JUDGMENT : Easwaran S., J. The defendant in O.S No.1426 of 2013 before the 1 st Additional Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, is the appellant herein. 2. The suit is filed by the respondents/plaintiffs seeking a permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction restraining the defendant from making construction in the terrace of the second floor of the plaint schedule property. A mandatory injunction directing the defendant to demolish and remove plaint B and C schedule property within a time limit is also sought for. According to the plaintiffs, the husband of the 1 st plaintiff and the father of 2 nd and 3 rd plaintiffs owned an extent of 3.140 cents of land in Survey No.1989/3 of Ernakulam Village by virtue of sale deed No.2677 of 1972 of Ernakulam, SRO. Late Vijayasenan constructed a double storied building in the plaint A schedule property having ground floor plus first floor. The ground floor was rented to a hotel business and the tenant is in occupation. The defendant, a lawyer by profession, had entered to lease with the late Vijayasenan for the 1 st floor of the building in the year 2006. Later, Vijayasenan had obtained a building permit No.MOP1/232/08 dated 04.07.2008 for construction of 29.27 Sq.mtrs on the second floor. At that time, the defendant approached late Vijayasenan and offered to purchase the second floor along with the building permit. As per the mutual agreement, a sale deed was entered in the year 2008 whereby, the defendant purchased the 1/3 rd right over the plaint A schedule property together with right to construct the building in the second floor with an area of 29.27 Sq.mtrs. It was further agreed that the construction would also carry over to a canopy over the roof of the second floor. The defendant, after purchasing the second floor, completed the construction on the basis of the permit and was finished during the month of April, 2011. The defendant violated the terms and conditions of sale by exceeding the permitted construction limits. In the meantime, there were several litigations between the parties regarding the financial transactions and ultimately O.S No.603 of 2011 was filed by the defendants for recovery of money. In the said suit, a counter claim was preferred by the plaintiffs questioning the construction done by the defendant in the second floor of the building. In the meantime, there were several litigations between the parties regarding the financial transactions and ultimately O.S No.603 of 2011 was filed by the defendants for recovery of money. In the said suit, a counter claim was preferred by the plaintiffs questioning the construction done by the defendant in the second floor of the building. Later, in the Lok Adalat, a settlement arrived and the counter claim was closed with liberty to the plaintiffs to prefer a fresh suit and, hence the fresh suit. 3. The defendant entered appearance and contested the suit and contended that the suit is barred by limitation. It was further contended that the suit was also hit by Section 563 of the Kerala Municipalities Act , 1994 (for short, ‘the Act, 1994’). The defendant asserted that, he had completed the construction as early as on 06.10.2009 and that the suit filed in the year 2013 was clearly barred by limitation. Other contentions were also raised by the defendant. 4. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts.A1 to A5 documents were produced and PWs 1 and 2 were examined. The report of the Advocate Commissioner was marked as Exts.C1 to C3 series. On behalf of the defendant, Exts.B1 and B2 were marked. No oral evidence was adduced by the defendant. The trial court on the basis of the pleadings framed the following issues:- “1. Whether suit is barred by limitation? 2. Whether the jurisdiction of this court is barred in view of Sec.509, 563 of the Kerala Municipality Act and Sec 271S of the Panchayat Raj Act? 3. Whether the plaintiffs entitled to mandatory injunction with regard to plaint B & C schedule properties as claimed? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to permanent prohibitory injunction as claimed? 5. Reliefs and costs?” 5. The trial court, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, decreed the suit, finding that the defendant was only permitted to construct over 29.27 Sq.mtrs of the second floor and inasmuch as the defendant had constructed beyond the permissible limit, including the terrace portion of the building by enclosing the canopy, paving tiles and installing iron gate, thereby the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree or mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove the illegal construction. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree in O.S No.1426 of 2013, the defendant preferred A.S No.109 of 2022 which was also dismissed by judgment dated 18.10.2024 and hence the defendant is before this Court in the appeal. 6. Heard Sri.T.Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant assisted by Sri.M.P.Ramnath, and Sri.M.R.Vineeth, and Sri.S.Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents/plaintiffs assisted by Sri.P.Martin Jose. 7. Initially, since the plaintiffs were appearing on caveat, this Court did not consider it appropriate to admit the appeal. However, later when preliminary arguments were addressed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, this Court thought it expedient to frame the following substantial questions of law:- “a) Are the trial court and 1 st appellate court justified in holding that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit? b) Are the trial court and the 1 st appellate court justified in holding that a simple suit for injunction without a prayer for declaration is maintainable on the facts of this case? c) Whether the trial court and the 1 st appellate court have properly construed the recitals in Ext.A2 document? e) Is the 1 st appellate court justified in not admitting in evidence the document produced before it under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC? f) Whether the suit is maintainable without the juncture of corporation of Kochi and is not Corporation of Kochi a necessary party to the suit? g) Is not the suit claim barred by limitation?” 8. Sri.T.Krishnanunni, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant raised the following submissions: - a) The suit is not maintainable, since the issue raised in the suit as regards the violation of the building permit and construction not being in accordance with law. The defendant, even if he is found to have constructed beyond the permissible limit, he is entitled to move for regularisation of the unauthorized construction before the Corporation. In fact, proceedings were initiated in this regard before the Corporation and ultimately it reached the Government, whereby the Government had rejected the claim of the appellant. The defendant, even if he is found to have constructed beyond the permissible limit, he is entitled to move for regularisation of the unauthorized construction before the Corporation. In fact, proceedings were initiated in this regard before the Corporation and ultimately it reached the Government, whereby the Government had rejected the claim of the appellant. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant approached the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions, Thiruvananthapuram, and by order dated 15.04.2024 in Appeal No.750 of 2022, the entire proceedings were set aside and the Secretary of the Corporation of Kochi was directed to measure out the property and the appellant was permitted to submit fresh application for regularization. The decision in the suit, thus infringes upon the statutory remedy pursued by the appellant. In the light of the judgment and decree, the benefit of the order passed by the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions cannot be enjoyed by the appellant. b) The courts below failed to notice that the conditions prescribed for maintaining a suit for mandatory injunction under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act , 1963 (for short, ‘the Act, 1963’) is not available in the present case. c) It is further submitted that, the approved plan permits the defendant to undertake the construction of the entire floor and therefore, the extent of construction noted in the plan as 29.27 Sq.mtrs is only a misnomer. d) The suit was clearly barred by limitation since the defendant had constructed the second floor way back in the year 2009 and that the suit was instituted only on 20.12.2013 was clearly not maintainable. e) The fact that the plaintiffs had filed a counter claim in O.S No.603 of 2011 and that further a compromise was entered between the parties permitting the plaintiffs to withdraw the counter claim with liberty to file a fresh suit, will not enable them to tide over the period of limitation. Order XXIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), specifically provides that if a suit is withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit, such liberty will not enable the plaintiffs to tide over the period of limitation. Order XXIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), specifically provides that if a suit is withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit, such liberty will not enable the plaintiffs to tide over the period of limitation. f) It is further pointed out that findings rendered by the trial court as regards the continuing cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs is completely perverse and against the principles laid down by this Court in Abdul Razzak S. v Suraja Devi C.B [2024 KHC Online 846]. It is further contended that the interpretation of Ext.A1 document by the trial court is completely erroneous and that the entire undivided right over the building is conferred by Ext.A1 and therefore, the defendant was entitled to complete the construction. 9. On the other hand, Sri.S.Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf the plaintiffs would raise the following submissions: - a) The suit is not barred under Section 563 of the Act, 1994, since the suit does not call into question any orders passed by the statutory authorities constituted under the Act, 1994. b) The contention that the defendant had completed the construction as early as in the year 2009 is not supported by any documentary evidence. On contrary, while examining the 1 st plaintiff as PW1, a specific query was raised to her as regards the date of starting of the construction on 09.07.2010. c) The contention that under Ext.A1, an absolute right title and interest over 1/3 rd and undivided share is granted to the defendant cannot be sustained especially since a bare reading of Ext.A1 does not disclose the said fact. It is further pointed out that referring to Clause 7 of Ext.A2, the defendant could not have carried out construction beyond 29.27 Sq.mtrs. which affects the stability of the building. At any rate, the construction beyond the second floor is clearly unauthorised. d) Since the defendant did not enter the box to tender the evidence, the averments in the plaint stood uncontroverted and since no supporting evidence to prove the facts contended in the written statement, the main assertion of the defendant will not suffice the costs. e) It is pointed out that the proceedings before the Tribunal for the Local Self Government Institutions will not bind the plaintiffs since the defendant did not choose to make the plaintiffs as a respondent in the proceedings. e) It is pointed out that the proceedings before the Tribunal for the Local Self Government Institutions will not bind the plaintiffs since the defendant did not choose to make the plaintiffs as a respondent in the proceedings. The defendant knew very well that a civil litigation was going on and therefore, the plaintiffs ought to have been made parties to the appeal before the Tribunal. 10. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the Bar, and perused the judgment rendered by the courts below and the records. Maintainability of the Suit 11. One of the prime questions to be considered by this Court, is regarding the maintainability of the suit. The parties are at serious variance as regards the entitlement of the plaintiffs to maintain the suit. It is the assertion of the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the suit is hit by Section 563 of the Act, 1994. To appreciate the said contention, it is necessary to extract the provision under Section 563 of the Act, 1994, which reads as under:- “563. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred. - No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit, application or petition challenging the legality or propriety of any action taken by or under the authority of the Secretary under any provisions comprised in Chapters XVII, XVIII and XIX or the rules and regulations, if any, made thereunder.” A reading of the aforesaid provision, clearly shows that a suit if lodged against the action taken by or under the authority of the Secretary under any provisions of Chapters XVII, XVIII and XIX is barred and the civil court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain such suit. The essential distinction to be drawn from the provision of Section 563 of the Act, 1994 is that, the suit is barred only if the order passed by the Secretary of the of the Municipality is called into question. From the facts presented before this Court, one can safely decipher the distinction, inasmuch as the plaintiffs wanted to enforce their civil rights. Going by provisions contained under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, civil courts do have the Jurisdiction to try all suits unless expressly or impliedly barred. On a plain reading of Section 563, it cannot be said that, there is an implied bar to file suit. Going by provisions contained under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, civil courts do have the Jurisdiction to try all suits unless expressly or impliedly barred. On a plain reading of Section 563, it cannot be said that, there is an implied bar to file suit. The express bar to maintain a suit is qualified with certain conditions. The plaintiffs have not called into question any orders passed by the statutory authority under the Act, 1994. 12. A Division Bench of this Court in Bernad Mani @ Roy and Others v. James and Others [ 2012 (1) KHC 377 ], has held that a civil suit is maintainable when a building is constructed illegally or in violation of the rules. Paragraph 14 of the judgment is extracted hereunder:- “14. Going by the plaint averments as well as averments in the application for temporary injunction we are of the view that the Court below was not justified in holding that it was debarred by S.563 of the Kerala Municipality Act from going into the said question. If as a matter of fact the buildings have been constructed illegally or in violation of the Rules, then the plaintiffs will be justified in seeking the temporary injunction against the issuance of the aforementioned certificates and allotment of number in respect of those buildings. The Court below by refusing to go into this question has abdicated its function as the Civil Court. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order so far as it relates to the above question and direct the Court below to go into that question untrammeled by any of the observations made therein or in this judgment. The order for status quo shall be in force till the matter is finally decided.” 13. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the findings rendered by the trial court as well as the first appellate court that, the suit is maintainable, do not call for any interference and hence the question of law is answered against the appellant. Whether conditions prescribed under Section 39 of Specific Releif Act 1963 is satisfied or not. 14. Whether conditions prescribed under Section 39 of Specific Releif Act 1963 is satisfied or not. 14. According to Sri.T.Krishnanunni, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the suit is not maintainable without seeking for a declaration and further that, for seeking a relief for mandatory injunction, the plaintiffs must satisfy the conditions prescribed under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act 1963. 15. It must be remembered that, the title of the plaintiffs was never an issue before the trial court. That be so, this court cannot fathom the reason for the appellant to raise the question regarding the title of the plaintiffs in these proceedings. A close reading of the written statement shows, the entire case of the appellant was build around the question of limitation and jurisdiction of the civil court. Therefore, this court is not impressed by the aforesaid contention. 16. Be that as it may, the more pertinent question raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is as regards the entitlement of the plaintiffs to seek mandatory injunction. In order of appreciate the said contention, one needs to look into Section 39 carefully. Section 39 which reads as under:- “ 39. Mandatory injunctions When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts.” A bare reading of Section 39 of the Act, 1963, shows that a suit for mandatory injunction is maintainable to prevent a breach of an obligation and to compel the performance of certain acts. The pertinent question is, whether in the present case plaintiffs have satisfied the conditions prescribed under Section 39 of the Act, 1963. In order to, appreciate the point further, one needs to read the conditions prescribed in Ext.A2 sale deed. A reading of Ext.A2 shows that what is transferred by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs to the defendant is 1/3 rd undivided share in the landed properties and to complete 29.27 Sq.metrs on the second floor of the building with sunshade and incidental constructions and use of common areas unto the purchaser by way of absolute sale. Clause 7 of the said agreement reads as under:- “7. Clause 7 of the said agreement reads as under:- “7. that the Purchaser will not do or omit to do anything in or about in the property or to the common facilities, amenities in the building constructed in the schedule property which will in any way affect the strength and support of any building or structures or diminish the value or utility of schedule property or any structures, assets or amenities therein or cause any obstruction or nuisance to any of the others of undivided interest in schedule property or building, or in the use of common areas, facilities and amenities in the property or which will not be in the best common interest of all the owners or undivided interest in the property.” A reading of Clause 7 shows that the purchaser-defendant herein is obliged not to do or omit to do anything about the property to the common facilities therein or cause any obstruction or nuisance to any others from the undivided share in the scheduled building. The reading of the plaint in its entirety, including the reliefs would show that the plaintiffs have sought for the enforcement of the obligations contained in Ext.A2 sale deed. That being so, there is no merit in the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant/appellant that without seeking for a declaration of the right, a suit for mandatory injunction is not maintainable. The facts presented before this Court would show that the plaintiffs have complied with the conditions prescribed under Section 39 of the Act, 1963, and therefore, the suit is perfectly maintainable. Therefore, the question of law raised as above is answered against the appellant. Interpretation of Ext A 2 sale deed. 17. There cannot be a doubt, that question as regards the construction of a document will qualify itself as a substantial question of law. A deeper analysis of Sale deed (Ext.A2) is required to be done, in order to find as to whether, the predecessor of the plaintiffs had transferred any absolute right over the plaint schedule properties to the defendant. There cannot be a doubt, that question as regards the construction of a document will qualify itself as a substantial question of law. A deeper analysis of Sale deed (Ext.A2) is required to be done, in order to find as to whether, the predecessor of the plaintiffs had transferred any absolute right over the plaint schedule properties to the defendant. The schedule to Ext.A2 reads as under:- “1/3 rd of impartible undivided share in the land having an extent of 1.31 Ares equivalent to 3.140 Cents comprised in Sy.No.1989/3 in Ernakulam Village obtained by the Vendor by virtue of Settlement Deed No.2627/72 registered at SRO, Ernakulam and to complete the second floor of the building having a super built up area of 29.27 Meter Square with sunshade, staircase and canopy over the " roof of the second floor of the building and to use the common areas and all rights.” Still further, the intention of the parties as gathered from the reading of Ext.A2 would show that what is intended to be transferred in only an undivided impartible share over 1.31 Ares of land in Survey No.1989/3. The relevant portion of Ext.A2 is extracted as under:- “ AND WHEREAS the Vendor has agreed to sell and relying on the aforesaid assurance of the Vendor, the Purchaser has agreed to purchase 1/3 impartible undivided share in 1.31 Ares equivalent to 3.140 Cents in Sy.No.1989/3 in Ernakulam Village and to construct second floor with staircase and canopy on the third floor in Ernakulam Village together with all improvements in the property for a total sale consideration of Rs.4,10,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs Ten Thousand Only. NOW THIS DEED WITNESS as follows: In pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of a sum of Rs. NOW THIS DEED WITNESS as follows: In pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of a sum of Rs. 4,10,000/-(Rupees Four Lakhs Ten Thousand Only) paid by the Purchaser to the Vendor, the receipt of which the Vendor hereby admits and acknowledges, the entire Sale consideration thus FULLY SATISFIED, the Vendor does hereby transfer, convey, assign and deliver possession of 1/3 rd undivided share in the landed property and to complete 29.27 Meter Square on the second floor of the building with sunshade and incidental constructions and use common areas unto the Purchaser by way of absolute sale all estate, right, title, interest, claims and privileges in the second floor more particularly described in the schedule hereunder, together with all improvements thereon all easements and other similar rights appurtenant thereto and together with the benefits of all covenants and indemnities to which the Vendor is entitled to in respect thereof AND TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said undivided share in the property with all improvements thereon unto and to the use of the Purchaser absolutely and forever with exclusive title, possession and enjoyment. The Vendor hereby agree with the Purchaser to complete second floor of the building by collecting men and materials in the open premises around the building without any hindrance or interruption from the Vendor and the Vendor shall in no way interfere with the right of the Purchaser for construction.” 18. Read as may, this Court could not find any clause conferring absolute right title and interest in favour of the defendant to do such activities beyond the permissible limit of 29.27 Sq.Mtrs. on the second floor. At any rate, construction beyond the second floor is completely prohibited inasmuch as the defendant derived right title and interest over 1/3 rd undivided share of the property with right to construct building to an extent of 29.27 Sq.mtrs alone. Therefore, the argument of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that going by Ext.A2, the defendant has absolute right over the entire second floor of the building cannot be appreciated under any circumstances. Equally so, this Court is also not impressed by the argument of the learned Senior Counsel that the fact that drawings in approved plan shows the entire second floor and hence the appellant is entitled to construct the entire floor. Equally so, this Court is also not impressed by the argument of the learned Senior Counsel that the fact that drawings in approved plan shows the entire second floor and hence the appellant is entitled to construct the entire floor. The appellant cannot raise such an argument contrary to the condition specified in the sale deed. Therefore, the trial court and the first appellate court have properly construed Ext.A2 and arrived at a right conclusion. Accordingly, the question of law is answered against the appellant. Refusal of the Appellate Court to accept Additional evidence. 19. It is argued with vehemence by the Learned Senior Counsel for appellant, that the first appellate court committed serious irregularity in not allowing an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. It is true that an application was preferred under Order 41 Rule 27 during the pendency of the appeal. The record of proceedings of the first appellate court, shows that the said application was neither pressed into service at any point of time during the pendency of the appeal. Though, from the endorsement made in the application it is seen that, the appellate court had ordered that the application to be considered along with the appeal, nothing is there to suggest that, at any point of time, the appellant had pressed for the disposal of the application. The resultant conclusion, would be that the appellant having not pursued the said application before the first appellate court, cannot contend otherwise. Therefore, it is inevitable for this Court to hold that the first appellate court did not commit any illegality in not admitting the additional evidence, the document produced before it. Even if it is assumed that, the defendant/appellant was entitled to pursue his remedy against the non consideration of the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC, in the light of the overwhelming facts and evidence in the present case, this Court is not persuaded to remand the matter back to the first appellate court to consider the additional documents which are produced by the appellant, simply for the reason that the additional evidence, even if it was produced before the first appellate court, would not have made any difference to the conclusions arrived at by the courts. Hence it is found that the first appellate court was justified in not admitting the evidence since the appellant herein never pursued his claim before the court. Accordingly, the questions of law are answered against the appellant. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party . 20. One of the specific arguments raised by the learned Senior counsel for the appellant is that the Corporation of Kochi is a necessary party and non joinder is fatal to the suit. 21. Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 deals with requirement to implead necessary party and speaks about the consequence of the non joinder. Order 1 Rule 9 reads as under. Rule 9- No suit shall be defeated for the mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties and the court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of parties actually before it. [Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to non-joinder of a necessary party] A bare reading of Rule 9, would show that there is iota of difference between a proper party and a necessary party. Necessary parties are parties whose presence is essential and, in whose absence, no effective decree can be passed. Whereas, proper party is once in whose absence an effective order can be passed but whose presence is necessary for complete and final decision. Whether the Corporation of Kochi is a necessary party or a proper party to the suit. To answer this question, it will be worthwhile to look into the relief’s sought for in the plaint. “a) a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendant to demolish and remove the plaint B and C schedule properties within a time limit fixed by this Hon’ble Court failing which the plaintiff may be permitted to demolish and remove the same and realize the cost from the defendant. b) a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant his men or agents or anybody claiming under him from making any construction in the terrace of the 2 nd floor and thereby enclosing the same. c) a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant his men or agents or anybody claiming under him from causing any obstruction to the plaintiffs in using the terrace portion of the 2 nd floor and common passage to the 2 nd floor and terrace portion. c) a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant his men or agents or anybody claiming under him from causing any obstruction to the plaintiffs in using the terrace portion of the 2 nd floor and common passage to the 2 nd floor and terrace portion. d) Award the cost of the suit and e) Grant such other relief as may be prayed for from time to time.” From a reading of the above it becomes evident that, the plaintiff’s have basically tried to assert their civil rights. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt as regards the question whether the Corporation of Kochi is a necessary party or not. It must also be remembered that, for adjudication of the issues involved in the suit, presence of Corporation of Kochi is not mandatory. Therefore, it is inevitable for this Court to conclude that Corporation of Kochi is not a necessary party nor a proper party to the suit. Further, it is to be noted that the trial court has not framed an issue as regards non joinder of necessary parties. Hence, this Court finds that said issue having been not raised before the trial court, the appellant cannot raise the question of non-joinder of necessary parties for the first time in an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and accordingly the question is answered against the appellant. Whether suit if barred by limitation 22. One of the most contentious issues raised in the appeal, is the question of limitation. The specific case of the appellant is that he had completed the construction on 06.10.2009. Pertinently, no evidence was adduced by the appellant to prove his case. The conscious act of the defendant in not stepping into the box to tender evidence to substantiate the plea raised in the written statement must be, viewed as detriment as to him. That apart, except vague assertion in the written statement that the construction was completed in the year 2009, no evidence is seen produced to support the same. 23. It is further pertinent to note that, while O.S No.603 of 2011 was pending consideration, the plaintiffs herein preferred a counter claim alleging illegal constructions made by the defendant. Admittedly, the suit was compromised on 15.11.2013. 23. It is further pertinent to note that, while O.S No.603 of 2011 was pending consideration, the plaintiffs herein preferred a counter claim alleging illegal constructions made by the defendant. Admittedly, the suit was compromised on 15.11.2013. Going by the terms of compromise entered between the parties before the Lok Adalat, the plaintiffs herein were permitted to withdraw the counter claim with liberty to file a fresh suit in accordance with law. Later, on 20.12.2013, the fresh suit was filed. It is the specific case of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the bar under Order XXIII Rule 2. Going by the provisions of O XXIII Rule 2, even if the suit is withdrawn with leave of the court to file fresh suit, the same cannot arrest the period of limitation. 24. At first blush, this court was impressed with the aforesaid argument and hence decided to delve deep into the said issue. However, on a close exploration of the issue, this court finds the said argument has its own infirmities. One cannot dispute that the plaintiffs were granted liberty to file a fresh suit. What is the impact of the compromise? Does it enable the plaintiffs to tide over the period of limitation or the rigor of Rule 2 to Order XXII still applies to them. These intricate questions, forms the concluding part of this Judgment. 25. One of the crucial factor which has been lost sight by the appellant is that the rigor of Rule 2 to Order XXII of CPC is not absolute. The bar under Rule 2 is qualified and controlled by Section 14 (3) of the Limitation Act 1963. It is trite law that the law regarding limitation is governed by provisions of Limitation Act 1963 and not by the provisions of CPC. Therefore, one needs to look into the Limitation Act 1963 to ascertain whether there is any saving provisions to tide over the impasse likely to arise by operation of Rule 2 to Order XXIII. Fortunately, we have Section 14 (3) of the Limitation Act 1963 to deal with exact situation like in this case. Section 14 (3) of the Limitation Act 1963, reads as under:- “ 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. Fortunately, we have Section 14 (3) of the Limitation Act 1963 to deal with exact situation like in this case. Section 14 (3) of the Limitation Act 1963, reads as under:- “ 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. - (1) xxx (2) xxx (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature.” 26. In Union of India & Ors. v. WestCost Paper Mills Ltd. & another [ (2004) 3 SCC 458 ], the Supreme Court considered meaning and scope of the term, the other causes of like nature under Section 14 of the Act, and held that the aforesaid terminology should receive a liberal interpretation. This was again followed in Shakti Tubes Ltd. v. State of Bihar [ (2009) 1 SCC 786 ]. 27. What constitutes a cause of like nature, will always depend upon the facts of each case. On a liberal interpretation of the term “other causes of like nature”, this court is inclined to hold that the earlier suit having ended in a compromise between the parties, and that the counter claim failed only because of the compromise of the suit for recovery of money filed by the appellant herein and that the liberty was reserved to file a fresh suit, the same constitute as ‘other causes of like nature’. That apart, the suit having compromised on 15-11-2013, and the present suit being filed on 20- 12-2013, that too within a reasonable time, it would be travesty of justice to non-suit the plaintiffs on the ground of limitation especially in the light of brazen violation of law by the appellant. This court, cannot remain oblivious of the fact that the appellant being a practicing lawyer has resorted to the activities in clear violation of the law. 28. This court, cannot remain oblivious of the fact that the appellant being a practicing lawyer has resorted to the activities in clear violation of the law. 28. Be that as it may, this Court would have been in a better position to appreciate the contentions of the appellant had the counter claim not been compromised and that the same was withdrawn on request of the plaintiffs. At any rate, the entire argument on limitation is built around the assertion in the written statement that the construction was completed on 06.10.2009 for which no evidence was adduced by the appellant. Therefore, this Court finds that the decision cited at the Bar in Abdul Razzaq (supra) {authored by E.S.J } is distinguishable in the facts of this case. Having miserably failed to demonstrate before this Court that, under what authority the constructions on second floor and the canopy of the building were made and the impertinent act of closing down the entry to the terrace portion of the building does not inspire confidence in the minds of the court. Viewed in the perspective, this court is inclined to hold that the suit is not barred by limitation. Accordingly, the question of law raised as above is answered against to the appellant. Resultantly, in view of the above findings of this Court, it is inevitable for this Court to hold that the appellant has miserably failed to sustain his cause before this Court in the present appeal. Thus, the appeal lacks merit and accordingly, the same fails and dismissed with costs of the plaintiffs.