ORDER : Kauser Edappagath, J. This revision petition has been directed against the judgment of the Court of Sessions, Thiruvananthapuram (for short, the appellate court) dismissing Crl.Appeal No.1075/2007 filed against the judgment of conviction and sentence of the Judicial First-Class Magistrate Court- I, Neyyattinkara (for short, the trial court) in ST No.52/2001. 2. The petitioner was the first accused in ST No.52/2001. He along with the second accused faced trial for the offences punishable under Sections 2(ia), 7(i), 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short, the PFA Act) r/w Rule 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (for short, the PFA Rules). 3. The prosecution allegation is that on 7/12/2000, at about 4:00 p.m., the Food Inspector of Neyyattinkara Municipality (PW1) visited the hotel run by the petitioner, viz. Raphy Hotel in Balaramapuram and purchased 12 covers of smart drinks kept for sale as per Ext.P6 voucher and Ext.P6 (a) bill. They were divided into three parts in accordance with the PFA Rules. After necessary formalities, one part of the sample was sent for analysis, and Ext.P12 report was obtained stating that the sample contained artificial sweetener, saccharin and therefore adulterated. Accordingly, the prosecution was launched before the trial court. 4. The petitioner appeared before the trial court. He filed an application to implead the manufacturer of the smart drink. Accordingly, the manufacturer was impleaded as the second accused. The second accused denied that he sold the materials to the petitioner. After the trial, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of the offences charged against him and he was convicted for the said offences. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The second accused was found not guilty, and he was acquitted. The petitioner challenged the conviction and sentence before the appellate court in Crl. Appeal No.1075/2007. The appellate court dismissed the appeal. This revision petition has been filed challenging the concurrent finding of conviction and sentence. 5. I have heard Sri. K. Ramakumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner assisted by Sri.Manu Tom and Sri.Sangeetha Raj, the learned Public Prosecutor. 6. Appeal No.1075/2007. The appellate court dismissed the appeal. This revision petition has been filed challenging the concurrent finding of conviction and sentence. 5. I have heard Sri. K. Ramakumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner assisted by Sri.Manu Tom and Sri.Sangeetha Raj, the learned Public Prosecutor. 6. Though several contentions were raised in the memorandum of revision petition, the learned Senior Counsel Sri.K.Ramakumar confined his argument only on one point -violation of Section 10 (7) of the PFA Act, which reads thus; “10. Powers of food inspectors - (1) A food inspector shall have power - xxxxx (7) Where the food inspector takes any action under clause (a) of sub-section (1), sub-section (2), sub- section (4) or sub-section (6), he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures.” It is submitted that there was non-compliance with Section 10 (7) of the PFA Act inasmuch as PW1 Food Inspector failed to procure the signature of the independent persons when he took the sample. Thus, the only issue that arises for consideration in this revision petition is whether the Food Inspector had complied with the provisions of Section 10 (7) of the PFA Act or not. The very same contention was taken up by the petitioner before the appellate court. However, the appellate court found that the evidence of PW1 will show that PW1 had called independent witnesses, but they did not sign the mahazar and thus there is substantial compliance with Section 10 (7) of the PFA Act. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Division Bench of this court in Food Inspector v. Narayanan ( 2003 (2) KLT 1035 ). 7. In Narayanan (supra), the following two questions were referred to the Division Bench for authoritative pronouncement: (i) Whether Section 10 (7) of PFA Act is mandatory. (ii) Whether the fact that one of the witnesses called by the Food Inspector to witness the sampling is an employee of the vendor would vitiate the proceedings against the vendor or the warrantor on the ground that the person called to witness the sampling is not an independent witness as insisted by Section 10(7). (ii) Whether the fact that one of the witnesses called by the Food Inspector to witness the sampling is an employee of the vendor would vitiate the proceedings against the vendor or the warrantor on the ground that the person called to witness the sampling is not an independent witness as insisted by Section 10(7). The Division Bench answered these two questions as follows: (i) Section 10 (7) of the PFA Act is not mandatory in the sense that non-compliance of the same by itself will not vitiate the proceedings in all cases (ii) Section 10(7) only casts a duty on the Food Inspector to call one or more persons to be present when he takes action. In the case where the Food Inspector called persons to witness the taking of a sample and none was willing to cooperate, the prosecution is relieved of its obligation to cite independent witnesses. 8. The Division Bench relied on a three bench decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Labhaya v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi ( AIR 1974 SC 789 ) wherein it was held that Section 10(7) of PFA Act casts an obligation on the Food Inspector only to call one or more persons to be present on the spot when he takes samples and he cannot compel their presence and, therefore, the prosecution is relieved of its obligation under this provision as and when the effort is made by the Food Inspector to associate independent witnesses by calling them to join the investigation and non compliance of Section 10(7) on refusal of such persons to join the investigation will not vitiate the trial. It was further held that the words “one or more persons” in Section 10(7) must be one or more independent persons. The Supreme Court has also found specifically that the provisions of Section 10(7) are mandatory and not obligatory. 9. It was further held that the words “one or more persons” in Section 10(7) must be one or more independent persons. The Supreme Court has also found specifically that the provisions of Section 10(7) are mandatory and not obligatory. 9. Section 10(7) of the PFA Act originally required that the Food Inspector, when he takes action either under the provisions of sub-sections (1)(a), (2), (4) or (6) to call as far as possible not less than two persons to be present at a time when such action is taken and take their signature, but that provision was amended by the Act of 1964 and instead it was provided that the Food Inspector shall call one or more persons at the time when such action is taken and take his/their signature. By the Amendment Act of 1964, the words “as far as possible” were deleted. It was held in Ram Labhaya (supra) that this deletion naturally lends plausibility to the contention that the provisions of Section 10(7) are mandatory. However, contrary to the said finding, the Division Bench in Narayanan (supra) took the view that provisions of Section 10(7) is not mandatory and from the totality of the evidence, regularity of the action in taking the sample from a particular shop by the Food Inspector is proved, proceedings can be sustained even if Section 10 (7) is not complied with. In Rajinder Kumar v. State of H.P. and Another [(2003) 11 SCC 120], following Ram Labhaya (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that the obligation cast on the Food Inspector under Section 10(7) is only to call one or more persons to be present when he takes action. 10. Thus, the law is well settled that “one or more persons” mentioned in Section 10(7) to witness the actions of the Food Inspector must necessarily be “one or more independent persons”. The provision in Section 10(7) that when the Food Inspector takes any action under sub-sections (1)(a), (2), (4) or (6), he shall call one or more independent witnesses and take their signatures to witness the action are mandatory and not obligatory. The provision in Section 10(7) that when the Food Inspector takes any action under sub-sections (1)(a), (2), (4) or (6), he shall call one or more independent witnesses and take their signatures to witness the action are mandatory and not obligatory. However, when earnest effort is made by the Food Inspector to secure the presence of one or more independent witnesses when he takes action under any of the provisions mentioned in sub-section (7) of Section 10, the prosecution is relieved of its obligation under these provisions and the refusal of such persons to stand as witness will not vitiate the trial. At the same time, total non-compliance with Section 10(7) and failure on the part of the Food Inspector to call one or more independent persons to witness his actions would certainly be fatal to the prosecution case. In other words, there must be positive evidence to prove that the Food Inspector made earnest efforts to associate with independent witnesses in the process of taking samples and in the absence of such evidence, the entire trial would be vitiated as provisions of Section 10 (7) are mandatory. Coming to the facts of the case, PW1 stated in his evidence that though he called two independent witnesses available, they refused to join as witnesses. However, when a specific question was asked, he could not disclose the name or details of those witnesses. There is no evidence with regard to the efforts made by PW1 to associate independent witnesses in the process of taking samples from the shop of the petitioner, other than his own interested testimony. PW2, the peon at the Neyyattinkara Municipality who accompanied PW1, deposed that he did not know whether PW1 had called any witness and he refused to sign in the mahazar. Yet another witness in Ext.P7 mahazar, who was an employee at the hotel viz., Zaid, was also not examined. For these reasons, I have no hesitation in holding that there is no reliable and credible evidence to establish that PW1 had made any earnest effort to associate the independent witnesses as required under Section 10(7). The evidence of PW1 alone is not sufficient to prove the effort made by him to associate with independent witnesses before taking the sample. For these reasons, I have no hesitation in holding that there is no reliable and credible evidence to establish that PW1 had made any earnest effort to associate the independent witnesses as required under Section 10(7). The evidence of PW1 alone is not sufficient to prove the effort made by him to associate with independent witnesses before taking the sample. Therefore, the concurrent finding of conviction and sentence against the petitioner is liable to be interfered with for total non-compliance with the provisions of Section 10(7). Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court in S.T.No.52/2001 as confirmed by the appellate court in Crl. Appeal No.1075/2007 are hereby set aside. The petitioner is found not guilty of the offences charged against him, and he is acquitted. The criminal revision petition is allowed.