JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. The supplementary defendants 22, 23 and 26 to 28 in a suit for partition are the appellants herein. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows: The plaint schedule property comprised in item Nos.1 to 9 belonged to Karuvarakandiyil Karunakaran Nair. While so, Karunakaran Nair expired on 20.8.1985 leaving behind the plaintiff and the defendants as his legal heirs. Late Karunakaran Nair had three wives. The first wife, namely Lakshmibai, expired and defendants 1 to 4 are the children born to Karunakaran Nair from Lakshmibai. The 5 th and 11 th defendants are the 2 nd and 3 rd wives of late Karunakaran Nair and defendant Nos.6 to 10 and defendant Nos.12 to 21 are the children born out of the said wedlocks. The plaint schedule property are in joint possession of the plaintiff and the defendants. Before the death of Karunakaran Nair, he never made any arrangements or executed any document by way of gift or Will bequeathing the properties to his legal heirs. Since the plaintiff did not want to continue the joint possession of the properties, on 15.8.2004, a lawyer notice was issued seeking partition. Since the defendants were not amenable to it, the suit was filed. Contentions of the defendants 3. Late Karunakaran Nair had properties apart from those included as item Nos.1 to 9 in the plaint. An extent of 96.5 cents comprised in re-survey No.21/4 along with item No.5 of the plaint schedule property is not included in the suit. The extent of property shown in item No.3 in the plaint, having an extent of 1.3… Acre is not correct. In fact, the correct extent is 2.6‰ Acres. Likewise, the description of item No.7 is also not correct; instead of 1.59 Acres, it is 2.10 Acres. Moreover, an extent of 1.52 Acres in Narakkod Amsom Desom is not seen included in the plaint property. The status of plaintiff and defendants 5 to 21 as the legal heirs of Karunakaran Nair was denied. It was also denied that Karunakaran Nair had three wives. In fact, according to the defendants, Karanakaran Nair had only one wife named Lakshmibai, who is the mother of defendant Nos.1 to 4. The plaintiff is not entitled to partition of the property into 22 equal shares. It was also denied that Karunakaran Nair had three wives. In fact, according to the defendants, Karanakaran Nair had only one wife named Lakshmibai, who is the mother of defendant Nos.1 to 4. The plaintiff is not entitled to partition of the property into 22 equal shares. Karunakaran Nair had no relationship, whatsoever, with the 5 th and 11 th defendants and never solemnised any marriage with them. As far as item No.6 of the plaint schedule property is concerned, it was contended that late Karunakaran Nair executed a Will on 14.7.1985. Since defendant Nos.1 to 3 were residing at Bombay, the plaint schedule property as well as the properties not included therein were being managed by the plaintiff and other defendants. The averment that the 1 st defendant had declined to sign the partition deed on 20.8.2004 was also denied. 4. On behalf of the plaintiff, Exts.A1 to A44 were marked and PW1 was examined. On behalf of the defendants, Exts.B1 to B5 were marked and DW1 to DW3 were examined. On the basis of the aforesaid documents, the trial court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff has got any right over the plaint schedule properties? 2. Whether the suit is properly valued? 3. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit? 4. Whether all the properties are included in the suit for partition? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get share of profits? 6. Reliefs and costs.” Thereafter, by order dated 10.8.2006, the aforesaid issues were recasted as follows: “1. Is the suit bad for partial partition as contended by the 1 st defendant? 2. Are the plaintiff and defendant Nos.5 to 21, the legal heirs of late Karunakaran Nair? 3. Is there any will executed by late Karunakaran Nair with respect to item No.6 of the plaint schedule property in favour of 1st defendant as contended by him? 4. If so, what is the share to which the plaintiffs and the defendants are entitled to? 5. What is the order as to costs?” 5. The primary contention of the 1 st defendant was regarding the execution of Ext.B1 Will. According to the 1st defendant, item No.6 is not available for partition. Therefore, the primary concern of the trial court was regarding the validity of the Will. The 1 st defendant examined himself as DW1. 5. What is the order as to costs?” 5. The primary contention of the 1 st defendant was regarding the execution of Ext.B1 Will. According to the 1st defendant, item No.6 is not available for partition. Therefore, the primary concern of the trial court was regarding the validity of the Will. The 1 st defendant examined himself as DW1. The scribe and the 2 nd attesting witness of the Will was examined as DW2. However, the plaintiff finding that there is an inconsistency between the evidence of DW1 and DW2, filed IA No.82/2007 seeking for sending Ext.B1 Will for an expert opinion to compare and prove the signature of late Karunakaran Nair with the admitted signature in Ext.A10. Though the trial court allowed the said application, no steps were taken by the plaintiff. However, despite this, the trial court proceeded to analyse the evidence between DW1 and DW2 and found that there is inconsistency and suspicious circumstances in the execution of the Will and therefore, rejected the defence of the 1st defendant and decreed the suit as prayed for. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the legal heirs of the 1 st defendant preferred AS No.30/2014, which was also dismissed by judgment and decree dated 9.2.2015 by the Sub Court, Koyilandy and hence, the present second appeal. While admitting the appeal, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law: “i. Whether the alleged marriage between deceased Karunakaran Nair and defendants 5 and 11 stood proved? ii. Is it proved that defendants 6 to 10, the plaintiff and defendants 12 to 21 are the children of Karunakaran Nair? iii. Whether the courts below are justified in its conclusions after having found that the defendants 5 and 11 are not the legally wedded wives of Karunakaran Nair? iv. Is it not clear that the conclusions by the court below on Ext.B1 are totally erroneous especially when the evidence on record clearly indicate that the same is genuine?” 7. Heard Sri.B.Krishna Mani, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri.R.Parthasarathy, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Arguments of the appellants 8. iv. Is it not clear that the conclusions by the court below on Ext.B1 are totally erroneous especially when the evidence on record clearly indicate that the same is genuine?” 7. Heard Sri.B.Krishna Mani, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri.R.Parthasarathy, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Arguments of the appellants 8. Shri B.Krishna Mani, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, though vehemently contended as regards the status of the defendants 5 & 11 as the legally wedded wives of the deceased Karunakaran Nair, in all fairness, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that his clients will be satisfied with regard to the examination of the validity of Ext.B1 Will and findings recorded by the trial court. In the aforesaid premise, he requested this Court to examine whether the trial court was justified in rejecting the contention regarding the execution of Ext.B1 Will. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, no doubt, the burden to prove the Will lies on the propounder of the Will, namely the 1 st defendant. A Will is required to be proved in terms of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 , read with Section 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 . Once the 1 st defendant had examined the scribe and the attesting witness of the Will, the burden is discharged by the 1 st defendant, and later, it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to prove that still suspicious circumstances surround the Will. It is the specific case of the learned counsel that the mandate of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not require anything to be done in furtherance of examining at least one attesting witness. In the present case, the scribe, being the attesting witness as well, was examined and hence the burden is discharged by the 1 st defendant, predecessor in interest of the appellants. Arguments of the plaintiff 9. Sri.R.Parthasarathy, vehemently countered the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. According to the learned counsel, the paramount duty to dispel the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will is on the propounder of the Will. The 1 st defendant having failed to discharge the burden despite examining DW2, the scribe and the attesting witness, the legal heirs cannot contend otherwise. Sri.R.Parthasarathy, vehemently countered the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. According to the learned counsel, the paramount duty to dispel the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will is on the propounder of the Will. The 1 st defendant having failed to discharge the burden despite examining DW2, the scribe and the attesting witness, the legal heirs cannot contend otherwise. According to the learned counsel, the plaintiff with an abundant caution had filed IA No.82/2007 for sending the Will for expert opinion. However, he candidly admitted that though his clients did not pursue the matter further by taking steps pursuant to the order of the trial court in I.A.No.82/2007, that by itself could not have deterred the trial court from examining the suspicious circumstances that surrounded the execution of Ext.B1 Will. According to Sri.R.Parthasarathy, the evidence of DW1, which was inconsistent with the evidence of DW2, was sufficient for the trial court to have concluded that the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will have not been discharged by the 1 st defendant. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the trial court was justified in decreeing the suit. It is further pointed out that both the courts have concurrently found that the 1 st defendant failed to discharge the burden surrounding the execution of Ext.B1 Will. Thus, it is contended that a concurrent finding of fact is not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 . Evaluation of the Arguments. 10. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar and have perused the judgments of the courts below and also the records in the present case. 11. Since both the parties are in unison in their submission that the only question this Court needs to be considered is regarding the validity of Ext.B1 Will, this Court is not venturing into the other issues that are raised in this appeal and proceeded to answer the question of law raised as regards the “Will”. 12. The “Will” is one of the most solemn documents known to the law. By it a dead man entrusts to the living to carrying out of his wishes, and as it is impossible that he can be called either to deny his signature or to explain the circumstances in which it was executed. 12. The “Will” is one of the most solemn documents known to the law. By it a dead man entrusts to the living to carrying out of his wishes, and as it is impossible that he can be called either to deny his signature or to explain the circumstances in which it was executed. Hence it is essential that, trustworthy and effective evidence should be tendered to establish the compliance of the law. 13. The manner in which a Will is required to be proved, was a recurring topic for the decisions of the courts in a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. Suffice to say, the party propounding a Will or otherwise making a claim under the Will, is no doubt seeking to prove the document and in deciding how it is to be proved, the court must necessarily refer to the statutory provisions, which govern the proof of documents. 14. The principles of burden of proof with regard to Wills have been expressed in several well-known authorities, including Barry Vs Butlin [(1838 ) 12 E.R. 1089], Tyrrell Vs Painton [(1894) P.151], Boyse vs Rossborough [(1856) 6.H.L.C 2]. Applying the principles laid down in the above case, the Privy Council in Gomtibai Vs Kanchhedilal [ AIR 1949 PC 272 ] held that “The onus probandi to establish a will lied on the person who propounds it. This onus is in general discharged by proof of capacity and the fact of execution from which the knowledge and the assent to its contents by the testator will be assumed. But where a will is prepared and executed under circumstances which excite the suspicion of the court it is for those who propound the will to remove such suspicion and to prove affirmatively that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the will. Where once it is proved that a will has been executed with due solemnities by a person of competent understanding and apparently a free agent, that is, when the propounder of the will has discharged the onus, the burden of proving that it was executed under influence is on the party who alleges it.” 15. The statutory provision which governs the field is Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, which reads as under: “ 68. The statutory provision which governs the field is Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, which reads as under: “ 68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested .––If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence: Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied.” 16. There is a plethora of decisions which unanimously lay down that, going by the proviso to Section 68, a Will is required to be proved by examining at least one attesting witness. The first decision on the point by the Supreme Court appears in H.Venkatachala Vs B.N. Thimmajamma [ AIR 1959 SC 443 ]. It was held under para 22 as follows: “22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in an application for probate or action on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may, how- ever, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances sur- rounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly neces- sary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Parcq in Harmes v. Hinkson [50 Cal.W.N 895 : AIR 1946 PC 156 ] “where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not an obdu- rate persistence in disbelief. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Parcq in Harmes v. Hinkson [50 Cal.W.N 895 : AIR 1946 PC 156 ] “where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not an obdu- rate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never re- quired to close his mind to the truth”. It would sound platitudinous to say so, but it is nevertheless true that in discovering truth even in such cases the judicial mind must always be open though vigilant, cautious and cir- cumspect.” 17. With these principles in mind, let us analyse whether the 1 st defendant has discharged the burden. If so, what more was required of him. There cannot be a doubt that if ‘Will’ is sustained, the claim of partition allowed on the plaint schedule item no.6 will have to be interfered with. The claim for partition was resisted by the 1 st defendant, who is the beneficiary under the ‘Will’. Hence, the primary responsibility is on the shoulders of the 1 st defendant. The 1 st defendant examined DW2, who is the scribe and a lawyer who prepared the Will. It is evident that in Ext.B1, the scribe is also an attesting witness. The prime dispute in the present appeal stems out from the fact that both the trial court as well as the 1 st appellate court refused to accept the contention of the appellants that suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will have been discharged by examining DW2. The primary reason for disbelieving the appellants was that there were several inconsistencies, when the evidence tendered by DW1 and Dw2 was examined. 18. Is there a mandate of law, which requires the propounder to discharge further burden even after examining at least one attesting witness? This Court is required to examine this seminal question a little deeper, especially since the decision in this case hinges on the ultimate finding regarding the nature of proof required to be discharged by the propounder. 19. A reading of the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act would show that it is the bounden duty of the propounder of the Will to examine at least one attesting witness. The mandate of Section 68 stops there. 19. A reading of the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act would show that it is the bounden duty of the propounder of the Will to examine at least one attesting witness. The mandate of Section 68 stops there. The law requires the propounder to examine at least one attesting witness. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the Will, or shall be signed by some person in his presence and by his direction, and that the signature shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will. Thus, the question as regards whether the Will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last testament of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the Will? Did he understand the nature and effect of dispositions in the Will? Was the signature in the Will affixed by him, knowing what is contained? These are the questions which determine the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of Wills. 20. There may be cases, where execution of the Will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The words “suspicious circumstances” have not been defined in any of the provisions of law. Suffice to say, once the mind of the court is ignited towards the suspicious circumstances, it is for the propounder to dispel such circumstances. 21. In Boyse vs Rossborough {(1856-1857) 6 H.L.C 2 at page 48} , it is held that “Where once it has been proved that a Will has been executed with due solemnities by a person of competent understanding and apparently a free agent - that is, when the propounder of the will has discharged the onus- the burden of proving that it was executed under undue influence is on the party who alleges it.” The above observation appears to more practical solution to the vexatious question posed before this Court. 22. Be that as it may, let us examine this issue in the context of the Indian Law governing the proof of Will. As stated earlier, Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governs the field. 22. Be that as it may, let us examine this issue in the context of the Indian Law governing the proof of Will. As stated earlier, Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governs the field. Read as may, this Court could not decipher any requirement of law which casts further burden on the propounder, other than to examine the attesting witness. But, there may be situations which present itself before the court, especially when the credibility of the witness will be called into. The only logical conclusion possible is when the credibility of the attesting witness is sought to be impeached, then it is a burden on the person who is seeking to impeach the evidence. However, that may not be the position where, on the face of the record, inconsistencies creep in as regards the testimonies of the propounder as well as the attesting witness. 23. In Surendra Pal & Ors v Dr.(Mrs.) Saraswati Arora & Anr [ (1974) 2 SCC 600 ] , the Supreme Court broadly laid down the guidelines regarding the nature and the extent of the burden of proof on the propounder. In paragraph No.7, it was held by the Supreme Court as thus: “7. The propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator : that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, that he put his signature to the testament of his own free will and that he has signed it in the presence of the two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But there may be cases in which the execution of the will itself is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, such as, where the signature is doubtful, the testator is of feeble mind or is overawed by powerful minds interested in getting his property, or where in the light of the relevant circumstances the dispositions appear to be unnatural, improbable and unfair, or where there are other reasons for doubting that the dispositions of the will are not the result of the testator’s free will and mind. In all such cases where there may be legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and satisfactorily explained before the will is accepted. In all such cases where there may be legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and satisfactorily explained before the will is accepted. Again in cases where the propounder has himself taken a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers on him substantial benefit that is itself one of the suspicious circumstances which he must remove by clear and satisfactory evidence. After all, ultimately it is the conscience of the Court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case, entertain. [See H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma & Ors [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 426 and Rani Purnima Devi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev [1962] 3 S.C.R. 195]. In the latter case this Court, after referring to the principles stated in the former case emphasised that where there are suspicious circumstances the onus will be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the will could be accepted as genuine; and where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion the onus is on him to prove the same. It has been further pointed out that the suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator’s mind, the dispositions made in the will which may be unnatural or unfair or improbable when considered in the light of the relevant circumstances. If the caveator does not discharge the burden which rests upon him in establishing the circumstances which show that the will had been obtained by fraud or undue influence, a probate of the will must necessarily be granted if it is established that the testator had full testamentary capacity and had in fact executed it validly with a free will and mind. The observations of the Privy Council in Motibai Hormusjee Kanga v. Jamsetjee Hormusjee Kanga [ AIR 1924 PC 28 ] support the above proposition. Mr. Ammer Ali observed at p. 33 ; "It is quite clear that the onus of establishing capacity lay on the petitioner. The observations of the Privy Council in Motibai Hormusjee Kanga v. Jamsetjee Hormusjee Kanga [ AIR 1924 PC 28 ] support the above proposition. Mr. Ammer Ali observed at p. 33 ; "It is quite clear that the onus of establishing capacity lay on the petitioner. It is also clear that if the caveator impugned the will on the ground that it was obtained by the exercise of undue influences, excessive persuasion or moral coercion, it lay upon him to establish that case." In the light of what has been stated if the various requirements of a valid will are established, then as observed by the Privy Council in Motibai Hormusjee Kanga’s came at p.33: “A man may act foolishly and even heartlessly; if he acts with full comprehension of what he is doing the Court will not interfere with the exercise of his volition." 24. In Derek A C Lobo and Others v. Ulric M A Lobo (Dead) by Lrs. and Others [2023 SCC Online 1893] , the Supreme Court held that it is for the person raising suspicious circumstances on execution of the Will to prove that the Will was not executed by the testator. In the very same judgment, the Supreme Court held that once the burden of proof is discharged by the propounder in terms of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act read with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act by adducing prima facie evidence proving the competence of the testator, the onus is on the opposing contestant to show prima facie the existence of the suspicious circumstances so as to shift the onus on the propounder to dispel the same. 25. On a close exploration of the precedents cited above would lead to an irresistible conclusion that the prima facie burden is on the propounder of the Will to dispel the suspicious circumstances, which are surrounding the execution of the Will. The question in the present case is whether the said burden has been discharged by the 1 st defendant, who is the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants. As stated above, the 1 st defendant got himself examined as DW1, who deposed that the ‘Will’ was handed over to him by the advocate who is also the scribe and attesting witness after the death of the testator. As stated above, the 1 st defendant got himself examined as DW1, who deposed that the ‘Will’ was handed over to him by the advocate who is also the scribe and attesting witness after the death of the testator. Though, prima facie burden was discharged by the original 1 st defendant by examining DW2, who is the scribe and the attesting witness of the Will, the problem arose when the evidence of DW1 was read along with DW2. While DW1 deposed that he received the Will only after the death of his father, the attesting witness deposed that he had handed over the Will on the same date itself and the 1 st defendant was present during the execution of the ‘Will’. This according to the learned counsel for the respondents, Sri.R.Parthasarathy, is a suspicious circumstance, which had excited the minds of the court. Therefore, it was incumbent on the 1 st defendant to have discharged the burden further and dispel all suspicion around the Will. 26. However, this submission is countered by the learned Counsel for the appellants by referring to the application IA No.82 of 2007, by which the plaintiff sought permission to send the disputed Will for expert opinion. Though the court below allowed the application, the plaintiff did not pursue further steps. Therefore, according to the appellants, the court had to draw an adverse inference. 27. Going by the scheme of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and also the provisions of Section 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 , though the propounder is bound to examine at least one attesting witness which has been done in this case, that by itself is sufficient. If any facts excite the mind of the court as regards the execution of the Will, the propounder is certainly bound to dispel the suspicion and come out clearly on the execution of the Will. 28. In Sarat Kumari Bibi Vs Sakhi Chand [(1928) LR 56 IA 62] the Privy Council observed that the principle which requires the propounder to remove suspicions from the mind of the court is not confined only to cases where the propounder takes part in the execution of the Will and receives the benefit under it. 28. In Sarat Kumari Bibi Vs Sakhi Chand [(1928) LR 56 IA 62] the Privy Council observed that the principle which requires the propounder to remove suspicions from the mind of the court is not confined only to cases where the propounder takes part in the execution of the Will and receives the benefit under it. There may be other suspicious circumstances attending on the execution of the Will and even in such cases, it is the duty of the propounder to remove all clouds and satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument is the last Will of the testator. 29. Coming to the facts of this case, it is indisputable that the 1st defendant took part in the execution of the Will. This is clear from the evidence of DW2. Perhaps, thinking that his participation in the execution of the Will may turn against him, DW1 in his oral testimony said that the Will was handed over to him by the lawyer after the death of his father. The glaring inconsistency, between the evidence of DW1 and DW2 caused the courts below to believe that the execution of the Will is shrouded with suspicion. The inability of the 1 st defendant to remove the suspicion is fatal to the outcome of the sanctity of the ‘Will’. Viewed in the above perspective, the failure to take further steps pursuant to the order dated 27.2.2007 in IA No.82 of 2007 cannot be of much consequence, when judged in the context of the failure of the original 1 st defendant to dispel the suspicion. Moreover, the evidence of DW1 and DW2 were not contemporaneous, but were given within a span of one and half months. Yet another circumstance that created suspicion is that DW1 deposed that his father was bedridden for several months prior to his death. The testator died on 20.8.1985 whereas Ext.B1 ‘Will’ was executed on 14.7.1985. However, according to the attesting witness, the lawyer (Dw2), the testator came to his office and executed the ‘Will’ and at that time DW1 was present. However, DW1 had no such case. Therefore, when the oral testimony of DW1 and DW2 are examined, several suspicious circumstances cropped out, which were not satisfactorily explained by the propounder, which led to the courts below disbelieving the 1 st defendant. However, DW1 had no such case. Therefore, when the oral testimony of DW1 and DW2 are examined, several suspicious circumstances cropped out, which were not satisfactorily explained by the propounder, which led to the courts below disbelieving the 1 st defendant. In the absence of any satisfactory evidence adduced by the 1st defendant, it cannot be said that the trial court went wrong in holding the Will not to be genuine. 30. Resultantly, this Court holds that the original defendant having failed to discharge the burden of proof as regards the genuineness of the ‘Will’, the concurrent finding of the courts below does not call for interference. Accordingly, the question of law raised in this appeal is answered against the appellants. As an upshot of these discussions, this Court finds that there is no merit in the appeal and accordingly the same fails and dismissed. No costs.