JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. This appeal is preferred by the 1st accused in S.C.No. 199 of 2017 on the file of the III Additional Sessions Judge, Thodupuzha, challenging the finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence arrived at against him. By the impugned judgment, the appellant was found guilty and was convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of 20 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, with a default clause for the offence under Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code , and to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a find of Rs.50,000/-, with a default clause for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC . Brief Statement of Facts: 2. Sabitha Maji, wife of Kundan Maji (PW1), was a 32-year-old woman and the mother of a child. A native of Odisha, she was employed along with her husband in the “Kallivayal Estate” at Kuttikanam. The couple resided in a line building “Layam” allotted to estate workers by the management. On 01.01.2017, being a Sunday, there was no scheduled work at the estate. However, PW1 opted to work that day and left for work at around 7:00 a.m., accompanied by ten other workers. At the time, Sabitha Maji was washing clothes outside their quarters. The appellant resided in the adjacent room, while other neighbouring rooms were occupied by PW2 and a woman named Sumathi. 2.1 PW1 returned from work at approximately 5:00 p.m., only to find that his wife was missing. He enquired with the neighbours and conducted a search in the locality but his wife could not be located. 2.2 Later that night, the Estate Manager and more employees joined the search efforts. At midnight, the body of Sabitha Maji was discovered in a bushy, forested area, concealed under dry leaves with multiple cut injuries all over her body. PW1 then approached the police and lodged a complaint, based on which, Crime No.6 of 2017 of Peerumedu Police Station was registered at 7:00 a.m. on 02.01.2017 under Section 302 IPC . 2.3. At the time of lodging the First Information Statement, none of the estate employees had any knowledge of the identity of the perpetrators. 2.4 The investigation was taken over by PW13, the Circle Inspector of Police, Peerumedu. 2.3. At the time of lodging the First Information Statement, none of the estate employees had any knowledge of the identity of the perpetrators. 2.4 The investigation was taken over by PW13, the Circle Inspector of Police, Peerumedu. He conducted the inquest over the body of the deceased (Ext.P2) and seized the clothes, bangles, a tooth and other items found near the body. The assistance of Forensic experts, a Scientific Assistant, and Dog Squad was secured. Translators and interpreters were also engaged to communicate with estate workers. 2.5 On 03.01.2017, the 1st and 2nd accused were arrested as per Ext.P20 and Ext. P23 arrest memos. Their personal belongings were seized. On 04.01.2017, an address verification report (Ext.P24) was submitted to the court, containing the details of the accused. Subsequently, Ext.P25 was forwarded, incorporating Section 376 r/w. Section 34 IPC , in addition to Section 302 of the IPC . 2.6. A scene mahazar (Ext.P4) was prepared in the presence of witnesses. Based on a disclosure statement (Ext.P5(a)) made by the 1st accused, MO5 (chopper), allegedly used as the weapon in the crime, was recovered from beneath the bed in his residence. The clothing worn by the 1st accused during the commission of the offence was also seized (Ext. P6). 2.7 Both accused were subjected to potency tests, and samples of their blood, hair, toenail, and fingernail clippings were collected for comparison. The clothing purportedly worn by the 2nd accused during the incident was seized under Ext.P7 mahazar. A vaginal swab and smear were collected from the deceased by the Doctor who conducted the autopsy and were handed over to the Investigating Officer for analysis. 2.8 On completion of the investigation, the final report was submitted before the jurisdictional Magistrate. The Charge: 3. The prosecution case, as per the charge laid before the Court, is that on 01.01.2017 at around 3:00 p.m., the accused, in furtherance of their common intention to rape and murder, intercepted Sabitha Maji while she was returning along the Kuttikanam–Mekkunnam Mud Road carrying twigs on her head, the 2nd accused gave signals to the 1st accused intimating him of her arrival. On receiving the signal, the 1st accused stealthy approached the deceased and allegedly struck her on the back of her head with the blunt side of a chopper. On receiving the signal, the 1st accused stealthy approached the deceased and allegedly struck her on the back of her head with the blunt side of a chopper. She fell down in a dazed state and the 1st accused is alleged to have raped her in the open with the 2nd accused holding her down, on the bare ground in the forest. Then the 2nd accused raped her. Thereafter, the accused attempted to dispose of the injured in a low-lying area, but the victim held on to a plant to resist. The 1st accused allegedly cut her wrist with MO5 chopper, nearly severing her palm. The 2nd accused then took the MO5 weapon from the hands of the 1st accused and inflicted multiple cut injuries on her face causing her death. On the basis of these allegations, the accused were charged under Sections 376D and 302 r/w. Section of the IPC . 4. Committal proceedings were initiated by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the law, and the case was committed to the Court of Session, Thodupuzha, which court made over the case to the Additional Sessions Judge. After hearing the prosecution and the accused, charges were framed under Sections 376D , 302 r/w. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code . When the same was read over, they pleaded not guilty and that they be tried in accordance with the law. 5. While so, the 2nd accused filed an application under Section 307 of the Cr.P.C. seeking pardon. The prosecution, on the other hand, filed an application seeking to cancel the bail granted to the 1st accused. The application for the cancellation of bail of the 1st accused was allowed. In response to the application seeking pardon, an affidavit was filed by the Investigating Officer pointing out that they have no objection to granting pardon to the 2nd accused and in making him an approver. It was stated therein that the case rested on circumstantial evidence, and if the 2nd accused is examined as a prosecution witness, it would enable the prosecution to procure the conviction of the 1st accused. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the application by order dated 22.12.2018, and the 2nd accused was transposed as additional witness No.21 for the prosecution. Evidence Tendered: 6. To prove its case, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses as PWs 1 to 13 and through them Exts. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the application by order dated 22.12.2018, and the 2nd accused was transposed as additional witness No.21 for the prosecution. Evidence Tendered: 6. To prove its case, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses as PWs 1 to 13 and through them Exts. P1 to 34 were exhibited and marked. Material objects were produced and identified as MOs 1 to 26. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials were put to the 1st accused under Section 313(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. He denied the circumstances and maintained that he was innocent. According to him, he was working in the bamboo forest, cutting bamboo till the evening. After finishing his work, he came back to the “Layam” and, after taking a bath, went to Peerumedu. He received the information about the brutal murder only the next day. On the side of the defence, the application filed by the 2nd accused seeking pardon was marked as Ext.D1. Findings of the learned Sessions Judge: 7. The learned Sessions Judge arrived at the conclusion that the testimony of PW2, the approver, was both credible and trustworthy. The Court found that the evidence tendered by the approver clearly established that the 1st accused had subjected the deceased to rape, and thereafter inflicted multiple cut injuries, and thereby committed murder. The Sessions Judge further held that the medical evidence, along with the evidence relating to recovery, offered substantive corroboration to the version of events put forward by the prosecution, as narrated by the approver. The Court concluded that the prosecution had successfully proved the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 376D and 302 of the IPC against the 1st accused. Accordingly, the 1st accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. Contentions of the appellant: 8. Smt. V.K. Hema, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, raised the following submissions: a) The learned Sessions Judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence adduced by the prosecution and proceeded to record a finding of guilt. While it is settled law that an accomplice is a competent witness and a conviction can be sustained solely on the basis of his uncorroborated testimony, it is equally well-settled that such testimony must be approached with extreme caution. She added that no reliance ought to be placed on the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She added that no reliance ought to be placed on the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material particulars. b) As per the police charge, there were only two accused persons, and the 2nd accused was attributed with an equal, if not greater, role in the rape and murder. However, in the petition filed under Section 307 of the Cr.P.C., the 2nd accused came up with an exculpatory version to persuade the Court to grant him pardon. In Ext.D1, the 2nd accused claimed that he was coerced and threatened by the 1st accused to aid in the commission of the offence. He did not admit to having raped the deceased, nor to having inflicted any cut injuries on her body. c) The Sessions Court mechanically, and without due application of mind, allowed the application and tendered pardon to the main assailant. Though the power of the Court to grant pardon is not fettered by any rigid condition, the Court is expected to exercise such discretion judiciously, particularly recognizing the risk involved in allowing one offender to escape punishment at the cost of implicating another. In a case such as the present, where only two accused are involved and both are alleged to have played equal roles in the commission of the crime, the grant of pardon was unwarranted. She argued that the principle underlying the grant of pardon mandates that it be offered to the person least culpable among multiple accused, and only where the facts justify such a course. d) The learned counsel further submitted that, as per the prosecution case, the deceased was laid on the ground in a tea plantation and raped by two adult males. However, the medical evidence did not corroborate this allegation. While spermatozoa was detected in the vaginal swab and smear, the prosecution failed to conduct a DNA analysis to determine whether it could be forensically linked to either of the accused. PW1, the husband of the deceased, had deposed that the couple had an active sexual life, but had also admitted that they last had intercourse more than five days prior to the discovery of the body. Thus, had a proper forensic analysis been conducted and if the spermatozoa was found to belong to someone else, the very foundation of the prosecution case would have collapsed. Thus, had a proper forensic analysis been conducted and if the spermatozoa was found to belong to someone else, the very foundation of the prosecution case would have collapsed. e) Heavy reliance was placed by the learned Sessions Judge on the evidence of recovery of MO5 weapon and clothes at the instance of the appellant. The evidence was, however, lacking to substantiate the alleged recovery of the weapon and clothes at the instance of the 1st accused. Though the prosecution suggested that a sniffer dog played a crucial role in solving the crime, no evidence was adduced to support this claim. f) Apart from the testimony of PW2, the approver, and the alleged recovery evidence, there was no other substantial evidence linking the 1st accused to the crime. Submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor: 9. The learned Public Prosecutor countered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. She submitted that PW2, the approver, was a competent witness, and the Court had rightly found his testimony to be credible and trustworthy, and there is no reason to discard it. She further pointed out that, under Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act , 1872, which is a rule of law, the evidence of an accomplice is legally admissible and sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, as per Section 114 , Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act, which lays down a rule of prudence, it is generally considered unsafe to base a conviction solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The learned Public Prosecutor emphasized that while a conviction based on the sole testimony of an accomplice is not illegal per se, the rule of prudence mandates that the Court should seek corroboration in material particulars to strengthen such testimony. In the present case, she submitted that the recovery evidence at the instance of the 1st accused, coupled with the testimony of PW5, reasonably establishes the presence of the 1st accused in and around the scene of occurrence. These pieces of evidence, she argued, serve as sufficient corroboration to support the version of events narrated by PW2. The learned Public Prosecutor concluded by asserting that the learned Sessions Judge had rendered the finding of guilt after a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the evidence on record, and that the conviction was legally and factually sustainable. 10. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by both sides. The learned Public Prosecutor concluded by asserting that the learned Sessions Judge had rendered the finding of guilt after a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the evidence on record, and that the conviction was legally and factually sustainable. 10. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by both sides. We have also evaluated the entire evidence and have gone through the impugned judgment. Whether the death was homicidal? 11. Before we deal with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we shall first assess whether the prosecution has established that the death of Sabitha Maji was a case of homicide. 11.1 PW1, in his evidence, stated that his wife went missing on 01.01.2017, and that on the same night at midnight, her dead body was found in a forest area by the employees of the estate. PW13, the Investigating Officer, conducted the inquest over the body of the deceased. The autopsy was carried out by PW7, a Lecturer in the Department of Forensic Medicine, who noted as many as 56 antemortem injuries on the body. 11.2 Before addressing the nature of these injuries, it is pertinent to first understand the prosecution case as detailed in the charge sheet. As per the charge, the 1st accused initially struck the deceased on the back of her head with the blunt side of MO5, a chopper. Following this blow, when the victim collapsed, she was subjected to rape by accused Nos. 1 and 2, one after the other. Thereafter, the accused attempted to lift her body, with the intention of disposing of it. While doing so, the injured victim clutched onto a nearby plant, and in order to release her grip, the 1st accused inflicted a cut injury on her wrist, nearly severing her palm. When the victim cried out in pain, the 1st accused inflicted further cut injuries on her body and then handed over the weapon to the 2nd accused, who proceeded to inflict multiple cut injuries on her face. 11.3. The description of MO5, the chopper allegedly used in the offence, is detailed in Ext. P28, the property list. The weapon is described as having an overall length of 41 cm, with a blade portion measuring 21 cm in length and 4.5 cm in width at the midpoint. It is sharp on one edge, blunt on the other, and has a pointed front end. P28, the property list. The weapon is described as having an overall length of 41 cm, with a blade portion measuring 21 cm in length and 4.5 cm in width at the midpoint. It is sharp on one edge, blunt on the other, and has a pointed front end. The grip portion of the handle is wrapped with a black rubber band. 11.4 While there is no dispute that the death of Sabitha Maji was a clear case of homicide, we are left with serious doubts as to whether MO5 alone could have caused all the injuries found on the body of the deceased. This is because some of the wounds are long chop wounds with underlying fracture, some are small incised wounds of minimum depth. There are also contusions and abrasions which are not possible with the chopper. Be that as it may, it can safely be concluded that the death of the deceased was a case of homicide. Evidence let in by the prosecution: 12. PW1, the husband of the deceased, deposed that he was residing in the “Layam” (estate accommodation for employees) with his wife and child. At the relevant time, his child had gone to a friend’s house and was not at home. Although 01.01.2017 was a Sunday and a holiday, he chose to go for work. He left home at 7:00 a.m. and returned at 5:00 p.m. When he found that his wife was missing, he enquired with the neighbours. He has asked the 1st accused, who was residing in the adjacent building about her whereabouts. The 1st accused told him that his wife might have gone to fetch their child. PW12 (Santhi), a senior employee of the estate, informed PW4 (Geevarghese), the Estate Manager, who mobilised other workers and formed a search party. During the search, the search party noticed bloodstains in and around the bushes, and by midnight, they discovered the mutilated body of Sabitha Maji, concealed under leaves, with one hand protruding outside. PW5 (Mikhael Joseph), the owner of the estate, was informed, and the police were promptly alerted. Within an hour, PW11 (Charlie Thomas), the Sub-Inspector of Police, arrived at the scene. PW1 gave a statement to the police at 7:30 a.m. on 02.01.2017, based on which the crime was registered. 12.1 During cross-examination, PW1 stated that the 1st accused was a senior employee of the estate. Within an hour, PW11 (Charlie Thomas), the Sub-Inspector of Police, arrived at the scene. PW1 gave a statement to the police at 7:30 a.m. on 02.01.2017, based on which the crime was registered. 12.1 During cross-examination, PW1 stated that the 1st accused was a senior employee of the estate. He added that the 1st accused had a habit of ogling at his wife and making inappropriate physical contact. However, he admitted that he had not mentioned this behaviour in his statement to the police. He also testified that the police dog squad arrived at the estate on 04.01.2017, and while PW2 was sitting and eating lunch, the dog allegedly approached and caught hold of him. Regarding his relationship with the deceased, he stated that he was sexually active, and had engaged in sexual intercourse with his wife about 4–5 days before the incident. 13. PW2 is the approver in this case. He stated that he was employed in the “Kallivayal Estate” and was residing with his family, including his wife, in “Layam” located between the houses of the deceased and one Sumathi. The 1st accused lived alone in the first room of the Layam. PW2 deposed that on the evening of 31.12.2016, the 1st accused invited him to his room and offered him liquor. During their conversation, the 1st accused remarked that the deceased was beautiful and asked PW2 to approach Sabitha Maji. PW2 replied that he was afraid of her and that she might beat him. He stated that when the 1st accused had previously attempted to initiate contact with Sabitha, she had rejected him, saying that he was too old, which apparently enraged him. On the next day, after the parents of PW2 left for the market, he sat outside his house. The 1st accused invited him again and asked him to follow Sabitha when she went out to collect firewood, stating that he would be waiting in the bamboo plantation. PW2 was instructed to signal the presence of Sabitha by throwing stones. He know that it was for effectuating a sexual assault. 13.1 PW2 testified that he returned home and saw PW1 (Kundan Maji) washing his hands after breakfast. After some time, PW1 left for work. At about 11:00 a.m., his parents left for the market. By then, only PW2, his sister, and Sabitha were present in the Layam. He know that it was for effectuating a sexual assault. 13.1 PW2 testified that he returned home and saw PW1 (Kundan Maji) washing his hands after breakfast. After some time, PW1 left for work. At about 11:00 a.m., his parents left for the market. By then, only PW2, his sister, and Sabitha were present in the Layam. 13.2 PW2 added that Sabitha had previously complained to his wife about his alcohol use, and this led his in-laws to take his wife away. This, he claimed, had caused him to harbour resentment toward Sabitha. At about 2:00 p.m., Sabitha left the house to collect firewood. PW2, wearing only a half-pant, followed her discreetly. Sabitha did not notice him. As planned, he threw stones at the bamboo plantation where the 1st accused was hiding. 13.3 Upon receiving the signal, the 1st accused emerged stealthily, armed with a chopper used for cutting bamboo and came near to him. He asked PW2 to climb on top of the hill and keep watch. The 1st accused then followed Sabitha and struck her on the back of the head with the blunt side of the chopper, causing her to collapse. Sabitha was carrying firewood at the time. PW2 then ran to the scene. The 1st accused instructed him to hold Sabitha’s hands, while she lay face-up, semi-conscious, and intermittently opening and closing her eyes. The 1st accused lifted Sabitha’s saree and raped her, asking PW2 to look away. Thereafter, he instructed PW2 to rape Sabitha. Subsequently, both accused attempted to move the injured Sabitha to conceal her body. When she screamed and clutched onto a small tree, the 1st accused inflicted a deep cut injury on her wrist, almost severing her palm. As she cried out in pain, the 1st accused inflicted multiple cut injuries using the chopper, after which PW2 believed Sabitha had died. They again attempted to move the body. The 1st accused held her legs and PW2 held her hands, but due to the blood and the weight of the body, she slipped from PW2’s grasp. The 1st accused then wrapped her saree around her neck and dragged the body to a bushy area, covering it with leaves. PW2 stated that he had placed the chopper on the ground beside him during the act, and later tucked it behind his back under his clothing. The 1st accused then wrapped her saree around her neck and dragged the body to a bushy area, covering it with leaves. PW2 stated that he had placed the chopper on the ground beside him during the act, and later tucked it behind his back under his clothing. The 1st accused instructed him to wash his hands and feet, which he did. He also testified that the 1st accused placed a 100 Rupee note in the pocket of PW2. 13.4 PW2 identified several material objects recovered during the investigation, including MO5 (the chopper), MO6 (Sabitha’s saree), MO7 (blouse), MO1 (locket), MO3 (broken red bangle piece), and MO4 (blue sandal). Thereafter, PW2 went to Kuttikanam, bought biscuits, saw his parents at the market, and returned home with them. He then told his mother what had happened. Enraged, she slapped him and asked why he had consumed alcohol with the 1st accused and gone to the forest. He also identified MO8 series sandals worn by the 1st accused. 13.5 After the incident, he bought a new pair of pants and sandals, and went to the house of his friend, where he hid his bloodstained half-pant and sandals among firewood. He had dinner at his friend’s house and spent the night there. The next morning, upon returning home, he noticed that the estate was swarming with police. 13.6 While he was having food, the police dog came near his room and began scratching at the door. A policeman then beat him, and at that stage, he divulged the details of the incident. He also revealed that the 1st accused had threatened him not to tell anyone about what had happened. He recalled that PW1 had earlier asked him if he had seen his wife, and that he had lied, stating he had not seen the 1st accused that day. 13.7 In cross-examination, PW2 stated that he had joined the estate approximately eight months prior to the incident, while PW1 and his wife were already residing there. He claimed to have had a friendly relationship with the 1st accused and that they consumed alcohol together occasionally. He admitted to frequent quarrels with his wife due to his drinking habits. 13.8 PW2 confirmed that the 1st accused lived alone, and stated that Sabitha had complained to his in-laws about his alcohol abuse approximately one month before the incident. He claimed to have had a friendly relationship with the 1st accused and that they consumed alcohol together occasionally. He admitted to frequent quarrels with his wife due to his drinking habits. 13.8 PW2 confirmed that the 1st accused lived alone, and stated that Sabitha had complained to his in-laws about his alcohol abuse approximately one month before the incident. He denied having picked a fight with Sabitha, though he acknowledged that he had avoided speaking to her thereafter. However, he claimed that Sabitha had tried to initiate conversation on several occasions. He further stated that the 1st accused had only once asked him to speak to Sabitha, with the intention of pursuing a sexual relationship and other objectionable matters. According to PW2, on the day prior to the incident, the 1st accused had called him to his room and confided his desire to have a sexual relationship with Sabitha. PW2 admitted that, driven by resentment towards Sabitha for revealing his drinking habits to his in-laws, he had agreed to assist the 1st accused. The petition filed by PW2 seeking pardon was marked as Ext.D1. When questioned about whether the 1st accused had paid him Rs.100/- to throw stones as a signal, as stated in Ext.D1, PW2 denied making such a statement and claimed that he helped the 1st accused solely out of anger, since his wife had left him. He denied that the 1st accused had offered him any money for his service. He stated that he did not mention about the throwing of stones as requested by the 1st accused in Ext.D1. He stated that he had followed Sabitha Maji for quite a distance. He denied having stated in Ext.D1 that he felt guilt ridden when he saw the 1st accused raping Sabitha and it was then that he rushed to the place. He stated that he had stated in his petition that after raping Sabitha, the 1st accused asked him to rape and he has no explanation as to why such a statement is absent in Ext.D1. Various other discrepancies in his statement before the court, vis-a-vis, Ext.D1 was brought out by the defence. He stated that the 1st accused sat on the ground and inflicted cut injuries on the body of Sabitha. Blood fell on the clothes of the 1st accused and his body. Various other discrepancies in his statement before the court, vis-a-vis, Ext.D1 was brought out by the defence. He stated that the 1st accused sat on the ground and inflicted cut injuries on the body of Sabitha. Blood fell on the clothes of the 1st accused and his body. He stated that he had disclosed whatever he knew to the police when they had questioned him. 14. PW3 is the Estate Supervisor. On receiving information from the Manager, he reached the estate at 9 a.m. He assisted the police in questioning the employees. Material objects found at the scene were seized. He mentioned that one tooth was seized from the place of occurrence. He stated that the body of Sabitha was in a mutilated state. He stated that he is acquainted with the 1st accused, but PW2 is a stranger. 15. PW4 was the Estate Supervisor during the relevant time. He stated that the 1st accused was an employee of the Estate for the past 20 years but PW2 had joined the Estate as an employee only about 8 months back. It was Santhi who had told him that Sabitha was missing. He stated how he and the employees went in search of Sabitha and ultimately chanced upon her mutilated body. He stated that the 1st accused led the Police to his house and then handed over the chopper allegedly used for commission of the crime. On 6.1.2017, as led by PW2, the Police went to his “Layam” and seized the clothes worn by him at the time of occurrence. 16. PW5 is the owner of the Estate. He stated that on 1.1.2017, he, along with his family members, had gone to the Check dam for boating. While he was boating, he could see the 1st accused in the bamboo forest cutting bamboo. At about 1 p.m., he finished boating and returned back home. Late at night, he was informed about the murder and he instructed the Manager to look into the same. 17. PW7 is an Estate employee who testified that on 1.1.2017, he had occasion to see the 1st accused cutting Bamboo in the forest near to the dam. They exchanged pleasantries and he left the place. In the evening, he went to the market and saw PW2 and Hemanth there. 17. PW7 is an Estate employee who testified that on 1.1.2017, he had occasion to see the 1st accused cutting Bamboo in the forest near to the dam. They exchanged pleasantries and he left the place. In the evening, he went to the market and saw PW2 and Hemanth there. On the next day, early in the morning, he received a call from a co-worker asking them to assemble in the office. He stated that the 1st accused had also told him once that he liked her. The 1st accused used to ask about his private life which he did not like. 18. PW10 was the Scientific Officer, DCRB, Pathanamthitta. She stated that the room in which PW2 stayed was examined and she found the presence of blood. A report was prepared. However, the Investigating Officer did not seek for the report and hence she did not give. 19. PW12 is Santhi, and is a neighbour of the deceased. She stated that on 1.1.2017 she had gone to the Bamboo Forest and had seen the 1st accused there. She returned back at 2 p.m. While returning back, she had seen Sabitha walking towards the Bamboo forest. She asked Sabitha where she was going and she responded that she was going to collect firewood. She stated that PW2 was also found following her. 20. PW13 is the Investigating Officer. He deposed that, after taking over the investigation on 02.01.2017, he held an inquest over the dead body of the deceased, which is marked as Ext.P2. Various objects, including clothes, bangle, tooth and other items found at the scene of crime, were seized, labelled, and sealed for the purpose of forwarding them to the scientific analyst. 21. On 03.01.2017, the accused were arrested. The 1st accused was taken to the scene of crime, and in his presence, Ext.P4 scene mahazar was prepared. Pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the 1st accused, MO5 chopper was seized from beneath the bed in his residential house. The clothes allegedly worn by him at the time of the crime were also seized under Ext.P6 mahazar. Samples of body fluids of the accused were collected and forwarded for forensic analysis. 22. On 06.01.2017, based on the disclosure statement made by the 2nd accused, the clothes worn by him at the time of the incident were seized and marked as Ext.P7 mahazar. 23. Samples of body fluids of the accused were collected and forwarded for forensic analysis. 22. On 06.01.2017, based on the disclosure statement made by the 2nd accused, the clothes worn by him at the time of the incident were seized and marked as Ext.P7 mahazar. 23. During cross-examination, the Investigating Officer admitted that a tooth and bloodstains were found approximately 18.96 meters away from the place where the body was discovered. He also acknowledged that the tooth was sent for forensic examination. He further admitted that he had not verified whether a check dam existed near the scene of crime. According to him, the Scientific Analyst had informed him that bloodstains were detected on the ground and walls inside the house of the 2nd accused. However, according to him, a chicken had been slaughtered inside the house, which, in his opinion, explained the presence of the bloodstains. When confronted with Ext.D1, the petition seeking pardon, filed by the 2nd accused and the fact that the version of the approver, was found to be at total variance with the charge, the witness stated that he had not read the petition carefully and was unaware of its contents. He also denied the allegation that the 1st accused was subjected to custodial torture to extract a confession. Omissions in the statement of PW12 were also brought to the witness’s attention during cross-examination. Evaluation of the evidence 24. In light of the evidence referred to above, it is evident that the prosecution case fundamentally rests on the testimony of PW2, the approver. The other incriminating material connecting the appellant with the crime is the alleged recovery of MO5 chopper, claimed to have been used to inflict the fatal injuries and the presence of human blood in the watch, chopper and ring. The sole additional circumstance relied upon is the evidence of PW5, who testified that the appellant was seen near the Bamboo Forest at around 1:00 p.m. 25. Before examining the reliability of the testimony of the approver, it is necessary to highlight certain aspects of the prosecution case which appear to be inconsistent with the version of the approver of the incident. As per the charge laid before the Court, the deceased, Sabitha Maji, was initially struck with the blunt side of MO5, rendering her dazed and immobile. It is alleged that the accused then subjected her to rape, one after the other. As per the charge laid before the Court, the deceased, Sabitha Maji, was initially struck with the blunt side of MO5, rendering her dazed and immobile. It is alleged that the accused then subjected her to rape, one after the other. Thereafter, they are said to have inflicted as many as 56 injuries on her body using the MO5 chopper and then disposed of the dead body. Immediately thereafter, the 1st accused was found in his Layam and PW1 met him and enquired the whereabouts of his wife with him. 26. When it comes to the allegation of rape by multiple persons, PW7, the Doctor who conducted the autopsy and and who had issued Ext.P9 postmortem certificate did not note anything untoward in the vaginal region of the deceased. He observed that the hymen exhibited old and healed tears. The victim was allegedly raped in open ground in a forested region by two adult males. The injuries found on the body of the accused are noted in Ext.P15 Certificate insofar as it concerns the 1st accused and Ext.P14 Certificate insofar as it concerns the 2nd accused. In Ext.P15, the Doctor has noted an abrasion injury in the right arm, left leg, and right leg. Those are all very minor injuries. Insofar as the 2nd accused is concerned, is a scratch mark on the left side of the neck. 27. During the postmortem, vaginal swabs and smears were collected and sent for Forensic analysis. As per Ext.P10 series Chemical Analysis Report, human semen and spermatozoa were detected in the vaginal samples. During cross-examination, PW1 was specifically asked regarding the date of last intercourse with his wife. He stated that it had occurred 4 - 5 days before she was found dead. The learned Sessions Judge, however, rejected the possibility that the semen could belong to PW1, relying on authoritative forensic literature which states that motile spermatozoa (sperm cells that are able to move, or swim, with the help of their flagellum) typically survive in the vagina for 6 to 8 hours, occasionally up to 12 hours. Non-motile sperm can be detected for up to 24 hours, with occasional reports up to 48–72 hours, and very rarely beyond 96 hours. Based on this scientific timeline, the court concluded that intercourse must have taken place within a much shorter window prior to death and that the victim was indeed subjected to rape. Non-motile sperm can be detected for up to 24 hours, with occasional reports up to 48–72 hours, and very rarely beyond 96 hours. Based on this scientific timeline, the court concluded that intercourse must have taken place within a much shorter window prior to death and that the victim was indeed subjected to rape. The testimony of PW2 was considered corroborative on this aspect. 28. However, there exists a fundamental flaw in the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge. The specific case of the prosecution is that the deceased was subjected to sexual assault by both the accused. Having found that the spermatozoa is not that of PW1, it could have belonged to either of the accused or of a third person, if the assertion of innocence of the appellant is accepted. Given that blood samples of both accused were collected, the failure to conduct DNA profiling on the recovered spermatozoa is scientifically indefensible. DNA analysis is a highly accurate and established method for individual identification in forensic investigations, particularly in sexual assault cases. A comparative DNA analysis between the semen sample and the blood samples of the accused would have provided conclusive evidence to identify or exclude either accused as the source. In other words, if the DNA analysis had indicated that the semen did not belong to the 1st accused but matched the 2nd accused, or was inconsistent with both, it would have fundamentally altered the prosecutorial narrative. Therefore, the omission to conduct such a crucial scientific test introduces a significant evidentiary gap and raises serious doubt about the reliability and completeness of the case of the prosecution. 29. The next significant aspect pertains to the detection of bloodstains on the walls and floor of the house where PW2 resided. PW10, the Scientific Officer, DCRB, Pathanamthitta, deposed that she had examined the premises and observed the presence of blood on the floor and walls of the room occupied by PW2. She further stated that a report documenting these findings was prepared. However, this report was neither summoned by the prosecution nor produced before the Court by the Investigating Officer, and thus was not made part of the evidentiary record. She further stated that a report documenting these findings was prepared. However, this report was neither summoned by the prosecution nor produced before the Court by the Investigating Officer, and thus was not made part of the evidentiary record. If the testimony of PW2 is accepted as truthful, his account indicates that he was wearing only a half-pant when he had aided the 1st accused and after the incident and as instructed by the 1st accused, he had cleaned himself. Under such circumstances, the presence of blood in his room becomes highly material. The suppression of the scientific report by the Investigating Officer, despite its clear relevance to the prosecution case, and its usefulness in revealing the truth, raises serious concerns about the transparency and integrity of the investigation. The omission also undermines the possibility of establishing whether the bloodstains were consistent with the prosecution version, or indicative of a different role or major role of PW2 in the incident. The concealment or non production of the report, therefore, creates a serious flaw and evidentiary gap that casts doubt on the version of events advanced by the prosecution. 30. Now we shall come to the evidence of the approver. The Trial court has heavily relied on the evidence of the approver to arrive at the finding of guilt. 31. The materials before this Court reveals that PW2 was aged about 18 years old and he was married. He was an alcoholic. The evidence let in by PW12 reveals that he used to beat up his wife after consuming alcohol. The case of the prosecution was that he was also nursing animosity towards the deceased as she informed his in-laws about his addiction to alcohol and wife beating and it was pursuant to the same that they had come and taken away his wife. While PW1 is alleged to have nursed a desire to be sexually intimate with the deceased, PW2 had every reason to be angry towards the deceased as she was instrumental in causing a breakup between him and his wife. PW1 in his examination stated that when the deceased complained about the 1st accused, he responded that the 1st accused was harmless as he was an old man. 32. In the Police Charge, the allegation against the 2nd accused is as serious as that of the 1st accused. PW1 in his examination stated that when the deceased complained about the 1st accused, he responded that the 1st accused was harmless as he was an old man. 32. In the Police Charge, the allegation against the 2nd accused is as serious as that of the 1st accused. He had also subjected the deceased to rape and thereafter took the chopper from the hands of the 1st accused and inflicted cut injuries on her face. He also was instrumental in disposing of the body. 33. It was after the framing of charge and when the case was posted for trial that the appellant had come up with a petition (Ext.D1) invoking Section 307 of the Cr.P.C. seeking pardon. In the said petition, he has diluted his involvement and has given a self exculpatory version. 34. We shall first deal with the question whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified in granting pardon to PW2. The learned counsel had pointed out that the grant of pardon to PW2 is illegal for several reasons. According to her, a) The role of PW2 is equal if not more grave than that of the 1st accused. Admittedly, he had animosity towards the deceased as per the charge. He had actively participated in the commission of the offence. He had raped the deceased and had inflicted injuries on her face with a chopper. It is settled that while tendering pardon, the court has to offer pardon to one of the least guilty among the several accused. In the case on hand, an equal, if not more major role is attributed to PW2. b) Ext.D1 submitted by PW1 before the learned Sessions Judge was self-exculpatory. In the petition, he has stated that he was threatened and coerced by the 1st accused to aid him whereas as per the charge, his role was much more grave. c) The failure of the Sessions Judge to record the statement in compliance of Section 306(4) r/w. Section 307 of the Cr.P.C. is fatal. In the case on hand, the court has accepted the petition seeking pardon of the approver and has not insisted that a statement of the 2nd accused be recorded so as to bind him. d) The learned Sessions Judge has casually granted pardon and permitted PW2 to escape from punishment by making the appellant the sacrificial lamb. In the case on hand, the court has accepted the petition seeking pardon of the approver and has not insisted that a statement of the 2nd accused be recorded so as to bind him. d) The learned Sessions Judge has casually granted pardon and permitted PW2 to escape from punishment by making the appellant the sacrificial lamb. e) At any rate, the evidence tendered by the approver could have been the basis for arriving at a finding of guilt. Lack of corroboration of the evidence tendered by the approver was also highlighted. 35. We shall deal with the questions raised by the learned counsel before deciding on the credibility and reliability of the testimony of PW2. 36. Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. deals with a tender of pardon to an accomplice. It reads as under: 306. Tender of pardon to accomplice.— (1) With a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, and the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. (2) This section applies to— (a) any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by the Court of a Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952); (b) any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with a more severe sentence. (3) Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall record— (a) his reasons for so doing; (b) whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person to whom it was made, and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record free of cost. (3) Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall record— (a) his reasons for so doing; (b) whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person to whom it was made, and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record free of cost. (4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1)— (a) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any; (b) shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. (5) Where a person has accepted a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) and has been examined under sub-section (4), the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence shall, without making any further inquiry in the case,— (a) commit it for trial— (i) to the Court of Session if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court or if the Magistrate taking cognizance is the Chief Judicial Magistrate; (ii) to a Court of Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court; (b) in any other case, make over the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate who shall try the case himself. 37. Section 307 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: 307. Power to direct tender of pardon. —At any time after commitment of a case but before judgment is passed, the court to which the commitment is made may, with a view to obtaining at the trial the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any such offence, tender a pardon on the same condition to such person. 38. 38. A conjoint reading of the provisions makes it clear that under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C., with a view to securing the evidence of a person believed to be directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence to which the section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation, inquiry, or trial, and a Magistrate of the First Class at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on the condition that he makes a full and true disclosure of all the facts within his knowledge relating to the offence and every other person involved, whether as principal or abettor. On acceptance of the pardon, the approver shall be examined as a witness both in the court of Magistrate and in the subsequent trial and shall, unless already on bail, remain in custody until the conclusion of the trial. Section 307 of the Cr.P.C. confers power on the court to which the case has been committed to tender a pardon, at any time after such commitment but before judgment, to any person believed to be directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, the offence, on the same condition as specified in Section 306 of the Cr.P.C., namely, that such person makes a full and true disclosure of the entire circumstances within his knowledge pertaining to the offence and the involvement of others therein. 39. Under Section 306(4) of the Cr.P.C., every person accepting a tender of pardon made under Sub-section (1) has to be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate, taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial. Section 307 of the Cr.P.C. says that even after the commitment of a case, and before the judgment is passed, the Court may tender pardon on the same condition, which means the conditions prescribed under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. 40. Section 307 of the Cr.P.C. says that even after the commitment of a case, and before the judgment is passed, the Court may tender pardon on the same condition, which means the conditions prescribed under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C. 40. In Rampal Pithwa Rahidas v. State of Maharashtra , [1994 SCC CRI 1 851]] , the Apex Court noticed the position that after the grant of pardon that the status of an accused is changed into that of a witness and the law enjoins upon the courts to record the statement of the approver immediately after pardon is granted to him so that he may consider himself bound by that statement and failure to do so at the trial would render him liable for prosecution. It was observed as under in paragraph No. 33 of the judgment: “33. A careful analysis of the statement of the approver given at the trial coupled with the circumstances under which he came to be arrested, the averments in his application for grant of bail and other circumstances has created an impression on our minds that the approver is a planted witness and his testimony is not at all worthy of reliance and credence. The investigating agency appears to have created false evidence and fabricated false clues insofar as the testimony of the approver is concerned. From all the attendant circumstances, we are satisfied that the approver Ramcharan is not a reliable witness; his arrest was intrinsically unnatural and his self-confessed participation in the crime without taking any active part in it not acceptable. The approver has claimed to be a spectator of every fact and of every moment but asserted that he did not participate in the assault at any stage and remained standing at a distance taking care of the clothes of some of the co-accused. His statement is almost of an exculpatory nature. His statement as a whole does not inspire confidence. His story is not worthy of credence. His statement is almost of an exculpatory nature. His statement as a whole does not inspire confidence. His story is not worthy of credence. We find ourselves unable to place any reliance on his untrustworthy and unreliable evidence and in that view of the matter, we refrain even from expressing any opinion about the effect of the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section 306(4) CrPC read with Section 307 CrPC, as admittedly after the grant of pardon by the order dated April 24, 1987, no statement of Ramcharan approver was recorded till he appeared at the trial as PW 49. It is only after the grant of pardon that the status of an accused is changed into that of a witness and the law enjoins upon the courts to record the statement of the approver immediately after pardon is granted to him so that he may consider himself bound by that statement and failure to do so at the trial would render him liable for prosecution. That exercise was not performed in this case.” (emphasis supplied) 41. In the above case, the Apex Court had refrained from expressing any opinion about the effect of the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section 306(4) Cr.P.C. r/w. Section 307 Cr. P.C., though it was noted that after the grant of pardon, no statement of Ramcharan approver was recorded till he appeared at the trial as PW49. The Court noted that it was only after the grant of pardon that the status of an accused is changed into that of a witness and the law enjoins upon the courts to record the statement of the approver immediately after pardon is granted to him so that he may consider himself bound by that statement and failure to do so at the trial would render him liable for prosecution. 42. However, in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and Another v. State of Maharashtra , [ (2000) 8 SCC 457 ] ] , the Apex Court held that it is not necessary to comply with the requirement of Section 306(4) of the Cr.P.C. when the pardon is tendered by the Trial Court. Relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar , [1994 AIR SC 2420]] , it was observed by the Apex Court as under: “26. Relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar , [1994 AIR SC 2420]] , it was observed by the Apex Court as under: “26. In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80, (1994) 2 Crimes 1027 this Court while dealing with the case where the approver was granted pardon by the committal court observed that every person accepting the tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) of Section 306 has to be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any. The examination of the accomplice in such a situation was held to be mandatory which could not be dispensed with. Referring to a Full Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Kalu Khoda v. State [ AIR 1962 Guj 283 (FB)] this Court observed that: “If the said defect of not examining the approver at the committal stage by the committing Magistrate is rectified later, no prejudice can be said to be caused to an accused person and therefore the trial cannot be said to be vitiated on that account.” 27. There is no legal obligation on the trial court or a right in favour of the accused to insist for compliance with the requirement of Section 306(4) CrPC. Section 307 provides a complete procedure for recording the statement of an accomplice subject only to compliance with the conditions specified in sub-section (1) of Section 306. The law mandates the satisfaction of the court granting pardon, that the accused would make a full and true disclosure of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. It is not necessary to comply with the requirement of Section 306(4) when the pardon is tendered by the trial court. The trial court, in this case has taken all precautions in complying with the provisions of Section 306(1) before tendering pardon to the accused Raju, who later appeared as PW2. We do not find any violation of law or illegality in the procedure for tendering the pardon and recording the statement of PW2.” 43. In the case on hand, the statement of the approver was not recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.. We do not find any violation of law or illegality in the procedure for tendering the pardon and recording the statement of PW2.” 43. In the case on hand, the statement of the approver was not recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.. The defence was prejudiced as PW2 had a free hand before the trial court. They got his petition marked as Ext.D1 and confronted him, and some contradictions were brought out while cross-examining him. As held in Rampal Pithwa (supra), only after the grant of pardon that the status of an accused is changed into that of a witness and the law enjoins upon the courts to record the statement of the approver immediately after pardon is granted to him so that he may consider himself bound by that statement and failure to do so at the trial would render him liable for prosecution. We are, however, bound by the observations in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary (supra) wherein it was held that requirement of recording a statement is not required when pardon is tendered under Section 307 of the Cr.P.C. 44. The next question is whether the evidence of the approver is to be discarded in toto as it is exculpatory. We take note of the fact that the case set up by the prosecution rested purely on circumstantial evidence. There is no eyewitness to the incident. It is the projected case of the prosecution which was attempted to be proven by adducing evidence, both oral and documentary, that both the accused had raped and had inflicted injuries on the deceased. In Ext.D1, PW2 has given his version of the events and struck more or less to the same version when he was examined before court. The application for pardon can be filed by the prosecution or by one of the accused, out of several. If the application is filed by one of the accused, the court has to refer it to the prosecuting agency and after getting their inputs, pass a reasoned order. The power which the court exercises is not on its own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency and therefore, such power can be exercised only when the prosecuting agency joins the request for pardon. 45. The primary object under Sections 306 and 307 of the Cr.P.C. is to obtain the evidence of an accomplice to facilitate conviction of others. 45. The primary object under Sections 306 and 307 of the Cr.P.C. is to obtain the evidence of an accomplice to facilitate conviction of others. The secrecy of the crime and scarcity of clues are some of the reasons which necessitates the investigating agency in taking the evidence of an accomplice solely for the apprehension of other offenders, the recovery of incriminating materials and the production of evidence otherwise unobtainable. A wide power has been conferred upon the court to tender a conditional pardon to a particular person with a view to obtaining the evidence of that person in support of the charge against the other accused. Under sub-section (1) of Section 306 of the Cr.P.C., any person who is directly or indirectly concerned or privy to an offence can be granted pardon on condition that the said person makes a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as a principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. 46. In Suresh Chandra Bahri (supra), the Apex Court has explained the purpose and scope of the provisions in the following words: “Since many a times the crime i.s committed in a manner for which no clue or any trace is available for its detection and, therefore, pardon is granted for apprehension of the other offenders for the recovery of the incriminating objects and the production of the evidence which otherwise is unobtainable. The dominant object is that the offenders of the heinous and grave offences do not go unpunished, the legislature in its wisdom considered it necessary to introduce this section and confine its operation to cases mentioned in Section 306 of the Code. The object of Section 306 therefore is to allow pardon in cases where heinous offence is alleged to have been committed by several persons so that with the aid of the evidence of the person granted pardon the offence may be brought home to the rest. The basis of the tender of pardon is not the extent of the culpability of the person to whom pardon is granted, but the principle is to prevent the escape of the offenders from punishment in heinous offences for lack of evidence. The basis of the tender of pardon is not the extent of the culpability of the person to whom pardon is granted, but the principle is to prevent the escape of the offenders from punishment in heinous offences for lack of evidence. There can therefore be no objection against tender of pardon to an accomplice simply because in his confession, he does not implicate himself to the same extent as the other accused because all that Section 306 requires is that pardon may be tendered to any person believed to be involved directly or indirectly in or privy to an offence” (emphasis supplied). 47. As held by the Apex Court, the basis of the tender of pardon is not the extent of the culpability of the person to whom pardon is granted, but to prevent the escape of the offenders from punishment in heinous offences for lack of evidence. On the sole reason that the approver does not implicate himself to the same extent as the other accused would not make any difference as pardon may be tendered to any person believed to be involved directly or indirectly in or privy to an offence. It cannot be disputed that the appellant was directly involved and was privy to the offence. In that view of the matter, the contention of the learned counsel that the evidence of the approver being exculpatory, the same ought to be rejected, cannot be accepted. However, the above aspect can be considered while appreciating the credibility of his evidence. 48. Now we shall consider the question whether the approver can be considered to be a reliable witness and whether a conviction can be based on his evidence. 49. Section 133 of the Evidence Act expressly provides that an accomplice is a competent witness against his co-accused and it renders admissible the testimony of an accomplice against his co-accused. It has, however, been a long-settled practice of law that Section 133 of the Evidence Act must be read along with the provisions of Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Section 114 of the Evidence Act empowers the court to presume the existence of certain facts, and Illustration (b) in express terms says that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Section 114 of the Evidence Act empowers the court to presume the existence of certain facts, and Illustration (b) in express terms says that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Thus, it follows, that whereas law permits the conviction of an accused person on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice by virtue of the provisions of Section 133 who is treated as a competent witness, the rule of prudence which has rightly been always accepted by the courts, embodied in Illustration (b) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, strikes a note of warning/caution to the courts that an accomplice does not generally deserve to be relied upon, unless his testimony is corroborated in material particulars. Thus, as a matter of practice and prudence, the courts have held that the testimony of an approver may be accepted in evidence for recording conviction of an accused person provided it receives corroboration from direct or circumstantial evidence in material particulars. The courts have generally looked upon with suspicion the statement of an approver because he is considered to be a person of low morals and not a wholly trustworthy person who for the sake of earning pardon for himself is willing to let down his erstwhile accomplices and therefore before recording conviction courts insist upon independent corroboration of his testimony (See: Rampal Pithwa (supra)). 50. In Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary (supra), the Apex Court reiterated the need for corroboration in the following lines: “37. For corroborative evidence the court must look at the broad spectrum of the approver's version and then find out whether there is other evidence to corroborate and lend assurance to that version. The nature and extent of such corroboration may depend upon the facts of different cases. Corroboration need not be in the form of ocular testimony of witnesses and may even be in the form of circumstantial evidence. Corroborative evidence must be independent and not vague or unreliable.” 51. In Ram Narain v. State Of Rajasthan , [[ (1973) 3 SCC 805 ]] , the Apex Court, while laying down the principles observed as under: “An approver who is admittedly guilty of the crime is an accomplice who has betrayed his associates and has apparently sought pardon for saving his own skin. In Ram Narain v. State Of Rajasthan , [[ (1973) 3 SCC 805 ]] , the Apex Court, while laying down the principles observed as under: “An approver who is admittedly guilty of the crime is an accomplice who has betrayed his associates and has apparently sought pardon for saving his own skin. In other words he has purchased complete immunity for his prosecution at the expense of his associates by agreeing to give evidence against them for the prosecution. He is, therefore, presumed not to be a man of high character or a fair witness. His pardon being conditional, to please the prosecution he may well weave some false detail into the true details of the prosecution story and may also falsely involve some innocent person. There is thus a real danger of his telling a story true in general outline but containing some untruth which he can easily work into the story. It is for this reason that the courts as a matter of prudence and caution anxiously look for some corroboration to satisfy their conscience that the approver's testimony which is clearly admissible is also worthy of belief credit. One can of course visualise an accomplice who is genuinely repentant for the commission of his crime and truly desires to make a clean breast of the whole affair by way of penitence. But even in such cases the court has to judicially determine the extent to which his uncorroborated testimony can be considered as trustworthy by looking to the other relevant material and the attending circumstances on the basis of which the accused can be safely convicted. The rule which seems to emerge from the foregoing discussion and judicial decisions is that the necessity of corroboration as a matter of prudence except when it is safe to dispense with such corroboration must be clearly present to the mind of the judge.” 52. The principle stated above has withstood the test of time, and it is with this well-settled legal background in mind that we proceed to evaluate the testimony of PW2. While appreciating his evidence, the courts are required to consider the circumstances under which he was arrested, the specific role attributed to him in the charge, the actual role he played in the commission of the offence, and the timing and manner in which he chose to turn approver. While appreciating his evidence, the courts are required to consider the circumstances under which he was arrested, the specific role attributed to him in the charge, the actual role he played in the commission of the offence, and the timing and manner in which he chose to turn approver. These are critical factors in assessing the creditworthiness of his testimony and determining the nature and extent of corroboration necessary before placing reliance upon it in support of the prosecution case. 53. The specific case as per the charge is that PW2 committed the offence of rape and, thereafter, took the chopper from the hands of the 1st accused and inflicted cut injuries on the face of the deceased. Our endeavour is to assess the broader version of events as narrated by the approver and examine whether there exists other evidence that corroborates and lends assurance to his testimony. We must also assess whether the evidence led by the prosecution to link the appellant with the crime is reliable, and we must ensure that the corroborative evidence is independent, specific, and not vague or inherently unreliable. 54. PW1 stated that upon his return from work, the 1st accused was present at the Layam, but PW2 was not seen. When the police dog was brought to the estate, the canine led directly to the house of PW2 and caught him. Both PW4, the Estate Manager, and PW6, an employee of the Estate, stated that the appellant had been employed in the Estate for over a decade, whereas PW2 had joined only about 6–8 months prior to the incident. PW4 further deposed that PW1 had complained to him that PW2 had picked a quarrel with the deceased, Sabitha Maji, accusing her of being responsible for his wife returning to her parental home. On at least three occasions, PW2 picked quarrels with Sabitha, following which a complaint was lodged against him, and PW4 had warned him to refrain from such conduct. 55. PW10, the Scientific expert, stated that blood was detected on the walls and floor of the room in which PW2 was residing. However, the Investigating Officer failed to obtain the relevant forensic report. PW10 clarified that the report remains stored in her computer. 55. PW10, the Scientific expert, stated that blood was detected on the walls and floor of the room in which PW2 was residing. However, the Investigating Officer failed to obtain the relevant forensic report. PW10 clarified that the report remains stored in her computer. PW12, a woman who had gone to the Bamboo forest to collect firewood, stated that she met the 1st accused there and later saw Sabitha Maji going into the forest around 2:00 p.m. She further stated that she saw PW2 following the deceased. The 1st accused was seen cutting bamboo at a location far from the Layam. PW12 also stated that she saw PW2 approximately 15–20 meters away from the deceased. She added that PW2 had a history of domestic violence and that his in-laws had taken away his wife. She denied having informed the police that PW2 and the deceased had fought on prior occasions and that their relationship was soured. 56. In the light of the evidence adduced, it becomes necessary to evaluate the reliability of the testimony of PW2. In his deposition, PW2 suppresses the fact that he had a strained relationship with the deceased and that he had quarrelled with her on multiple occasions, prompting PW1 to file a complaint with the Estate Manager, following which he was warned. As the 1st accused was residing in an adjacent room, it is implausible that he was unaware of the discord between PW2 and Sabitha. In such a context, it is difficult to believe that the 1st accused would have given money and alcohol to PW2, a newcomer in the Estate, to approach Sabitha and express his desire to form a relationship with her. 57. PW2 admits to having followed Sabitha Maji when she went into the forest to collect firewood, a fact he could not suppress, given that PW12 had independently testified to the same. He then proceeds to narrate his version of the incident, in which he does not admit to having raped the deceased, nor does he admit to having taken the chopper from the 1st accused to inflict injuries on her face. Instead, he attributes the infliction of all injuries solely to the 1st accused. After the disposal of the body, PW2 claims that the 1st accused asked him to wash his hands and legs. Instead, he attributes the infliction of all injuries solely to the 1st accused. After the disposal of the body, PW2 claims that the 1st accused asked him to wash his hands and legs. PW2 further states that he was wearing only a half pant at the time, and that after cleaning himself, he returned to the Layam, wore his shirt, and then went to Kuttikkanam Junction to purchase biscuits. If, as claimed, he had thoroughly washed himself of all bloodstains, there remains no credible explanation for the presence of blood in his room, as detected by PW10, the Scientific Expert. Her testimony in this regard stands unchallenged. If blood was indeed found in room of PW2, his version of the events becomes suspect. The Investigating Officer, instead of conducting a proper forensic investigation, opined that a chicken was butchered in the room, resulting in blood being spattered on the floor and walls. This explanation is difficult to believe, considering that the Layam is a residence with limited space and is occupied by the family of PW1, including his parents and sister. In such circumstances, it is more likely that a chicken would have been butchered outside and not inside the cramped room. Furthermore, the said assertion by the Investigating Officer is at variance with the evidence tendered by the Scientific expert. 58. Another serious lapse is the failure of the Investigating Officer to investigate the identity of the tooth found a few meters away from the body of the deceased. The prosecution, as well as the Doctor who conducted the autopsy, do not assert that the deceased lost a tooth during the assault. Although the accused were examined by a Doctor, there is no report suggesting that either of them had lost a tooth. While the tooth was seized and forwarded for Forensic examination, no report has been produced. This omission suggests that the prosecution is suppressing material evidence that would not have aligned with its narrative. 59. The most glaring flaw in the investigation, however, is the failure to subject the motile spermatozoa detected in the vaginal swabs and smears to DNA analysis. As previously noted, Ext.P10 series of Chemical Analysis Report confirms the presence of human semen and spermatozoa in the samples. Had DNA analysis been conducted, the identity of the perpetrator could have been conclusively established, leaving no room for speculation. 60. As previously noted, Ext.P10 series of Chemical Analysis Report confirms the presence of human semen and spermatozoa in the samples. Had DNA analysis been conducted, the identity of the perpetrator could have been conclusively established, leaving no room for speculation. 60. In view of the discussion above, we are satisfied that PW2 is not a totally reliable witness, relying on which we could have arrived at a finding of guilt against the appellant. His self-confessed participation in the crime without taking any active part in it is unacceptable. His statement is almost of an exculpatory nature and at total variance with the charge and other evidence. His statement as a whole does not inspire confidence and is not worthy of credence. We find ourselves unable to place any reliance on his untrustworthy and unreliable evidence. Once the evidence of the approver is found to be not reliable, the worth of his evidence is lost and such evidence, even by seeking corroboration, cannot be made the foundation of a conviction. The above ratio has been reaffirmed and reiterated by the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri (supra), Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra , [[ (1999) 5 SCC 30 ]] and Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary (supra). 61. Even though we have held that the evidence of the approver is unreliable, we shall for the sake of completeness, deal with the other evidence relied on by the learned Sessions Judge to find the appellant guilty. The seizure of MO10 watch, MO11 ring from the body of the accused at the time of his arrest and recovery of MO5 chopper, and MO16 to MO19 clothes of the 1st accused based on the disclosure statement made by the appellant are the other pieces of evidence relied on by the learned Sessions Judge. It was on 3.1.2017 at 7.30 p.m. that the 1st accused was arrested. The watch, ring and sandals worn by the appellant were seized by the police at the time of arrest as per Ext.P3 mahazar. Ext.P27 is the property list dated 3.1.2017 detailing the property seized. It is evident from Ext. P27 that the seized items reached the court only on 9.1.2017. Ext.P32 is the report of analysis. The said report states that human blood was detected in the watch, ring and sandal of the 1st accused. Ext.P27 is the property list dated 3.1.2017 detailing the property seized. It is evident from Ext. P27 that the seized items reached the court only on 9.1.2017. Ext.P32 is the report of analysis. The said report states that human blood was detected in the watch, ring and sandal of the 1st accused. The prosecution has not been able to let in evidence to reveal the blood group of the accused or the deceased and that the human blood found on the watches and ring was that of the deceased. Even otherwise, the prosecution has not been able to establish the chain of custody for the court to safely rule out any manipulation. We are, therefore, of the view that Ext.P32 report would not in any way advance the case of the prosecution. 62. Now we shall come to the recovery of the chopper and clothes at the instance of the 1st accused. It is on the basis of Ext.P5(a) confession of the 1st accused that MO5 chopper was recovered from beneath the cot in his room being number XVI/127-2011. The seizure mazahar is Ext.P5. It was on the basis of Ext.P6(a) disclosure statement that MOs 16 to 19 clothes worn by him were seized. Ext.P6 is the seizure mahazar. PW4, the Estate Manager, who is the attestor to the recovery mahazar. We have gone through Exts.P5 and P6 mahazars, the disclosure alleged to be made by the accused and the evidence of PW13, the investigating officer as well as the attestor. We are afraid that the requirements of law have not been met. 63. In State of Rajasthan v. Bhup Singh , [[ (1997) 10 SCC 675 ]] , the Apex Court has observed the following as the conditions prescribed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 for unwrapping the cover of the ban against the admissibility of the statement of the accused to the police (1) a fact should have been discovered in consequence of the information received from the accused; (2) he should have been accused of an offence; (3) he should have been in the custody of a police officer when he supplied the information; (4) the fact so discovered should have been deposed to by the witness. The Court observed that if these conditions are satisfied, that part of the information given by the accused which led to such recovery gets denuded of the wrapper of prohibition and it becomes admissible in evidence. 64. In Ext.P5, the exact statement made by the appellant has not been extracted. All that is stated is that when he was arrested, he confessed and accordingly in the mahazar, it has been stated that The same is the case with Ext.P6, the mahazar as per which the clothes worn by the appellant were seized. None of the witnesses were present when the confession statements were given by the accused. What emerges from the evidence of the investigating officer is that the appellant stated before him while he was in custody that the weapon and clothes have been concealed, and the accused is alleged to have volunteered to take the Investigating Officer to enable him to discover the place. This statement does not indicate or suggest that the appellant indicated anything about his involvement in the concealment of the weapon. It is a vague statement. Mere discovery cannot be interpreted as sufficient to infer authorship of concealment by the person who discovered the weapon. He could have derived knowledge of the existence of that weapon at the place through some other source also. He might have even seen somebody concealing the weapon, and therefore, it cannot be presumed or inferred that because a person discovered the weapon, he was the person who had concealed it, lest it can be presumed that he used it. This is the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ramanand alias Nandlal Bharti Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh , [[2022 SCC OnLine SC 1396]] and in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka , [[2022 SCC OnLine SC 1400]] . Applying the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Apex Court, we find the evidence of the investigating officer does not constitute legal evidence. 65. We have already held that the approver’s evidence is not reliable and trustworthy. Even if it is assumed that the evidence of recovery of the material objects at the instance of the accused is reliable, the same is not sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt. 65. We have already held that the approver’s evidence is not reliable and trustworthy. Even if it is assumed that the evidence of recovery of the material objects at the instance of the accused is reliable, the same is not sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The above principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Vinobhai vs. State of Kerala , [[2025 SCC OnLine SC 178]] . In the said case, while considering the principles, it was observed as under: “8. In this case, there are material omissions which amount to contradiction. Coupled with the material omissions, if we consider the conduct of both the witnesses, their version does not inspire confidence. Once evidence of these two witnesses is disbelieved, the only remaining evidence against the appellant is of the recovery of the knife at his instance. The law relating to the evidentiary value of recovery made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act , 1872 is settled by this Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P.2. Paragraph 22 of the said decision reads thus:— “22. A doubt looms : can disclosure statements per se, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, be deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We find it implausible. Although disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt.” 66. After carefully examining the evidence presented by the prosecution, we find that, apart from the many discrepancies in the prosecution case, the testimony given by the approver is filled with inconsistencies and the same directly conflicts with the other evidence brought forward by the prosecution. Furthermore, the prosecution case does not exactly align with the scientific and medical evidence on record. The failure of the prosecution to adduce DNA evidence with respect to the spermatozoa and tooth, when such an examination would have clinched the issue, exacerbates the situation even more. We are of the firm view that the support available to back the testimony of the approver falls well short of the level needed to rely on the version of an accomplice. We are of the firm view that the support available to back the testimony of the approver falls well short of the level needed to rely on the version of an accomplice. The law clearly requires that the statement of an approver, being that of a tainted witness, must be supported by independent and reliable evidence. However, in this case, we do not find any such supporting evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that would lend credibility or assurance to what the approver has stated. The doubts this Court has about the involvement of the appellant go far beyond what can be considered reasonable doubt. We are fully aware that acquitting an accused in a grave crime should happen only when the evidence is clearly insufficient. But a criminal court cannot and must not take away a person’s liberty, or impose a sentence as serious as life imprisonment, unless it is reasonably sure of the guilt of the accused. In the present case, we are compelled to conclude that the prosecution has not met that standard. In the result, this appeal will stand allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant in S.C. No. 199 of 2017 on the file of the III Additional Sessions Judge, Thodupuzha, are set aside. We acquit the appellant and direct that he be set at liberty forthwith, if his continued incarceration is not required in any other case.