JUDGMENT : HARISANKAR V. MENON, J. The petitioner has filed the captioned writ petition seeking to challenge Ext.P15 order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), against the findings in Ext.P13 order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Ernakulam, in an application filed by the 3 rd respondent herein under the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). 2. The 3 rd respondent had obtained some credit facilities from the 1 st respondent-Bank. Insofar as the repayment was not punctual, the Bank initiated steps with reference to the provisions of the Act. It is not in dispute that a possession notice under Section 13(4) of the Act was served on the 3 rd respondent herein. Later, the property was placed for sale on 17.09.2004, and the petitioner herein had participated in the sale and became the successful bidder. On the basis of the sale effected, the possession of the property was handed over, which is evident from Ext.P4 dated 19.03.2005. The petitioner contends that on the basis of the sale so effected, a sale certificate was also issued to him, and the same was also registered. Later, Ext.P8 application was filed by the 3 rd respondent herein under Section 17 of the Act, seeking to set aside the sale effected on 17.09.2004, as carried out without complying with the mandatory requirements under the Act. The petitioner herein entered appearance and filed a detailed written statement, essentially contending that the application filed as above was belated with reference to the provisions of the Statute. The DRT, Ernakulam by Ext.P11 found the issue in favour of the petitioner herein and against the 3 rd respondent. Then the 3 rd respondent approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.34683 of 2005, and by Ext.P12 judgment dated 24.06.2015, this Court found that the matter requires a revisit at the hands of the DRT, and hence the impugned order was set aside, directing a fresh consideration. On the basis of the afore directions, Ext.P13 order came to be issued by the DRT; however, this time, finding the issue in favour of the 3 rd respondent herein holding that the application was filed within the period prescribed under Section 17(1) of the Act. On the basis of the afore directions, Ext.P13 order came to be issued by the DRT; however, this time, finding the issue in favour of the 3 rd respondent herein holding that the application was filed within the period prescribed under Section 17(1) of the Act. The Tribunal found so, essentially on account of the contention raised by the 3 rd respondent that he was not served with any notice with respect to the alleged sale held on 17.09.2004. Therefore, the order at Ext.P13 was challenged by the petitioner herein before the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal, by Ext.P15 order dated 09.09.2019 at paragraph No.8, found that in view of the factual circumstances pointed out - the alleged lapse and irregularities committed by the Bank as well as the auction purchaser, the presiding officer is justified in “ignoring the defect of limitations”. Thereafter, the Appellate Tribunal directed the borrower to compensate the auction purchaser in the manner noticed in paragraph No.9 of the order. 3. It is in such circumstances that the captioned writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking to challenge Exts.P13 and P15 orders issued by the DRT and the DRAT, respectively. 4. I have heard Sri.Zakeer Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri.K.C.Eldho, learned counsel for the 3 rd respondent, as well as Sri.Lal K. Joseph, learned counsel for the 1 st respondent Bank. 5. The short issue arising for consideration in this writ petition would be as regards the findings rendered by the DRT in Ext.P13 order, with reference to the interpretation of the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act. The provisions of Section 17(1) reads as under: “(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower”. (underlining supplied) A reading of the afore provision would show that the 3 rd respondent herein-the borrower, was entitled to make an application seeking to challenge the “measures” taken with reference to the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Act. It is with reference to the afore power that the 3 rd respondent has admittedly, filed Ext.P8 application. A reading of para.16 of Ext.P8 application would show that the 3 rd respondent has taken up the contention that he came to know about the alleged sale of the property only as per the letter dated 22.12.2004, served on him on 29.12.2004, and hence with reference to that date, the application was well within the prescribed period. At the same time, this Court notices the fact that the notice under Section 13(4) of the Act with reference to taking over possession of the property was served on the 3 rd respondent herein by the Bank on 29.05.2004, is not in dispute. The 3 rd respondent herein had initially taken steps to challenge the afore notice, and it is even thereafter that the subsequent proceedings were instituted before the DRT, seeking to challenge the subsequent sale on 17.09.2004. It is the case of Sri.Eldho, on behalf of the 3 rd respondent herein, that insofar as no sale notice was served on the 3 rd respondent, the 3 rd respondent was perfectly justified in instituting the application under Section 17(1) with reference to the date of service of the letter dated 22.12.2004. But this Court is of the opinion that insofar as the provisions of Section 17(1) specifically provides for “measures” taken, with reference to the provisions of Section 13(4) of the Act, insofar as the 3 rd respondent admits that he was served with the possession notice on the afore date, the 3 rd respondent may not be justified in taking up the contention that insofar as he was not served with a sale notice, he is entitled to challenge the sale with reference to the date of service of the letter dated 22.12.2004. 6. This Court further notices the provisions of Section 17(1), extracted above, which provide for filing of an application within 45 days from the date on which such “measures” had been taken. The afore “such measures” refers to the measures adopted under Section 13(4) of the Act. 6. This Court further notices the provisions of Section 17(1), extracted above, which provide for filing of an application within 45 days from the date on which such “measures” had been taken. The afore “such measures” refers to the measures adopted under Section 13(4) of the Act. Insofar as, admittedly, the notice of possession is served on the 3 rd respondent on 29.05.2004, the subsequent sale notice, merely because the same was not served, even if it is assumed so, will not entitle the 3 rd respondent to maintain a fresh application under Section 17(1), when the 3 rd respondent was informed about the sale during December, 2004. 7. In this connection, this Court notices the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Indian Bank v. George [ 2020 (6) KLT 289 ] , wherein it has been held by this Court that under the provisions of the Act, the DRT has no power to entertain an application presented beyond the period of 45 days from the date on which the impugned “measures’ have been taken. 8. This Court further notices the findings rendered by the DRAT in Ext.P15 order, to the effect that, on the face of the relevant facts and figures, though, there was limitation as contended by the petitioner and the 1 st respondent herein, the Presiding Officer had every power to ignore the afore delay. I am at a loss to understand the afore reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal. A reading of the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act does not extend any such leeway to the Presiding Officer to ignore the limitation, assuming that there are certain procedural irregularities, as contended by the 3 rd respondent herein.