JUDGMENT : (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi, J.) 1 This first appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (henceforth, referred to as ‘CPC’), challenging the judgment and decree dated 28-11-2019 passed by the 2 nd Upper District Judge, Rajnandgaon (CG) in Civil Suit No. 35A/2015, whereby the civil suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff has been dismissed. (hereinafter, parties would be referred as per their status shown in the plaint.) 2 Facts of the case in brief, are that, plaintiff filed civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction stating inter alia that, he is owner of land bearing Khasra No. 331/4, area 3.25 acre, situated at village Bamhnichar Bhatha, P.H. No. 48, Post Charbhatha, Tehsil Chhuria, District Rajnandgaon (henceforth referred to as ‘suit land’). He needed Rs. 1 lakh for his domestic work, which was given by defendant No. 1 subject to condition that he will execute registered sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1. Plaintiff executed registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) dated 29-11-2005 in respect of suit land. It is further pleaded by plaintiff that, defendant No. 1 had agreed to re- transfer the suit land vide registered sale deed to be executed in his favour after return of aforesaid amount, as such, sale deed (Ex.P-1) was not an actual sale deed, rather, it was ‘mortgage by conditional sale’. In this regard, the defendant No. 1 had also executed agreement (Ex. P-2) in favour of plaintiff on same day i.e. 29-11-2005. Plaintiff has returned sum of Rs. 90,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- on 14-3-2009 and 29-1-2011 respectively to the defendant No. 1, thereafter despite repeated requests, defendant No. 1 did not execute registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff filed civil suit seeking declaration that, sale deed Ex. P-1 dated 29-11-2005 was executed for security of loan, therefore, it does not confer title or right over the suit land, as such, plaintiff is having title over it. He has also sought relief of permanent injunction against defendant No. 1 restraining him from interfering in his possession over the suit land. 3 Defendant No. 1 filed written statement denying substantive pleading made by plaintiff claiming therein that, plaintiff needed money to purchase a tractor and for domestic work. Therefore, he executed registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) in his favour after getting full sale consideration of Rs. 1 lakh. 3 Defendant No. 1 filed written statement denying substantive pleading made by plaintiff claiming therein that, plaintiff needed money to purchase a tractor and for domestic work. Therefore, he executed registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) in his favour after getting full sale consideration of Rs. 1 lakh. Possession of suit land was also handed over to defendant No. 1. Aforesaid amount was not given to the plaintiff as a loan, rather the transaction was absolute sale of suit land, as such, plaintiff had also handed over possession over it to the defendant No. 1. Sale deed (Ex. P-1) also does not stipulate that, it has been executed to secure loan. Defendant No. 1 has also denied execution of alleged agreement (Ex. P-2) for return of suit land vide registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff, as it does not contain signature of defendant No. 1. Plaintiff has also not returned any amount to him. Defendant No. 1 has further pleaded that transaction made between plaintiff and defendant No. 1 vide registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) was an absolute sale and not ‘mortgage by conditional sale’. After execution of registered sale deed (Ex. P-1), plaintiff had handed over possession over the suit land, but after filing civil suit, plaintiff has forcefully dispossessed defendant No. 1 from it. Therefore, defendant No. 1 filed counter claim seeking relief of vacant possession over the suit land from plaintiff. 3.1 Plaintiff has filed reply to the counter claim filed by the defendant No. 1 with the pleading that, he has never handed over possession to defendant No. 1 over the suit land, rather he is always in possession, as such, there is no question of dispossession of defendant No. 1 from the suit land. No cause of action arises in favour of the defendant No. 1 for filing counter claim, hence, it be dismissed. 4 Defendant No. 2 has filed written statement with pleading that State is a formal party in the civil suit. 5 On the basis of pleading of both the parties, learned trial Court framed as many as 9 issues, recorded evidence adduced by the parties and after considering the evidence and contention of the learned counsel for the parties, it dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff holding therein that, the sale deed (Ex. 5 On the basis of pleading of both the parties, learned trial Court framed as many as 9 issues, recorded evidence adduced by the parties and after considering the evidence and contention of the learned counsel for the parties, it dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff holding therein that, the sale deed (Ex. P-1) was absolute sale deed, through which, right, title and all the interest was conveyed absolutely in favour of defendant No. 1, as such, it was not ‘mortgage by conditional sale’. The plaintiff has illegally dispossessed him, therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief, rather, the trial Court accepted counter claim of defendant No.1 and directed the plaintiff to hand over possession of the suit land to him within 2 months. Being aggrieved by such judgment and decree, appellant/plaintiff has filed instant first appeal. 6 Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are cousin brother. Since son of plaintiff was ill, therefore, to provide him treatment, plaintiff had sought money from defendant No. 1, to which he was ready subject to mortgage of suit land by executing conditional sale deed, therefore, plaintiff had executed registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) in his favour, but on the same day, i.e. on 29-11-2005, defendant No. 1 had executed Ikrarnama (Ex. P-2) in favour of plaintiff that, if plaintiff refunds Rs. 1 Lakh, then defendant No. 1 will execute registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff for return of suit land, but the expenses for such registration shall be incurred by plaintiff, which was conceded by him. Thereafter, defendant No. 1 gave him Rs. 1 Lakh as loan and plaintiff mortgaged suit land by conditional sale deed vide Ex. P-1. The area of suit land is total 3 acre 25 dismil. Ashok Kumar (D.W. 2), who is independent witness and resident of the village where suit land is situated, has stated that, 14 years prior to his deposition, (2-11-2019), rate of land in their village was 2 – 2½ lakhs rupees per acre, as such, in the year 2005, rate of suit land would be more than 60 thousand per acre. Even defendant No. 1 himself has admitted that, at that time, rate of land was Rs. 60,000 – 70,000/- per acre. On this count also, rate of 3.25 acre land could not be Rs. Even defendant No. 1 himself has admitted that, at that time, rate of land was Rs. 60,000 – 70,000/- per acre. On this count also, rate of 3.25 acre land could not be Rs. 1 lakh, to which, the suit land could be sold by the plaintiff. This fact also shows that sale deed Ex. P-1 was a nominal/sham sale deed and executed as ‘mortgage by conditional sale’. Learned counsel further submits that, if it would have been actual sale deed, then defendant No. 1 ought to have mutated the suit land in the year 2005 itself or at the earliest, but he got mutated the suit land in his name in the year 2014 vide Ex. P-3. The plaintiff is in possession over the suit land, which has never been transferred to defendant No. 1 and, therefore, defendant No. 1 has sought possession of the same, which itself shows that, possession was not transferred to the defendant No. 1. He also submitted that, learned trial Court without considering aforesaid fact, has mechanically dismissed the aforesaid suit. Hence, it is prayed that, the appeal may be allowed and decree may be granted in favour of the plaintiff by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree. 7 Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/ defendant No. 1 would submit that, plaintiff has sold the suit land vide registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) and alleged Ikrarnama (Ex. P-2) has not been proved. There is no iota of word in sale deed (Ex. P-1) that it was executed as mortgage by conditional sale. Defendant No. 1 has specifically pleaded in his counter claim that, he was in possession of suit land till 31-7-2015, thereafter he has been forcibly removed by the plaintiff, which is also supported by witness Ashok Kumar (D.W. 2). He further submits that, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is well reasoned and based on evidence, which does not call for any interference. 8 Learned State counsel submits that State is a formal party in this case. 9 Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record along with record of the trial Court. 10 Undisputedly, plaintiff was owner of suit land and he executed registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) on 29-11-2005 in favour of defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit land for sale consideration of Rs. 9 Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record along with record of the trial Court. 10 Undisputedly, plaintiff was owner of suit land and he executed registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) on 29-11-2005 in favour of defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit land for sale consideration of Rs. 1 lakh. 11 Plaintiff Satruhan (P.W. 1) has stated in his deposition that he had needed Rs. 1 lakh, which was given by defendant No. 1 subject to condition that, he will execute registered sale deed in respect of suit land in his (defendant No. 1) favour. Therefore, he (plaintiff) had executed aforesaid registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) in favour of defendant No. 1, as such, it was not a deed of conveyance sale, rather it was a ‘mortgage by conditional sale’. He has further deposed that, on 29-11-2005 itself, defendant No. 1 had executed agreement (Ex. P-2) in his favour to the effect that, on refund of aforesaid amount i.e. Rs. 1 lakh, he (defendant No. 1) will re-transfer the suit land in his favour vide executing registered sale deed. He has further submitted that, he returned the sale amount to the defendant No. 1 in two installments i.e. Rs. 90,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- on 14-3-2009 and 29-1-2011 respectively, which was also endorsed by defendant No. 1 in the said agreement, but despite being request made by him, defendant No. 1 did not re-transfer suit land and did not execute registered sale deed in his favour. 12 Dev Kumar Das Vaishnav (P.W.2) is said to be witness of registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) and alleged agreement (Ex. P-2). In his examination-in- chief submitted under Order 18 Rule 4(a) of the CPC, he has supported the case of plaintiff Satruhan Das (PW 1) , but in cross-examination, he has only supported execution of registered sale deed (Ex. P-1) and he had completely denied the fact that talk of keeping mortgage suit property had happened in front of him and alleged agreement (Ex. P-2) contains his signature. He has also admitted the suggestion that no content was written in the sale deed about mortgage of suit land. Prem Singh Yadav (P.W. 3) is a heresay witness about said transaction, therefore, his statement is of no worth in respect of said transaction. P-2) contains his signature. He has also admitted the suggestion that no content was written in the sale deed about mortgage of suit land. Prem Singh Yadav (P.W. 3) is a heresay witness about said transaction, therefore, his statement is of no worth in respect of said transaction. Defendant No. 1 Hirendra Das (D.W. 1) has clearly denied the statement of plaintiff that, sale deed (Ex. P-1) was executed by plaintiff as mortgage by conditional sale, rather, he stated that complete sale was made by the plaintiff after getting full sale consideration by handing over possession of the suit land to him. He has also denied about execution of the agreement (Ex. P-2) and refund of Rs. 1 lakh to him by the defendant No. 1. 13 Thus, the core issue in this case is, as to whether the sale deed (Ex. P-1) executed by plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1 is a mortgage by way of conditional sale or a sale with condition of re-purchase. In this regard, Clause 3 and 4 of the sale deed (Ex. P-1) are reproduced as under :- 14 Perusal of aforesaid contents of sale deed and even complete perusal of it, does not show that it contains any single word that, said transaction was made as ‘mortgage by conditional sale’, rather, contents i.e. shows that it was a complete sale transaction and not ‘mortgage by conditional sale’. 15 At this stage, it is apt to refer Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (henceforth, referred to as ‘Act, 1882’), wherein the terms of “Mortgage", "mortgagor", "mortgagee", "mortgage-money" and "mortgage deed" etc. have been defigned. Sub-section (c) of Section 58 deals with ‘mortgage by conditional sale’, which is relevant for the point in issue, and is extracted below :- “ 58. "Mortgage", "mortgagor", "mortgagee", "mortgage- money" and "mortgage deed" defined. have been defigned. Sub-section (c) of Section 58 deals with ‘mortgage by conditional sale’, which is relevant for the point in issue, and is extracted below :- “ 58. "Mortgage", "mortgagor", "mortgagee", "mortgage- money" and "mortgage deed" defined. a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) Mortgage by conditional sale -Where, the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property- On condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or On condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or On condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale: PROVIDED that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale. 16 Proviso to sub-section (c) of Section 58 of the Act, 1882 provides that no transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effect or purports to effect the sale. 17 As has been stated in preceding paragraph that, sale deed (Ex. P-1) does not contain any word to hold it to be mortgage by conditional sale. In this regard, plaintiff Satruhan (P.W. 1) has deposed that, on the date of execution of the sale deed (Ex. P-1) i.e. on 29-11-2005, defendant No. 1/vendee had executed agreement (Ex. P-1), in which, he had admitted that after refund of Rs. 1 lakh, he (defendant No. 1) will re-transfer suit land by execution of registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff. He has also deposed that, he has returned Rs. 1 lakh in two installments but, this fact has neither been supported by Dev Kumar Das Vaishnav (P.W. 2), who is said to be alleged witness of Ikrarnama (Ex. P-2) nor execution of aforesaid Ikrarnama has been admitted by the defendant No. 1/Vendee. Even plaintiff Satruhan (P.W. 1) himself has admitted in his cross-examination para 18 that, in back side of Ex. P-2, there is no signature of defendant No. 1 below the endorsement of payment of amount. He has also stated in his cross- examination that, he did not know as to what is written in Ex. Even plaintiff Satruhan (P.W. 1) himself has admitted in his cross-examination para 18 that, in back side of Ex. P-2, there is no signature of defendant No. 1 below the endorsement of payment of amount. He has also stated in his cross- examination that, he did not know as to what is written in Ex. P-2 and who has written it, as such, only on the basis of vague, baseless and unsupported statement of plaintiff Satruhan (P.W. 1), it cannot be held that, alleged agreement (Ex. P-2) was executed by the defendant No. 1 and plaintiff has returned Rs. 1 lakh to him. Therefore, on the strength of statement of plaintiff alone, it cannot be held proved that the sale deed (Ex. P-1) was a mortgage by conditional sale as it does not contain any such fact, which ought to have been embodied in the sale deed in view of proviso to Section 58(c) of the Act of 1882. 18 In the case of Prakas (dead) by Lr Vs. G. Aradhya & others (Civil Appeal No. 706/2015), similar case came up before Hon’ble Apex Court for consideration. In that case, on 16.10.1963 a property measuring 30 ft. x 60 ft. was purchased by the father of the appellant, Gangaramaiah, in the name of the appellant, who was minor at that time. On 24.12.1973 the father of the appellant, Gangaramaiah sold the aforesaid property to one Rudramma for a sum of ?5000/-. The age of the appellant, who claimed himself to be minor at that time, was mentioned as 13 years. On the same day, another unregistered document was executed between the parties claiming to be Reconveyance Deed in terms of which on the request of the vendor, the vendee had agreed to re-transfer the property back within five years of the Sale Deed in case the sale consideration of ?5000/- is paid. 19 In aforesaid case, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering various judgments, has held in para 25 to 28 as under :- “25. Similar argument, where two separate documents were executed, came up for consideration before this Court in Bishwanath Prasad Singh's case [(2006) 4 SCC 432]. One was the Sale Deed and the second was the agreement for sale. Both were executed on the same date. Similar argument, where two separate documents were executed, came up for consideration before this Court in Bishwanath Prasad Singh's case [(2006) 4 SCC 432]. One was the Sale Deed and the second was the agreement for sale. Both were executed on the same date. It was opined therein that to appreciate a document its contents are to be read in entirety and the intention of the parties is to be gathered from the language used therein. Para 16 of the aforesaid judgment is referred to for ready reference: "16. A deed as is well known must be construed having regard to the language used therein. We have noticed hereinbefore that by reason of the said deed of sale, the right, title and interest of the respondents herein was conveyed absolutely in favour of the appellant. The sale deed does not recite any other transaction of advance of any sum by the appellant to the respondents which was entered into by and between the parties. In fact, the recitals made in the sale deed categorically show that the respondents expressed their intention to convey the property to the appellant herein as they had incurred debts by taking loans from various other creditors." 25.1. Further, in the aforesaid judgment, this Court while interpreting the terms of the agreement executed along with the Sale Deed and opined that the same cannot be treated to be a mortgage as the expression used therein were 'vendor', 'vendee', 'sold' and 'consideration'. Fixed period was granted for execution of the Sale Deed. 25.2. The scope of Section 58(c) of the 1882 Act was considered in detail in paras 27 to 33 thereof which are extracted below: "27. A bare perusal of the said provision clearly shows that a mortgage by conditional sale must be evidenced by one document whereas a sale with a condition of retransfer may be evidenced by more than one document. A sale with a condition of retransfer, is not mortgage. It is not a partial transfer. By reason of such a transfer all rights have been transferred reserving only a personal right to the purchaser (sic seller), and such a personal right would be lost, unless the same is exercised within the stipulated time. 28. In Pandit Chunchun Jha v. Sk. It is not a partial transfer. By reason of such a transfer all rights have been transferred reserving only a personal right to the purchaser (sic seller), and such a personal right would be lost, unless the same is exercised within the stipulated time. 28. In Pandit Chunchun Jha v. Sk. Ebadat Al [ (1955) 1 SCR 174 : AIR 1954 SC 345 ] this Court clearly held: (SCR p. 177) "We think that is a fruitless task because two documents are seldom expressed in identical terms and when it is necessary to consider the attendant circumstances the imponderable variables which that brings in its train make it impossible to compare one case with another. Each must be decided on its own facts." 29. Yet again in Mushir Mohd. Khan v. Sajeda Bano [ (2000) 3 SCC 536 ] this Court upon construing Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act opined: (SCC pp. 541-42, para 9) "9. The proviso to this clause was added by Act 20 of 1929 so as to set at rest the conflict of decisions on the question whether the conditions, specially the condition relating to reconveyance contained in a separate document could be taken into consideration in finding out whether a mortgage was intended to be created by the principal deed. The legislature enacted that a transaction shall not be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition for reconveyance is contained in the document which purports to effect the sale." 30. Referring to Chunchun Jha [ (1955) 1 SCR 174 : AIR 1954 SC 345 ] it was held: (SCC p. 544, para 14) "14. Applying the principles laid down above, the two documents read together would not constitute a 'mortgage' as the condition of repurchase is not contained in the same documents by which the property was sold. The proviso to clause (c) of Section 58 would operate in the instant case also and the transaction between the parties cannot be held to be a 'mortgage by conditional sale'." 31. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan [ (2005) 6 SCC 243 ] wherein one of us was a party, this Court held:(SCC p. 254, para 21) "21. There exists a distinction between mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with a condition of repurchase. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan [ (2005) 6 SCC 243 ] wherein one of us was a party, this Court held:(SCC p. 254, para 21) "21. There exists a distinction between mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with a condition of repurchase. In a mortgage, the debt subsists and a right to redeem remains with the debtor; but a sale with a condition of repurchase is not a lending and borrowing arrangement. There does not exist any debt and no right to redeem is reserved thereby. An agreement to sell confers merely a personal right which can be enforced strictly according to the terms of the deed and at the time agreed upon. Proviso appended to Section 58(c), however, states that if the condition for retransfer is not embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect a sale, the transaction will not be regarded as a mortgage. (See: Pandit Chunchun Jha v. Sk. Ebadat Ali [ (1955) 1 SCR 174 : AIR 1954 SC 345 ], Bhaskar Waman Joshi v. Narayan Rambilas Agarwal [ (1960) 2 SCR 117 : AIR 1960 SC 301 ], ?. Simrathmull v. S. Nanjalingiah Gowder [1962 Supp (3) SCR 476 AIR 1963 SC 1182 ] Mushir Mohd. Khan [ (2000) 3 SCC 536 ] and Tamboli Ramanlal Motilal [Tamboli Ramanlal Motilal v. Ghanchi Chimanlal Keshavlal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 295].)" 32. The High Court relied upon Indira Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor [ (1988) 2 SCC 488 : AIR 1988 SC 1074 ]. Therein the Court took into consideration the factors adumbrated therein, particularly, a long stipulated period of 10 years for conveying the property and the vendee was prohibited from selling and parting with his right, title and interest for 10 years. The vendor was allowed to occupy the property as a tenant on payment of Rs 80 per month. No order of mutation was passed in his favour. It was held: "6. ... In the present case having regard to the facts and circumstances highlighted in the course of the discussion pertaining to the question as to whether or not the transaction was a transaction of mortgage having regard to the real intention of the parties it would be difficult to hold that the agreement to sell executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff was by way of a 'concession'. It was a transaction entered into by the defendant who was a hard-headed businessman and the documents in question have been carefully framed in legal terminology taking into account the relevant provisions of law. The transaction also discloses the awareness of the defendant about Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act as is evident from the fact that the reconveyance clause is not embodied in the sale deed itself. In the agreement to sell, no reference has been made to the transaction of sale though it has been executed contemporaneously. The defendant who has permitted the plaintiff to continue in possession on payment of rent equivalent to about 13½ per cent interest and was evidently aware of all the dimensions of the matter would not have granted any concession or executed the agreement by way of a concession. The agreement was executed evidently because the plaintiff would not have executed the sale deed unless an agreement to sell by a contemporaneous document was also executed to enable the plaintiff to enforce specific performance within ten years. It was therefore a transaction entered into with open eyes by the defendant and there was no question of granting any concession." 33. In the instant case, as noticed hereinbefore, the transfer is complete and not partial, no stipulation has been made that the appellant cannot transfer the property. Not only that, the appellant was put in possession of the land, his name was also mutated." 25.3 A perusal of the aforesaid paras of the judgment shows that the proviso was added in Section 58(c) of the Act vide Act No.20 of 1929, so as to put at rest the conflicting decisions on the issue. A deeming fiction was added in the negative that a transaction shall not be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition for reconveyance is contained in the document which purports to effect the sale. 25.4. The judgment of this Court in Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan , [ (2005) 6 SCC 243 ], has also been referred to, which defines the distinction between mortgage by conditional sale and a sale with a condition of repurchase. In a mortgage, the debt subsists and a right to redeem remains with the debtor; but a sale with condition of repurchase is not a lending and borrowing arrangement. In a mortgage, the debt subsists and a right to redeem remains with the debtor; but a sale with condition of repurchase is not a lending and borrowing arrangement. Proviso to Section 58(c) of the 1882 Act was referred to in the aforesaid judgment to hold that if the condition for re-transfer is not embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect a sale, the transaction will not be regarded as a mortgage. The judgment of this Court in Ramlal's case [ Ramlal and another Vs. Phagua and orhers (2006) 1 SCC 168 ], relied upon by learned Senior counsel for the appellant, was specifically dealt with and distinguished in paras 34 and 35 thereof in Bishwanath Prasad Case (supra) and the same are extracted below: "34. In Ramlal v. Phagua this Court having regard to the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein opined: (SCC p. 173, para 18):- "18. In our opinion, agreement to reconvey the property will not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the sale is nominal and in view of the stand of Defendant 8, as also of the fact that the property worth Rs 700 has been purportedly sold for Rs 400, we are of the considered opinion that the sale deed dated 1-12-1965 did not convey any title to Defendant 8. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that the vendor cannot convey to the vendee better title than she herself has." 35. As of fact, it was held therein that the sale deed in question was not a real sale deed but was by way of a surety. In that case, furthermore, the defendant categorically admitted that the plaintiff had taken loan. It is in that situation, the transaction was held to be a mortgage. Apart from it, there were other circumstances which led the court to arrive at the said conclusion. The said decision, therefore, cannot have any application in the instant case." 26. Before we proceed to consider the legal effect thereof, we find it appropriate to extract the contents of the two documents. Apart from it, there were other circumstances which led the court to arrive at the said conclusion. The said decision, therefore, cannot have any application in the instant case." 26. Before we proceed to consider the legal effect thereof, we find it appropriate to extract the contents of the two documents. The contents of the Sale Deed are extracted below: "On this 24th day of December, 19731, Gangaramaiah, S/o. late Kambaiah, residing at No.62, Hosaguddadahalli, Mysore Road, Bangalore City on behalf of minor son Prakashaiah, aged about 13 years as his guardian and father is executing this Absolute Sale Deed in favour of Smt. Rudramma, W/o. Sri Gangappa, aged about 48 years, residing at No. 68, Nehru Road, Hosaguddadahalli, Mysore Road, Bangalore City as follows:- The schedule property mentioned below was acquired by us from Smt. Sharadamma, S/o P.V. Raghavendra Naidu and her children under a registered sale dated 16-10-1963 registered as Document No. 5676 of Book-l in Volume No. 2332 at pages 238-241 registered at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bangalore North Taluk and ever since the possession of the property is with us. In order to meet domestic expenses and to meet the education of the minor son and also to discharge some of the petty debts the schedule property is sold for a sale consideration of Rs.5,000/-. I have received a sum of Rs.3,000/- in the presence of the witnesses and also agreed to receive the remaining sale consideration of Rs.2,000/- at the time of the registration of this sale deed in the presence of the Sub-Registrar. Thus, total sale consideration of Rs.5,000/- is paid to me. Therefore, on this day of the registration the possession of the schedule property is delivered to you. Here afterwards you can change Katha in respect of the schedule site in your name and you are at liberty to enjoy all such resources available/standing over the schedule site by paying tax, cess etc., and you shall enjoy the schedule site as the absolute owner thereof from generation to generation. There are no other claimants, legal heirs and there is no charge such as the payment of maintenance, Shreedhan rights, minor disputes, court decrees, attachment etc. In the event of any dispute, I will undertake to resolve them at my cost. I have handed over the sale deed dated 16-10-1963 and the Survey Endorsement, Tax paid receipts, Katha Endorsements." 27. There are no other claimants, legal heirs and there is no charge such as the payment of maintenance, Shreedhan rights, minor disputes, court decrees, attachment etc. In the event of any dispute, I will undertake to resolve them at my cost. I have handed over the sale deed dated 16-10-1963 and the Survey Endorsement, Tax paid receipts, Katha Endorsements." 27. The contents of the reconveyance/ agreement of buy back deed dated 24.12.1973 are extracted below: "On this 24th day of December, 1973 I, Smt. Rudramma, W/o. Sri Gangappa residing at No. 68, Nehru Road, Hosaguddadahalli, Mysore Road, Bangalore City is executing this Reconveyance Agreement in favour of Sri. Gangaramaiah, S/o. late Kambaiah, residing at No.62, Hosaguddadahalli, Mysore Road, Bangalore City as follows:- You are aware that the property mentioned under the schedule given below was sold and registered by you in my name for a sum of Rs.5,000/- at the office of the Sub- Registrar, Srirampuram, Bangalore City on 24-12-1973 which is registered as Document No. 3265, in Book-1. Since you requested me to resell the schedule property but I permitted you to repurchase the schedule property within a given time, I am granting you 5 years of time for you to repurchase the same. In the event, you pay me the sale consideration of Rs.5,000/-, I will reconvey the schedule property in your favour. This agreement shall cease on the next day of the expiry of 5 years. At the time of repurchase you must bear the registration charges." 28. In the case in hand, the specific term used in the document is "reconveyance agreement" executed by Rudramma in favour of Gangaramaiah. It is clearly mentioned therein that the property in-question had already been sold and registered in the name of Rudramma. On a request made by Gangaramaiah, the right to purchase the property was given within a period of five years on payment of sale consideration of ?5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand). The agreement states that it shall cease to have effect on expiry of a period of five years.” 20 Reverting to the facts of instant case, as per plaintiff, there are two separate documents i.e. sale deed (Ex. P-1) and agreement (Ex. P-2), but neither execution of agreement (Ex. P-2) has been proved by the plaintiff nor it has been proved by him that, he had returned Rs. 1 lakh to the defendant No. 1. P-1) and agreement (Ex. P-2), but neither execution of agreement (Ex. P-2) has been proved by the plaintiff nor it has been proved by him that, he had returned Rs. 1 lakh to the defendant No. 1. Further, since the sale deed (Ex. P-1) does not contain any word to hold it to be mortgage by conditional sale or a sale with condition of re-transfer, as provided in Section 58(c) of the Act of 1882, rather, the contents of the sale deed (Ex. P-1) as has been referred in preceding paragraph, itself shows that, it was a complete sale deed, which conveyed absolute right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land in favour of the defendant No. 1, as such, it was a complete sale. Hence, the finding recorded by learned trial Court in respect of Issue No. 1, 2, 3 and 6 in favour of defendant No. 1 and against the plaintiff is found to be based on evidence and law, as such, the same are affirmed. 21 Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff stressed in his contention that, even after execution of registered sale deed (Ex. P-1), plaintiff has not handed over the suit land to the defendant No. 1, rather it was always in possession of the plaintiff. Further, if it would have been actual sale deed, then defendant No. 1 ought to have mutated the suit land in his name at the earliest, but he got mutated the suit land in revenue record in his name in the year 2014. As per counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, aforesaid fact also shows that, the sale deed Ex. P-1 was a mortgage by conditional sale. But, aforesaid contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff is not found to be true as it has been discussed in detail in preceding paragraph that, the sale deed does not contain any single word to hold it to be mortgage by conditional sale and further, contents of sale deed (Ex. P-1) clearly shows that after execution of it, possession and all the rights were transferred to defendant No. 1, therefore, only because the mutation entry was made by defendant No. 1 in the year 2014, it cannot be held that the sale deed (Ex. P- 1) was executed as mortgage by conditional sale. P-1) clearly shows that after execution of it, possession and all the rights were transferred to defendant No. 1, therefore, only because the mutation entry was made by defendant No. 1 in the year 2014, it cannot be held that the sale deed (Ex. P- 1) was executed as mortgage by conditional sale. Further defendant No. 1 Hirendra Das (D.W.1) has deposed that in the year 2015, plaintiff has forcibly taken possession of the suit land from him, which is also supported by Ashok Kumar (D.W. 2). Therefore, learned trial Court has rightly held that the plaintiff has illegally dispossessed defendant No. 1 from the possession of the suit land, hence, granting decree of possession in his (defendant No. 1) favour and against the plaintiff is also not found to be perverse and illegal, as such, the finding recorded by learned trial Court in respect of other issues are also affirmed. 22 In view of above discussion, I do not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Hence, the same is affirmed. 23 Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. 24 In view of above, pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. 25 No order as to cost(s).