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2025 DIGILAW 1688 (BOM)

Commissioner, Tribal Development Maharashtra State v. Badashaha Dagadu More

2025-12-23

M.M.SATHAYE, SUMAN SHYAM

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JUDGMENT : Suman Shyam, J. 1. This Writ Petition, jointly filed by the Commissioner, Tribal Development, Maharashtra as well as the Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development, Thane as Petitioners Nos.1 and 2, is directed against the judgment and order dated 30 th March, 2015 passed in Original Application (OA) No.81 of 2012, whereby, the order of dismissal from service of the sole Respondent was set aside on the ground of disproportionate punishment and the matter was remanded to the disciplinary authority to impose one of the minor punishments prescribed under Rule 5(1)(i) to (vi) of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, after giving proper opportunity of being heard to the Respondent. The facts and circumstances of the case giving rise to filing of the Writ Petition, shorn of unnecessary details, may be noted as hereunder. 2. The sole Respondent herein was promoted to the post of Head Master of Government Secondary School (Ashram Shala), Gowade, Taluka-Palghar, District-Thane on 23 rd June,1995. The said school was involved in imparting education to tribal students. There were separate hostel facilities both for the boys and girls which were run under the direct control and supervision of the respective Superintendents. One Vinod Shirsat was the Superintendent of Boys Hostel where as Ms. Meena S. Sankhe was the Superintendent of the Girls Hostel. Sometime in the year 2008, the fact of carnal relationship between the Superintendent of boys hostel viz. Vinod Shirsat with a teenaged inmate of the Girls hostel came to light. In the year 2009 the girl became pregnant and then Ms Sankhe took her to a private hospital for sonography. The incident had attracted lot of attention and created a furor in the society. This Court also took suo-moto cognizance of the incident and issued certain directions in suo-moto Writ Petition No.1420 of 2008. An FIR was registered and three accused persons were subjected to prosecution in Sessions Case No.28 of 2009 ( State of Maharashtra Vs. Vinod and two others ). The Respondent herein was the accused No.2. The main accused was Vinod S. Shirsat (accused No.1) i.e. the Superintendent of the Boys hostel who was charged with offence committed under Section 376(2)(c) read with Section 417 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE (IPC). Ms. Meena S. Sankhe, the Superintendent of the Girls hostel was the accused No. 3. The charge against the Respondent (accused No.2) and Ms. The main accused was Vinod S. Shirsat (accused No.1) i.e. the Superintendent of the Boys hostel who was charged with offence committed under Section 376(2)(c) read with Section 417 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE (IPC). Ms. Meena S. Sankhe, the Superintendent of the Girls hostel was the accused No. 3. The charge against the Respondent (accused No.2) and Ms. Sankhe (accused No.3) was under Section 202 of the IPC for intentional omission to give information about an offense. A Departmental Enquiry was therefore, initiated against the Respondent and co-accused by serving memorandum of charge dated 9 th February, 2009. As many as three charges were brought against the Respondent. On conclusion of the departmental proceedings, the Enquiry Officer submitted report dated 6 th April, 2009 by concluding that all the three charges brought against him have been proved. The copy of the enquiry report was forwarded to the Respondent, so as to enable him to submit his say. Thereafter, by the order dated 13 th May, 2009 issued by the Petitioner No.2, the Respondent was dismissed from service. The order of dismissal from service was challenged by the Respondent by filing statutory appeal before the Petitioner No.1. In the meantime, the learned Sessions Judge, Palghar had passed judgment and order dated 6 th October, 2009 in Sessions Case No.28 of 2009 granting acquittal to all the three accused persons including the present Respondent. The State has filed Criminal Appeal No.1147 of 2009 before this Court against the judgment and order of acquittal. The appeal is pending disposal before this Court. In the meantime, by order dated 5 th December, 2011, the statutory appeal preferred by the Respondent against the order of dismissal from service was rejected. Being aggrieved thereby, the Respondent as Applicant, had instituted Original Application No.81 of 2012 before the learned Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal (MAT) Mumbai, which was disposed of by judgment and order dated 30 th March, 2015, thus, interfering with the order of penalty imposed upon the sole Respondent on the ground that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to proved delinquency. The operative part of the judgment dated 30 th March, 2015 passed by the learned MAT is reproduced herein below for ready reference:- “19. The point, however, remains as to the quantum of punishment, because even the punishment in a D.E. should not be shockingly disproportionate to the proved delinquency. The operative part of the judgment dated 30 th March, 2015 passed by the learned MAT is reproduced herein below for ready reference:- “19. The point, however, remains as to the quantum of punishment, because even the punishment in a D.E. should not be shockingly disproportionate to the proved delinquency. The above discussed facts need not be recapitulated. The Applicant was to be blamed for the negligence, but in the set of the facts and circumstances, such as they obtained then, to make him lose his job totally without any post retiral benefits would, in our opinion, be totally disproportionate to the proved delinquency. Therefore, even though it will not be just for the asking that the Tribunal would interfere with the findings with regard to the punishment, one has to still find that it is a part of the quasi-judicial duty of the Tribunal to make sure that the punishment is not shockingly disproportionate to the delinquency established. In fact, we have reduced the punishment quite substantially even in the case of Ms. Sankhe and we are convinced that the same course of action will have to be adopted herein as well. 20. The Original Application is partly allowed. The impugned orders are modified as far as the punishment is concerned. The Applicant shall be reinstated with continuity of service but without back wages. In order to effectuate this direction the order of his suspension shall stand revoked. The matter shall be placed back before the disciplinary authority who shall after giving to the Applicant an opportunity of being heard on the point of punishment shall impose one of the minor punishments prescribed under Rule 5(1) (i) to (vi) of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979. Consistently with the punishment imposed as herein directed proper decision shall be taken with regard to the period of suspension that the Applicant was in. Compliance within six weeks from today. No order as to costs.” 3. The three charges against the Respondent are listed herein below for ready reference. 4. The English translation of the charge reads as follows :- “Item one B.D. More, while working as the Secondary Principal of Government Secondary Ashram School, Gowade, Tal. Palghar, Dist. Thane since 26/6/2006, did not exercise control over the staff and students of the Ashram School. The three charges against the Respondent are listed herein below for ready reference. 4. The English translation of the charge reads as follows :- “Item one B.D. More, while working as the Secondary Principal of Government Secondary Ashram School, Gowade, Tal. Palghar, Dist. Thane since 26/6/2006, did not exercise control over the staff and students of the Ashram School. Item two During the aforesaid period and while working in the aforesaid office, the above B.D. More did not inform the superior office in a timely manner about the love affair, immoral relationship and pregnancy of the student between Vinod Santosh Shirsat, Superintendent of Ashram School and a minor student named Ms. Chandrakala Sakharam Bhujade of 10th standard. Item three During the aforesaid period and while working in the aforesaid office, he has committed dereliction of duty and has violated Rule No.3 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1979. The copy is signed by Hon'ble Additional Commissioner. Additional Commissioner, Residential Development Thane " 5. From a careful reading of the judgment and order dated 30 th March, 2015, we find that the learned MAT has expressed an opinion that although the Respondent was not directly involved in the commission of crime against the minor girl nor was there any charge framed against him to that effect, yet, there was some element of negligence on his part in failing to promptly report the incident to the higher authorities or to prevent the same by virtue of his official position as the Head-Master of the school. The learned Tribunal has also taken note of “admission” allegedly made by the Respondent to such effect but at the same time, it was also observed that the efforts on the part of the Respondent to take action in the matter did not receive proper support from his higher authorities. Therefore, while accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer that there was some negligence on the part of the Respondent, the order of dismissal from service issued by the disciplinary authority was interfered with by the learned MAT in the manner indicated hereinabove, on the limited ground of quantum of punishment. Therefore, while accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer that there was some negligence on the part of the Respondent, the order of dismissal from service issued by the disciplinary authority was interfered with by the learned MAT in the manner indicated hereinabove, on the limited ground of quantum of punishment. Since the Respondent has not challenged the judgment and order dated 30 th March, 2015 passed by the learned MAT, it would not be necessary for this Court to examine the legality and validity of the impugned judgment dated 30 th March, 2015 from the prospective of the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal on the question of negligence on the part of the Respondent. The only issue, that would, therefore, arise for consideration of this Court in the present proceeding is as to whether or not, the limited interference caused by the learned MAT against the order of punishment imposed upon the Respondent, on the point of quantum of punishment, was justified in law. 6. Law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that scope of the Court to interfere with an order of penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority, in exercise of powers of judicial review, is extremely limited. However, one of the grounds on which such interference is permissible is if the punishment is found to be shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the charge. If it is found that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, the same can be interfered with the Court/ Tribunal and a direction can be issues to impose a fresh punishment in terms of the guidelines issued by the court. 7. In the case of B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and ors. reported in (1995)6 Supreme Court Cases 749, while dealing with an issue of similar nature, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows :- “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 8. In the present case, there is no allegation of involvement of the Respondent in committing any sexual offence punishable under the law, The allegation against him is of failing to prevent the incident by exercising control over his staff and student and also in failing to report the matter to the superior authorities. The Project Officer Shelke has admitted before the learned Sessions Court that inspection of the hostel was part of her duties. There is nothing on record to indicate that the Respondent was, in any manner, responsible for the day to day running of the Girls hostel. Rather, there was a Superintendent of the Girls hostel to discharge such function. The order of major penalty imposed upon her has already been interfered with by the learned MAT. 9. The learned MAT has also taken note of the fact that the Respondent had in fact taken steps in the early days to ensure that the matter did not escalate further but his superior authorities did not stand by him. There is nothing to dislodge such finding recorded by the learned MAT. Taking note of such facts, the learned MAT has held that the major penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the delinquent official was shockingly disproportionate to the nature of delinquency. Accordingly, the order of penalty was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the disciplinary authority to issue a fresh order of penalty in accordance with law. 10. After analyzing the impugned judgment we find that the view expressed by the learned Tribunal is not only a plausible view but the conclusion is also reasonable. Accordingly, the order of penalty was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the disciplinary authority to issue a fresh order of penalty in accordance with law. 10. After analyzing the impugned judgment we find that the view expressed by the learned Tribunal is not only a plausible view but the conclusion is also reasonable. Even if the allegation of negligence brought against the Respondent is sustained, even then, considering the nature of delinquency, the same in our considered opinion, would not justify the major penalty for dismissal from service. Viewed from that angle, we do not find any infirmity in the opinion expressed by the learned Tribunal. 11. Since the matter has now been remanded back to the disciplinary authority to take a fresh decision on the question of penalty to be imposed upon the Respondent, the impugned judgment and order of the learned MAT is found to be in consonance with the established principles of law. 12. Situated thus, we are of the view that there is no justifiable ground by this Court to interfere with the impugned order. The direction of the learned MAT be implemented within sixty (60) days from the date of this order. 13. This Writ Petition is, therefore, held to be devoid of any merit. The same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost.