JUDGMENT : C. M. JOSHI, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the defendants in O.S.No.164/2003, which was reversed by the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.511/2010 by which the dismissal of the suit for partition of a joint property was set aside by the First Appellate Court. 2. The factual matrix that is relevant for the purpose of this appeal may be stated as below: (a) It is the case of the plaintiffs that they represent their fathers Shanmukhangouda and Basanagouda who were brothers. The said Shanmukhangouda and Basanagouda had a brother by name Rudragouda. The defendants are the descendants of Rudragouda. The suit land bearing Sy.No.20/2, hissa Nos.3 and 4 was the property owned by Shanmukhangouda, Rudragouda and Basanagouda jointly. Therefore, the father of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff No.2 i.e., Shanmukhangouda and Basanagouda had 1/3 rd share each. The said property was the exclusive property of their father, (who is also Basanagouda) and as such, they had inherited the share. (b) It is contended that all other properties belonging to Shanmukhangouda, Rudragouda and Basanagouda were divided long back, but the suit land was kept in a joint status and great part of the said land was a wasteland used for grazing the cattle. Plaintiff No.1 was in government service and he was away from the village and plaintiff No.2 was an uneducated, rustic person. Taking advantage of this, the defendants and their father got their name entered in the revenue records, omitting the names of the plaintiffs. Recently the defendants without following any mandatory provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 changed the entries in the revenue records in collusion with the Village Accountant and got half portion recorded in the name of defendant No.1 and the other half in the names of defendants Nos.2 to 5. (c) It is contended that the record of rights for the year 1978-79 mentioned the names of Shanmukhangouda, Rudragouda and Basanagouda and therefore, the suit land could not have been mutated only in the names of defendant Nos.1 to 5 excluding the plaintiffs. Therefore, they contended that they are entitled for partition and each of the plaintiffs is entitled for 1/3 rd share. They denied the contention of the defendants that the suit schedule property was acquired by Basanagouda, who is the father of Shanmukhangouda, Rudragouda and Basanagouda. Therefore, they contended that they are entitled for partition and each of the plaintiffs is entitled for 1/3 rd share. They denied the contention of the defendants that the suit schedule property was acquired by Basanagouda, who is the father of Shanmukhangouda, Rudragouda and Basanagouda. They also contended that since they were not parties to O.S.No.350/1 of 1953-1954, as it was a suit for injunction, it is not binding on them. This was contended in the light of the contention of the defendants that Rudragouda had filed the said suit against the original owners i.e., Rudrappa and Sangappa. 3.(a) The suit was resisted by defendant No.1 contending that all the sons and daughters of Shanmukhangouda and Basanagouda are not made parties to the suit and the suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties. (b) Defendant No.1 further contended that long back there was oral partition between Shanmukhangouda, Rudragouda and Basanagouda and in the said partition, Shanmukhangouda and Basanagouda were allotted the properties bearing Sy.No.20/2, hissa 2+6 and Sy.No.20/2, hissa 4. (c) By virtue of the said partition, the suit survey number was allotted to the share of Rudragouda and therefore, the contention of the plaintiffs that the suit schedule property was not subject matter of the earlier partition is false and not sustainable. (d) Thirdly, they contended that plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 had filed O.S.No.44/1967 for partition and the same came to be dismissed. It is their contention that the suit schedule property was owned by Basanagouda, the grandfather of the plaintiffs and defendants and it was also subject matter of the partition. 4. On the basis of the above contentions, the Trial Court framed the following issues. “ISSUES 1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that, the suit property was kept in joint between them and the defendants? 2. Whether the plaintiffs further prove that, they have 2/3 rd share in the suit land? 3. Whether the defendant No.1 proves that, long back there was an oral partition and the suit property was fallen to the share of father of defendant No.1 and the father of defendant No.3 to 5? 4. To what reliefs, the parties are entitled? 5. What decree or order? Addl.Issue 1. Whether defendant No.1 proves that grand father of D-1 & 3 has purchased the suit land?” 5. 4. To what reliefs, the parties are entitled? 5. What decree or order? Addl.Issue 1. Whether defendant No.1 proves that grand father of D-1 & 3 has purchased the suit land?” 5. Plaintiff No.1 was examined as PW.1 and two witnesses were examined as PW.2 and PW.3 and Exs.P.1 to P.23 were marked. The defendant was examined as DW.1 and two witnesses were examined as DW.2 and DW.3. Exs.D.1 to D.30 were marked. After hearing both the sides, the Trial Court held the issue Nos.1, 2 and 4 in the negative and issue No.3 and additional issue No.1 in the affirmative and dismissed the suit. 6. The Trial Court held that the names of Shanmukhangouda and Basanagouda were entered in the record of rights in a pencil and it was a temporary entry. The Trial Court also observes that there was a partition as admitted by PW.1, but he pleads ignorance as to the manner in which the properties were divided. The Trial Court observed that in view of there being only a pencil entry in the record of rights, the entitlement of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 is disputed and when it is admitted fact that there was a partition, there is no reason to keep the suit schedule property in common. 7. Further, the Trial Court held that there is no material to show that the suit schedule property alone was kept in common. It is pertinent to note that though the Trial Court observes in detail about the documents pertaining to O.S.No.350/1 of 1953-1954 marked at Exs.D.27 to D.29, it does not mention as to for what purpose the said suit was filed and by whom. However, it observes that the O.S.No.44/1967 was filed by the father of the plaintiffs and it was a suit for injunction, but it was dismissed. It was held that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit schedule property and therefore, it declined to grant the decree for partition. 8. The First Appellate Court in the impugned judgment framed the following points for consideration. “i) Whether the judgment and decree passed by lower court called for interference? ii) What order?” 9. While answering the point No.1, the First Appellate Court observes that the testimony of DW.1 shows there was a partition and he is possessing a partition deed and such partition deed was not produced. “i) Whether the judgment and decree passed by lower court called for interference? ii) What order?” 9. While answering the point No.1, the First Appellate Court observes that the testimony of DW.1 shows there was a partition and he is possessing a partition deed and such partition deed was not produced. Therefore, it draws adverse inference against DW.1 and comes to the conclusion that there was no partition. Further, it relies on the record of rights wherein the pencil entries were made showing the names of the fathers of the plaintiffs. Therefore, it holds that the judgment of the Trial Court is perverse and as such answering the point No.1 in the affirmative , it passes the following: “ORDER Appeal filed by the appellants is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree in OS.No.164/03 on 12/08/2010 passed by the lower court is hereby set-aside. Send entire records to the lower court.” 10. Being aggrieved, the defendants are before this Court in appeal. 11. This Court, while admitting the appeal, has framed a following substantive question of law on 13.07.2017: "Whether the First Appellate Court has committed an error in law by not framing proper point for consideration, in accordance with Order XLI Rule 33 C.P.C., and by not re-appreciating the evidence in right perspective?" 12. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the First Appellate Court has not framed proper points for consideration and therefore, it failed to address the issues on which the finding was given by the Trial Court. It is submitted that the contention of the defendants that the suit was hit by non-joinder of necessary party, earlier partition, and judgment and decree in O.S.No.350/1 of 1953-1954 were not at all considered by the First Appellate Court. 13. It is submitted that the First Appellate Court has not framed appropriate points for consideration. He contends that the First Appellate Court does not address the issues framed and points out as to why the judgment of the Trial Court is perverse. It picks up certain sentences in the cross-examination of DW.1 and draws adverse influence against the defendants while setting aside the impugned judgment. He further submits that the impugned judgment do not specify the shares that were to be allotted to plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. It picks up certain sentences in the cross-examination of DW.1 and draws adverse influence against the defendants while setting aside the impugned judgment. He further submits that the impugned judgment do not specify the shares that were to be allotted to plaintiff Nos.1 and 2. It was incumbent upon the First Appellate Court to specify the terms of the decree passed by it and it fails to do so. Simply setting aside the impugned judgment, which had dismissed suit does not serve the purpose and the First Appellate Court should have specified the terms of the decree that is passed by it. Therefore, he submits that the impugned judgment is not sustainable in law. 14. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 has submitted the impugned judgment and points out that it has re-appreciated the evidence and has found that the judgment of the First Appellate Court is perverse, while appreciating the evidence. Therefore, he submits that the impugned judgment is proper and correct and no interference is required. So far as improper final order being passed, he submits and admits that the impugned judgment do not specify the shares of the plaintiffs or the defendants. 15. It is pertinent to note that the Trial Court in its judgment has answered the issues with reasoning. The Trial Court holds that the suit schedule property was not the property, which was kept in joint and therefore, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they have a share in it. However, it doesn't venture into finding out whether in the earlier partition, fathers of the plaintiffs were also given appropriate share in the other hissas of the suit survey number. There is a specific contention by the defendants that there was a previous partition and in the said partition, the suit schedule property was also partitioned. 16. It is relevant to note that the partition need not be in each of the properties held by the family. It would suffice that the partition is effected by metes and bounds and in such partition a single survey number may be allotted to one sharer and another survey number may be allotted to another sharer. Therefore, the question whether the suit schedule property was kept in joint as per the terms of the earlier partition is a matter, which should have been considered by the First Appellate Court. Therefore, the question whether the suit schedule property was kept in joint as per the terms of the earlier partition is a matter, which should have been considered by the First Appellate Court. Therefore, it is evident that by picking up certain sentences in the cross-examination of DW.1, it could not have set aside the impugned judgment of the Trial Court. 17. Framing of the proper points for consideration is hallmark of application of mind by the First Appellate Court. Though a contention was raised by the defendants in the Trial Court that the suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have not dealt this aspect. Therefore, it was necessary on the part of the First Appellate Court to frame appropriate points for consideration. Obviously, the previous partition, non-joinder of necessary party and the availability of the suit schedule property for partition would be the appropriate points for consideration. 18. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the view that the First Appellate Court having not framed appropriate points for consideration, has fell into error in picking up only certain portion of the cross-examination of the DW.1. The non framing of proper points for consideration is an error in law. Order XLI Rule 31 of C.P.C. reads as below: “ 31.Contents, date and signature of judgment.- The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state— (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.” 19. It is evident that the said provisions are not adhered to by the First Appellate Court. In that view of the matter, the substantial question of law is answered in the affirmative . In the result, the appeal deserves to be allowed with a remand to the First Appellate Court. Hence, the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is allowed and the matter is remanded to the First Appellate Court to consider the appeal afresh after hearing the arguments of both sides and framing proper points for consideration in the light of the observations made by this Court in this judgment. Hence, the following: ORDER (i) The appeal is allowed and the matter is remanded to the First Appellate Court to consider the appeal afresh after hearing the arguments of both sides and framing proper points for consideration in the light of the observations made by this Court in this judgment. (ii) Both the parties are directed to appear before the First Appellate Court on 19.01.2026 without waiting for notice. (iii) The First Appellate Court is expected to dispose of the matter expeditiously, preferably within a period of four months from the date of appearance of the parties before it. (iv) In view of disposal of the appeal, pending interlocutory applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and are disposed of.