Muslim Wakf Committee, Zila Sawai-Madhopur v. Keshav Das S/o Harlal Bajaj
2025-10-28
SUDESH BANSAL
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : SUDESH BANSAL, J. 1. With the consent of learned counsel for both the parties, since the appellant in all these appeals, is common and the private respondents are independent allottees, being the owners of their respective plots; facts and grounds raised in the appeals are also substantially similar and further, the substantial questions of law are too one & same, hence, all these second appeals were earlier tagged and have been heard together, and shall stand decided by this common judgment. 2. Appellant- Muslim Wakf Committee was defendant and private respondents were plaintiffs before the trial Court and for the sake of convenience, parties shall be referred as they were called before the trial Court. 3. Plaintiff’s suit for mandatory and permanent injunction was dismissed vide judgment dated 26.08.2015 by the Additional Civil Judge, Sawai Madhopur, whereagainst plaintiff preferred civil First Appeal. In the First Appeal, plaintiff’s suit has been decreed vide judgment dated 09.03.2022 by the Additional District Judge, Sawai Madhopur and a decree has been passed against the defendants and in favour of plaintiff, which is substantially identical in nature in all the civil suits, except change of plot numbers and name of allottees. For ready reference the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 461/1996 (282/1984): Keshav Das Vs. Muslim Wakf Board & Ors. in First Appeal No. 31/2015 by the Additional District Judge, Sawai Madhopur, is being reproduced hereunder:- Challenging the judgments and decree dated 09.03.2022 passed by the First Appellate Court, instant Civil Second Appeals have been filed by and on behalf of Muslim Wakf Committee, Zila- Sawai Madhopur, invoking the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 100 of CPC. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant, in his long drawn arguments, has emphasized on following three substantial questions of law, which have been suggested and referred by appellant in the memorandum of appeals and it has been argued by the counsel that these substantial questions of law do arise for consideration in these Civil Second Appeals:- “(I) Whether the plaintiff should have challenged the Notification so issued with regard to disputed land under Wakf Act within a period of one year? (II) Whether the plaintiff could bring the suit for perpetual injunction without making a prayer for possession as he was not in possession over the suit plot of land at the time of filing of the suit?
(II) Whether the plaintiff could bring the suit for perpetual injunction without making a prayer for possession as he was not in possession over the suit plot of land at the time of filing of the suit? (III) Whether learned first appellate court wrongly reversed the findings of the learned trial on issue No.1?” 5. Heard learned counsel for both the parties, at length on the above proposed substantial questions of law and perused the record of both the Courts. 6. For the sake of convenience and brevity, facts, in brief, as pleaded in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 109/2022 and Arising out of Civil Suit No. 461/1996 (282/1984): Keshav Das Vs. Muslim Wakf Board & Ors., have been taken note of. 7.1 Plaintiff filed a civil suit, for seeking permanent and mandatory injunction way back on 15.09.1984, stating inter alia that plot in question was allotted to him by Gram Panchayat Alanpur, vide allotment letter dated 24.07.1963, which was later on registered on 19.07.1965. It was averred by plaintiff that he is absolute owner and possession holder of the plot in question and when on 05.09.1984, he came to know that few persons are trying to raise construction on a boundary wall over the plot, he filed the present civil suit on 15.09.1984, seeking to restrain the defendants from entering into unauthorized possession over the plot in question and to remove the kaccha-pakka construction of wall, whichever has been erected by them on the plot in question. 7.2 Plaintiff’s suit was resisted by the defendants- Muslim Wakf Committee, disputing the possession of plaintiff over the plot land, stating inter alia that land measuring 1 bigha 3 biswa, out of total land of 2 bigha 12 biswa of Khasra No. 1508, in Village Alanpur is a wakf property, reserved and recorded in the revenue record as Gair Mumkin Kabristan and for which, a notification by the Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf, Jaipur dated 23.09.1965 has been issued. Hence, according to defendants, the disputed plot falls under the wakf property, which has been kept reserved for the purpose of Kabristan. In addition, defendants also pleaded in Para No.6 of the written statement that at-site, one Masjid, kaccha-pakka Majarat & Kotri (Pyau), has also been constructed over the land in question and same has been in use and occupation by the people of Muslim community.
In addition, defendants also pleaded in Para No.6 of the written statement that at-site, one Masjid, kaccha-pakka Majarat & Kotri (Pyau), has also been constructed over the land in question and same has been in use and occupation by the people of Muslim community. 7.3 On the basis of rival pleadings, respective issues were framed and both parties were given opportunities to adduce their respective evidence. Both the parties produced their oral and documentary evidence. The trial Court, vide judgment dated 26.08.2015, dismissed the plaintiff’s suit, but on filing First Appeal by plaintiff, his suit has been decreed by the First Appellate Court, which is impugned herein in the present Second Appeals. Substantial Question of Law No.(I) 8. In respect of this substantial question of law as proposed and suggested by learned counsel for appellant and referred hereinabove, it has been argued that notification dated 23.09.1965, notifying the property in question as of Wakf, was not challenged by the plaintiff and further, the land of Khasra No. 1508 (new Khasra Nos. 2260, 2261 & 2262), measuring 1 bigha 3 biswa, out of total land of 2 bigha and 12 biswa, has been entered in the name of the Muslim Wakf Committee as Wakf Property for Gair Mumkin Kabristan, in the revenue record, vide mutation entry No.357. The attention of the Court has been invited on the documents of revenue record (Exhibit A/3, A/9 to A/22). Counsel for appellant has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in case of Syed Zainul Abedeen Vs. Rajasthan Board of Muslim Wakf , (2020) 19 SCC 401. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents-plaintiffs pointed out that the notification dated 23.09.1965 nowhere includes land in question of Khasra No.1508 and as far as mutation entry No.357 is concerned, same has been quashed by the District Collector, vide judgment dated 17.12.1975 (Exhibit 13) passed in appeal, thereagainst. Learned counsel further pointed out that vide and another order dated 20.03.1963 (Exhibit 10), land measuring 31 bigha 4 biswa including the land of Khasra No.1508 in Village Alanpur, was permitted by the District Collector, Sawai Madhopur, to be used for Aabadi purposes by the Gram Panchayat Alanpur, subject to deposition of 20 times Lagaan.
Learned counsel further pointed out that vide and another order dated 20.03.1963 (Exhibit 10), land measuring 31 bigha 4 biswa including the land of Khasra No.1508 in Village Alanpur, was permitted by the District Collector, Sawai Madhopur, to be used for Aabadi purposes by the Gram Panchayat Alanpur, subject to deposition of 20 times Lagaan. In furtherance to such order, requisite amount was deposited by Gram Panchayat and then plotting over the Aabadi land was made, same were auctioned and in the auction, plot in question was allotted, as much as physical possession was handed over to plaintiff. Hence, his submission is that neither notification dated 23.09.1965 proves the plot in question to be part of Wakf property, nor defendant could establish the use of plot in question for Kabristan or being a part of Masjid, Kotri (Pyau) etc. as Wakf property. 10. This Court finds that the First Appellate Court, having re- appreciated the entire evidence, assigned reasons to set aside the findings of the trial Court and clearly held that the plot in question is in absolute ownership and possession of plaintiff. The allotment of plot in question to plaintiff by the Gram Panchayat and handing over possession, has been found proved by the oral & documentary evidence. The evidence of defendants, in order to show plot in question in possession of Wakf Committee, was also analyzed. Statements of DW-1 and DW-3 were considered and it was held that the plot in question was never demarcated as Wakf Property. It was observed by the first appellate Court that defendants could not prove that this plot was ever used as Kabristan or is part of Masjid, Kotri (Pyau) etc. An endeavour was made by defendants by producing DW-3, to show that the land in question was let out by the Wakf Committee to them in the year 1980, for running a tal of slab stones and few photographs were also placed on record. But on analysis of such evidence, the First Appellate Court found that the photographs are of year 2012, whereas the present civil suit was led in the year 1984. It was observed that no convincing evidence to establish the tenancy of DW-3, has been adduced. 11. This Court further finds that the notification dated 23.09.1965 (Exhibit A4) does not refer the details of land in question, which is indisputably a part of Khasra No.1508.
It was observed that no convincing evidence to establish the tenancy of DW-3, has been adduced. 11. This Court further finds that the notification dated 23.09.1965 (Exhibit A4) does not refer the details of land in question, which is indisputably a part of Khasra No.1508. The notification dated 23.09.1965 does not have any nexus with the land in question of Khasra No.1508. Thus, the reliance placed by learned counsel for appellant on the notification dated 23.09.1965, is misplaced, since same does not include the land of plot in question. 12. As far as entry of land in question in the register of Wakf Committee and revenue record (Exhibit A/3, A/9 to A/22) is concerned, the First Appellate Court in its well reasoned and speaking findings, has recorded in Para No.22, 23 & 24, and held that under the order of the District Collector, Sawai Madhopur dated 20.03.1963, land in question alongwith other chunk of land was permitted to be converted and used for Aabadi purposes by the Gram Panchayat and the order of District Collector dated 20.03.1963 (Exhibit 10) has not been questioned by the Wakf Committee. The land was already recorded in the name of Gram Panchayat, which got dissolved in Nagar Palika under entry No.260, therefore, the subsequent mutation entry No. 357 made by the Tehsildar, has no legal value, more so such mutation entry No.357 has been cancelled by the District Collector, Sawai Madhopur vide judgment dated 17.12.1975 (Exhibit 13). On such basis, the First Appellate Court made observation that the entry made in the register of Wakf Committee and revenue record, looses its significance to confer any right or interest of Wakf Committee, in the land in question. 13. As far as reliance placed by counsel for appellant on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Syed Zainul Abedeen (Supra) is concerned, the principle of law expounded therein does not find its footing in the present appeals, since notification of the Wakf Committee does not include the land in question as Wakf Property. 14. In view of above discussion, the Substantial Question of Law No.(I) does not arise, on the facts and circumstances of the present appeals, hence, same is hereby rejected. Substantial Question of Law No.(II) 15.
14. In view of above discussion, the Substantial Question of Law No.(I) does not arise, on the facts and circumstances of the present appeals, hence, same is hereby rejected. Substantial Question of Law No.(II) 15. Counsel for appellant argued that plaintiffs were not in possession over the plot in question, hence at the most they should have filed the suit for possession, instead of suit for permanent and mandatory injunction. In support, counsel for appellant relied upon the judgment of Coordinate Bench delivered in case of Aman Singh vs. D.J. Balotra , 2008 (1) DNJ 22 . 16. A perusal of the record of the first appellate court reveals that the plaintiff has been held to be the absolute owner and in actual possession of the plot in question, on the basis of a Patta dated 24.07.1963 issued by the Gram Panchayat Alanpur, which was duly registered on 19.07.1965. According to the findings of the first appellate court, the plot in question, being part of the land of Khasra No. 1508, was abadi land within jurisdiction of Gram Panchayat and available for allotment, and the allotment in favour of plaintiff is valid and lawful. It is noteworthy that the registered Patta issued in favour of the plaintiff was never challenged by the defendants. The first appellate court has further held that the defendants did not produce any evidence to prove their possession or ownership over the plot in question, nor could establish that the plot was under the possession of Wakf Committee. It was also held that there is no evidence to prove that the land in question was ever used for kabristan or any masjid, pyau etc. were constructed thereupon. The evidence produced by the defendants to show that the land was let out by the Wakf Committee to one Mujahid Hussain (DW-3) for running a tal of stone slab, was not found sufficient to prove his possession, at the time of institution of the suit, since the photographs showing stone slabs lying on the subject land were of the year 2012 and no corresponding evidence to prove his possession since 1980 was produced by defendants.
The first appellate court also considered the statement of DW-2, the Executive Officer of Nagar Palika, Sawai Madhopur, who admitted that the plot in question had been allotted by the Nagar Palika (erstwhile Gram Panchayat) to the plaintiff through auction and documents are true. Thus, as per the findings of the first appellate court, the plaintiff was found to be in lawful possession of the plot at the time of institution of the present suit, being title holder of the same. 17. In the judgment of Aman Singh (Supra), consideration before the Coordinate Bench was entirely on different factual aspect and plaintiff was not found in possession over the suit property, hence the Coordinate Bench held that without obtaining declaration of title and possession, plaintiff cannot maintain the suit for permanent injunction. The factual matrix, in the present appeals are entirely different, hence the judgment relied upon by the counsel for appellant does not render any support to the appellant. 18. Hence, this substantial question of law does not arise in the present second appeals. On the strength of title and possession over the plot in question, the first appellate court has not committed any illegality or irregularity in decreeing the plaintiff’s suit for mandatory and permanent injunction. Substantial Question of Law No.(III) 19. As far as this question of law is concerned, same does not arise at all, in the light of order dated 20.03.1963 (Exhibit 10) issued by the District Collector, permitting to use the land measuring 31 rakba 4 biswa, including land of Khasra No.1508 by the Gram Panchayat for Abadi purposes. It has come on record that in furtherance to such order, Gram Panchayat had deposited 20 times lagaan as demanded and the order dated 20.03.1963 attained finality. In addition, it is noteworthy that no such factual plea was raised by defendants in written statement. Thus, this substantial question of law is devoid of any substance and does not arise at all. 20. Involvement of substantial question of law is sine quo non to entertain a civil second appeal within scope of Section 100 CPC. The law is well established and reference of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in cases of Shankareppa M. Mutanki v. B.M. Mutanki , (2000) 9 SCC 254 & Birendra Kumar Dubey v. Girja Nandan Dubey , (2001) 6 SCC 767 is suffice. 21.
The law is well established and reference of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in cases of Shankareppa M. Mutanki v. B.M. Mutanki , (2000) 9 SCC 254 & Birendra Kumar Dubey v. Girja Nandan Dubey , (2001) 6 SCC 767 is suffice. 21. It is an established proposition of law that the first appellate court is the last & final court to record findings of fact, and the High Court, in exercise of its powers and jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, in a second appeal, may not interfere with such findings of first appellate Court, unless they suffer from perversity, or are based on no evidence, or on inadmissible evidence. In the present appeals, the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court are based on appreciation of admissible evidence. The first appellate court has assigned cogent reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the trial court and for reversing the same. Learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any perversity or illegality in the fact findings recorded by the first appellate court so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC, or to give rise to any substantial question of law. The first appellate court has clearly recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and in possession of the plot in question at the time of filing of the suit in the year 1984, whereas the defendants failed to establish any right or possession over the land. Hence, the findings of the first appellate court do not attract the involvement of any substantial question of law. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, on the issue of interference by the High Court in the fact findings of the first appellate Court, in case of Krishnan Vs. Backiam , (2007) 12 SCC 190 has held as under: “11. It may be mentioned that the First Appellate Court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court under Section 96 CPC.
Backiam , (2007) 12 SCC 190 has held as under: “11. It may be mentioned that the First Appellate Court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the First Appellate Court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect. In the present case no question was framed by the High Court as to whether the finding of the First Appellate Court that Ramayee and Lakshmi are one and the same person, is a finding based on no evidence or is perverse. Hence the findings of the First Appellate Court that Ramayee and Lakshmi are one and the same person, could not have been interfered with by the High Court. 12. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court has practically acted as a First Appellate Court and has re-appreciated the findings of fact of the learned Subordinate Judge which it could not validly do in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.” 23. For the discussion and enunciation made hereinabove, in the considered opinion of this Court, present second appeals are devoid of substance and impugned judgments dated 09.03.2022 passed by the first appellate Court, do not warrant interference. 24. Accordingly, all the second appeals are hereby dismissed. No costs. 25. Record of both courts below be sent back forthwith. 26. Stay applications and pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. 27. A copy of this Judgment be placed in each connected file.