ORDER : K.S. HEMALEKHA, J. 1. The petitioner has called in question the acquisition proceedings initiated under Sections 28 (1) and 28 (4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (‘KIAD Act’ for short) in respect of land, Survey No.41/5 measuring 1 acre situated at Thalaghattapura Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as ‘scheduled land’). Facts in brief: 2. The petitioner claims to be the absolute owner of the aforesaid land and continues to remain in actual physical possession thereof. The said land came to be notified for acquisition for the purposes of Bangalore- Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP) pursuant to the preliminary notification dated 14.06.2006 issued under Section 28 (1) of the KIAD Act and final notification dated 16.10.2008 issued under Section 28(4). It is stated that although nearly 17 years have lapsed since the issuance of the final notification, no award has been passed by the acquiring authority, nor has any possession been taken in accordance with law. The petitioner also relies on the endorsement dated 05.06.2025 issued by the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Area Planning ((BMICAP) Office, which categorically states that no ramp, interchange, link alignment or BMICP facility exists or is proposed upon Survey No.41/5, and consequently, that the land is not required for BMICP. It is further averred that an affidavit filed by the Government of Karnataka before the Apex Court in Contempt Petition (C) No.139/2012, shows that 554 acres of excess land had already been handed over to the concessionaire, and that no further land would be delivered. It is further stated that this admission further demonstrates that the schedule land was neither essential nor intended for BMICP utilization. It is submitted that the acquisition by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) was never adjudicated in the earlier writ petitions. 3. Heard Sri H.N. Shashidhara, learned senior counsel for Sri H.S. Suhas, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Ravindra V. Reddy, learned special counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2, Smt. Anuparna Bordoloi, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 5 and Sri R.V.S. Naik, learned senior counsel for Sri Nitin Prasad, learned counsel for respondent No.6 and perused the material on record. 4. 4. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the present acquisition has become stale, abandoned and non est, as no award has been passed for more than 17 years and the respondents have taken no steps to conclude the proceedings. It is argued that the petitioner continues in actual possession and that there is no lawful possession mahazar, spot sketch or contemporaneous record evidencing physical dispossession. It is argued that the land has no nexus with the BMICP, as confirmed by the BMICP in its endorsement dated 05.06.2025 and that respondent No.6 cannot now rely upon a belated theory of ‘ramp requirement’ when the project authority itself disowns such necessity. Further, it is argued that the NICE-respondent No.6, being only a concessionaire, cannot override the technical determinations of the BMICP Planning Office. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel that the State’s affidavit before the Apex Court in Contempt Petition (C) No.139/2012 acknowledges the delivery of excess land and reinforces the absence of any subsisting public purpose. It is contended that the earlier BMICP litigation does not bar the present challenge, since the present notification under the KIAD Act constitute a fresh cause of action. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, the petitioner having approached this Court nearly 19 years after the preliminary notification and 17 years after the final notification. It is submitted that the acquisition for BMICP has been upheld by this Court and Apex Court and the petitioner herself had earlier litigated in W.P.No.41618/2003. 6. Learned senior counsel for respondent No.6 vehemently contends that the land is indispensable for the construction of a permanent ramp connecting Kanakpura Road (NH-209) to the BMICP peripheral road and that a makeshift temporary ramp is in place only because the petitioner has not delivered possession. It is contended that the KIADB notification was validly issued for BMICP and the petitioner addressed the letters advising the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) not to proceed further on account of an interim order contributed to the delay in passing the award. He further disputed about the BMICP endorsement relied upon by the petitioner, contending that the project authority's communication does not supersede the sanctioned alignment or technical records. He further disputed about the BMICP endorsement relied upon by the petitioner, contending that the project authority's communication does not supersede the sanctioned alignment or technical records. It is the case that the possession was taken in 2008 and the land vested under Section 28 (5) of the KIAD Act. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the point that arises for consideration is: “Whether the prolonged inaction in not passing an award for more than 17 years renders the acquisition invalid on the ground of delay, and whether the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed.” 8. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the contentions urged and perused the material on record. 9. Learned senior counsel for respondent No.6 had urged that the earlier rounds of litigation relating to BMICP, namely, W.P. No.41618/2003, W.A. No.390/2004, and the order of the Apex Court dated 20.04.2006 operate as a bar to the present petition. This Court perused the record and finds that Sy. No.41/5 was indeed mentioned as one of the items in the schedule of lands placed before the Court in those cases, which involved general challenges to the BMICP framework agreement and the notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioner was neither dispossessed nor issued any award at that time, and the State itself did not assert that the land forms part of the original BMICP corridor. What transpired instead is that, several years, after the Apex Court upheld the BMICP scheme, the authorities initiated a separate and a fresh acquisition under the KIAD Act through notifications dated 14.06.2006 and 16.10.2008. These KIAD notifications are entirely independent of the original BMICP acquisition and was never considered in the earlier writ petitions or appeals. 10. It is thus becomes clear that although Sy. No.41/5 was formed part of the earlier proceedings, those proceedings did not examine whether an award existed, whether possession had been taken, whether the BMICP required this land, or whether any KIADB proceedings had been initiated. These issues arise for the first time in the present petition. 11. This Court therefore finds that the inclusion of Sy. No.41/5 in the earlier proceedings did not validate, affirm or even address the acquisition of Sy. No.41/5, because the acquisition had not yet occurred. Consequently, the earlier judgments upholding the BMICP scheme do not bar the petitioner from challenging the present KIADB notifications. 11. This Court therefore finds that the inclusion of Sy. No.41/5 in the earlier proceedings did not validate, affirm or even address the acquisition of Sy. No.41/5, because the acquisition had not yet occurred. Consequently, the earlier judgments upholding the BMICP scheme do not bar the petitioner from challenging the present KIADB notifications. 12. The preliminary notification is of the year 2006, final notification is of the year 2008, no award has been passed for more than 17 years after the final notification. The respondents have not offered any acceptable explanation. The KIADB cannot indefinitely keep the petitioner's property under acquisition without concluding proceedings and such extraordinary dormancy defeats the statute and vitiates the acquisition. There is considerable force in the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the impugned acquisition cannot survive in light of the consistent judicial pronouncement of this Court and the Apex Court regarding inordinate delay in concluding the acquisition proceedings under the KIAD Act. 13. Learned senior counsel points out that though preliminary notification in the present case was issued in the year 2006 and final notification in 2008, no award has been passed even after more than 17 years. 14. In Smt. M. Shakuntalamma vs. State of Karnataka and others , W.P. No.64702/2016 D.D. on 08.08.2017 , (Smt. M. Shakuntalamma) the learned Single Judge directed the SLAO to pass an award. However in W.A. No.6763/2017 preferred by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (BMICP), the Division Bench quashed the very same notifications on the ground of 11 years of inaction, holding that the learned single judge ought to have set aside the proceedings instead of directing the authority to pass an award. 15. The Division Bench Judgment dated 08.06.2023 was thereafter carried to the Apex Court in SLP Diary No.3767/2024, which came to be dismissed by the Apex Court refusing to interfere with the quashing of the acquisition on the ground of prolonged non-passing of the award, though leaving the ‘question of law open’. 16. Similarly in K.H. Shivanna and others vs. State of Karnataka and others , W.P. No.13139/2019 D.D. on 02.03.2021 (K.H. Shivanna), this Court quashed a preliminary notification issued on 07.08.2006 under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act on the ground that the acquisition proceedings had remained incomplete for 14 years. 16. Similarly in K.H. Shivanna and others vs. State of Karnataka and others , W.P. No.13139/2019 D.D. on 02.03.2021 (K.H. Shivanna), this Court quashed a preliminary notification issued on 07.08.2006 under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act on the ground that the acquisition proceedings had remained incomplete for 14 years. The said judgment came to be affirmed in W.A. No.557/2021 and the dismissal was upheld by the Apex Court in SLP No.28887/2022, following the principle that the a delay of 9 years between the final notification and further steps in acquisition is fatal. Likewise, in the case of Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board and another vs. M.Venkataramaiah and others , W.A. No.558/2021 D.D. on 06.04.2022 (M. Venkataramaiah) was dismissed by following the ratio of K.H. Shivanna 17. In The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB and others vs. Sri V.R. Venugopal and others W.A. No.6820/2017 D.D. on 04.02.2020 (V.R. Venugopal), the Division Bench confirmed the order of the learned single judge in W.P. Nos.34313- 34317/2016, holding that when the preliminary notification was issued in 2000 and final notification in 2005, but no award passed even after 7 years, the acquisition could not be sustained. 18. Likewise, in A.S. Vedhamurthy vs. The State of Karnataka and others , W.P. No.6528/2018 D.D. on 28.03.2022 (A.S. Vedhamurthy), the acquisition initiated in 2007 was quashed on the ground that more than 9 years have lapsed without payment of compensation and without taking possession. 19. The position of law has been emphatically reaffirmed by the Apex Court in the case of Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Another vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and others , (2024) 10 SCC 533 (Kolkata Municipal Corporation) wherein the Apex Court held that right of restitution and fair compensation, the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and the right to timely conclusion of proceedings are integral components of constitutional protection under Article 300A of the Constitution. The Apex Court has categorically observed that even if one of these sub rights is violated, the acquisition becomes one, ‘without authority of law’ and at paragraph Nos.30 and 31 has held as under: “30. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such sub- rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such sub- rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are: (i) The duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property — the right to notice, (ii) The duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition — the right to be heard, (iii) The duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire — the right to a reasoned decision, (vi) The duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose — the duty to acquire only for public purpose, (v) The duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate — the right of restitution or fair compensation, (vi) The duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings — the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and (vii) The final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting — the right of conclusion. 31. These seven rights are foundational components of a law that is tune with Article 300-A, and the absence of one of these or some of them would render the law susceptible to challenge. The judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantation declares that the law envisaged under Article 300-A must be in line with the overarching principles of rule of law, and must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is, of course, precedentially sound to describe some of these sub-rights as “procedural”, a nomenclature that often tends to undermine the inherent worth of these safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be procedures, but they do constitute the real content of the right to property under Article 300-A, non- compliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law.” 20. In the present case, there is an unexplained delay of 17 years after the final notification and in light of the law declared in the decisions referred above, such prolonged and unexplained dormancy destroys the legality of the acquisition. Added to this is the categorical endorsement by the BMICP Planning Authority dated 05.06.2025 stating that the land is not required for the BMICP. The cumulative effect of the following factors; i. The absence of any subsisting public purpose; ii. Added to this is the categorical endorsement by the BMICP Planning Authority dated 05.06.2025 stating that the land is not required for the BMICP. The cumulative effect of the following factors; i. The absence of any subsisting public purpose; ii. Gross and inordinate delay in concluding statutory steps, renders the present acquisition one that cannot be sustained. iii. The earlier BMICP decision does not bar the present challenge. iv. No lawful possession has been taken, 21. The acquisition of the petitioner's land cannot be allowed to survive and the impugned notification needs to be quashed. Accordingly, the point framed for consideration is answered and this Court pass the following: ORDER i. The writ petition is allowed ii. The preliminary notification dated 14.06.2006 and final notification dated 16.10.2008 issued under Sections 28(1) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act respectively, insofar as they relate to the petitioner's land bearing Survey No.41/5 measuring 1 acre Thalaghattapura Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru, are hereby quashed.