Order : (Rakesh Mohan Pandey, J.) 1. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Principal District Judge, Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in MJC No. 31/2024 dated 08.11.2024, whereby, the application moved by the petitioner for condonation of delay was rejected and Miscellaneous Appeal preferred under Order 43 Rule 1(c) of CPC was dismissed. 2. The facts, in a nutshell, are that the petitioner filed a Civil Suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents with regard to survey Nos. 116, 358, 535/1, 885, and 2324 total admeasuring 1.63 acres situated at Village Sukulpara Kharod, Patwari Circle No. 27, Tahsil Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Champa inter alia on the ground that the original owner of the property i.e. his grandmother willed out the property in his favour. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement. The matter was set for evidence of the petitioner on 26.06.2018 but he failed to appear; therefore, the Civil Suit No. 24A/2013 was dismissed for want of prosecution. 3. The petitioner moved an application under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC for restoration of Civil Suit along with an application for condonation of delay and the same was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Class II vide order dated 03.01.2020. 4. The petitioner preferred a Miscellaneous Appeal against the order dated 03.01.2020 on 05.04.2024 along with an application for condonation of delay. In the application, the petitioner assigned reasons for the delay that he suffered a paralytic attack and was under treatment of one Dr. Ramayan Singh. He annexed a prescription from the treating Doctor and a medical certificate. According to the medical certificate, the petitioner was under treatment by that Doctor from 20.12.2019 to 10.03.2024. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner explained the cause of the delay properly. He would further submit that a medical prescription and certificate issued by the treating Doctor were produced along with the application for condonation of delay. He would also submit that the learned Court below ought to have taken a liberal view while dealing with the application for condonation of delay as the right of the petitioner was not decided on merits. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India and others, (2021) 5 SCC 321. 6. On the other hand, Mr. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India and others, (2021) 5 SCC 321. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjeev Agrawal, Panel Lawyer appearing for the State would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Sahu. He would submit that there was an inordinate delay in filing the appeal; therefore, the learned Court below rightly rejected the application for condonation of delay. 7. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents placed on the record. 8. The Civil Suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed for want of prosecution on 26.06.2018. The petitioner moved an application for restoration under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC before the learned trial Court along with an application for condonation of delay. According to the pleadings made in the writ petition, there was a delay of 210 days in filing such application. The application was rejected on 03.01.2020. 9. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(c) of CPC against the order dated 03.01.2020 on 05.04.2024. There was a delay of four years and four months in filing the appeal. The petitioner stated that he suffered a paralytic attack on 11.11.2019. He was under the treatment of a Medical Officer from 20.12.2019 to 10.03.2024. It is further stated that when he became fit, he approached his counsel, who informed him that the application for restoration was rejected vide order dated 03.01.2020, and thereafter, he collected the certified copy of the order dated 03.01.2020 and preferred the appeal. A certificate was issued by the treating Doctor to the effect that the petitioner was under his treatment from 20.12.2019 to 10.03.2024. 10. The petitioner in the application for condonation of delay has annexed only the prescription given by that Medical Officer. It cannot be presumed that thereafter treating Doctor never prescribed medicines or examined the petitioner. Further, the petitioner could have told his children to approach the counsel to enquire about the status of the case, but no steps were taken and he kept mum for long four years and four months. 11. It cannot be presumed that thereafter treating Doctor never prescribed medicines or examined the petitioner. Further, the petitioner could have told his children to approach the counsel to enquire about the status of the case, but no steps were taken and he kept mum for long four years and four months. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay in the matter of Sridevi Datla (supra) held that the adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Relevant para 25 is reproduced herein-below:- “25. Much later, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 this court referred to a large number of previous judgments 1 , and observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Other decisions have highlighted that there cannot be a universal formula to judge whether sufficient cause has, or has not been shown and the exercise is necessarily fact specific; in Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh, (2010) 6 SCC 786 , the court held: “16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.” 12. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector ( LA ) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3 (1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 13. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85 , it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50 , wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363 , where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81 , this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 14. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. 14. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 15. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 17. Human Beings are mortal and the litigation cannot be made immortal for an indefinite period. A liberal approach cannot be adopted to condone delay when the petitioner himself was not vigilant. The suit was dismissed for want of prosecution thereafter he preferred an application under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC with a delay of 210 days and after its dismissal, filed an appeal with a delay of four years and four months. Mere filing a medical certificate or only a medical prescription cannot be held as a proper explanation for such an inordinate delay. 18. Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), no case is made out for interference. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s).