JUDGMENT : Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioners, who are the members of Puzhakkara Chennas Mana, have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the 2 nd respondent Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee to protect and ensure that the religious customs, rituals, traditional rites and ceremonies, poojas, practice and usage in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple are performed in strict adherence to the age old Sambradayas without causing any type of alteration; a declaration that the 4 th respondent Tantri does not have any right or authority to alter in any manner the age old customary religious rituals, practice, usage, poojas and its time prevailed in the Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple; a writ of mandamus commanding the 2 nd respondent Managing Committee and the 3 rd respondent Administrator to consider Ext.P4 representation dated 15.05.2024 preferred by the petitioners and pass appropriate orders thereon; declare that the right of Tantriship is vested upon Puzhakkara Chennaas Illam and not on any individual in his personal capacity and the ritualistic karmas to be performed in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple is to be exercised by all the male members of Puzhakkara Chennaas Illam; direct the 2 nd respondent Managing Committee to take steps to restore to its original stage the rites, rituals and ceremonies, customs and usages existed in the Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple prior to October 2021. 2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the petitioners who are Malayali Brahmins are the major male members of Puzhakkara Chennas Mana. The Tantric right (Tantravrathi service) of Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple and its subsidiary Temples are vested in Puzhakkara Chennas Mana. Being the senior-most male member of the family, the 4 th respondent happened to be the senior Tantri of Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple and an Ex officio member in the Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee. On 01.10.2022, all members of Puzhakkara Chennas Mana assembled at the Illam and discussed in detail various aspects, including the Tantric rights of Chennas Mana in all temples, including Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple, and executed an agreement as a future guideline. Even though the 4 th respondent is the senior Tantri, he does not have any authority to modify or alter the age-old rituals, pooja, etc., prevailing in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple and other Temples. Even though the 4 th respondent is the senior Tantri, he does not have any authority to modify or alter the age-old rituals, pooja, etc., prevailing in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple and other Temples. The 4 th respondent cannot obstruct petitioners from the performance of poojas in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple. According to the petitioners, due to unknown reasons, the 4 th respondent, on his own, decided to change certain age-old customs, traditions, usages and rituals prevailing in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple, by ignoring the objection raised by the petitioners and others. Any type of disturbance of the rituals, poojas, ceremony, etc., may impair the manifestations of divine force or Chaitanya of the Temple. When the petitioners objected, the 4 th respondent orally prevented the petitioners from performing their traditional Tantric duties and poojas in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple. Under Section 34 of the Guruvayur Devaswom Act, 1978, it is the duty of the Managing Committee to ensure that the Temple follows the established usage in regard to any matter. Under Section 10(a) of the Act, the Managing Committee shall exercise its duties, subject to the customs and usages in the Temple, and arrange for the proper performance of the rites and ceremonies in the Temple and the subordinate temples attached thereto, But, according to the petitioners, the Managing Committee failed to protect the customs and established usages in the Temple. 3. On 03.06.2024, when this writ petition came up for admission, the learned counsel for the petitioners was asked to address arguments on the maintainability of the reliefs sought for in this writ petition, especially the declaratory reliefs 1 and 4, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. On 13.06.2024, when this matter came up for consideration, the learned Standing Counsel for Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee was directed to make available for the perusal of this Court the files relating to Ext.P3 notice dated 24.04.2024 issued by the Deputy Administrator (Temple). On 03.07.2025, Registrar (Judicial) was directed to keep in safe custody the files handed over by the Standing Counsel for Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee. 5. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee for respondents 2 and 3, on the question of maintainability of the reliefs sought for in this writ petition. 5. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee for respondents 2 and 3, on the question of maintainability of the reliefs sought for in this writ petition. On the above legal issue, we also heard the arguments of the learned Senior Government Pleader for the 1 st respondent. 6. The Guruvayur Devaswom Act, 1978, enacted by the State Legislature, which received the assent of the President on 18.03.1978, makes provision for the proper administration of the Guruvayur Devaswom. Clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act defines ‘person having interest in the temple’ to mean a person who is entitled to attend at or is in the habit of attending, the performance of worship or service in the temple or who is entitled to partake or is in the habit of partaking, in the benefit of the distribution of gifts thereat. Section 3 of the Act deals with incorporation. As per sub-section (1) of Section 3, the administration, control and management of the Devaswom shall be vested in a Committee constituted in the manner hereinafter provided. 7. Section 10 of the Act deals with the duties of the Committee. Section 3 of the Act deals with incorporation. As per sub-section (1) of Section 3, the administration, control and management of the Devaswom shall be vested in a Committee constituted in the manner hereinafter provided. 7. Section 10 of the Act deals with the duties of the Committee. As per clause (a) of Section 10, subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, it shall be the duty of the Committee, subject to the customs and usages in the temple, to arrange for the proper performance of the rites and ceremonies in the temple and the subordinate temples attached thereto in accordance with the dittam or scale of expenditure fixed for the temple and the subordinate temples under Section 20 or, till the dittam or scale of expenditure is fixed under that Section, in accordance with the dittam or scale of expenditure fixed for the temple and the subordinate temples under Section 51 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951; as per clause (b) of Section 10, to provide facilities for the proper performance of worship by the worshippers; as per clause (d) of Section 10, to ensure maintenance of order and discipline and proper hygienic conditions in the temple and the subordinate temples attached thereto and of proper standard of cleanliness and purity in the offerings made therein; and as per clause (g) of Section 10, to do all such things as may be incidental and conducive to the efficient management of the affairs of the Devaswom and the convenience of the worshippers. 8. Section 35 of the Act provides that Tantri to be final authority in religious matters. As per sub-section (1) of Section 35, nothing in this Act shall be deemed to authorise the Committee or the Commissioner or the Government to interfere with the religious or spiritual matters pertaining to the Devaswom. As per sub-section (2) of Section 35, the decision of the Tantri of the temple on all religious, spiritual, ritual or ceremonial matters pertaining to the Devaswom shall be final, unless such decision violates any provision contained in any law for the time being in force. 9. The role assigned to the Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee, constituted under Section 3 of the Guruvayur Devaswom Act, 1978, is that of a trustee in the management of the properties vested in the deity. 9. The role assigned to the Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee, constituted under Section 3 of the Guruvayur Devaswom Act, 1978, is that of a trustee in the management of the properties vested in the deity. The Managing Committee is duty-bound to scrupulously follow the stipulations contained in the Act of 1978. The Committee, being the trustee in management of Devaswom properties, is legally bound to perform its duties with utmost care and caution. In view of the prohibition contained in sub-section (1) of Section 35, the Managing Committee or the Commissioner or the Government shall not interfere with the religious or spiritual matters pertaining to Guruvayur Devaswom, and sub-section (2) of Section 35 mandates that the decision of the Tantri of the temple on all religious, spiritual, ritual or ceremonial matters pertaining to Guruvayur Devaswom shall be final, unless such decision violates any provision contained in any law for the time being in force. In view of the provisions contained in Rule 6 of the Guruvayur Devaswom Rules, 1980, the Committee shall not alter or cause to alter the performance of customary rites and ceremonies in the temple. 10. In Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala [(1999) 3 KLT 574] a Larger Bench of this Court, in the context of Section 4 of Guruvayur Devaswom Act, which deals with composition of Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee, answered the reference by holding that the Hindu members of the Council of Ministers who nominate the members of the Managing Committee of Guruvayur Devaswom need only be Hindus, without any insistence on their being believers in temple worship. Section 4 of the Act itself ensures that persons who have faith in God and temple worship and profess the Hindu Religion alone are qualified to be nominated to the Managing Committee and the members shall, before entering upon their office, make and subscribe an oath in the form prescribed. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Larger Bench has noticed the argument advanced by Mr.Ashok Desai, the learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the State of Kerala, that Section 35 of the Guruvayur Devaswom Act is expressly added to ensure that all religious, spiritual, ritual and ceremonial matters are decided by the Tantri. 11. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Larger Bench has noticed the argument advanced by Mr.Ashok Desai, the learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the State of Kerala, that Section 35 of the Guruvayur Devaswom Act is expressly added to ensure that all religious, spiritual, ritual and ceremonial matters are decided by the Tantri. 11. In Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala [(2005) 11 SCC 45] , the Apex Court affirmed the judgment of the Larger Bench of this Court in Gopalakrishnan Nair [(1999) 3 KLT 574] . In paragraph 21 of the said decision, the Apex Court noticed that the management or administration of a temple partakes of a secular character as opposed to religious aspects of the matter. The Guruvayur Devaswom Act, 1978 segregates the religious matter from secular matters. So far as religious matters are concerned, the same are entirely left in the hands of the Tantri. He is the alter ego of the deity. He gives the moola mantra to the priest. He holds a special status. He prescribes the rituals. He is the only person who can touch the deity and enter the sanctum sanctorum. He is the final authority in religious matters. Wherefor, a legal fiction has been created in Section 35 of the Act, in terms whereof the Committee or the Commissioner or the Government is expressly prohibited from interfering with the religious or spiritual matters pertaining to the Devaswom. His decision on all religious, spiritual, ritual or ceremonial matters pertaining to the Devaswom is final unless the same violates any provision contained in any law for the time being in force. Therefore, the provisions of Section 4 of the Guruvayur Devaswom Act must be construed, having regard to the said factor in mind. 12. In the instant case, the reliefs sought for in the writ petition filed invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, centre around declaratory relief No.(iv), i.e., a declaration that the right of Tantriship is vested upon Puzhakkara Chennaas Illam and not on any individual in his personal capacity, and the ritualistic karmas to be performed in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple are to be exercised by all the male members of Puzhakkara Chennaas Illam. It is in that context that the petitioners, who are the members of Puzhakkara Chennas Mana, are seeking the other reliefs, including a writ of mandamus commanding the 2 nd respondent Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee to protect and ensure that the religious customs, rituals, traditional rites and ceremonies, poojas, practice and usages in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple are performed in strict adherence to the age old Sambradayas without causing any type of alteration. In the writ petition, it is stated that on 01.10.2022, all members of Puzhakkara Chennas Mana assembled at the Illam and discussed in detail various aspects, including the Tantric rights of Chennas Mana in all temples, including Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple, and executed an agreement as a future guideline. The contention of the petitioners is that, along with the 4 th respondent Tantri, they have equal right to perform Tantric rites and poojas in Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple and other subsidiary temples, and that the 4 th respondent is attempting to alter the existing customs and recognised religious practices in the said temple. 13. Relying on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Vasudevan Bhattathirippad v. Mallapally Thirumalida Mahadeva Temple [ILR 2014 (4) Ker 389] , the learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that normally and usually a Tantric right is conferred on a family or families. 14. In Vasudevan Bhattathirippad [ILR 2014 (4) Ker 389] , the decision of the learned Single Judge arises out of the judgment and decree of the Sub Court, Thiruvalla in A.S.No.23 of 2007. The issue involved in the original suit was regarding Tantriship in Thirumalida Mahadeva Temple at Mallappally. In the said decision, which was one rendered in R.S.A.No.12 of 2014, the learned Single Judge noticed that there are instances where a temple can have more than one Tantri from different families. When a question is asked as to who is the Tantri of the temple, the answer is never with reference to the name of the person, but the name of the family is mentioned. For example, it is said that the Tantri of the temple is Tharananelloor, Chennas, Thazhaman, Kuttikkad Illom, etc. Therefore, there is sufficient material to show that normally the Tantriship belongs to a family. 15. For example, it is said that the Tantri of the temple is Tharananelloor, Chennas, Thazhaman, Kuttikkad Illom, etc. Therefore, there is sufficient material to show that normally the Tantriship belongs to a family. 15. The issue raised in the instant writ petition regarding the Tantriship of Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple cannot be decided, placing reliance on the decision of the learned Single Judge in Vasudevan Bhattathirippad [ILR 2014 (4) Ker 389] since the writ courts are not properly equipped to deal with such factual disputes for which evidence may be required to be adduced. During the course of arguments, the learned Standing Counsel for Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee has made available for the perusal of this Court a lawyer notice dated nil, caused to be issued by petitioners 2, 5 and 6, to the 4 th respondent Tantri and the 2 nd respondent Managing Committee, preceding the institution of legal proceedings before the appropriate forum, on the very same issues raised in this writ petition. 16. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006] , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the special remedy provided in Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. 17. In P.R. Muralidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Pader [ (2006) 4 SCC 501 ] , the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the 1 st respondent therein claimed himself to be a Sanyasi in the tradition of ‘Sree Chattambi Swamy Thiruvadikal’ and Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan of Parama Bhattara Gurukula Seva Sangham, known as ‘Vadayampadi Asharamam’. He filed a suit in the Munsiff's Court, Kolencherry as O.S.No.71 of 2000 for a declaration that he was entitled to continue in the said capacity and he was not allowed to discharge his duties attached to the said office in terms of the purported order dated 20.01.1996 of Kailasanatha Theertha Padar. The said suit was dismissed for default. An application for restoration of the said suit was filed which was also dismissed. In relation to the affairs of the trust a suit as O.S.No.30 of 2002 is pending in the Munsiff's Court, Kolencherry. The said suit was dismissed for default. An application for restoration of the said suit was filed which was also dismissed. In relation to the affairs of the trust a suit as O.S.No.30 of 2002 is pending in the Munsiff's Court, Kolencherry. The said suit has been filed by one G. Parameswaran Nair, founder member of Vadayampadi Asharamam questioning the aforementioned purported resolution dated 07.01.2001. Brahmasree Kailasanatha Theertha Padar filed an interlocutory application for getting himself impleaded as a party, alleging that as per the bye laws, he had admittedly been serving in the said capacity since 1996 and, thus, in law continues to be the Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan. The said applicant as also the 1 st respondent before the Apex Court are parties in O.S.No.30 of 2002. Though O.S.No.71 of 2000 filed by the 1 st respondent was dismissed, he filed W.P.(C)No.16047 of 2004 before this Court praying for police protection. A Division Bench of this Court went into the question as to whether the 1 st respondent herein was entitled to hold the office of Madathipathi and Sthiradhyakshan for the purpose of issuing an appropriate direction as regards grant of police protection. This Court opined that the State and the police officials have got a legal obligation to give protection to the life and properties of the appellant upon arriving at a finding of fact that he was entitled to hold the said office. Aggrieved by that judgment, the appellant approached the Apex Court. 18. In P.R. Murlidharan [ (2006) 4 SCC 501 ] , the Apex Court noticed that the construction of the trust and the rights and obligations thereunder were in question. The 1 st respondent filed a suit in that behalf, which was dismissed. In terms of Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 another suit would not be maintainable at his instance. Another suit, i.e., O.S.No.30 of 2002 filed by one G. Parameswaran Nair is pending in the Munsiff’s Court. The High Court, despite noticing the said fact, sought to usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court, and determined the contentious issues which were required to be proved in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872. Another suit, i.e., O.S.No.30 of 2002 filed by one G. Parameswaran Nair is pending in the Munsiff’s Court. The High Court, despite noticing the said fact, sought to usurp the jurisdiction of the civil court, and determined the contentious issues which were required to be proved in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872. It is one thing to say that in a given case a person may be held to be entitled to police protection, having regard to the threat perception, but it is another thing to say that he is entitled thereto for holding an office and discharging certain functions when his right to do so is open to question. A person could not approach the High Court for the purpose of determining such disputed questions of fact which were beyond the scope and purport of the jurisdiction of the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction as it also involved determination of disputed questions of fact. The 1 st respondent who sought to claim a status was required to establish the same in a court of law in an appropriate proceeding. He for one reason or the other, failed to do so. The provisions of Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure stare on his face. He, therefore, could not have filed a writ petition for getting the selfsame issues determined in his favour, which he could not do even by filing a suit. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the writ court is wide while granting relief to a citizen of India so as to protect his life and liberty as adumbrated under Article 21 of the Constitution, but while doing so it could not collaterally go into that question, determination whereof would undoubtedly be beyond its domain. What was necessary for the determination of the question arising in the writ petition was not the interpretation of the documents alone, but it required adducing oral evidence as well. Such evidence was necessary for the purpose of explaining the true nature of the deed of trust, as also the practice followed by this trust. In any event, the impleading applicant in O.S.No.30 of 2002 has raised a contention that he alone was ordained to hold the said office as per the bye- laws of the trust. The qualification of the 1 st respondent to hold the office was also in question. In any event, the impleading applicant in O.S.No.30 of 2002 has raised a contention that he alone was ordained to hold the said office as per the bye- laws of the trust. The qualification of the 1 st respondent to hold the office was also in question. In this view of the matter, the Apex Court held that such disputed questions could not have been gone into by the High Court in a writ proceeding. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the civil court is wide and plenary. In a case of this nature, a writ proceeding cannot be a substitute for a civil suit. For the said reasons, the Apex Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. However, the appeal was allowed with the observation that, in the event the 1 st respondent feels that he as a person should receive protection to his life, he may make an appropriate representation to the Superintendent of Police, who, after causing an inquiry made in this behalf, may pass an appropriate order as is permissible in law. 19. In P.R. Murlidharan [ (2006) 4 SCC 501 ] , P.K.Balasubramaniam J, in his concurring judgment, observed that a writ petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner, cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thing to approach the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea that a particular party has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately flouting that decree or order and in spite of the petitioner applying for it, or that the police authorities are not giving him the needed protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction. But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a writ petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations. On the facts of the case on hand, the learned Judge noticed that, various disputed questions arose based on a deed of trust and the facts pleaded by the writ petitioner and controverted by the other side. The High Court should have normally directed the writ petitioner to have his rights adjudicated upon, in an appropriate suit in a civil court. The fact that a writ petitioner may be barred from approaching the civil court, in view of Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or some other provisions, is no ground for the High Court to take upon itself, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the duty to adjudicate on the civil rights of parties for the purpose of deciding whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to the police authorities for the protection of the alleged rights of the writ petitioner. A writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to the person of a writ petitioner can be issued, when the court is satisfied that there is a threat to his person and the authorities have failed to perform their duties and it is different from granting relief for the first time to a person either to allegedly protect his right to property or his right to an office, especially when the pleadings themselves disclose that disputed questions are involved. As rightly pointed out in the judgment, the High Court was in error in proceeding to adjudicate on the rights and obligations arising out of the trust deed merely based on the affidavits and the deed itself. As rightly pointed out in the judgment, the High Court was in error in proceeding to adjudicate on the rights and obligations arising out of the trust deed merely based on the affidavits and the deed itself. The High Court should not have undertaken such an exercise on the basis that the right of the writ petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution is sought to be affected by the actions of the contesting respondents and their supporters, and that can be prevented by the issue of the writ of mandamus prayed for. A writ for ‘police protection’ has only a limited scope, as, when the court is approached for the protection of rights declared by a decree or by an order passed by a civil court. It cannot be extended to cases where rights have not been determined either finally by the civil court or, at least at an interlocutory stage, in an unambiguous manner, and then too in furtherance of the decree or order. 20. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in P.R. Murlidharan [ (2006) 4 SCC 501 ] , a Division Bench of this Court in which one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J] was a party held in Paraswaran Somayajipad E.M. v. Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee [2023 KHC OnLine 10770] , a decision relied on by the learned Standing Counsel for Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee, the claim made by the petitioner therein, who belongs to ’Panniyoor Village, for granting him the benefit of ’Dwadasipanam’ and permit him to take part in ’Vechunamaskaram’ conducted at Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple, was denied by the respondents therein by contending that, as per the custom and usage followed in the temple from time immemorial, only those Namboothiri’s from the ’Perumanom’, ’Sukupuram’ and ’Irinjalakuda’ Villages who had performed `Agnihothram’ alone are eligible to participate in the ’Vechunamskaram’ performed in the Koothambalam of Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple on the 'Dwadasi’ day. In the said decision, it was held that, in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot adjudicate on the civil rights of the petitioner therein. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. 21. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. 21. In the result, this writ petition filed before this Court on 31.05.2024 fails on the ground of maintainability and the same is accordingly dismissed; however, leaving open the contentions raised by both sides on the Tantriship of Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple. Registry to return the files relating to Ext.P3 notice dated 24.04.2024 issued by the Deputy Administrator (Temple), Guruvayur Devaswom, to the learned Standing Counsel for Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee, which are kept in the safe custody of the Registrar (Judicial), as per the order dated 03.07.2025.