as the criminal court acquitted the appellant on 30-1-2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w.e.f. 30- 1-2002. But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension. 33. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the judgment and order dated 28-1-2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 948 of 1983 as affirmed by the Division Bench in LPA No. 1085 of 2002 and allow this appeal. However, there shall be no order as to costs.” 21. 33. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the judgment and order dated 28-1-2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 948 of 1983 as affirmed by the Division Bench in LPA No. 1085 of 2002 and allow this appeal. However, there shall be no order as to costs.” 21. Whereas in the case of Ram Lal (supra) the relevant paras read as:- “28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. 29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved” — in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” 30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] . xxxxxxxx 33. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 31-3-2004; the order of the appellate authority dated 8-10-2004; the orders dated 29-3-2008 and 25-6-2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty respectively, are all illegal and untenable. 34. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of DB Special Appeal (Writ) No. 484 of 2011 dated 5-9-2018 [Ram Lal Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3031] . We direct that the appellant shall be reinstated with all consequential benefits including seniority, notional promotions, fitment of salary and all other benefits. As far as back wages are concerned, we are inclined to award the appellant 50% of the back wages. The directions be complied with within a period of four weeks from today.” ( Emphasis supplied) 22. On perusal of the findings recorded by the trial Court in S.T. No. 122/2023 dated 23/10/2024, and the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the cases of GM Tank (supra) and Ramlal (Supra ), this Court finds that not only that the prosecution in the present case has miserably failed to bring home the guilt of the petitioner, but the trial Court has also found the deposition of the prosecutrix untrustworthy. 23. In such circumstances, when the charges in the departmental enquiry against the petitioner were only of keeping in touch with the complainant, and also of assault, whereas, the charge of assault was also framed against the petitioner in the criminal trial and was found to be false, this Court is of the considered opinion that any penalty much less the penalty of dismissal from service was totally uncalled for, and although it is true that the petitioner is in police service and it is expected of him to behave as per the ethics of police service, however, the criminal trial has brought out the falsity of the charges levelled against him. 24. 24. In view of the same, the impugned orders dated dated 30.5.2024 and 20.11.2024 (P/1 & P/2) are hereby quashed, and the writ petition stands allowed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and grant all the consequential benefits including the monitory benefits. Let the aforesaid exercise be completed within a further period of three months. 25. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed.