JUDGMENT : RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY, J. 1. Heard Mr. Navniti Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ashok Kr. Yadav, learned Sr. S.C.-I. 2. In this writ application, the petitioner has sought for a direction upon the respondent State to allow the petitioner to work the mines for a further period of 5 years and 8 months or by any other period this Court deems fit from the date of expiry of the original lease period that is 09-07-2022 against the period lost due to suspension of mining operations owing to reasons attributable to the actions of the State Government. 3. The factual aspects of the case reveal that the petitioner had received a notice issued by the District Mining Officer as contained in Letter No. 1329/M dated 08-12-2016 followed by another letter in continuation dated 10-12-2016 purportedly in terms of Rule 12(10) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 2016. The said letters alleged certain irregularities/breaches of the terms and conditions of the lease deed against the petitioner and replies were duly submitted by the petitioner on 31-01-2017 and 08-02- 2017. Pursuant to the reply submitted by the petitioner, the Deputy Commissioner, West Singhbhum by Letter bearing no. 918/M dated 30-05-2017 had presented his opinion to the Member, Board of Revenue. The petitioner was called upon to present its case by the Member, Board of Revenue on 09-08-2018 regarding the alleged violations pointed out by the respondent State. The petitioner was communicated an order as contained in Memo No. 28/M dated 04-01-2019 by which the lease of the petitioner was terminated and the petitioner was directed to hand over the possession of the leasehold area to the District Mining Officer within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said order. The order dated 04.01.2019 was challenged before the Revisional Authority in Revision Application No. 06/05/2019/RC-1 which was dismissed vide Final Order No. 13/2020 dated 07-07-2020 and the petitioner had challenged the order dated 04-01-2019 and 07-07-2020 before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2013/2020. The orders dated 04-01-2019 and 07- 07-2020 were quashed by this Court vide order dated 21-05- 2020 and the respondent State was directed to pass a fresh order within 12 weeks. The orders dated 04-01-2019 and 07- 07-2020 were quashed by this Court vide order dated 21-05- 2020 and the respondent State was directed to pass a fresh order within 12 weeks. It is the case of the petitioner that though none of the charges as contained in the notices dated 08-12-2016 and 10-12-2016 could be proved, but the petitioner has still not been allowed to operate the mines by seeking necessary approval etc. The lease of the petitioner is for a limited period and due to the arbitrary act of the State, the petitioner is losing a period of lease. 4. It has been submitted by Mr. Navniti Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was granted a lease of iron and manganese ore on 10-07-1972 for a period of 30 years and before expiry of the period of lease, an application for renewal was submitted and during pendency of the said application, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation), Act (in short MMDR Act) was amended with effect from 12-01-2015. In terms of Section 8 A of the MMDR Act, the lease granted to the petitioner for 30 years was deemed to have been granted for 50 years, i.e., up to 09-07-2022. Mr. Singh has submitted that a supplementary lease deal was executed between the petitioner and the State. During the currency of the lease, the mining activities of the petitioner was suspended by the authorities on numerous occasions and all such orders were set aside by either the Revisional Authority or by this Court. Due to such action of the State, there has been frequent disruption in the mining activities causing loss to the petitioner as well as to the State exchequer. Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel has further submitted that no third party right has been created and, therefore, there is no impediment to allow the petitioner to operate the mines for the period which it has lost on account of the action of the State. The petitioner, in fact, has lost 5 years 8 months of its total lease period due to the intermittent suspension of the mining activities by the State. Mr. Singh has added that resumption of the lease will ultimately benefit the State in general and the public in particular. In support of his contention, Mr. The petitioner, in fact, has lost 5 years 8 months of its total lease period due to the intermittent suspension of the mining activities by the State. Mr. Singh has added that resumption of the lease will ultimately benefit the State in general and the public in particular. In support of his contention, Mr. Singh has referred to the cases of Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 726 , M/s Rajmahal Traders v. State of Jharkhand and others in W.P. (C) No. 2378/2022 , M/s Hindustan Sugar Mills v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 599 , Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors. (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 21 and All India Groundnut Syndicate Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City , AIR 1954 Bom 232 . 5. Mr. Ashok Kr. Yadav, learned Sr. S.C.-I has submitted that the order of remand by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2013/2020 is still pending before the authorities. Reference has been made to Section 8A of the MMDR Act which, according to the learned Sr. S.C.-I, shuts the door on the claim of the petitioner as the extended period of lease has already expired on 09.07.2022. Mr. Ashok Kr. Yadav, learned Sr. S.C.-I has also referred to a similar issue as that of the petitioner in the case of M/s Nirmal Kumar Pradeep Kumar wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its order dated 29.08.2022 had refused to accede to the prayer of the said lessee. Neither any Forest Clearance nor any Environmental Clearance has been taken by the petitioner which resulted in adverse action taken against the petitioner. 6. Mr. Navniti Prasad Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there has been no adjudication in the case of M/s Nirmal Kumar Pradeep Kumar and, therefore, the said order is not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 7. In the case of Beg Raj Singh vs. state of U.P. and others, ( 2003) 1 SCC 726, it has been held as follows: “7. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the learned counsel for the State and the private respondent, we are satisfied that the petition deserves to be allowed. 7. In the case of Beg Raj Singh vs. state of U.P. and others, ( 2003) 1 SCC 726, it has been held as follows: “7. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the learned counsel for the State and the private respondent, we are satisfied that the petition deserves to be allowed. The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and the right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment. Third-party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in-between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. A plaintiff or petitioner having been found entitled to a right to relief, the court would as an ordinary rule try to place the successful party in the same position in which he would have been if the wrong complained against would not have been done to him. The present one is such a case. The delay in final decision cannot, in any manner, be attributed to the appellant. No auction has taken place. No third-party interest has been created. The sand mine has remained unoperated for the period for which the period of operation falls short of three years. The operation had to be stopped because of the order of the State Government intervening which order has been found unsustainable in accordance with stipulations contained in the mining lease consistently with GO issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The sand mine has remained unoperated for the period for which the period of operation falls short of three years. The operation had to be stopped because of the order of the State Government intervening which order has been found unsustainable in accordance with stipulations contained in the mining lease consistently with GO issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Merely because a little higher revenue can be earned by the State Government that cannot be a ground for not enforcing the obligation of the State Government which it has incurred in accordance with its own policy decision.” 8. The facts of the above quoted case are in a completely different hemisphere. The applicant was granted sand mining lease for one year and it was extended for a further period of two years as the original lease should have been executed for three years. During the extendable period of lease, decision had been taken by the Government to hold an auction of the sand mining lease. The lease deed executed was erroneously for a period of one year and in such background facts, the applicant was directed to operate the mines for a full period of three years subject to adjustment for the period for which he had already operated. 9. The case of Beg Raj Singh(supra) was also taken into consideration in the case of M/s Rajmahal Traders v. State of Jharkhand in W.P. (C) No. 2378 of 2022, wherein the petitioner was allowed to operate the mines for the rest period of three years which was on account of an arbitrary action of the State-respondent. The primary consideration was the non-adherence to the principles of natural justice and the fact that the letter of intent was cancelled since the lessor could not obtain the Environmental Clearance Certificate within the statutory period of 180 days. In the present writ application, the petitioner has operated the mines from 10-07-1972 till 09-07-2022 for a period of 50 years and certain aberrations leading to stoppage of mining activities cannot equate the case of the writ petitioner with either of the applicants in Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (supra) and M/s Rajmahal Traders v. The state of Jharkhand (supra) 10. Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has invoked an observation quoted in M/s Hindustan Sugar Mills v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (supra) and M/s Rajmahal Traders v. The state of Jharkhand (supra) 10. Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has invoked an observation quoted in M/s Hindustan Sugar Mills v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 599 which reads as under: “ It is true and we are aware that there is no legal liability on the Central Government to do so but it must be remembered that we are living in a democratic society governed by the rule of law and every government which claims to be inspired by ethical and moral values must do what is fair and just to the citizen, regardless of legal technicalities.” 11. Reference has also been made to the case of Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilizers Limited v. Deputy Commissioner Commercial Taxes & Ors. (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 21, particularly to the following: “ 22. Such is not the scope or intendment of the provisions concerned here. The main exemption is under the 1969 notification. The subsequent notification which contains condition of prior permission clearly envisages a procedure to give effect to the exemption. A distinction between the provisions of statute which are of substantive character and were built in with certain specific objectives of policy on the one hand and those which are merely procedural and technical in their nature on the other must be kept clearly distinguished. What we have here is a pure technicality. Clause 3 of the notification leaves no discretion to the Deputy Commissioner to refuse the permission if the conditions are satisfied. The words are that he “will grant”. There is no dispute that appellant had satisfied these conditions. Yet the permission was withheld — not for any valid and substantial reason but owing to certain extraneous things concerning some inter-departmental issues. Appellant had nothing to do with those issues. Appellant is now told, “We are sorry. We should have given you the permission. But now that the period is over, nothing can be done”. The answer to this is in the words of Lord Denning: [See Wells v. Minister of Housing and Local Government, (1967) 1 WLR 1000, 1007: (1967) 2 All ER 1041] “Now I know that a public authority cannot be estopped from doing its public duty, but I do think it can be estopped from relying on a technicality and this is a technicality.” 23. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, (1984 Edn.) says at page 683: “Unnecessary technicality: Modern courts seek to cut down technicalities attendant upon a statutory procedure where these cannot be shown to be necessary to the fulfilment of the purposes of the legislation.” 12. In All India Groundnut Syndicate Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City, AIR 1954 Bom 232 it has been held as follows: “9. But the most surprising contention is put forward by the Department that because their own officer failed to discharge his statutory duty, the assessee is deprived of his right which the law has given to him under sub-section (2) of S. 24. In other words, the Department wants to benefit from and wants to take advantage of its own default. It is an elementary principle of law that no person—we take it that the Income- tax Department is included in that definition—can put forward his own default in defence to a right asserted by the other party. A person cannot say that the party claiming the right is deprived of that right because “I have committed a default and the right is lost because of that default.” 13. Mr. Singh while referring to the aforesaid judgments has submitted that the rights of the petitioner has been foreclosed due to the inaction of the State. 14. There have been certain instances causing disruptions in mining activities and we may take notice of Memo No. 28/M Ranchi dated 04-01-2019 issued by the Joint Secretary of Mines, Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand by which the lease was terminated against which the petitioner had preferred W.P.(S) No. 177/2019 in which vide order dated 07-02-2019, the parties were relegated to the Revisional Authority. This order was challenged in L.P.A No. 183/2019 which has been averred to be pending. The Revision Application was filed before the Revisional Authority which, however, was rejected. This led to the petitioner challenging the order of termination dated 04- 01-2019 and the revisional order dated 07-07-2020 in W.P.(C) No. 2013/2020 and vide order dated 21-05-2021, both the orders were quashed and the concerned authority was directed to pass a fresh order. It has been mentioned in the counter affidavit that hearing is being conducted by the authorized officer after the matter was remanded back. It has been mentioned in the counter affidavit that hearing is being conducted by the authorized officer after the matter was remanded back. The petitioner has categorized the period during which it was unable to work the mines in a tabular form. A period of one year one month has been shown for the period 07-09-1977 to 12-10-1978 and two separate periods of 06 months and 07 months have been stated for the period 01-04-2016 to 31-12-2018. Once the orders for stoppage of mining activities were set aside by the higher forum, the petitioner had resumed its mining activities. The major portion of stoppage of mining activities is from 04-01-2019, when the lease was terminated till the expiry of the period of lease on 09- 07-2022. This period is the subject matter of the authority concerned to whom it was remanded by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2013/2020 and which is also under challenge in L.P.A. No. 183/2019. So far as the earlier periods are concerned, certain violation seems to have been pointed out leading to disruption in mining activities which were set at rest by the higher forums after which the mining activities resumed and so far as the last period of termination of lease is concerned, it would be premature to make any observation by this Court as the subject matter, according to the counter affidavit, is sub-judice before the authority to whom the issue was remanded as well as in L.P.A. No. 183/2019. The petitioner cannot be permitted to take advantage of such aberrations as the acts cannot be said to be unfair specifically in the context of the lease running for 50 years. 15. Based on the aforesaid reasonings, we do not find any cause to accede to the prayer of the writ petitioner and consequently, we dismiss this writ application. 16. Pending I.A.s, if any, stands closed.