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2025 DIGILAW 1664 (TS)

G. Satyakumar, (Died) v. G. Srinivas

2025-12-01

NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA

body2025
JUDGMENT : NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J. Heard Sri Kowturu Pavan Kumar, Learned counsel for the appellants and Sri P.Sasidhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This appeal is filed under Section 96, read with order XLI Rule 1 & 2 of C.P.C against the judgment passed in OS No.31 of 2010 on the file of the XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, 3. The brief facts of the case are that the appellants/plaintiffs herein have filed a suit against the defendants Nos.1 to 3 seeking damages of Rs.10,01,000/- for causing loss and reputation and for defamation. 4. The plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 are wife and husband and the defendants Nos.1 and are natural brothers of the Plaintiff No.1, Defendant No.3 is the husband of junior matieral aunt of the plaintiff No.1. The plaintiff No.1 has filed OS No.3 of 2002 on the file of XIII Additional Senior Civil Judge, Secunderabad, seeking partition of the properties, including a joint family property and a self-acquired property of their deceased father, G. Mallesham against defendant No.1 and 2 and three others i.e., two sisters and her mother janamma. 5. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 filed a written statement, alleging that the said suit was fraudulently filed with sole intention to knock away the properties. During the proceedings, the defendant No.1 reportedly conspired with the third defendant to issue defamatory statements against the plaintiffs. The first plaintiff alleged that the defendant No.1 threatened her with assassination to deter her from pursuing the case, subsequently extending the threat to the plaintiff No.2 to withdraw the claim. The defendants also made accusations against the plaintiffs regarding their character, suggesting that the plaintiff No.1 maintained an illegitimate relationship with the second plaintiff before their marriage. 6. In the written statement, the defendant averted that the plaintiff No.1 left her paternal home while she was pregnant and implied uncertainty about her marital status. This narrative extended during cross-examination, where the defendant No.1 made claims about the plaintiffs' personal lives, including allegations of the plaintiff No.1 having been pregnant multiple times with the plaintiff No.2 prior to marriage. Defendant No.1 cross-examination escalated to baseless suggestions that the 2 nd plaintiff had inappropriate relationships plaintiff No.1 mother. 7. This narrative extended during cross-examination, where the defendant No.1 made claims about the plaintiffs' personal lives, including allegations of the plaintiff No.1 having been pregnant multiple times with the plaintiff No.2 prior to marriage. Defendant No.1 cross-examination escalated to baseless suggestions that the 2 nd plaintiff had inappropriate relationships plaintiff No.1 mother. 7. The plaintiffs claimed that the defamatory statements severely damaged their reputations, leading to public humiliation in front of other litigants in the court, where they faced disparaging looks and embarrassment due to the overzealous allegations made by the defendants. The plaintiffs sought damages amounting to Rs.10,01,000 for the alleged harm that the defamatory statements and actions caused, arguing that the impact of the defamation was irreparable and could not be quantified financially. 8. The defendants, in turn, filed a common written statement refuting the claims of defamation and disputing the alleged threats. They argued that the plaintiff No.1 has no locus standi the standing to bring the partition suit since the properties in question were inherited and rightfully willed to them by their father. They contended that the will deed dated 06.03.1992 executed by their late father in their favour, hence the question of partition does not arise. They maintained that the plaintiffs instigated their sisters to participate in the suit to apply pressure on the defendants despite lacking any legitimate claim or interest in the properties as per the above said will. 9. The defendants further accused the plaintiffs of fabricating allegations to harass them, maintaining that any statements made were rooted in the context of lawful cross-examination during legal proceedings and did not constitute defamation. It was asserted that the trial Judge permitted the cross-examination, which implies the questions raised were legitimate based on the plaintiffs' pleadings. 10. The defendants countered the plaintiffs' claims by stating that the plaintiff No.1 had initially run away with the plaintiff No.2, causing distress to their father, which purportedly contributed to his decline in health and subsequent death. They claimed the plaintiffs did not submit a marriage certificate to substantiate their marriage claims, indicating a lack of truthful representation of their relationship status. 11. The defendants concluded by emphasizing that the first plaintiff’s admission to cohabiting with the second plaintiff before marriage justified their line of questioning. They claimed the plaintiffs did not submit a marriage certificate to substantiate their marriage claims, indicating a lack of truthful representation of their relationship status. 11. The defendants concluded by emphasizing that the first plaintiff’s admission to cohabiting with the second plaintiff before marriage justified their line of questioning. They maintained that no real defamatory intent was involved, as their aim was merely to assert their rights regarding the properties, in accordance with the will of their father. 12. Additionally, it was noted that the third defendant, being related to the second plaintiff, only provided truthful testimony during the proceedings, suggesting that any perceived insults during the court session were a result of the plaintiffs’ own actions rather than intentional defamation. The defendants argued the plaintiffs were attempting to construct fictitious damage claims and denied any responsibility to compensate for these claims and prayed the trial Court to dismiss the suit. 13. During the trial, the 1stplaintiff examined herself as P.W-1 and got exhibited A-1 to A-7. The 2 nd plaintiff also examined himself as P.W-2. On the other hand, on behalf of the defendants, the 1st defendant examined himself as D.W-1. No documents were exhibited. 14. Basing on the pleadings and averments made by both the counsels, the learned trial Court framed the following issues which read as under: “1. Whether the defendants 1 to 3 defamed the plaintiffs and caused loss of reputation to them? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim damages of Rs.10,01,000/ as prayed for? 3. To what relief?” 15. After hearing both the parties and their rival contentions and perusing the oral and documentary evidences placed by both the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit and hold that plaintiffs are not entitled for the damages since the plaintiffs failed to prove that the allegations made by the defendants in OS No.3 of 2002 caused damage to their reputation in the public. 16. Being unsatisfied by the dismissal order by the trial Court, the present appeal is filed by the petitioners/appellants on the following among the other grounds that the learned Judge without giving any categorical findings on the evidence of PW.1 & 2, DW.1 and pleading of the appellants/plaintiffs has come to an conclusion on assumption and presumption only. 16. Being unsatisfied by the dismissal order by the trial Court, the present appeal is filed by the petitioners/appellants on the following among the other grounds that the learned Judge without giving any categorical findings on the evidence of PW.1 & 2, DW.1 and pleading of the appellants/plaintiffs has come to an conclusion on assumption and presumption only. The learned Judge without giving any categorical findings on the issues and pleadings of the parties and evidence which is on record had dismiss the suit against the settled principles of law. 17. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the learned Judge failed to consider the averments and allegation and contents mentioned in the Ex.A2 to Ex.A5 which clearly establishes that the respondents/defendant Nos.1 & 2 have made a derogatory and defamatory statements which causing damage to the reputation of the appellants/plaintiffs, and on that ground along the learned Judge ought to have decreed the suit and averred that learned Judge have failed to consider that the non-examination of the mother of appellants is not a fatal to the case, since the defendant Nos.1 & 2 have made a derogatory and defamatory statement before the Court of law against the appellants/plaintiffs and mother of the appellant No.1 and prayed this Court to allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed in OS No.31 of 2010, dated 06.10.2017 on the file of the learned XII Addl.Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad by decreeing the present suit in favour of appellants against respondents. 18. Learned counsel for the defendants contended that defendants have quantified and consciously pleaded in the affidavit and also retreated about the same contending that they are sticking to the statement made to the written statement and the admission made during the course of cross-examination which is necessary to know the truth of the case and further contended that any statement made during the course of trial in the Court comes under the absolute privilege, unless it can be shown that the statement was made without any reference to the proceedings before the Court and had no connection with them. 19. Learned counsel for the defendants submits that after considering the entire evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has dismissed the suit and needs no interference. 20. 19. Learned counsel for the defendants submits that after considering the entire evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has dismissed the suit and needs no interference. 20. Having heard the counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs and the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants, considering the contentions and rival contentions of both the parties, and the pleadings therein, now the point which arose before this Court is i) Whether the statement made by the defendants Nos.1 to 3 before the Court during the course of trial amounts to defamation as claimed by the appellants or not? ii) Whether the learned trial Court committed any error in rejecting the claim of the plaintiff? iii) Whether the appellants/plaintiffs are entitled for any damages as claimed for ? Point Nos.1 to 3 21. Admittedly, there is no dispute with regard to the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants. Earlier, the plaintiff No.1 filed O.S. No.3 of 2002 on the file of XIII Additional Senior Civil Judge, seeking partition of the property against the Defendant Nos.1 and 2 and three others i.e., two sisters and her mother. The main grievance of the plaintiff is that the Defendant No.1 during the commencement of the trial and in the written statement had made defamatory statement and openly threatened the plaintiff No.1 to assassinate her character during cross examination and threatened both the plaintiffs to withdraw the suit. It is also contended in the written statement filed by the Defendant No.1 in the above suit and made defamatory statement that the plaintiff No.1 left her paternal home without marriage and started with the Plaintiff No.2 and questioned the marriage of plaintiff No.1 with plaintiff No.2, though the plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 claimed they are legally wedded wife and husband married on 12.10.1989 and their first child was born on 24.04.1991, however the defendant No.1 gave a instruction to his counsel to suggest that plaintiff No.2 had illicit relationship with mother-in-law i.e., mother of the 1 st plaintiff, defendants Nos.1 and 2 and also went to the extent of deposed that two children of the plaintiff No.1 were born out of the alleged illicit relationship between the 2 nd plaintiff and their mother and also repeated the defaming statement in his chief affidavit against them and also stated that their father caught hold the plaintiff No.2 and their mother red-handedly while they were having illicit relationship. 22. 22. Though the contention of the defendants is that Defendant Nos.1 and 2 have made not any defamatory statements against the plaintiff Nos.1 and 2, however stated that there is no proof or marriage between appellant Nos.1 and 2 is produced to substantiate that the marriage happened on 12.10.1989. 23. Admittedly the said marriage certificate was in the hand of the plaintiff No.2, however the defendant No.1 wantedly and deliberately made false statement against the appellants, that the plaintiffs being involved in the illegal activities, which causes caused hardship to the plaintiff 24. Even in the written statement filed in reply to the Paragraph No.13, that it is reiterated the statement made in OS No.3 of 2002 is true and correct and also contended statements of Defendant Nos.1 & 2 are correct and there is no defamatory statements at all, as stated by the plaintiffs. 25. Coming to the evidence, even in the evidence of the DW.1, in the present suit, it is reiterated by the defendant No.1 that whatever is mentioned in Ex.A2-Written Statement is true and correct and even deposed and further reiterated that appellant No.1 was having illicit relation with appellant No.2 and denying their marriage performed on 12.10.1989 and also reiterated the same stand as stated in the cross examination and written statement 26. The contention of the appellants/plaintiffs have specifically stated about and imputation of certain allegation which directly affect the character of the plaintiffs and unless and until they are proved the question of taking the same as a true statement does not arise. 27. The defendant is claiming the absolute privileges on the ground that the said statement are made during the course of evidence and statements made in the judicial proceedings and it is also argued that in view of the privileges being extended to the defendants the statement which was made in the written statement, so also in the cross-examination does not come within the definition of defamation as the defendants enjoy the absolute privilege, as they are made during the judicial proceedings. 28. 28. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment of Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy , 2003 SCC Online Del 14 , wherein the Delhi High Court had awarded Rs.5,00,000/- to the appellant therein for the damages, as nothing on record to show that the written submissions were filed in reply to any question by the Commission which the defendant therein was found to answer and that offending position, was in any event relevant to the inquiry before the commission, hence absolute privilege cannot be available of by the defendants. 29. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the following judgments, i) K.Daniel v. T.Hymavathy Anna , 1985 SCC Online Ker 110 ii) Esbi H-Flex Priavte Limited & Anr. V. Vulkan Technologies Pvt. Ltd , 2015 SCC Online Cal 4421 iii) Brig. B.C.Rana v. Ms.Seema Katoch & ors., 2012 SCC Online Del 5421. 30. Per contra, Leaned counsel for the respondents/defendants has relied on Rajindra Kishore v. Durga Sahi , 1996 SCC Online All 149 , wherein the Allahabad High Court has passed the following order which reads as under 18. Now ordinarily a cross-examining counsel has, no personal interest in the result of the case—except of course, the normal professional interest of every counsel to win his case—and every question put by him to shake the credit of a witness is presumed to be disinterested. Therefore, if a witness instead of replying to his questions, gives the reply attaching the character of the counsel himself he cannot, claim any privilege when subsequently sued for slander. But where the cross-examining counsel is himself a party to the criminal proceedings under Sec. 107, Cr. P.C. and puts a question to a witness who is also a party in the other cross case, and in answer to his question the witness gives an answer defamatory of counsel's character, it cannot be said that the answer is irrelevant to the inquiry or has no reference to the proceedings. In such a situation it is difficult for a witness to draw any fine distinction between the position of his questioner as counsel and as party. I am therefore inclined to the view that the answer given by the respondent did not cross the limit of relevance in view of the peculiar position of the plaintiff appellant who was appearing both as a party and as counsel in his own cause. I am therefore inclined to the view that the answer given by the respondent did not cross the limit of relevance in view of the peculiar position of the plaintiff appellant who was appearing both as a party and as counsel in his own cause. 19. I dismiss this appeal but in the circumstances direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout. 20. Before leaving this case I would like to draw the attention of the Law Commission to the unsatisfactory state of law with regard to the doctrine of absolute privilege as applied to witnesses making defamatory statements in judicial proceedings. As the law of torts had not been codified yet, it is still governed by the English Law on the ground of equity, justice and good conscience. But the reasons on which the absolute privilege of a witness is founded under the English Law are not always valid in India. That reason is that witnesses in judicial proceedings must give evidence fearlessly and without fear of being liable for damages for any statement made by them. But in India it is notorious that this privilege is grossly abused. It is not uncommon, for example, for a person charged with the offence of criminal trespass to come forward with the defence that he went there on the invitation of a lady of the house who was on intimate terms with him. I can do no better than draw the attention of the Commission to the following observation of Sir Charles Arnold White, C.J. in In re P. Venkata reddy: “It seems monstrous that an accused person, just because he happens to occupy the position of an accused, should be entitled to utter any malicious untruths that may come into his head and so wantonly defame the complainant's character. The common instance may be given, so far as my experience extends in this Presidency of an accused person alleging without good faith that his prosecution is due to his having enjoyed immoral intimacy with one of complainant's female relations. A blackguardly attempt to besmirch the honour of a family in retaliation for an honest prosecution ought to be punishable at law and according to the Penal Code, 1860 it is.” 21. A blackguardly attempt to besmirch the honour of a family in retaliation for an honest prosecution ought to be punishable at law and according to the Penal Code, 1860 it is.” 21. The question for the Commission to consider is whether the absolute privilege enjoyed by such a witness in defence to a civil action for slander should be curtailed in the public interest, and if so, to what extent. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Law Commission. Appeal dismissed. 31. In this regard, it is imperative to look to the judgment passed by High Court of Delhi in Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy , 2006 SCC Online Del 14 wherein the Court observed that nothing on record to show that the written submission were filed in reply to any question by the Commission which the defendant was found to answer and that offending position, was in any event relevant to the inquiry before the Commission. Basic ingredients not fulfilled. Protection provided cannot be availed by the defendant. In the said judgment it is also observed that that absolute privilege is not absolute in the context of being infinite, if what is stated is necessary or relevant to the proceedings, immunity would be absolute and the relevant paragraphs are extracted for better understanding and read reference: “67. Even the issue of absolute privilege has remained a subject matter of considerable debate. Is absolute privilege absolute in the sense of being infinite? As late as 1998, in the decision reported as1998 (1) All ER 625, Waple v. Surrey County Council, it was held: “The absolute privilege which applies to statements made in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and in the documents made in such proceedings, would only be entitled where it was strictly necessary to do so in order to protect those who were to participate in the proceedings from being sued themselves.” 68. The decision brings out that absolute privilege is not absolute in the context of being infinite. Even when the occasion is privileged one gets no licence to utter irrelevant and scandalous things unrelated to the proceedings. If what is stated is necessary or relevant to the proceedings, immunity would be absolute. 69. I would be failing in not noting a few decisions which have highlighted the self-limiting span and sweep of the defence of qualified privilege. 70. If what is stated is necessary or relevant to the proceedings, immunity would be absolute. 69. I would be failing in not noting a few decisions which have highlighted the self-limiting span and sweep of the defence of qualified privilege. 70. Qualified privilege may be defeated and its protection destroyed by proof of express malice. But how is express malice to be established? 71. In the decision reported as (1872) LR 4 PC 495, Laughton v. Bishop of Sodor, in a charge to his clergy in convocation, the Bishop opined, in a rather harsh language, upon a speech made by a Barrister who had been instructed to oppose a bill before the House of Keys, promoted by Government, and which vested additional Ecclesiastical patronage in the Bishop and in which the conduct of the Bishop was attacked and unworthy motives were attributed to the Bishop. What was spoken by the Bishop was sent to a newspaper for publication. 93. Since law of defamation, by making actionable certain utterances, runs counter to another widely accepted legal tenent - the right to freedom of expression, the two have been harmonised by judicial process so that an individual's right of privacy and protection of honour and reputation is preserved and at the same time the public interest in free speech is also protected. 104. Unfortunately, in India, Law of Damages and in particular in relation to defamation has not developed at the same pace as it has developed in the European countries and the United States of America. Punitive damages in defamation are not awarded in India. Damages awarded are a recompense to the loss of honour and reputation. Inherently, quantification is a problem as honour and reputation are inherently incapable of being valued in terms of money. More often than not, loss of honour and reputation lowers the image of the person in the eyes of his friends and relatives and he suffers social isolation. If he is a professional, he may not suffer monetary loss as his clients would engage him for his professional skill and not his personal character. This appears to be the reason that the plaintiff, in relation to his earnings made no attempt to establish that after the offending words were written and spoken, his earnings suffered a dip. 107. If he is a professional, he may not suffer monetary loss as his clients would engage him for his professional skill and not his personal character. This appears to be the reason that the plaintiff, in relation to his earnings made no attempt to establish that after the offending words were written and spoken, his earnings suffered a dip. 107. Considering the professional standing of the plaintiff and his stature in social life I award damages in sum of Rs.5 lacs in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 32. In the decision reported in Panday Surinder Nath Sinha v. Bageshwari Prasad , AIR 1961 PAT 164 , distinction between absolute and qualified privilege was brought out as under : (i) In absolute privilege, it is the occasion which is privileged and when once the nature of the occasion is shown, it follows, as a necessary inference, that every communication on that occasion is protected; in qualified privilege, the occasion is not privileged, until the defendant has shown how that occasion was used. It is not enough to have an interest or a duty in making a statement the necessity of the existence of an interest of duty in making the statement complained of, must also be shown. (ii) In absolute privilege, the defendant gets absolute exemption from liability; in a qualified privilege, the defendant gets a conditional exemption from liability. (iii) In absolute privilege, the defendant is exempted from liability even when there is malice on his part; in qualified privilege, the defendant is exempted from liability only when there is no malice on his part. (iv) In absolute privilege, statements are protected in all circumstances, irrespective of the presence of good or bad motives; in qualified privilege, even after a case of qualified privilege has been established by the defendant, it may be met by the plaintiff proving in reply improper or evil motive on the part of the defendant, in which case defense of qualified privilege vanishes and the plaintiff succeeds; and (v) In absolute privilege as well as in qualified privilege, the defendant has to prove his plea of privilege, but with this difference that in absolute privilege the defense is absolute and irrefutable by plaintiff, whereas in qualified privilege the defense is not absolute but reputable by the plaintiff. 33. 33. On perusal of the decisions and law discussed above, the point would arose before this Court that in view of the admission made by the defendants that whatever statement he has made is with full of conscious and that he further reiterated that he was sticking to the same statement made that was made in the written statement but also in the cross examination. 34. Now the only aspect which has to be seen, whether the said written statement and statements made during the course of evidence and cross examination would come within the preview of judicial privilege and absolute privilege or not?. 35. To know the statement made by the defendant No.1 for appreciating the applicability of absolute privilege or not. I would like to extract the exact wording/statement by the defendant No.1 in the Chief affidavit, in OS No.3 of 2002, the paragraph Nos.5, 6, 7 which is reiterated hereunder: “5. In the year 1979 my father red handedly caught hold my mother and Ashok Kumar when they are having illegal intercourse in our house. Immediately she tried to commit suicide by pouring kerosense of her body and lit the fire.” 6. During that period also Mr.Ashok Kumar maintained his illegal relationship with my Mother by taking separate room near her parents house up to 1982” 7. Whereas the plaintiff grown very fat. Whereas the said Ashok Kumar advised to write X Class exam when she was studying VIII Class in Saraswathi Kanya Vidyalaya High School, R.P.Road, Secunderabad. On the advise of said Ashok Kumar Plaintiff went to Nirmal and written X Class exam as a Private Candidate. For writing X Class exam at Nirmal, the said Ashok went along with her and stayed 15 days there and developed illegal intimacy. 36. On perusal of the Chief Examination affidavit of DW.1, and at Paragraph No.14, which reads as under: “I submit that whatever statement made in OS No.3/2002 are true and correct. The Appeal is pending before the Hon’ble High Court already stayed the operation of Judgment and Decree. So the plaintiff does not have any rights to make any comment and not suppose to file the false case against me during the subjudice.” 37. The Appeal is pending before the Hon’ble High Court already stayed the operation of Judgment and Decree. So the plaintiff does not have any rights to make any comment and not suppose to file the false case against me during the subjudice.” 37. Applying the principles laid down in the above judgments cited above, it is clear that the parties have to make out written statement and made submission during the cross examination with regard to the case only, the suit i.e., OS No.3 of 2002 was filed seeking partition of the properties and the statement which was made by the defendants has no reference at all to the subject matter of the proceedings. It is further true that to seek protection under doctrine of the absolute privilege, it should be within the reference matter of said proceeding. The defendants have made derogatory remarks against the plaintiff No.2 (brother in law) and mother of plaintiff No.1 and it is not the case that statements were made as to the non-entitlement of the share by the plaintiff No.2 in the suit for partition. 38. It is necessary to mention here that the defendant No.1 has particularly stated in the Chief Examination affidavit and also in Cross Examination that whatever statement made in OS No.3 of 2002 are true and correct and further stated that “I will standby what I mentioned in my chief evidence and also my written statement in present suit i.e., OS No.31 of 2010”. Hence, the defendant No.1 in full sense averred in the written statement and stated the remarks in cross examinations. 39. It is clear, that the defendants has made personal remarks during the during the course of cross-examination which has no- relation with the partition suit and the defamatory statements made by the defendants against the plaintiffs convey unambiguous message and meaning that the plaintiffs lead and are living in illicit relation and that plaintiff No.2 was having immoral relationship with his mother-in-law and the statement made by defendant No.1 are blasphemous in nature and are intended and calculated to defame the plaintiffs. Therefore, a witness making a statement in judicial proceedings, who is subsequently sued for slander for having made that statement, can claim absolute privilege unless it can be shown that the statement was made with reference to the proceedings before the trial Court. 40. Therefore, a witness making a statement in judicial proceedings, who is subsequently sued for slander for having made that statement, can claim absolute privilege unless it can be shown that the statement was made with reference to the proceedings before the trial Court. 40. In the present suit, the statement which are made would amount to defamation, as the statement which are made whether it is true or not but are not related to the entitlement of share in the partition suit and it clearly amounts imputation made against the character of the plaintiff No.2 and mother of plaintiff No.1. 41. Though the findings given by the learned trial Court that the mother of the plaintiff No.1 and defendants were not examined to refute the allegation cannot change the nature of the statement and once prime facie the statement or evidence made is not related to the suit for partition and the statement made by the defendants being admitted by the defendants, the question of necessity to examine the mother of the plaintiff No.1 and defendants cannot be the reason to discard the contention of the plaintiffs. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the statement made by the defendant No.1 will not come under the umbrella of absolute privilege. 42 Though there is no evidence led to quantify the actual damages caused to assess the compensation of damages. But, considering the nature of the allegation levelled and that the statute being made this Court. Hence, this Court feels that it would be appropriate to assess the damages at Rs.1,00,000/-. Therefore, defendant No.1 is liable to pay compensation amount of Rs.1,00,000/- to the plaintiffs for causing loss and reputation for defamation. 43. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed, accordingly, this Court deems it proper to award damages for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) in favour of the plaintiffs and against defendant No.1 within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any are pending, shall stand closed.