JUDGMENT : The present interlocutory application has been filed under section 5 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963 for condonation of delay of 174 days in filing of the instant Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having been satisfied with the reasons stated in paragraph Nos. 3 onwards to the present Interlocutory Application stating therein that the substituted petitioner in W.P.(S) No.564/2019 submitted her representation through speed post on 10.4.2024. Thereafter, matter was examined and direction was sought from the higher authorities for further action. Accordingly, matter was placed before competent authorities at different stages in the office of the Director General of Police, Jharkhand, whereby, it was decided to obtain opinion of Law Department, Govt. of Jharkhand who sent the file to the Learned Advocate General for his opinion and the Learned Advocate General gave his opinion that L.P.A. be filed in the instant case through the office of Standing Counsel-IV. Thereafter, it was provided to the office of the concerned advocate and thereafter it was placed for approval of the competent authority and thereafter present L.P.A. was filed 27.09.2024. However, till then certified copy of the impugned order could not have been obtained which was subsequently filed on 17.10.2024 and thus the delay in filing the appeal is due to procedural technicalities and was not deliberate, we hereby condone the delay of 174 days’ in filing the appeal. 3. Accordingly, the present Interlocutory Application stands allowed. L.P.A. No. 617 of 2024 1. The present Appeal has been filed under Clause-10 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 06.03.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 564 of 2019, whereby and whereunder, the learned Single Judge has been pleased to allow the writ petition by quashing the order of dismissal from service dated 21.2.2018 with further direction to release the death-cum-retiral benefits of the original petitioner by treating him in service at the time of his death, however, without any back wages on the principle of ‘no work no pay’. 2. The brief facts, as per the writ petition is that the original petitioner was posted as Sub-Inspector of Police at Tisri Police Station in District-Giridih and he was made the Investigating Officer of Tisri P.S. Case No. 37/16 registered under Sections 147 /148/149//354/379/307/436 of 1.P.C and Tisri P.S. Case No. 38/2016 registered under Sections 147 /148/149/354/379/307 of IPC, both instituted on 09.10.2016. The original petitioner was arrested by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) on the allegation made by one Naresh Yadav that the I.O. of the aforesaid cases had demanded Rs.3,000/- from each of the accused persons of Tisri P.S. Case No. 38/2016 on the pretext of deleting their names from the said case. Subsequently, on verification of the allegation, A.C.B Dhanbad P.S. Case No. 15 of 2016 was registered on 30.11.2016 against the original petitioner. It was further alleged that the original petitioner was caught red handed by a team of ACB on 01.12.2016 while receiving bribe of Rs.10,000/- and he was remanded to judicial custody on 02.12.2016. Thereafter, he was suspended from service with immediate effect vide Giridih District Order No. 2623/2016 as contained in memo No. 6078 dated 02.12.2016 issued by the respondent No.3. A memo of charge was issued by the respondent No.3 to the original petitioner vide D.O. No. 2703/16 on 08.12.2016 for showing extreme lethargy, dereliction of duty, indiscipline, masterfulness, arbitrariness, inaction, violation of order, being caught red handed by Anti-Corruption Bureau while taking bribe of Rs.10,000/-, involvement in corruption and being an incompetent police officer. An explanation was asked from the original petitioner vide memo No. 2726/Confidential dated 12.09.2017 issued under the signature of the respondent No.3. He submitted his explanation on 24.09.2017 before the respondent No.3 requesting inter alia to stay the departmental proceeding till the final order was passed in the criminal case instituted against him. However, the enquiry officer proceeded with the enquiry and submitted report observing that the aforesaid charges against the original petitioner stood proved and also recommended for his dismissal from service. Thereafter, the respondent No.4 dismissed the original petitioner from service vide the impugned order dated 21.02.2018. The original petitioner then preferred an appeal against the said order of "dismissal from service" before the respondent No.2, however, the same was also rejected vide the impugned order dated 06.11.2018. 3. It is evident from the facts that the original writ petitioner, husband of the present writ petitioner, while working as Sub-Inspector of Police at Tisri Police Station has been trapped while taking amount of gratification and, thereafter, criminal case was instituted against him and he was taken into custody. A departmental proceeding has also been initiated against himwhich was concluded with an order of dismissal from service while the deceased employee was in service. 4. A departmental proceeding has also been initiated against himwhich was concluded with an order of dismissal from service while the deceased employee was in service. 4. The husband of the writ petitioner, the deceased employee, has preferred a writ petition challenging the order of dismissal mainly on the ground that the complainant, namely, Naresh Yadav on whose behest the complaint was instituted before the Anti Corruption Bureau has not been examinednor Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, Police Inspector-cum-investigating officer, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Dhanbad, was examined during the departmental enquiry. All the witnesses examined during the departmental proceeding were hearsay witnesses who neither proved the factum of demand nor the acceptance of illegal gratification. Further the ground was taken that during pendency of the criminal charge the departmental proceeding ought to have been stayed till the conclusion of criminal case. 5. The learned Single Judge has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter and has come to a conclusion that the allegation against the petitioner in criminal case and in departmental proceeding was identical and further by taking into consideration the non-adherence of Principle of Natural Justice by the authority concerned, has allowed the writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition has been allowed by interfering with the order of dismissal with a direction to release all the post death- cum- retiral benefits without any back wages on the principle of ‘no work no pay’ due to demise of the original petitioner which is the subject matter of the present appeal. The arguments advanced on behalf of the State-appellant: 6. The learned counsel for the State-appellant has taken the following grounds: (i) That the learned Single Judge while proceeding on the premise that the departmental proceeding and criminal case should not be allowed to be proceeded simultaneously, has interfered with the order of punishment of dismissal which cannot be said to be just and proper due to the reason that the departmental proceeding and the criminal case can go simultaneously as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “ Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited &Anrreported in (1993) 3 SCC 679which has not been properly appreciated. (ii) It is also submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Sarvesh Berry [S.L.P (Civil) No. 24560 of 2003] has held that criminal case and departmental proceeding can proceed simultaneously. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited &Anrreported in (1993) 3 SCC 679which has not been properly appreciated. (ii) It is also submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Sarvesh Berry [S.L.P (Civil) No. 24560 of 2003] has held that criminal case and departmental proceeding can proceed simultaneously. (iii) Further, it has been submitted that Letter No. 8000 dated 2.9.2015 issued by Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand does not prohibit the initiation of departmental proceeding during the pendency of a criminal case. It is only when the criminal case of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and facts it is desirable to stay the departmental proceeding till the conclusion of the criminal case. There is no strait jacket formula that in each and every case where a criminal case is pending the departmental proceeding should be stayed. (iv) The learned counsel for the State based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, suffers from error and, hence, it is fit to be quashed and set-aside. Analysis: 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gonethrough the impugned judgment and also to the materials available on record. The main limb of argument as has been advanced on behalf of the State, the appellant herein, is that the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited &Anr.(supra)has not properly been appreciated. 8. This Court, therefore, is proceeding to consider the aforesaid arguments in the premise of legal proposition settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited &Anr. (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the following guidelines as to in which case the departmental proceeding and the criminal case will allow to go parallel and in which case the departmental proceeding will have to wait for outcome of criminal case. For ready reference the paragraph of aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein under: “22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. For ready reference the paragraph of aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein under: “22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v.) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.” 9. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that if the allegation against the criminal case and the departmental proceeding is so complex that it cannot be segregated then in such circumstances, the departmental proceeding has to wait for outcome of the criminal proceeding. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that if the allegation against the criminal case and the departmental proceeding is so complex that it cannot be segregated then in such circumstances, the departmental proceeding has to wait for outcome of the criminal proceeding. We, on consideration of the aforesaid judgment and adverting to the factual aspect particularly by comparing with the accusation made in the First Information Report and the departmental proceedings, have found that the fact of the case is not so complex that it cannot be segregated reason being that the charge framed in the departmental proceeding pertains to the dereliction in duty, indiscipline, masterfulness, arbitrariness, inaction, violation of order and the involvement in the corruption while the charge in the criminal case is of accepting the gratification, hence, the law as laid down in the case of Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited &Anr. (supra) the case is not so complex so that it cannot be segregated but this aspect has not been taken into consideration by the learned writ court. 10. This Court therefore is of the view that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order that the facts pertaining to criminal case and the departmental proceeding are identical, this Court is of the view that the said findings cannot be said to be proper. 11. The fact remains, as would appear from comparison of the memorandum of charge and the imputation made in the First Information Report based upon the complaint made by the informant, namely, Naresh Yadav, the charge cannot be said to be similar, since in the departmental proceeding the question of moral turpitude and the lack of confidence have also been taken as a charge which is evident from the bare perusal of memorandum of charge compared with the criminal proceeding wherein the allegation has been leveled for accepting gratification leading to institution of a case under section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. For reference the charge as available in the FIR and the memorandum of charge pertaining to the Departmental Proceeding are as under: The charge as per First Information Report: 12. It is the admitted case that the complainant has not been examined during course of departmental proceeding. For reference the charge as available in the FIR and the memorandum of charge pertaining to the Departmental Proceeding are as under: The charge as per First Information Report: 12. It is the admitted case that the complainant has not been examined during course of departmental proceeding. The law is settled that non-examination of the complainant in a departmental proceeding amounts to violation of principles of natural justice and if there is violation of principles of natural justice then the decision so taken by the disciplinary authority, on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, cannot be said to be proper. 13. We are conscious that the proposition of law is that the High Court while exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may wish to interfere with the administrative decision taken by the disciplinary authority, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran , AIR 2015 SC 545 , in particular to paragraph 13, laying down following guidelines which are self-explanatory: “ 13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. , (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has laid down that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali , AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down following guidelines at paragraph 8 for interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali , AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down following guidelines at paragraph 8 for interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to reappreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re- appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Ors. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran , reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 14. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 14. It would be evident from the aforesaid judgment that if in a case of violation of principles of natural justice, the decision taken by the disciplinary authority, on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, is to be interfered exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The non-examination of the complainant amounts to violation of principles of natural justice which has been settled and has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi Ors. Vs. Jai Bhagwan reported in (2011) 6 SCC 376 . The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted hereunder: “16. .. Non-examination of the complainant and P.S. Narang during the departmental proceeding has denied the respondent of his right of cross- examination and thus caused violation of Rule 16(iii) of the Delhi Police (F&A) Rules, 1980. 17. In the absence of such a definite/clear proof supporting the case of the appellants it is difficult to draw a finding of taking illegal gratification by the respondent from the complainant. Therefore, as rightly held by the High Court the present case is a case of no evidence.” 15. This Court therefore taking into consideration the admitted fact that the complainant has not been examined which has also been taken note in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge at paragraph No. 17 wherein reference has been made that “ it is evident from the enquiry report annexed as Annexure-A to the supplementary counter affidavit dated 132.12.2023 that neither the complainant, Naresh Yadav, on whose complaint ACB, Dhanbad PS Case No. 15 of 2016 was lodged, nor Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, Police Inspector-cum-Investigating Officer, Anti- Corruption Bureau, Dhanbad, was examined during the departmental enquiry”. Therefore, the learned Single Judge is correct in considering the non-examination of the complainant coupled with the Investigating Officer of the criminal case and, as such, the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that enquiry cannot be said to be fair. 16. Therefore, the aforesaid findings of the learned Single Judge, according to our considered view, cannot be said to be suffers from error. 17. 16. Therefore, the aforesaid findings of the learned Single Judge, according to our considered view, cannot be said to be suffers from error. 17. Therefore, this Court is of the view that impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 564 of 2019 requires no interference. Thus, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. 18. The appellants, herein, are directed to disburse the death-cum- retiral benefits in favour of the writ petitioner, positively within a period of two months, from the date of receipt of copy of this order.