ORDER : 1. Heard Smt.Pooja R Savadatti, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri. T.Hanumareddy, the learned AGA for respondent-State. 2. The petitioners are accused Nos.2 & 3. Qua accused No.1, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Crl.P.No.101496/2021 disposed off on 26 th March 2024, had quashed the proceedings. The same reads as follows: “1. The petitioner who is accused No.1 calls in question registration of crime in Crime No.134 of 2019 for offences punishable under Sections 324, 326, 504, 506 r/w 34 of the IPC and pending before the I Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and JMFC, Dharwad. 2. Heard Sri Jagdish Patil and Smt. Pooja Savadatti learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri V.S. Kalasurmath, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1. Respondent No.2 though served long ago, remains unrepresented. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: The 2 nd respondent is the complainant and the petitioner is accused No.1. The father of the petitioner institutes a suit in O.S.No.131 of 2012 against the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, Hosategur, Dharwad District and the Tahsildar, Dharwad. The said suit was for permanent injunction against the defendants. The suit was instituted on a cause of action that the 1st respondent/defendant had entered the suit premises with some of its panchayat Members on political motive and started obstructing peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property. The obstruction to peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property is with regard to the entry of the property to be belonging to the Gram Panchayat and directing eviction of the plaintiff from the suit land. The suit is decreed by an order of the Court on 02-08-2012 holding that the property belongs to the plaintiff, the father of the petitioner. The Secretary of the Gram Panchayat and the Tahsildar filed an appeal against the said judgment and decree in R.A.No.182 of 2015. The Regular Appeal comes to be allowed by an order of the First Appellate Court on 23-11-2015, setting aside the judgment and decree passed in the aforesaid O.S.No.131 of 2012 and remanding the matter back to the concerned Court. The complainant is one who has set up certain shops in the area which is the subject matter of squabble between the Gram Panchayat and the family of the petitioner. On 21-11-2019 an incident is said to have happened in Sy.No.542 of the village. The complainant is one who has set up certain shops in the area which is the subject matter of squabble between the Gram Panchayat and the family of the petitioner. On 21-11-2019 an incident is said to have happened in Sy.No.542 of the village. The background to the said complaint is that, in Sy.No.542, about 20 years ago, six shops were rented out by the Panchayat, out of which one shop was rented out to the family of the complainant. It is alleged that on 21-11-2019 at about 5.30 p.m. the petitioner along with others come to Sy.No.542 in the village and hurled abuses and created ruckus. This becomes a crime in Crime No.134 of 2019 for the aforesaid offences. The registration of crime is what drives the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. This Court, in terms of its interim order dated 23- 03-2022, had interdicted further investigation on the ground that the incident is said to have taken place in Block No.542 or Sy.No.542 of Tegur village, which was not existence in the village at all. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would take this Court through the documents appended to the petition with particular reference to the complaint so registered by the complainant and the remand request. The learned counsel would submit that nothing is found in the complaint. All that the complaint narrates is events that have happened in Sy.No.542. The remand request also indicates that it has happened in Sy.No.542. Sy.No.542 is not even existing in the village is the endorsement given by the Village Accountant. Insofar as the offence alleged concerning Arms Act, the allegation found is that he has removed the pellets and fired in the air. He would submit that the entire allegations are shrouded with improbabilities. The learned counsel would emphasize on the fact that the proceedings initiated by the petitioner against the Panchayat has resulted in eviction of the complainant. Therefore, the story is twined that the incident had happened on the said date. 5. The learned High Court Government Pleader while placing the records of investigation conducted up to date would seek to submit that there are statements recorded with regard to the incident. The second respondent - complainant receives the notice on 10.04.2022 from the hands of the Court and the service of notice is also noted in the order sheet of the Court. The second respondent - complainant receives the notice on 10.04.2022 from the hands of the Court and the service of notice is also noted in the order sheet of the Court. The complainant remains unrepresented despite himself receiving the notice, though the matter is listed close to six occasions. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned High Court Government Pleader are heard. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the statements recorded are all of the relatives of the complainant who were rented out with certain shops in the disputed land and, therefore, he would contend that the entire issue is a counter-blast to the proceedings instituted by the petitioner. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. It is the case of the complainant that property in revenue Sy.No. 542 of Hosategur village consists of 6 shops, out of which one shop is allotted to the aunt of the complainant by name Akkamma and a years back, the said Akkamma dies. Her daughter Channamma Chabbi took over the shop and running her business in the said shop from about 3 months. When the shop collapsed due to heavy rainfall, Channamma Chabbi had re- constructed the shop, at which point in time, the petitioner is said to have objected to the same. There began the squabble between the aunt of the complainant and the petitioner. It is further averred in the complaint that on 21-11-2019 when the complainant was proceeding on his goods vehicle towards Kittur, the petitioner and accused Nos. 2 and 3 stopped the vehicle near the bus stop of the village, dragged the complainant from the vehicle, abused him with filthy language and assaulted him. At that time one Abbayya Naviramath and Manjunath Hunasikatti came to the rescue of the complainant and tried to pacify the scuffle. Thereafter the complainant sought to register a crime against the petitioner, which has become a crime in crime No.134 of 2019 on 22-11-2019 for the incidents that have happened on 21-11-2019 for offences punishable under Sections 324, 326, 504, 506 r/w 34 of the IPC. The narration in the complaint is repeated in the remand request. Thereafter the complainant sought to register a crime against the petitioner, which has become a crime in crime No.134 of 2019 on 22-11-2019 for the incidents that have happened on 21-11-2019 for offences punishable under Sections 324, 326, 504, 506 r/w 34 of the IPC. The narration in the complaint is repeated in the remand request. Few of the paragraphs of the remand request assume significance in the case at hand and they read as follows: “.... .... .... A little history to the registration of the complaint is what is required to be noticed. The father of the petitioner is the owner of certain property which the Panchayat is claiming its rights over the said property. It is in the precincts of the said Panchayat shops are established and are rented out, one of which to the aunt of the complainant. Dispute arose against the petitioner and the Panchayat. The dispute leads the father of the petitioner to institute a suit in O.S.No.131 of 2012 seeking permanent injunction against the Gram Panchayat and the Tahsildar. The suit is decreed by granting permanent injunction. This is called in question by the Panchayat and the Tahsildar in Regular Appeal No.182 of 2015, which comes to be disposed of by an order dated 23-11-2015 setting aside the judgment and decree and remitting the matter back to the hands of the concerned Court with certain directions. 9. The result of the squabble between the petitioner and the Panchayat has the direct effect of eviction of the complainant’s aunt who has a shop, which is the subject matter of the suit between the petitioner and the Panchayat. After the registration of the complaint, information is secured at the hands of the Village Accountant as to whether block No.542 was in the limits of the Hosathegur village where the alleged squabble is said to have taken place. The endorsement by the Village Accountant reads as follows: The endorsement is by the competent officer of the village. It clearly indicates that no property bearing block No.542 exists in Hosathegur village or within any limits of the said village. If civil suits are pending against the warring parties, the inference that can be drawn is that, a place of squabble is projected without there being any place bearing block No.542. Therefore, it hinges upon the improbability of the incident itself. The complaint was registered on 22.11.2019. If civil suits are pending against the warring parties, the inference that can be drawn is that, a place of squabble is projected without there being any place bearing block No.542. Therefore, it hinges upon the improbability of the incident itself. The complaint was registered on 22.11.2019. The subject petition was filed on 03.08.2021 and for the first time on 23.03.2022, a co-ordinate bench of this Court grants an interim order, which reads as follows: “The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the alleged incident has taken place in Block No.542 of Tegur Village, however, the said survey number is not in existence which is evident from the certificate issued by the Village Accountant. The learned High Court Government Pleader accepts notice for the first respondent. Issue emergent notice to the second respondent. The further proceedings in Crime No.134/2019 registered by the Garag Police Station is hereby stayed till the next date of hearing. List this petition on 18.04.2022.” Therefore, from 22.11.2019 to 23.03.2022, no charge sheet was filed against the petitioner, who has arrayed as accused No.1. Though non- filing of a charge sheet for three years can lead to obliteration of a crime, what is necessary to be noticed is the very happening of the incident. If the incident has happened at the place it is alleged to have happened, there would be impediment to file a charge sheet immediately. The improbabilities of the incident is what brings the subject petition within the ambit of 7 postulates enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJANLAL, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 . The Apex Court has held as follows: “102. The improbabilities of the incident is what brings the subject petition within the ambit of 7 postulates enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJANLAL, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 . The Apex Court has held as follows: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Emphasis supplied) As observed hereinabove, the direct effect of the squabble between the petitioner and the Panchayat over the property would lead to eviction of the complainant’s aunt. Therefore, it is also a case where the complaint is registered to arm twist the petitioner to permit the complainant to continue in the rented shops and not take any action, be it, by the Panchayat or by the petitioner. The Apex Court in plethora of judgments has clearly held that criminal law being set into motion in proceedings which are purely civil in nature are only to arm twist the accused and has held that the proceedings should not be permitted to be continued as it would be permitting continuous of the crime and by putting a premium on the act of wreaking vengeance or arm twisting by the complainant. The Apex Court in identical circumstances, where cases are registered to wreak vengeance or arm twist the accused by the complainant, in VARALA BHARATH KUMAR V. STATE OF TELANGANA, (2017) 9 SCC 413 has held as follows: “5. Respondent 2, though served, has chosen to remain absent. We have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties who are present and perused the record. Having carefully perused the first information report, as well as, the contents of the charge-sheet, we find that the ingredients of Sections 498-A and 406 IPC are not forthcoming. Respondent 2, though served, has chosen to remain absent. We have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties who are present and perused the record. Having carefully perused the first information report, as well as, the contents of the charge-sheet, we find that the ingredients of Sections 498-A and 406 IPC are not forthcoming. The entire story narrated by the complainant does not attract the aforementioned provisions, as there has not been any dowry demand of the appellants or harassment to the second respondent. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to note the provisions of Sections 498-A, 405 and 406 of the Penal Code, which read thus: “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” “405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”. Explanation 1.—A person, being an employer of an establishment whether exempted under Section 17 of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not who deducts the employee's contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family Pension Fund established by any law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid. Explanation 2.—A person, being an employer, who deducts the employees' contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to the Employees' State Insurance Fund held and administered by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation established under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid. 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 6. It is by now well settled that the extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is by now well settled that the extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where allegations made in the first information report/the complaint or the outcome of investigation as found in the charge-sheet, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case against the accused; where the allegations do not disclose the ingredients of the offence alleged; where the uncontroverted allegations made in the first information report or complaint and the material collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of offence alleged and make out a case against the accused; where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be exercised. 7. While exercising power under Section 482 or under Article 226 in such matters, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully or with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down under Section 482 itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone courts exist. The court must be careful and see that its decision in exercise of its power is based on sound principles. The inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. 8. We are conscious of the fact that, Section 498-A was added to the Code with a view to punish the husband or any of his relatives, who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. 8. We are conscious of the fact that, Section 498-A was added to the Code with a view to punish the husband or any of his relatives, who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. Keeping the aforementioned object in mind, we have dealt with the matter. We do not find any allegation of subjecting the complainant to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. The records at hand could not disclose any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the complainant to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the complainant. So also, there is nothing on record to show that there was a demand of dowry by the appellants or any of their relatives, either prior to the marriage, during the marriage or after the marriage. The record also does not disclose anywhere that the husband of the complainant acted, with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand of any property or valuable security. 9. The ingredients of criminal breach of trust are also not forthcoming from the records as against the appellants. The allegations contained in the complaint and the chargesheet do not satisfy the definition of criminal breach of trust, as contained in Section 405 IPC. In view of the blurred allegations, and as we find that the complainant is only citing the incidents of unhappiness with her husband, no useful purpose will be served in continuing the prosecution against the appellants. This is a case where there is a total absence of allegations for the offences punishable under Section 498- A and Section 406 IPC. In the matter on hand, the allegations made in the first information report as well as the material collected during the investigation, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC against the appellant-accused. So also the uncontroverted allegations found against the appellants do not disclose the commission of the offence alleged and make out a case against the accused. So also the uncontroverted allegations found against the appellants do not disclose the commission of the offence alleged and make out a case against the accused. The proceedings initiated against the appellants are liable to be quashed.” Later, in the case of SURESH KUMAR GOYAL V. STATE OF U.P. , (2019) 14 SCC 318 , the Apex Court has held as follows: “12. While dealing with the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings at the stage of issuance of process, or at the stage of committal, or at the stage of framing of charges, that is to say before the commencement of actual trial, in the light of material placed on record by the accused, this Court in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 158, laid down as under : (SCC pp. 347-348, paras 28-30) “28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held. 29. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held. 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one : whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two : whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three : whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four : whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 13. In the present case the shares in question, right since the date of acquisition have always been in the custody of Appellant 1. The material on record is absolutely clear that the acquisition was from the funds of Appellant 1. The complainant has merely alleged that the funds came from his bank account but beyond such allegations no material has been placed on record at any stage. The material on record is absolutely clear that the acquisition was from the funds of Appellant 1. The complainant has merely alleged that the funds came from his bank account but beyond such allegations no material has been placed on record at any stage. The stand taken by the appellants in their application under Section 245(2) CrPC is quite clear that the shares can be sold in the market and the proceeds can be divided between Appellant 2 and Respondent 2. If Respondent 2 is insisting on having complete ownership in respect of the shares concerned, the matter must first be established before a competent forum. We have considered the material on record through the steps indicated in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 158 and are convinced that the instant case calls for interference under Section 482 CrPC. Further, from the facts that Appellant 1 had disowned Respondent 2 and had filed civil proceedings seeking appropriate orders against them, we are also convinced that the present criminal complaint is nothing but an attempt to wreak vengeance against the father, brother and the brother-in-law of the complainant. The instant criminal complaint is an abuse of the process of court and is required to be quashed.” In the light of the aforesaid facts and the judgments of the Apex Court supra, permitting further investigation against the petitioner - accused No.1 would become an abuse of the process of the law and result in miscarriage of justice. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER: (i) Criminal petition is allowed. (ii) The Crime registered in Crime No.134 of 2019 Stands quashed qua the petitioner-accused No.1. (iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings pending against the petitioner before any other fora.” 3. The learned HCGP would not dispute the position and accept the fact that qua the accused No.1, the proceedings are quashed. 4. In that light, the petition deserves to succeed. Accordingly, the following: ORDER: i. The Criminal Petition is allowed. ii. The proceedings in C.C. No.4196/2024 on the file of I Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) and JMFC, Dharwad is quashed qua the petitioners.