JUDGMENT : Deepak Roshan, J. Heard Mr. D. K. Dubey, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner, Mrs. Richa Sanchita, Ld. Counsel for the Accountant General and Mr. Risabh Kaushal AC to G.P.-II appearing for the Respondent-State. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for following reliefs:- (a) For quashing of the departmental proceeding, initiated vide Memo No. 482 dated 20.04.1999 (Annexure-4) and Memo No. 299 dated 30.01.2003 (Annexure-7) in view of the decision rendered by the, Hon’ble High Court as well as by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the point of inordinate delay in conclusion of the departmental proceeding; (b) To pay full salary for the period from 20.02.1996 to 08.02.1999 in terms of Memo No. 1803 dated 06.08.2005 and Memo No. 217 dated 08.02.2016; (c) For quashing the Memo No. 1176 dated 04.08.2017, whereby punishment has been inflicted against the petitioner as dismissal from service which came to the knowledge of the petitioner by way of Annexure-C to the counter affidavit as contained in Annexure-15 to the writ application (d) After quashing of the departmental proceeding and the punishment, grant the petitioner all the consequential benefits for which he is entitled to under the law. 3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings is that the Petitioner was appointed as Touring Veterinary Officer and he joined on 04.04.1986. On 1996, while he was posted as Touring Veterinary Officer, Rampur at Lohardaga, an FIR has been lodged by the Central Bureau of Investigation being R.C. Case No. 59 (A)/1996, in which the Petitioner was initially made an accused but while submitting the charge-sheet, the Petitioner was not sent up for trial but he has been made as witness on behalf of the prosecution. In the year 1998, the Petitioner along with other persons moved before the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2792 of 1998 which was disposed of on 06.11.1998 with a direction to complete the departmental proceeding within six months and if not concluded, suspension order shall be revoked. Thereafter, suspension of the Petitioner has been revoked on 17.08.1999 along with other similarly situated persons. 4. Subsequently, vide Memo No. 482 dated 20.04.1999, the Petitioner was served with a memo of charge for initiation of departmental proceeding. On 04.06.1999, the Petitioner filed the reply to the memo of charge. Thereafter, suspension of the Petitioner has been revoked on 17.08.1999 along with other similarly situated persons. 4. Subsequently, vide Memo No. 482 dated 20.04.1999, the Petitioner was served with a memo of charge for initiation of departmental proceeding. On 04.06.1999, the Petitioner filed the reply to the memo of charge. On 25.07.2001 & 01.06.2001, the Petitioner has been asked to appear in the departmental proceeding. In the meantime, after bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bihar, the services of the Petitioner have been allocated to the State of Jharkhand and the proceeding which was initiated in the year 1996; again, vide Memo No. 299 dated 30.01.2003, the Petitioner has been served with same memo of charge by the Inquiry officer in the State of Jharkhand (Annexure-7). On 21.02.2003, the Petitioner filed the reply to the memo of charge issued on 30.01.2003. 5. Thereafter, in compliance to the letters dated 09.03.2007 and 23.03.2007 issued by conducting officer, the Petitioner filed the reply indicating therein that in the order passed in R.C. Case No. 59 (A)/1996, he has not been convicted; nor made an accused by the trial court and also, he has not been sent up for trial; rather the Petitioner was made as a prosecution witness. Pursuant to the reply dated 23.03.2007, the Petitioner received a letter dated 02.07.2007 wherein he has been asked for second show-cause. After receiving second show-cause notice, Petitioner filed detailed reply to the same on 09.07.2007. On 31.05.2019, the Petitioner retired from service under suspension after attaining the age of superannuation but no final order has been passed in spite of reply dated 09.07.2007. 6. After retirement, the Petitioner moved before this Court by way of present writ application for quashing of the departmental proceeding on the ground of delay. Some similarly situated persons namely, Dr. Shyam Sundar Baitha, Kinkar Kumar Mahto, Krishna Kumar Sahu and Peter Tirkey, whose names also find place along with the Petitioner in the category of not sent up for trial, have already been provided with full salary for the period from 1996 to 1999 by the department. After filing of the writ application, counter affidavit has been filed in which an order has been enclosed issued on 04.08.2017, whereby the punishment order has been passed. After filing of the writ application, counter affidavit has been filed in which an order has been enclosed issued on 04.08.2017, whereby the punishment order has been passed. After getting knowledge of the same, the Petitioner filed an interlocutory application bearing I.A. No. 590 of 2021, which was allowed by this Court on 23.03.2021 and the amended writ petition was filed. 7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that from perusal of the enquiry report, it is evident from page-10 of the enquiry report that the departmental proceeding has been concluded on the basis of the FIR lodged by the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and others , (2009) 2 SCC 570 that the FIR by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove and/or to corroborate the said document. Reliance, by the Inquiry officer on the FIR could not have been treated as evidence. In the present case, it has been observed by the Conducting Officer that the documents have been sought for by the CBI but it has not been furnished and on the basis of the opinion of the Law Department , only the evidence which had been taken are the FIR lodged by the Deputy Commissioner, Lohardaga and the order passed by the Special Judge in R.C. Case No. 59 (A) of 1986. 8. It has been submitted by Ld. Counsel that the evidence which had taken into account for finding the Petitioner guilty is bad in law in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra). He contended that in view of the above, the punishment order as contained in Annexure-15 of the writ application is also bad in law because from perusal of the impugned order, same ground was taken for punishing the Petitioner on the basis of the FIR and the order passed by the Special Judge in which the Petitioner has not been sent for trial; rather he has been made the witness on behalf of the prosecution. In other words, the Petitioner has no occasion to face the trial; rather he has made the statement as a witness. 9. In other words, the Petitioner has no occasion to face the trial; rather he has made the statement as a witness. 9. He further submits that the point which has to be considered by this Court is that if the Special Judge found the involvement of the Petitioner, he should have asked the Petitioner to face trial but such action has not been taken by the Special Judge. Therefore, it can be said that the order passed by the Special Judge as well as the FIR cannot be taken into account because of the fact that while filing the charge sheet, the CBI has not found any material against the Petitioner. 10. He further submits that so far as the impugned order dated 04.08.2017 is concerned, that has come into light in the counter affidavit filed by the State and the said order has never been communicated to the Petitioner at any point of time till he retired after attaining the age of superannuation because of the fact that earlier the writ application was filed for quashing of the departmental proceeding on the ground of delay, then only in the counter affidavit such punishment order has been enclosed and the said punishment order has not, at all, been communicated to the Petitioner while he was in service. Thus, the punishment order dated 04.08.2017 is non-Est in the eyes of law on the basis of principle of "no communication no order". Accordingly, the Petitioner is entitled for all the reliefs as sought for in the writ application. 11. Per contra, Ld. Counsel representing the Respondent State tries to defend the impugned order relying upon the counter affidavit, however he could produce any document to show that the punishment order has been communicated to the Petitioner while he was in service. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed with the respective affidavit, it is evident that the initiation of departmental proceedings against the Petitioner was solely premised upon the FIR lodged by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the accompanying charge-sheet. However, the Inquiry officer has relied exclusively on these documents without adducing any independent evidence or examining any witness to substantiate the allegations therein. However, the Inquiry officer has relied exclusively on these documents without adducing any independent evidence or examining any witness to substantiate the allegations therein. This approach is contrary to the principles laid down in Roog Singh Negi (Supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that mere reliance on unproven documents, without corroborative testimony, cannot form the basis of a valid disciplinary finding. For brevity paragraph 14 & 15 of the above referred judgment is quoted herein below:- "14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence . The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left." Emphasis Supplied. 13. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the criminal proceeding arising out of the said FIR is still pending, and neither the FIR; nor the charge-sheet has been proved in accordance with law before the criminal court. 13. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the criminal proceeding arising out of the said FIR is still pending, and neither the FIR; nor the charge-sheet has been proved in accordance with law before the criminal court. The reliance on such unproven documents in the departmental enquiry, without affording the Petitioner an opportunity to confront and rebut the evidence through cross-examination, amounts to a denial of principles of natural justice. 14. Additionally, the record reveals that the punishment order was never communicated to the Petitioner during his tenure in service. Such non- communication of the order not only violates the mandatory procedural requirement but also renders the entire disciplinary action legally unsustainable. The communication of the punishment order is an essential component of due process, and its absence vitiates the proceedings ab initio. Moreover, the very effectiveness of an order, which is not communicated to the person against whom it is made, is also questionable since such order would become effective only upon communication. The basic principle is that an order passed by an adjudicating body does not become effective until it is communicated to the person affected thereby. The principle is: “No communication, no order”. This principle has been expounded by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika , 1996 SCC Online SC 48. The brief facts of the case were that the Amar Singh Harika was an Assistant Director, Civil Supplies, in the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU). He was dismissed from service by an order purported to have been passed on June 3, 1949, which was communicated to him on January 2/3, 1953. He filed a suit against the State of Punjab alleging that the impugned order whereby he was dismissed was invalid, inoperative and illegal since it had been passed without holding any inquiry or following proper procedure. He further claimed a declaration that despite the said order of dismissal, he continued to be an employee of the State of Punjab and to hold his post as Assistant Director, Civil Supplies. The trial court dismissed the suit of the respondent and, thereafter, the matter went up to the Supreme Court. The relevant discussion is in paragraph 11 of the judgment, which is reproduced hereinbelow: 11. The first question which has been raised before us by Mr. The trial court dismissed the suit of the respondent and, thereafter, the matter went up to the Supreme Court. The relevant discussion is in paragraph 11 of the judgment, which is reproduced hereinbelow: 11. The first question which has been raised before us by Mr. Bishan Narain is that though the respondent came to know about the order of his dismissal for the first time on the May 28, 1951, the said order must be deemed to have taken effect as from the June 3, 1949, when it was actually passed. The High Court has rejected this contention ; but Mr. Bishan Narain contends that the view taken by the High Court is erroneous in law. We are not impressed by Mr. Bishan Narain’s argument. It is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that, in some cases, the authority may feel that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the said order and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him? These and other complications would inevitably arise if it is held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is passed, though it may be communicated to the officer concerned several days thereafter. It is true that, in the present case, the respondent had been suspended during the material period; but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. We are, therefore, reluctant to hold that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. When a public officer is removed from service, his successor would have to take charge of the said office; and except in cases where the officer concerned has already been suspended, difficulties would arise if it is held that an officer who is actually working and holding charge of his office, can be said to be effectively removed from his office by the mere passing of an order by the appropriate authority. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was plainly right in holding that the order of dismissal passed against the respondent on the June 3, 1949, could not be said to have taken effect until the respondent came to know about it on May 28, 1951.” Emphasis Supplied 15. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the departmental proceedings suffer from grave procedural irregularities and violation of principles of natural justice. The reliance on FIR and the Order passed by the Special Judge in R.C. Case No. 59 (A) of 1986 in which the Petitioner has not sent up for trial; absence of witness examination, and non- communication of the punishment order collectively renders the disciplinary action arbitrary and legally untenable. 16. Accordingly, the proceedings and the subsequent orders are liable to be set aside. 16. Accordingly, the proceedings and the subsequent orders are liable to be set aside. Hence, impugned order Memo No. 1176 dated 04.08.2017 contained in Annexure-15 of the writ application, is hereby, quashed and set aside and the Petitioner shall be granted all consequential benefits to which he is legally entitled, in accordance with law. 17. Consequently, the instant writ application is hereby allowed. Pending I.As., if any, is also closed.