JUDGMENT : ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This second appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 19.01.2004 (decree dated 27.01.2004) passed by the learned District Judge, Hazaribagh in Title Appeal No. 16 of 1999 whereby the learned District Judge dismissed the Title Appeal and affirmed the judgment dated 04.02.1999 (decree dated 24.02.1999) passed by the learned Additional Munsif, Hazaribagh in Title Suit No. 37 of 1989. 3. The title suit was filed for declaration of title of the plaintiff over the lands described in Schedule A of the plaint and also for declaration that, the order dated 15.09.1987 passed by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Hazaribagh in Land Ceiling Case No. 48/1973 and the notification of surplus lands under Memo No. 567 dated 03.02.1989 published in the District Gazette, Hazaribag dated 03.02.1989 concerning the suit land, is not binding upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff further prayed for injunction restraining defendant No. 1 and 2 from giving effect to the order dated 15.09.1987 passed in Land Ceiling Case No. 48/1973 and published in the District Gazette dated 03.02.1989. 4. The description of the suit property mentioned in Schedule-A is as under: - Village – Marhand (Dadigarha), Thana No. 116, Thana Katkamsandi (Hazaribagh), District Hazaribagh Khata No. Plot No. Area 90 79 16.00 acres 154 1.19 acres 87 1.88 acres 192 2.06 acres 180 0.61 acres 181 0.16 acres 282 2.00 acres Total 23.90 acres Arguments of the appellant 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the trial court framed as many as 9 issues for consideration and the learned 1 st appellate court has framed as many as 8 issues. He has submitted that the point of maintainability of the suit was contested referring to Section 43 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 [ hereinafter referred to as the aforesaid “Act of 1961” ] . However, since the plaintiff had also claimed title over the property, issue to that effect was also framed. He has submitted that the learned trial court decided the title against the appellant-plaintiff, but could not grant any relief to the appellant on the ground that the suit was barred under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961. However, since the plaintiff had also claimed title over the property, issue to that effect was also framed. He has submitted that the learned trial court decided the title against the appellant-plaintiff, but could not grant any relief to the appellant on the ground that the suit was barred under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961. So far as the learned 1 st appellate court is concerned, the title was declared in favour of the plaintiff. However, again the 1 st appellate court could not grant relief by referring to Section 43 (2) of the aforesaid Act of 1961. Consequently, in spite of declaration of title in favour of the appellant, the appellant has not been granted any relief. 6. With this background, the learned counsel has referred to substantial question of law as framed by this Court vide order dated 07.04.2025 which are as follows: - (i) Whether in the absence of jurisdiction, the trial court and the appellate court should have returned the plaint for raising the grievance before appropriate forum or not? (ii) Whether in spite of giving finding that the suit is not maintainable for want of jurisdiction and still proceed with the trial and appeal and thus, making the petitioner/ appellant remedy-less, is permissible in law or not? (iii) Whether the suit is maintainable in spite of prohibition under Section 43 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus land) Act, 1961 or not? 7. The learned counsel has submitted that if the suit is held to be maintainable in spite of Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961, then the other two substantial questions of law become redundant and thus the core issue before this Court is whether the suit was maintainable or not. 8. The learned counsel has submitted that the plaintiff first claimed the property on the basis of registered gift deed dated 14.03.1970 executed by one Lilawati Mitra in favour of father of the plaintiff and the gift deed was acted upon and the plaintiff’s father came in possession of the property. He submits that the finding of possession has also been conclusively recorded in favour of the plaintiff by the learned 1 st appellate court. 9. He submits that the finding of possession has also been conclusively recorded in favour of the plaintiff by the learned 1 st appellate court. 9. The learned counsel has further submits that as per the provision of Section 5 (1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act, 1961, the Collector has got the power to make necessary enquiries as to whether any transfer of land by land holder by a registered instrument or otherwise made after 22 nd October 1959 and if he is satisfied that such transfer was made with and objection to defeat or in contravention with the provisions of the Act or found to be benami or farzi, then the Collector may, after giving reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and be heard, annual such a transfer. He submits that the gift deed involved in this case being dated 14.03.1970, no exercise under Section 5(1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act was ever undertaken against the appellant who was the plaintiff in the present suit. 10. The learned counsel submits that so far as the donor of the registered gift is concerned, certain proceedings were initiated against her which culminated in passing of certain orders and final order was dated 15.09.1987. The learned counsel submits that the State continued to issue rent receipts and at no point of time, the authorities had declared that the gift deed was farzi in terms of the provision of Section 5 (1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act of 1961. The learned counsel has submitted that the plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of title and possession over the suit land and had prayed that the order dated 15.09.1987 was not binding upon the plaintiff passed by the Additional Collector in Land Ceiling Case No. 48/1973. 11. The learned counsel has submitted that in the aforesaid circumstances and considering the nature of relief prayed for in the suit, both the courts were not justified in holding that the suit seeking declaration of title was itself not maintainable. The learned counsel has also submitted that the bar of Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 will not come into play, so far as the declaration of title is concerned. 12. The learned counsel has also submitted that the bar of Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 will not come into play, so far as the declaration of title is concerned. 12. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Patna High Court reported in AIR 1988 Patna 160 (Dhaka Singh & Others vs. Baleshwar Prasad Singh & Others) which arises out of the aforesaid Act of 1961, though the proceeding involved in the said case was under Section 16 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 and has referred to paragraph 10 of the said judgment to submit that in the said case, the bar under Section 43 was rejected in view of the fact that the suit was of purely of a civil nature and such relief would not come within the fold of Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961. He submits that the Hon’ble Court has held that in a case which involves a suit of pure civil nature involving question of title and possession, bar under Section 43 would not apply. The relevant portion is quoted as under: - “…………………………………………………………………………... The question of benami before the Revenue Court, in the application under Section 16 (3) of the Act, is only an ancillary question which may be gone into, if raised -- the primary question in such applications by the pre-emptors is whether the pre-emptors are the adjoining raiyats. The present suit is purely of a civil nature and looking at Section 43 of the Act (quoted above) it is clear that a suit which is of a purely civil nature is not within its fold. Only because one of the many questions may have been raised before the Revenue Court, it cannot be said that Section 43 bars maintainability of a suit of purely civil nature involving question of title and possession. It is well settled that the Civil Court is quite competent to deal with a case where the decision of the Board of Revenue, the appellate authority or the Collector was without jurisdiction or that the orders passed by such authorities were not passed under the Act. If the submission, as advanced by the learned counsel for the intervenor-defendants/contesting respondents, is accepted then the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction even if the order passed by the Revenue Court was without jurisdiction. If the submission, as advanced by the learned counsel for the intervenor-defendants/contesting respondents, is accepted then the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction even if the order passed by the Revenue Court was without jurisdiction. I hold that the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the intervenor-defendants/contesting respondents is without any substance. It is also well settled that the bar raised by Section 43 of the Act does not operate against the maintainability of a suit for declaring that the order was void ab initio.” 13. The learned counsel has submitted that as per his specific case before the learned trial court, the final publication under Section 15 was made on 03.02.1989 and as soon as the plaintiff came to know on 12.02.1989 about the publication, he filed his objection on 13.02.1989 which was not entertained and ultimately dismissed. The learned counsel has also referred to the order-sheet dated 13.03.1989 of the learned trial court wherein the learned trial court had waived the requirement for giving notice under Section 80 of CPC considering the emergent situation and then the case was directed to be registered. Arguments of the respondents 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, has vehemently opposed the prayer of the appellant and has referred to the written statement filed before the learned trial court and has in particular referred to paragraph 7 and 8 to submit that the matter was heard by the Collector and the gift deed dated 14.03.1970 was found to be farzi and illegal. The learned counsel has submitted that once the deed was found to be farzi and illegal in the land ceiling proceeding, the suit itself was not maintainable and barred under Section 43 would apply. 15. The learned counsel has also relied upon the judgments passed by this Court reported in 2004 (3) JCR 117 (Jhr.) [Bhairab Mahto & Others vs. Dalo Ram Mahto & Others] paragraph 6 and 2008 (3) JCR 37 (SC) [Dolhin Padharo Devi. Vs. Indrajeet Tiwary & Anr.] paragraph 6. 16. The learned counsel has submitted that since the suit was not maintainable, therefore the suit has been rightly dismissed and the appeal has also been dismissed and declaration of title in favour of the appellant by the 1 st appellate court has no bearing in the matter. Findings of this Court 17. Vs. Indrajeet Tiwary & Anr.] paragraph 6. 16. The learned counsel has submitted that since the suit was not maintainable, therefore the suit has been rightly dismissed and the appeal has also been dismissed and declaration of title in favour of the appellant by the 1 st appellate court has no bearing in the matter. Findings of this Court 17. The provisions of the aforesaid Act relevant for the purposes of the present case are as follows: - “ 5. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling area.- (1)(i) It shall not be lawful for any family to hold, except otherwise provided under this Act, land in excess of the ceiling area. Explanation. - All lands owned or held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be owned or held by the family. (ii)No land holder holding land in excess of the ceiling area shall from the commencement of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) (Amendment) Act, 1972 and till the publication of notification under Section 15 , transfer any land held by him except with the previous permission in writing of the Collector, who may refuse to give such permission if he is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded in writing that the transfer is proposed to be made with a mala fide intention of defeating the object of this Act: Provided that the transfer of any land made, with the previous permission of the Collector, shall be deemed to have been made from within the ceiling area admissible to the land-holder: Provided also that the transfer of any land beyond the ceiling area admissible to the land holder shall be deemed to have been made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act. (iii) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgement, decree or order of any court or authority the Collector shall have power to, make enquiries in respect of any transfer of land by a land-holder whether by a registered instrument or otherwise made after the 22nd day of October, 1959, and if he is satisfied that such transfer was made with the object of defeating, or in contravention of the provisions of this Act or for retaining, benami or farzi land in excess of the ceiling area, the Collector may after giving reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and be heard, annul such transfer and thereupon the land shall be deemed to be held by the transferor for the purposes of determining the ceiling area he may hold under this Section. 43. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court. (1)Save and except as provided in this Act no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act, required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Board of Revenue, the appellate authority or the Collector. (2)No order of the Board of Revenue, the appellate authority or the Collector made under this Act, shall be questioned in any Court. 18. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the specific case of the plaintiff-appellant before the learned trial court was that he was claiming the property by virtue of registered gift deed. It was the case of the plaintiff that: - a. the property was given to the father of the plaintiff Satya Kinkar Patra, S/o Late Pitambar Patra by Lilawati Mitra W/o Late Prabodh Chandra Mitra by virtue of registered deed of gift no. 4496 dated 14.03.1970 and his father came in possession, got the property mutated in his name and the plaintiff was also paying rent with respect to the property. The name of the donee has already been entered in Register-II maintained by the defendants. The plaintiff had also applied for loan and for the recovery of loan certain certificate case was also started. The name of the donee has already been entered in Register-II maintained by the defendants. The plaintiff had also applied for loan and for the recovery of loan certain certificate case was also started. b. On 12.02.1989, Circle Inspector and karamchari had come to the suit land for the purpose of distribution of lands amongst the landless and weaker section of the society as the land according to them, was notified under Section 15 (i) of the Ceiling Act and the same has been published in the District Gazette vide Memo No. 576 dated 03.02.1989. c. After having come to know of the notification u/s 15(i) of the Bihar Act 12 of 1962 on 12.02.89, the plaintiff moved the Additional Collector, Hazaribagh by petition dated 13.02.89 for exclusion of the suit land from the notification of surplus land of Nirmal Chandra Mitra but the same has been dismissed without granting any opportunity to the plaintiff of being heard, and the authorities have further accelerated the process of distribution of lands. d. In the aforesaid gazette dated 3 rd February 1989, the schedule land was included in the land of surplus land of Shri Nirmal Chandra Mitra, S/o of Late Prabodh Chandra Mitra, who had already died prior to the aforesaid notification. e. It was their further case that upon inspection of Land Ceiling Case No. 48/73 disposed of on 15.09.1987, the suit land was fraudulently included in the ceiling area of Nirmal Chandra Mitra (since deceased) and the same was further shown as surplus land of the said land holder without any opportunity to the plaintiff or proforma defendants, who were brother and mother of the plaintiff, of being heard before their interest in the suit land was affected and there has been serious miscarriage of justice and violation of the principles of natural justice. f. The plaintiff and his father, being raiyat of the schedule suit land, having been recognized by the State of Bihar through the defendant nos. 1 and 2 by acceptance of rent and land revenue under receipts, therefore, the plaintiff ought to have been heard before his raiyati lands were included as the surplus land of Nirmal Chandra Mitra and notifying the same as such. The plaintiff has acquired occupancy right in the suit land. g. In the aforesaid circumstances, the suit was filed. 19. 1 and 2 by acceptance of rent and land revenue under receipts, therefore, the plaintiff ought to have been heard before his raiyati lands were included as the surplus land of Nirmal Chandra Mitra and notifying the same as such. The plaintiff has acquired occupancy right in the suit land. g. In the aforesaid circumstances, the suit was filed. 19. A written statement was filed by the defendants, interalia, raising the following points: - i. In the year 1973, Land Ceiling Case No. 48 of 1973 was started against one Lilawati Mitra and the land involved in the said Land Ceiling Case was 934.63 acres in the village Marhand, P.S. Katkamsendi and after hearing the parties, Land measuring 799.79 acres was acquired by the State. ii. Against this acquisition, Lilawati Mitra filed an objection before the Commissioner, North Chhota Nagpur Division, Hazaribagh and in her appeal, Lilawati Mitra prayed for release of land on the basis of sale and gift made by her to different persons and also for allowing more units to her. The Commissioner remanded the matter to the Additional Collector for hearing the case on the above points. The matter was ultimately heard by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Hazaribagh, who after noticing the parties, held that since the gift was made on 03.03.1970 to Satyakinkar Patra and as such the gift was found to be farzi and illegal. Lilawati Mitra was however allowed 5 units. iii. It has been further stated that again Lilawati Mitra and her successor aggrieved by the order of the Additional Collector (Ceiling) dated 06.03.1983 filed another appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh and the Deputy Commissioner on 19.12.1986 ordered for rehearing the matter by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Hazaribagh. The Additional Collector (Ceiling), Hazaribagh again noticed all the parties concerned and after looking into the documents produced by the parties and after hearing them passed a final order on 15.09.1987, by which he allowed 13 units to the land holder and the rest lands measuring 291.38 acres, which were found in excess of the Ceiling area, were declared to be excess land, for which a notification under Section 11(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act was published. Thereafter, the notification under Section 15 (1) of the aforesaid Act was also published in the District Gazette for land measuring 291.38 acres. iv. Thereafter, the notification under Section 15 (1) of the aforesaid Act was also published in the District Gazette for land measuring 291.38 acres. iv. The excess land acquired from the land holder were distributed to landless persons of the village and settlement purcha were also issued to such persons and the rent receipts, which were issued to the plaintiff, were cancelled and rent receipts in respect to suit properties began to be issued in the names of the new settlees. It has been stated that the plaintiff should have filed objection, at the time his rent receipts were cancelled by the State, but the plaintiff preferred to remain silent for reasons best known to him. v. It has been further stated that after distribution of surplus land to different persons, the plaintiff filed an objection before the authority stating therein that 23.90 acres land belonged to the plaintiff which were acquired by the father of the plaintiff under a deed of right dated 03.03.1970. This objection was however rejected by the authority because of the fact that by earlier orders the alleged deed of gift was found to be fabricated and illegal. vi. It is the case of the defendant no. 1 and 2 that the present suit has been brought by the plaintiff after his objection was rejected by the Additional Collector (Ceiling), Hazaribagh. vii. It is the further case of the defendants that the land-holder Lilawati Mitra had earlier surrendered the lands of Khata no. 90, plot no. 282 and 905, area 100.50 acres out of her own accord as her excess land than the ceiling area vide L.C. Case No. 02/76. The land so surrendered by the land holder were taken possession by the State and the said land were distributed amongst the landless persons and rent receipts were issued by the State to such persons for the lands given to them and the rent receipts issued to the plaintiff was stopped. The defendants stated that in a normal course when the rent receipt of the plaintiff was stopped, it was expected from the plaintiff to have taken steps with the authorities in the matter of cancellation of rent receipts, but the plaintiff, for reasons best known to him kept silent and did not take any action in this regard. The defendants stated that in a normal course when the rent receipt of the plaintiff was stopped, it was expected from the plaintiff to have taken steps with the authorities in the matter of cancellation of rent receipts, but the plaintiff, for reasons best known to him kept silent and did not take any action in this regard. It has been stated in the written statement that though the deed of gift was of the year 1970, the mutation was done on 21.01.1981 and this shows that the plaintiff has any how managed to obtain mutation order. viii. It was the further case of the defendants that when the suit lands were being settled with the landless persons, it is expected that the plaintiff has full knowledge of the Land Ceiling proceedings. But at this stage also, the plaintiff remained silent, spectator and knowingly allowed things to go ahead. In such circumstances also, the plaintiff is not entitled to give any relief in the present suit. ix. It has been further stated that as a matter of fact the alleged Dan Patra was duly considered by the authority during the land ceiling proceeding and it was held to be illegal. Thus, it cannot be said that the Dan Patra was not considered at all by the Revenue authorities and as such, there was no necessity to give any notice to the donee. x. It has been further stated that when final publication under Section 11(1) of the Act was being taken, option was given to land holder to retain land of his choice. At this stage also, the land holder did not disclose that the suit lands were not in his possession and were given to Satya Kinkar Patra under Dan Patra. xi. The defendants stated that the entire land ceiling proceeding including distribution of land to the landless persons relate to village Marhand, P.S. Katkamsandi. The plaintiff is also resident of village Marhand and under no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the plaintiff is unaware of all the said proceedings. xii. The defendants denied the statements made in paragraph 13 of the plaint by stating that mere issuance of rent receipts does not show that the person is in possession of the land. 20. The learned trial court dismissed the suit by holding that the suit was barred under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act. 21. xii. The defendants denied the statements made in paragraph 13 of the plaint by stating that mere issuance of rent receipts does not show that the person is in possession of the land. 20. The learned trial court dismissed the suit by holding that the suit was barred under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act. 21. On the above pleadings, followings issues were framed by the learned 1 st appellate court: - i. Is the suit, as framed, is maintainable in law? ii. Is the suit barred u/s 43 of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961? iii. Is the suit bad for want of notice u/s 80 C.P.C.? iv. Has the plaintiff got cause of action and right to sue? v. Has the plaintiff got title and possession over the suit land? vi. Whether the order dated 15.9.87 passed by the Addl. Collector, Hazaribag in Ceiling Case no. 48/73 not binding on the plaintiff? vii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to grant of permanent injunction restraining defendant no. 1 and 2 from interfering with the suit land? viii. Is the plaintiff entitled to the relief sought for? 22. The learned 1 st appellate court considered issue no. V vide paragraph 7 onwards and given its finding as under: - “7. Issue no. v: - The plaintiff has claimed that his father Satya Kinker Patra had received the suit lands through a Deed of Gift executed by land holder Lilawati Mitra on 14.03.70. The possession of the lands were also delivered to the father of the plaintiff in acceptance of the said gift and the remained in possession till his lifetime. After his death, plaintiff and defendant no. 3 and 4 inherited the suit property and continued in possession of the same. It has also been claimed by the plaintiff that the name of his father was mutated in the Revenue Shrista and rent was also fixed. His name was also entered in Demand Registrar-II. The rent has been paid and rent receipt was granted regularly. The appellant also stated that he had taken loan for purchase of fertilizer etc. and 2 certificate was instituted against him for recovery of the loan amount. The plaintiff and proforma defendants discharged the loan by depositing the amount and they are in continuous possession of the suit land and are enjoining the fruits. 8. ………………………………………………………………. The appellant also stated that he had taken loan for purchase of fertilizer etc. and 2 certificate was instituted against him for recovery of the loan amount. The plaintiff and proforma defendants discharged the loan by depositing the amount and they are in continuous possession of the suit land and are enjoining the fruits. 8. ………………………………………………………………. 9. ………………………………………………………………. 10. ………………………………………………………………..... 11. the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence clearly go to show that the suit land was acquired by the plaintiff’s father by virtue of Deed of Gift (Ext. 2) on 14.3.70 executed by land holder Lilawati Mitra and he came in possession over the same. He constructed embankment, Pond, residential house and planted several fruit trees over the same. He brought a large area of land under cultivation. His possession alongwith possession of the plaintiff has been corroborated by the witnesses. However, plaintiff’s witnesses admitted that 250-300 acres of land of Lilawati Devi had been declared surplus land and the State Govt. had issued percha of the same. But the fact remains that since 14.3.70, father of the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and after his death, plaintiff is cultivating the suit lands and is in possession of the residential house, Pond and fruit bearing trees covering a period of about 30 years. All these facts go to show that Deed of Gift (Ext. 2) had been acted upon and even State of Bihar had issued rent receipt (Ext. 1 series) to the plaintiff which clearly got to sow that the father’s name and after his death, plaintiff’s name had been mutated and a Jamabandi was opened in his name which led to grant of aforesaid rent receipts. It was only during ceiling proceeding in the year 1984 when the Revenue Authority stopped grant of rent receipt to the plaintiff. 12 ………………………………………………………………… 13. As stated above, bar in transfer of land by a land holder under the Ceiling Act was only to the extent that permission of the Collector was required for the same. There was no complete bar in transfer under the said Act. All such transfers made before 9.9.70 should have been enquired into by the Authority under the Ceiling Act by giving notice to such land holders. Admittedly, no notice had been served on the plaintiff nor he was heard in the matter. There was no complete bar in transfer under the said Act. All such transfers made before 9.9.70 should have been enquired into by the Authority under the Ceiling Act by giving notice to such land holders. Admittedly, no notice had been served on the plaintiff nor he was heard in the matter. No Enquiry under the provision of Ceiling Act has been done with regard to the suit land. All these facts and the oral documentary evidence discussed above, clearly go to show that the plaintiff has been able to prove his title and possession over the suit land till the year 1989 when the suit land was finally published u/s 15 of the Ceiling Act as surplus land of land holder Lilawati Devi. The plaintiff has been able to prove his possession over the suit land in spite of the claim of defendant no. 1 and 2 either oral or documentary to show that the suit land had been distributed and is in occupation of any other person except the plaintiff. This issue is decided accordingly. (emphasis supplied) 23. The learned 1 st appellate court decided remaining issues vide paragraph 14 and 15 onwards, which are quoted as under: - “ 14. Issue no. i. ii, iii, iv, vi, vii: - There is no dispute of the fact that a Ceiling Case i.e. Ceiling Case No. 48/73 had been started against the land holder Lilawati Mitra and an area of 250-300 acres of her land including the suit land had been declared surplus i.e. in excess of the Ceiling area held by Lilawati Mitra and the same was notified in the District Gazette (Ext. A) u/s 15 of the Ceiling Act. This fact has not been disputed by the plaintiff or his witnesses. In fact, plaintiff has stated that he had filed an objection before the Addl. Collector in the said Ceiling Case which was dismissed. It appears that after final publication u/s 15 of the Ceiling Act, the Ceiling Authority refused to consider the objection of the plaintiff although no notice had been served on him nor any Ceiling proceeding was started against him. However, I must state that there is complete bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide any dispute under the said Act. However, I must state that there is complete bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide any dispute under the said Act. Section 43 of the Ceiling Act is as follows: - Save and except as provided in this Act, no Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Board of Revenue, the Commissioner, the appellate authority or the Collector” “No order of the Board of Revenue, the Commissioner, the appellate authority or the Collector made under this Act, shall be questioned in any Court.” It is clear from the said Provision that the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Ceiling Act, required to be settled, decided or dealt with by Board of Revenue, Commissioner, Appellate authority or the Collector. The said Provision further state that no order of the Board of Revenue, Commissioner, Appellate Authority of Collector made under the Ceiling Act, shall be questioned in any Court. Therefore, it is clear that the Civil Court cannot grant any relief against the orders passed under the Ceiling Act nor it can grant permanent injunction against the order of the Addl. Collector passed in Ceiling Case no. 48/73. Therefore, the plaintiff can have no cause of action or right to sue against defendant no. 1 and 2 and the pre-sent suit filed by him is not maintainable in law. The suit filed by the plaintiff is also hit by section 80 of the C.P.C. since no notice was served on defendant no. 1 and 2 under the said Provision. All these issues are decided accordingly. 15. Issue no. viii: - As discussed above and in view of the law of Section 43 of the Ceiling Act, plaintiff is not entitled to any relief south for. In the result, the judgment and decree of the court below is affirmed to the extent, as discussed above.” 24. As already recorded above, the plaintiff was exempted from issuing notice under section 80 of the CPC by an order of the learned trial court. 25. This Court finds that the defendant no. In the result, the judgment and decree of the court below is affirmed to the extent, as discussed above.” 24. As already recorded above, the plaintiff was exempted from issuing notice under section 80 of the CPC by an order of the learned trial court. 25. This Court finds that the defendant no. 1 and 2 have not raised any plea in connection with exercise of power in accordance with Section 5(1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act of 1961 against the donee of the registered gift deed dated 14.03.1970 or his successors which included the plaintiff and the proforma defendants, mother and brother of the plaintiff. Rather the defendant no. 1 and 2 pleaded that there was no need to issue notice to the donee. 26. This Court finds that ultimately the learned 1 st appellate court after considering the materials produced on record held that the appellant had right, title, interest and possession with respect to the suit property and the registered gift deed dated 14.03.1970 was held to be valid. However, so far as the applicability of bar under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 is concerned, the same has been decided by both the courts against the appellant. This is inspite of coming to a clear finding that all transfers made before 9.9.70 should have been enquired into by the Authority under the Ceiling Act by giving notice to such land holders. Admittedly, no notice had been served on the plaintiff nor he was heard in the matter. No Enquiry under the provision of Ceiling Act has been done with regard to the suit land. All these facts and the oral documentary evidence discussed above, clearly go to show that the plaintiff has been able to prove his title and possession over the suit land till the year 1989 when the suit land was finally published u/s 15 of the Ceiling Act as surplus land of land holder Lilawati Devi. 27. All these facts and the oral documentary evidence discussed above, clearly go to show that the plaintiff has been able to prove his title and possession over the suit land till the year 1989 when the suit land was finally published u/s 15 of the Ceiling Act as surplus land of land holder Lilawati Devi. 27. Meaning thereby that neither any proceeding was initiated against the donee (father of the plaintiff) or his legal heirs and successors nor they were made party in the proceedings initiated against the original land holder Lilawati Devi who had gifted the property to the father of the plaintiff vide registered gift deed dated 14.03.1970 much prior to initiation of proceedings and the father of the plaintiff and thereafter his successors were throughout in possession till the year 1989 when the suit land was finally published u/s 15 of the Ceiling Act as surplus land of land holder Lilawati Devi and mutation was also carried out in their name and rent receipts were also issued. 28. The aforesaid findings clearly demonstrate that no proceeding in terms of section 5 (1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act was initiated against the plaintiff or his father or proforma defendant no. 3 and 4 and a clear finding of fact has been recorded that no enquiry was made under the provision of Ceiling Act with regard to the suit land and the property. In a case where transfer has been made after 22.10.1959, in order to hold that the transaction was farzi, an enquiry has to be made by the Collector in respect of any transfer of land by a land-holder whether by a registered instrument or otherwise and if he is satisfied that such transfer was made with the object of defeating, or in contravention of the provisions of the Act or for retaining, benami or farzi land in excess of the ceiling area, the Collector can annul such transfer only after giving reasonable notice to the parties concerned to appear and be heard, and only thereupon the land shall be deemed to be held by the transferor for the purposes of determining the ceiling area he may hold under this Section. In the present case, the defendant no. In the present case, the defendant no. 1 and 2 had taken a specific stand in the written statement that it cannot be said that the Dan Patra (gift deed) was not considered at all by the Revenue authorities and as such, there was no necessity to give any notice to the donee. 29. Paragraph 6 of the judgment passed in the case of Bhairab Mahto vs. Dalo Ram Mahto (supra) is quoted as under: - “ 6. It is in this context that Section 43 of the Act has to be appreciated. Section 43 ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of a question which requires to be settled, decided or dealt with under the Act by the Board of Revenue, the appellate authority or the Collector. Here the right u/s 16(3) of the Act requires to be settled by the Collector. Therefore, the right put forward by the plaintiff is one that requires to be settled under the provisions of the Act by the machinery provided for by the Act. It is, therefore, clear that such a question cannot be agitated before the Civil Court. There is no dispute that the right available to the plaintiff is not a common law right but is only a right conferred by u/s 16(3) of the Act. In that situation, the Courts below, in may view, were clearly right in holding that the suit was not maintainable.” 30. Paragraph 6 of the judgment reported in 2008 (3) JCR 37 (SC) (supra) is quoted as under: - “6. It is firmly established that the jurisdiction of the civil appeal to deal with civil right can be excluded by Legislature, but the statutory provision in this regard must be expressed and clear. The bar created under the relevant provisions of a Statute excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot however operate in cases where the plea raised before the Civil Court goes to the root of the matter and could, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a nullity. This position was highlighted by this Court in Ram Swarup and Ors. v. Shikar Chand & another, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 893. If the proceedings of the orders passed therein are completely without jurisdiction then the bar to the maintainability to the suit in the ordinary Civil Court would not apply. This position was highlighted by this Court in Ram Swarup and Ors. v. Shikar Chand & another, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 893. If the proceedings of the orders passed therein are completely without jurisdiction then the bar to the maintainability to the suit in the ordinary Civil Court would not apply. The High Court noted that a plain reading of Section 43 of the Act shows that while a suit is not maintainable against an order passed under the Act, the jurisdiction of the authority passing such order can be decided by a Civil Court. …………………………………………………………..” 31. Thus, it has been held that the bar created under the relevant provisions of a Statute excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot however operate in cases where the plea raised before the Civil Court goes to the root of the matter and could, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a nullity. It has also been held that if the proceedings of the orders passed therein are completely without jurisdiction, then the bar to the maintainability to the suit in the ordinary Civil Court would not apply. It has also been held that a plain reading of Section 43 of the Act shows that while a suit is not maintainable against an order passed under the Act, the jurisdiction of the authority passing such order can be decided by a Civil Court. 32. In the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that in the absence of any enquiry under the provisions of the aforesaid Act and no notice was admittedly issued to the father of plaintiff (donee) or his successors including the plaintiff in terms of the provisions of section 5(1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act, the order dated 15.09.1987 so far as it relates to the registered gift deed involved in this case and the action to declare the land covered under registered gift deed dated 14.03.1970 as farzi and to include the land covered by the gift deed while calculating the ceiling land of the original holder (the doner) is wholly without jurisdiction so far as the father of plaintiff (donee) or his successors including the plaintiff are concerned and cannot bind the father of plaintiff (donee) or his successors including the plaintiff. Such an action is not only violative of the basic principles of natural justice but is in total disregards of the provisions of the aforesaid Act including section 5(1) (iii) thereof which clearly provides that any enquiry is to be undertaken in terms of section 5(1) (iii) and a transfer can be declared farzi only after hearing the parties after required enquiry. The learned 1 st appellate court has clearly recorded a finding of fact that no enquiry was made under the provision of Ceiling Act with regard to the suit land and the property. 33. This Court is of the considered view that in a suit seeking declaration of right, title, interest and possession, the bar under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 would not apply particularly in the circumstances where the defendants have not been able to prove that at any point of time the gift deed was declared to be void in terms of Section 5 (1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act of 1961 or even an enquiry was undertaken in terms of section 5(1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act. 34. It is important to note that the appellant had not challenged any of the orders passed under the Act of 1961, but had simply sought a relief for declaration of right, title, interest and possession over the suit property and had sought a declaration that the orders under the Land Ceiling Act was not binding upon the appellant in the absence of any proceeding in terms of Section 5(1) (iii) of the aforesaid Act of 1961. 35. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the learned courts were not justified in holding that the suit itself was not maintainable and was barred under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 inspite of a clear finding of fact that no enquiry was made under the provision of Ceiling Act with regard to the suit land and the property. Consequently, the finding of the learned courts that the suit was not maintainable on account of bar under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 is hereby set-aside. 36. The 3 rd substantial question of law is accordingly decided in favor of the appellant and against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 37. Consequently, the finding of the learned courts that the suit was not maintainable on account of bar under Section 43 of the aforesaid Act of 1961 is hereby set-aside. 36. The 3 rd substantial question of law is accordingly decided in favor of the appellant and against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 37. Having decided the 3 rd substantial question of law, this Court decides the 1 st substantial question of law by holding there was no need to return the plaint as the suit was maintainable. While decided 2 nd substantial question of law, this court holds that since the suit was maintainable, the learned 1 st appellate court has rightly decided all the issues and it is not in dispute that that right, title, interest and possession with respect to the suit property has been held by the learned 1 st appellate court in favor of the appellant while deciding the corresponding issue. The title has already been decided in favor of the appellant by the learned 1 st appellate court which is neither under challenge nor any substantial question of law has been frame in connection with such finding. It has been recorded by the learned 1 st appellate court that though the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had claimed that 3 rd party rights were created over the property, but no such document oral or documentary were brought by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The 1 st and 2 nd substantial questions of law are accordingly decided in favor of the appellant and against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 38. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings the suit is held maintainable and is decreed in favour of the appellant (plaintiff). 39. This second appeal is hereby allowed. 40. Pending I.A., if any, is closed. 41. Let this order be communicated to the courts concerned through ‘e mail/FAX’.