ORDER : FARJAND ALI, J. 1. By way of filing this civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 15.07.2010 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Chittorgarh (Rajasthan) in Original Civil Suit No. 14/2008, whereby the learned Court below dismissed the petitioner’s application filed under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the CPC, seeking determination of questions arising in the course of execution of the decree. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present Revision Petition are that the respondent had filed Civil Suit No. 6/1993 against the father of the petitioners, late Shri Mangi Lal Jain, which was decreed in favour of the respondent. In execution of the said decree dated 03.05.1993, the agricultural land measuring 38 Bigha 1 Biswa situated at Nawalpura, Tehsil Kapasan, belonging to the petitioners, was auctioned and purchased by the respondent. Thereafter, the petitioners filed an application dated 16.02.2008 under Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, raising objections to the anomalies alleged to have occurred during the auction proceedings, and sought rejection of the respondent’s application filed under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC for delivery of possession of the auctioned land. It was contended that although the learned executing court had confirmed the auction on 07.04.2005, the same was withdrawn on 02.08.2005, and again re-confirmed on 02.02.2006. The respondent subsequently moved an application under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC on 17.12.2007 for delivery of possession, along with the sale certificate issued under Order 21 Rule 94 CPC, pursuant to which a warrant of possession was issued and the matter remained pending. The petitioners further contended that the said application under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC was barred by limitation, as it had not been filed within the prescribed period, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant of possession. It was also urged that the sale certificate itself was issued beyond the limitation period, and hence, the respondent was not entitled to seek enforcement of the decree. The petitioners also objected to the respondent’s attempt to transfer the agricultural electricity connection relating to Khata No. 38-4- 4, which, according to them, was impermissible under law. It was also urged that the sale certificate itself was issued beyond the limitation period, and hence, the respondent was not entitled to seek enforcement of the decree. The petitioners also objected to the respondent’s attempt to transfer the agricultural electricity connection relating to Khata No. 38-4- 4, which, according to them, was impermissible under law. It was further submitted that the executing court did not have the power to withdraw its earlier confirmation order dated 07.04.2005, as such an appealable order could only be challenged through an appeal. 3. The respondent, in reply, contended that the provisions of the Limitation Act were not applicable to applications under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC, since the sale had already been completed and the sale certificate duly issued and registered in the respondent’s favour, thereby conferring absolute ownership. It was also submitted that the executing court was competent to review or modify its own order in the interest of justice, and that the petitioners, being judgment debtors, had no locus to raise objections beyond the scope of Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. 4. After hearing both sides, the learned court below, vide order dated 15.07.2010, dismissed the petitioners’ application, observing that no proceedings under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC were pending and that if the petitioners had any objections regarding the auction amount, the same could have been raised during the execution proceedings. Aggrieved by the said order dated 15.07.2010, the petitioners have preferred the present Revision Petition before this Court. 5. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that in Execution Case No. 6/1993, arising out of a decree dated 03.05.1993 passed in favour of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur, the disputed agricultural land measuring 38 Bigha 1 Biswa was put to auction, wherein respondent Shantilal was declared the highest bidder for Rs. 6,00,201/- on 09.04.2004. However, the mandatory deposit of 1/4th of the bid amount under Order 21 Rule 84 CPC and the balance 3/4th within fifteen days under Rule 85 CPC was never made, rendering the entire auction proceeding void under Rule 86 CPC. Despite repeated judicial notings showing non-deposit of the amount, the learned Executing Court erroneously confirmed the sale on 07.04.2005 and later issued possession warrant on 28.01.2008 under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC, without notice to the judgment debtors and beyond the limitation period prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. Despite repeated judicial notings showing non-deposit of the amount, the learned Executing Court erroneously confirmed the sale on 07.04.2005 and later issued possession warrant on 28.01.2008 under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC, without notice to the judgment debtors and beyond the limitation period prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. The impugned orders are therefore without jurisdiction, in violation of the mandatory provisions of Order 21 Rules 84, 85, and 86 CPC, hence the entire sale proceedings and consequential orders are nullity and liable to be set aside in the interest of justice. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner/judgment debtor had taken a loan from the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur by mortgaging the agricultural land of late Shri Mangi Lal, and upon default, the bank obtained a recovery decree and initiated execution proceedings pending since 1993. As repeated attempts to auction the property failed, the respondent offered Rs. 6,00,000/- for purchase and deposited a bank guarantee of the same amount on 12.12.2000, demonstrating bona fides. The auction was ultimately held on 08–09.04.2004, where the respondent’s bid of Rs. 6,00,201/- was the highest and was duly confirmed by the Court on 02.02.2006. The petitioner’s objections under Order 21 Rule 58 CPC were dismissed on 24.09.2007, and his appeal before the High Court was also rejected on 21.11.2008, rendering the sale final. The respondent thereafter deposited the full amount, got the sale deed registered on 19.11.2007, and obtained possession on 19.02.2008. It was argued that the present objections are barred by res judicata and that the bank guarantee, being equivalent to cash, satisfies the requirement under Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 CPC. The execution proceedings were lawfully conducted, and the impugned order dated 15.07.2010 rejecting the petitioner’s belated objection is just and proper. 7. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 8. On a careful reading of the record and the rival contentions, the chronology of events emerges as the determinative factual substrate. The decree in favour of the decree-holder (State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur) was executed by proceedings culminating in the auction of the subject agricultural parcel (38 Bigha 1 Biswa) on 9th April, 2004. The auction-sheet and subsequent court-notings disclose repeated and material lacunae: the highest bidder (respondent) was declared on the said date at Rs. The decree in favour of the decree-holder (State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur) was executed by proceedings culminating in the auction of the subject agricultural parcel (38 Bigha 1 Biswa) on 9th April, 2004. The auction-sheet and subsequent court-notings disclose repeated and material lacunae: the highest bidder (respondent) was declared on the said date at Rs. 6,00,201/-, yet there is contemporaneous and consistent notation on the order-sheets that the mandatory deposit of one-fourth of the bid amount was not made at the time of declaration; further entries in order sheets of court below spanning 2004–2006 repeatedly record the non-deposit or non-availability of the auction price in Court. Against this backdrop the lower Court proceeded, first to confirm and thereafter to withdraw confirmation, and thereafter to confirm again , a vacillating course of judicial action which, on the admitted state of the record, requires close legal scrutiny because the validity of each subsequent step in the execution chain necessarily turns upon whether the mandatory statutory preconditions were satisfied when they were required to be satisfied. 9. The statutory architecture which governs court-sales in execution proceedings is lucid and peremptory. Order XXI Rules 84 and 85 CPC impose two concomitant obligations on the person declared purchaser: (i) an immediate deposit of twenty-five per cent of the purchase-money upon declaration of sale (Rule 84), and (ii) payment of the balance within fifteen days from the date of sale (Rule 85). Rule 86 prescribes the sanction for default, forfeiture of the deposit (if the Court so thinks fit) and re-sale of the property, with the purchaser forfeiting any claim to the property or the sums realized on re-sale. Rules 84 and 85 of Order XXI CPC are mandatory and that non-compliance with these provisions vitiates the sale, rendering it a nullity(void ab initio) and not merely voidable. In particular, the requirement of deposit is not directory or permissive but mandatory and, consequentially, a court-sale completed in breach of these provisions cannot be allowed to stand. 10.Applying the statutory mandate to the admitted facts, there is an ineluctable legal difficulty in sustaining the sale or the orders founded upon it. The Court’s own order-entries of 28- 04-2004, 15-01-2005 and 02-08-2005 (and subsequent dates) manifest that the Court repeatedly noted that the purchase price was not deposited. 10.Applying the statutory mandate to the admitted facts, there is an ineluctable legal difficulty in sustaining the sale or the orders founded upon it. The Court’s own order-entries of 28- 04-2004, 15-01-2005 and 02-08-2005 (and subsequent dates) manifest that the Court repeatedly noted that the purchase price was not deposited. If the 25% deposit was not made immediately after declaration, and the balance was not paid within fifteen days as required by Rule 85, then the statutory consequence prescribed by Rule 86 would inexorably follow, the sale must be re-auctioned and the defaulting purchaser loses all right to claim under the purported sale. To treat the contrary would be to permit judicial legerdemain whereby a sale is clothed with the attributes of completeness notwithstanding the statutory infirmity at the very foundation of the sale. Such a course is antithetical to settled law and to the canon that “where the foundation is vitiated, the superstructure falls with it” , a principle long recognized in execution jurisprudence. 11.The respondent seeks to meet the statutory defect by pointing to a bank guarantee, past deposit entries and subsequent registration of a sale-deed. This submission, however, must be tested by rigid legal standards. First, the jurisprudence is replete with decisions that eschew formalistic expedients where statutory prescription is mandatory: deposits required under the auction rules must ordinarily be made in the manner and within the time prescribed; deposits by means impermissible to the rule (for instance by post-dated instruments or modes not accepted as immediate payment) have been held inadequate to cure non-compliance. When a particular course of performance is prescribed by law, any deviation or alternative route stands prohibited. Courts are bound to adhere to the manner expressly provided and not to invent parallel procedures inconsistent with statutory command. Equally, the mere registration of a deed , if procured in consequence of a sale which was void for want of compliance with Order XXI , cannot retroactively confer validity on proceedings which were statutorily defective ab initio. The law does not permit procedural ratification to be manufactured by subsequent events when the original act was void and without jurisdiction. Where, as here, Court records themselves cast doubt over the existence or continuance of the requisite deposit, the burden of establishing regularity and compliance lies heavily upon the successful purchaser and the decree-holder. The law does not permit procedural ratification to be manufactured by subsequent events when the original act was void and without jurisdiction. Where, as here, Court records themselves cast doubt over the existence or continuance of the requisite deposit, the burden of establishing regularity and compliance lies heavily upon the successful purchaser and the decree-holder. 12.There exists no provision under the Code of Civil Procedure which empowers a Court to treat previously deposited or retained sums as a form of guarantee for validating a sale. The Code prescribes specific and exhaustive modes for conducting court sales, and such sales must strictly conform to those statutory procedures. Any deviation, however well- intentioned, cannot substitute compliance with the express provisions of Order XXI. 13.The doctrine of nullity and the consequences of a defective foundation warrant detailed exposition. The proposition that a sale in execution can be held “null and void” for breach of Rules 84–86 is not an abstract or technical nicety ,it is a practical rule of law that protects judgment-debtors from deprivation of proprietary rights by means that fall short of the statutory yardstick. The maxim fraus omnia corrumpit (fraud vitiates everything) ,not in the sense of moral imputations but in its juridical application , captures the underlying rationale: where the process by which title is purportedly divested is materially tainted, all derivative acts grounded upon that process cannot be allowed to subserve an illusory transfer of title. Once the mandatory deposit requirements are proved to be unmet, the sale is to be treated as if it never gave rise to an enforceable right in the purchaser. In that event, subsequent steps such as issuance of sale-certificate, registration or orders for delivery of possession fall to be treated as corollaries of a void act and are themselves susceptible to being set aside. 14.The procedural posture in which these objections were urged by the petitioners is also germane. The petitioners invoked Section 47 CPC read with Section 151 CPC to bring to the Court’s attention the anomalies and to seek appropriate reliefs; they raised limitation-based objections and the fundamental failure to comply with Order XXI. Section 47 CPC empowers the Court to examine whether it has acted within jurisdiction and to rectify proceedings taken without jurisdiction. The petitioners invoked Section 47 CPC read with Section 151 CPC to bring to the Court’s attention the anomalies and to seek appropriate reliefs; they raised limitation-based objections and the fundamental failure to comply with Order XXI. Section 47 CPC empowers the Court to examine whether it has acted within jurisdiction and to rectify proceedings taken without jurisdiction. Where a sale is void because of breach of mandatory auction provisions, Section 47 CPC is an appropriate vehicle to impugn the execution proceedings, more particularly where the failure is intrinsic and affects the very competence of the executing Court to cause transfer of possession or make an absolute sale. The record shows that the executing Court, notwithstanding the repeated notings of non-deposit and the petitioners’ pleadings, proceeded to issue warrant for delivery of possession under Rule 95 of Order XXI CPC on 28-01-2008 and thereafter recorded in the impugned order that there was no pending Rule 95 application. The approach of the lower Court in making a summary pronouncement without subject-matter engagement with the cogent legal authorities and the contemporaneous order-sheet annotations renders the impugned order vulnerable to the criticism that it is perverse and without adequate judicial application of mind. 15.The limitation point raised by the petitioners, namely that the application for delivery of possession under Rule 95 is barred by the Limitation Act (Article 134 as relied upon in the petition) and that the warrant was issued after the expiry of the prescribed temporal window , must be considered in the analytical mix. Two principles inform the resolution: (a) the period for initiation of steps for delivery of possession and for issuance of sale-certificate are matters which ought to be determined with reference to the specific provisions of Order XXI read with the Limitation Act and the settled precedents that interpret the point from the perspective of when a sale becomes ‘absolute’ for the purposes of running of limitation; and (b) where a sale is in truth void from the beginning for non-compliance with Rules 84–86, the question of limitation in relation to a purported act which itself lacked jurisdiction needs to be considered in light of the primary nullity. If the sale never crystallized into an absolute and lawful transfer by reason of statutory non-compliance, subsequently framed limitation-based defences lose their mooring. If the sale never crystallized into an absolute and lawful transfer by reason of statutory non-compliance, subsequently framed limitation-based defences lose their mooring. The jurisprudence affirms that Courts will not become mute spectators to manifest illegality in execution sales even if the remedy was not the neat procedural form urged; in such cases the Court may, and indeed must, correct the anomaly so as to prevent miscarriage of justice. 16.Having considered the rival submissions and the authorities cited, the following legal propositions emerge as controlling for the present controversy: (i) Order XXI Rules 84 and 85 are mandatory; deposit of one-fourth immediately and balance within fifteen days are pre-conditions to any valid confirmation; (ii) non-compliance with those provisions ordinarily renders the sale a nullity and triggers Rule 86 consequences; (iii) subsequent formalities (sale certificate, registration, possession warrants) cannot confer validity upon an antecedent void sale; (iv) a Court exercising its supervisory or executing jurisdiction is under a duty to examine whether the statutory pre-conditions have been complied with before confirming and enforcing sales; and (v) where the record itself discloses non-compliance, equity and law both require that the rights purportedly acquired under such sale cannot be allowed to crystallize into indefeasible title. These propositions are not novel dicta but reflect the settled current of execution jurisprudence as reiterated by higher courts. 17.In the particular facts of this case, the executing Court’s repeated notations of non-deposit, the vacillation in confirming / withdrawing confirmation and the subsequent issuance of possession warrant without notice to the judgment-debtors and in the face of ongoing objections, collectively establish that the principal statutory conditions for a valid sale (Order XXI Rr. 84 & 85) were not satisfied in the manner and at the time the Code requires. The respondent’s reliance upon a bank guarantee and subsequent registration cannot, in the circumstances, be allowed to operate as a talisman which transmutes a defective proceeding into a valid one. To permit that would be to countenance an end-run around mandatory statutory safeguards designed to protect judgment-debtors from precipitate loss of property and to ensure transparency and finality in execution processes. 18.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 15.07.2010 insofar as it refuses to entertain the petitioners’ legitimate objections and insofar as it sanctions the delivery of possession to the purchaser, cannot be sustained. 18.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 15.07.2010 insofar as it refuses to entertain the petitioners’ legitimate objections and insofar as it sanctions the delivery of possession to the purchaser, cannot be sustained. The revision petition must therefore succeed and it is hereby allowed. 19.Accordingly, the following directions are issued: (a) the confirmation of sale and all consequential orders, including the sale certificate and the warrant of possession issued pursuant to Order XXI Rule 95, be and are hereby set aside as void ab initio; (b) the purported sale in favour of Shri Shantilal declared on 09.04.2004 (and any subsequent confirmation resting on that declaration) is declared null and void for non-compliance with Order XXI Rules 84 and 85 and consequent operation of Rule 86; (c)Since the earlier sale has already been annulled and any fresh proceedings would necessarily require initiation afresh, the judgment-debtor, if desirous of satisfying the decree, may avail the benefit of Rule 83 of Order XXI (postponement of sale to enable judgment-debtor to raise the decretal amount). The executing Court shall consider such request, if made, in accordance with law before proceeding to re-sale. (d) The decree-holder is always at liberty to initiate and conduct proceedings for sale strictly in accordance with the procedure contemplated under Order XXI — both under the provisions relating to “Sale Generally” (Rules 64–73) and those governing “Sale of Immovable Property” (Rules 82– 106). However, such proceedings must adhere to the Code’s express framework; no alternate or informal mode of sale is permissible. (e) the executing court shall proceed thereafter in accordance with law and in the light of these observations, including, if so advised and legally permissible, by re- auctioning the property in accordance with the statutory mandate and after giving due notice to all interested parties.