JUDGMENT : D.K. SINGH, J. 1. The present writ appeal has been filed impugning the judgment and order dated 23.01.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition Nos.13592-595/16 (LA-BDA) filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein. 2. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as per their ranking in the writ petition. 3. This Appeal has been filed accompanying I.A. No.1/ 2024 seeking condonation of delay of 1,854 days in filing the aforesaid appeal. The reasons stated in the affidavit accompanying the application seeking condonation of delay are stated in paragraph Nos.7 and 8, which reads as under:- "7. I state that, thereafter the file was sent to the legal section. Subsequently the file was mixed up with other file and the said file was not been traceable for several days in spite of the best effort made by the BDA officials. However after thorough search of the records in legal department the BDA official had found some of the part of the records. Thereafter, steps was taken to entrust the case to penal advocate. At the time of entrusting the file to panel advocate the entire documents which was annexed along with the Writ Petition was not available and made a request to the panel to secure the entire documents. After securing the entire documents the panel advocate took some time to draft the Writ Appeal. After drafting the Writ Appeal the documents which was in Kannada version annexed in Writ Petition was given for translation to English Version. After getting all translated document from Kannada to English Version, time was consumed to prefer a Writ Appeal. In this process there was a bonafide cause in not preferring the Writ Appeal with in time. The delay in preferring the Writ Appeal is not intentional but for the bonafide reasons. Since the appellant BDA got this case on merit. The delay in preferring the appeal is unintentional but for the bonafide reasons stated above. 8. I state that since sufficient cause has been made out for the delay in preferring the appeal, by the appellant this Hon'ble Court may take liberal approach and condone the delay. If the accompanying application is not allowed and the appeal is not considered on merits, it will be put to irreparable injury, loss and hardship. 8. I state that since sufficient cause has been made out for the delay in preferring the appeal, by the appellant this Hon'ble Court may take liberal approach and condone the delay. If the accompanying application is not allowed and the appeal is not considered on merits, it will be put to irreparable injury, loss and hardship. On the other hand, no prejudice would be caused to the other side, if the delay is condoned and appeal is heard on merits." 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that if there is merit in the appeal, no amount of delay would come on the way of deciding the appeal on merit. In support of his contentions the learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 Supreme (SC) 519. Paragraph Nos.13, 14, 16 and 17 of the said judgment has been pressed in service, which reads as under :- "ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION: 13. In the present case, the contentions of the appellant, on first blush appears to be attractive, inasmuch as the State cannot be given any undue indulgence as compared to an ordinary litigant, especially in matters of limitation. There is no doubt that all parties, whether or not State under Article 12 [Definition.- In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India] of the Constitution, are required to act with due diligence and promptitude. 14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation. 15. …………xxxx………..xxxxx……….xxxxx…………. 16. The Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 held: '10. …There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. …There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi" is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose".' (Emphasis supplied) 17. No doubt, Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar (supra) relates to a writ petition, but the statement of law laid down is clear. Sheo Raj Singh (supra) has also considered the impersonal nature of the functioning of the State, taking note of what was observed in State of Manipur v. Kotin Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 . In A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman, (2024) 10 SCC 613 , the Court considered as under: ‘37. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji, Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , the Court noted that it had been adopting a justifiably liberal approach in condoning delay and that “justice on merits” is to be preferred as against what “scuttles a decision on merits.” Albeit, while reversing an order of the High Court therein condoning delay, principles to guide the consideration of an application for condonation of delay were culled out in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 595. One of the factors taken note of therein was that substantial justice is paramount [Para 21.3 of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 595]. 38. In N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur considered, though in the context of delay vis-à-vis Article 226 of the Constitution, the decision in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 and held that: [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503, SCC OnLine Bom Para 22] “22. … The real- test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such, but the test is whether by reason of delay there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up his claim or whether before the petitioner has moved the writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” (emphasis supplied) 39. The Bombay High Court's eloquent statement of the correct position in law in N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574 : (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503 found approval in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 and Mool Chandra v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 625 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878. 40. In the wake of the authorities abovementioned, taking a liberal approach subserving the cause of justice, we condone the delay and allow IA No. 16203 of 2019, subject to payment of costs of Rs. 20,000 (Rupees twenty thousand) by the appellant to the respondent." (Emphasis supplied) 5. A perusal of the above paragraphs in INDER SINGH (supra), it would reveal that there should be sufficient reasons for not filing the petition/the appeal on time. 6. In the present case, as has been noted above except for what has been stated in paragraph 7 of the affidavit, no reason is coming forward for condoning the delay of more than 6 years in filing the appeal. 7. 6. In the present case, as has been noted above except for what has been stated in paragraph 7 of the affidavit, no reason is coming forward for condoning the delay of more than 6 years in filing the appeal. 7. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal on the ground of delay itself. However, we also have to take note of the observation made by the learned Single Judge. 8. The land was acquired when the Preliminary Notification was issued way back in the year 1978 and Final Notification came to be issued only on 24.11.1984 and the award came to be passed on 27.07.1989, but the award amount of Rs.49,817/- was deposited before the Civil Court only on 28.06.1990. The learned Single Judge noted that the appellants never took possession of the land in question. Paragraph Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder :- "12. In addition, what is most important in this case is, that the BDA has not utilized the land measuring 14 guntas for the purpose it was notified and acquired. Indeed, the surrounding lands have been fully developed. The photographs relied upon by the petitioner disclose that a huge apartment has come up on one side of the land and in the land in question, petitioner has put up construction. Therefore, it is amply clear that petitioners continue to be in possession of the property occupying the constructed portion thereunder. If that is so, it is apparent that the BDA has not taken over possession and has not used the same for the purpose of formation of layout. 13. Even though other acquired lands have been utilized for formation of layout, the fact remains that as this land has not been utilized and the petitioners have put up construction therein and the other lands surrounding the lands in question have been fully developed by the owners as they are excluded from the acquisition, the inescapable conclusion would be that petitioners have not been dispossessed of the land in question and this piece of 14 guntas of land is not going to affect the layout already formed even if excluded. 14. 14. The question of applicability of Section 24(2) of the New Act to the acquisition made by the BDA came up consideration before this Court and this Court has held in Chikkathayamma's case referred to supra that the provisions of Section 24(2) of the New Act, are applicable to the acquisition made for the benefit of BDA under the provisions of the BDA Act. It is urged that this matter is now the subject matter of Writ Appeal. 15. Be that as it may, as things stand, acquisition proceedings have not been completed. Possession of the petitioners have not been taken over. Petitioners have continued to be in possession and occupation of the land having put up construction thereon. The entire surrounding area has been developed. In such circumstances, the BDA having not utilized the land for the purpose it was notified, the acquisition proceedings stand lapsed." 9. After more than a decade, the appellants wants to take possession of the land, when the respondents have put in the constructions and are dwelling in those houses. The Learned Single Judge has held that it would be highly improper to displace/dispossess the petitioners from the land in question. We also otherwise, see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order dated 23.01.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.Nos.13592-595/2016 (LA-BDA). 10. In view thereof, the writ appeal stand dismissed both on the ground of delay as well as on merit, consequently I.A.No.1/2024 stand rejected.