JUDGMENT : TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, C.J. 1. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition being W.P. (C) No.1603 of 2014 vide order dated 14 th August 2019 by the learned Single Judge, the petitioner has filed this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. The petitioner had joined service of the respondents on 02.03.1992 as an Assistant and thereafter he was promoted to the post of HGA. 3. A memorandum of charge came to be served upon the petitioner on 12.10.2011 alleging gross irregularities which are enumerated below– (i) The CSE, while working as HGA (Sales), Dhanbad Branch 2, used password of Shri S.Y. Bhatt, the ABM (S) and Sri K.K. Das also the then ABM(S) for entering and validating wrong Commission payments through Add Pay Menu of FEAP; (ii) He was instrumental in making commission payment to the tune of Rs.15,99,416/- without any supporting paper to 11 agents; (iii) He used to approach the agents to whom these wrongful payments were made, to give amount to him for refunding the excess payments made to LIC. But he neither deposited the amount nor gave any receipt and thus, kept the amount with him for his personal gain. These amounts were refunded on a later date; (iv) He had declared income from salary as sole source of income and his wife had declared that husband’s income was her sole source of income when he was asked to furnish details of all bank accounts owned and operated by him or his wife individually or jointly. But he vide his letter dated 20.12.2010 did not disclose the bank account maintained by his wife which shows transactions much beyond his declared source of income. That undisclosed bank account showed heavy withdrawal on the date on which most of the amounts were refunded to LIC. 4. The petitioner was called upon to reply to the charges and in the reply so filed, he denied the allegations contained in the charge memo. 5. Not being satisfied with the reply, the respondents initiated departmental proceedings. 6. After conclusion of the enquiry, enquiry report was submitted revealing that all the charges against the petitioner had been proved. 7. The petitioner was called upon to file reply to the 2 nd show-cause notice which the petitioner did. 5. Not being satisfied with the reply, the respondents initiated departmental proceedings. 6. After conclusion of the enquiry, enquiry report was submitted revealing that all the charges against the petitioner had been proved. 7. The petitioner was called upon to file reply to the 2 nd show-cause notice which the petitioner did. However, even this reply was not accepted and that led to the penalty order being imposed by the disciplinary authority by way of reduction in the basic pay to the minimum scale of HGA in terms of Regulation 39(1)(d) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (for short “the Regulations”). 8. The petitioner preferred an appeal. However, the same was rejected vide order dated 17.09.2013, constraining the petitioner to file writ petition before the Writ Court. 9. As observed above, the writ petition filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed leading to the filing of this appeal. 10. It is vehemently argued by Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority as affirmed the appellate authority and the learned Writ Court are totally perverse and deserve to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Sachin Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents, has urged that not only the findings recorded by the Authorities below are in tune with the oral and documentary evidence on record, but looking to the scope of the interference, the findings warrant no interference as they cannot be said to be perverse as is being otherwise contended by the petitioner. 12. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the records of the case. 13. At the outset, we will deal with the principles and scope of interference in the disciplinary proceedings by the Writ Court as the same have succinctly been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court while plain stating and enunciating the principle and scope of interference with the disciplinary proceedings, has held in clear terms that in disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, cannot venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, cannot venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. It has further been held that under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. The legal position has thereafter been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in one of its latest decisions in the case titled Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2024) 1 SCC 175 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a writ court’s power to review the order of the disciplinary authority is very limited. The scope of enquiry is only to examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate and as a part of that exercise, the courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider whether the findings of the disciplinary authority have ignored material evidence and if it so finds, the courts are not powerless to interfere. 14. The scope of enquiry is only to examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate and as a part of that exercise, the courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider whether the findings of the disciplinary authority have ignored material evidence and if it so finds, the courts are not powerless to interfere. 14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, when the records of the case are perused, we find no perversity in the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority as affirmed by the appellate authority, reason being that the petitioner while working as HGA (Sales), Dhanbad Branch-2 of the respondents, used the password of Shri S.Y. Bhatt, the then ABM (Sales) and, Sri K.K. Das, the then ABM (Sales), for entering and validating wrong commission payments through Add Pay Menu of FEAP. The petitioner was ultimately found to be instrumental in making commission payment to the tune of Rs.15,99,416.00 (Rupees Fifteen Lakh, Ninety-nine Thousand, Four Hundred Sixteen) fraudulently. The modus operandi of the petitioner was that he used to approach the agents to whom the wrongful payments were made to give the amount to the petitioner for refunding the excess payments to the LIC. However, the amount so refunded was neither deposited in the cash-counter, nor any receipt thereto was given, rather the petitioner kept the amount with him for his personal gains. It is only when the excess payments were detected by the audit team, the amounts were refunded by the petitioner. If this was not sufficient, it needs to be noticed that the bank account was being operated in the name of the wife of the petitioner which showed heavy withdrawal on the date on which most of the amounts were refunded to the respondents. In such circumstance, no fault can be found with the report of the Enquiry Officer that the charges against the petitioner stood proved as he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to his duties and further failed to serve the Corporation honestly, faithfully, and acted in a manner prejudicial to the good conduct and detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and thereby, has violated the provisions of Regulations 21 and 24 read with Regulation 31(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 . The findings in this respect have been rendered after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence, which findings, as observed above, are based on evidence which cannot be held to be perverse. Once the findings have been reached that a substantial amount of transaction has taken place from the bank account of the wife of the petitioner and the refund of excess payment on account of commission has also been established, we really wonder how the appellant can still urge that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the findings recorded by the learned Writ Court are, in any way, perverse. On the other hand, we are of the considered view that the respondents have been more than magnanimous in imposing a very mild and less punishment upon the appellant compared to the proven misconduct. 15. In the aforesaid discussions and facts, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 16. All pending applications shall stand disposed off.