ORDER : Juvvadi Sridevi, J. This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused No.2 seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.2 of 2022 pending on the file of the learned I Additional Special Judge for Central Bureau of Investigation Cases, Hyderabad (for short ‘the learned trial Court’) registered for the offences under Sections 120B of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) read with Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short ‘the Act’). 2. Heard Sri V.R.Machavaram, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Srinivas Kapatia, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the Central Bureau of Investigation. Perused the record. 3(a). The brief facts of the case are that, based on a complaint dated 11.11.2020 lodged by Shri Kammari Kalappa before the Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Hyderabad, it was alleged that the accused No.1, an Income Tax Inspector, demanded an undue advantage of Rs.1,00,000/- from the complainant for closing a Tax Evasion Petition pending against him before the Income Tax Officer, Unit-I, Income Tax Investigation Department, Hyderabad. The said complaint was verified by Shri Shekhar Dora Babau, Inspector. During the verification, the complainant, accompanied by an independent witness, approached the accused No.1 on the pretext of negotiating the bribe amount, during which the accused No.1 agreed to reduce the demanded amount to Rs.80,000/-, directing the complainant to arrange the money at the earliest and to contact him once the amount was ready. In the presence of the verifying officer and an independent witness, the complainant also spoke to the accused No.1 over phone and requested whether he could pay Rs.40,000/- as the first installment, to which the accused No.1 declined. The said conversation was overheard by the verifying officer and the independent witness. 3(b). It is further alleged that on 12.11.2020, a trap was laid, during which the accused No.1 was caught while demanding and accepting the undue advantage of Rs.80,000/- from the complainant. During the post-trap proceedings, the hand-wash of the accused No.1 in colourless sodium carbonate solution turned pink. Further, an amount of Rs.30,000/-, being part of the trap money, was recovered from the possession of the accused No.1. During the same proceedings, the remaining amount of trap money, i.e. Rs.50,000/-, was recovered from the possession of the petitioner-accused No.2, also an Income Tax Inspector, who was assisting the accused No.1 in handling the verification of the Tax Evasion Petition against the complainant. During the same proceedings, the remaining amount of trap money, i.e. Rs.50,000/-, was recovered from the possession of the petitioner-accused No.2, also an Income Tax Inspector, who was assisting the accused No.1 in handling the verification of the Tax Evasion Petition against the complainant. The hand- wash of the accused No.2 also turned pink, indicating his handling of the tainted currency. Both the accused No.1 and the petitioner-accused No.2 were arrested after completion of all legal formalities and were remanded to judicial custody. During the course of investigation, on 13.11.2020, Shri Itta Upender Rao was arraigned as accused No.2. 4(a). Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused submitted that the petitioner-accused No.2 has no involvement whatsoever with the alleged offences. It is contended that there is no material or evidence to substantiate the allegation of criminal conspiracy between the accused Nos.1 and 2. There is no allegation that the petitioner-accused No.2 ever demanded any money from the complainant. It is further submitted that the verification report of the Inspector of Police, CBI, does not contain any averment regarding the presence of the petitioner-accused No.2 along with the accused No.1 at the time of the alleged demand of bribe. 4(b). It is further submitted that even according to the charge sheet, no official favour of any nature was pending with the petitioner-accused No.2 in relation to the de-facto complainant. It is also submitted that the petitioner-accused No.2 had already been transferred from the said post and had joined his new place of posting, and therefore, he had no exclusive custody or control over the office table drawer from which the alleged amount was recovered. No part of the alleged bribe money was recovered from the personal possession of the petitioner-accused No.2. The essential ingredients necessary to attract the offences punishable under Sections 120B of IPC read with 7(a) of the Act are absent. 4(c). With the above submissions, while praying to quash the proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.2, he relied upon a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh , 2025 INSC 1263 wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.17, 18 & 23 that: “17. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning adopted by the High Court in this regard. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning adopted by the High Court in this regard. In the first place, the negative result of the ‘hand-wash’ test was only one of several suspicious circumstances considered by the Trial Court, not the first or most determinative one. More importantly, it is not the case of either side that the appellant physically handled the tainted notes, and the same has been accepted by the High Court. The prosecution maintains that the notes were dropped into the drawer at the appellant’s instance, while the defence asserts that they were placed there without his knowledge. For either side, the ‘hand- wash’ test and the negative result thereof is of no consequence as it cannot advance the case one way or the other. What is troubling is that the High Court has nevertheless seized upon this circumstance and gone on to attribute wrongful intent to the appellant. We take this opportunity to reiterate that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. 18. The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved. The same has been reiterated time and again by this Court; in the recent decision of Rajesh Gupta vs. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, it was held: “17. For an offence under Section 7 of PC Act, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to prove the guilt. Mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute an offence under Section 7 of PC Act, unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand.” 23. In contrast, the defence has consistently maintained that the alleged demand and acceptance of bribe never took place. According to the appellant, the complainant entered his office alone and during the appellant’s brief absence, placed the tainted amount in the left-drawer of the table. Accordingly, when the trap-party entered, the appellant immediately denied having received any money, and the phenolphthalein test on both hands yielded negative results.” 4(d). According to the appellant, the complainant entered his office alone and during the appellant’s brief absence, placed the tainted amount in the left-drawer of the table. Accordingly, when the trap-party entered, the appellant immediately denied having received any money, and the phenolphthalein test on both hands yielded negative results.” 4(d). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in N.Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, Criminal Appeal Nos.100-101 of 2021 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl).Nos.4729-4730 of 2020) wherein it was held at Paragraph No.12 that: “12. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in the case of C.M.Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala (2009) 3 SCC 779 and in the case of B.Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2014) 13 SCC 55 . In the aforesaid Judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. The relevant paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in the case of B. Jayaraj (supra) read as under: "7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [ (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [ (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]. 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P11) before LW9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent." The above said view taken by this Court, fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf ofthe prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cell phone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a "possible view" as such the judgment of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record.” 4(e). Further, he relied upon a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) , (1979) 4 Supreme Court Cases 725 wherein it was held at Paragraph No.68 that: “68. Further, he relied upon a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) , (1979) 4 Supreme Court Cases 725 wherein it was held at Paragraph No.68 that: “68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and inturn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” 5. On the other hand, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the Central Bureau of Investigation contended that there are triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioner at this juncture and the matter is to be decided after conducting trial by the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Petition. 6. Having regard to the submissions made by both sides and upon a perusal of the material on record, it is evident that the case against the petitioner-accused No.2, as projected in the charge sheet, pertains only to his alleged participation in the handling of the verification process and in assisting the accused No.1. There is no allegation in the record that the petitioner-accused No.2 himself made any demand for illegal gratification from the complainant. The record clearly demonstrates that the alleged demand was made solely by the accused No.1, and the role attributed to the petitioner-accused No.2 is confined to the alleged handling or recovery of a part of the trap money from the drawer of his office table. 7. It is a well-settled principle of law that, for an offence under Section 7 of the Act, proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non, and mere recovery of currency notes, in the absence of such proof, is insufficient to sustain the charge. 7. It is a well-settled principle of law that, for an offence under Section 7 of the Act, proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non, and mere recovery of currency notes, in the absence of such proof, is insufficient to sustain the charge. The statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Act arises only after the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are established; the presumption is not automatic, as held in the above decisions. Mere recovery of tainted currency notes from the drawer of the petitioner-accused No.2, which is accessible to several persons, or recovery not from his exclusive personal possession, does not, by itself, constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt of voluntary acceptance by the petitioner-accused No.2. 8. It is not the case of the prosecution that the petitioner-accused No.2 either directly demanded or accepted the gratification from the complainant. Where the foundational fact of demand and/or acceptance is absent, the mandatory presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be invoked. The legal position is clear that mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not enough to constitute the offence under Section 7 of the Act unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. Even though the hand-wash test produced a pink reaction, as per the settled principle of law such tests are only one of the circumstances to be considered and cannot by themselves supply the missing link of demand or acceptance. 9. A perusal of the entire record indicates that the principal allegations are directed against the accused No.1, who is alleged to have demanded illegal gratification from the complainant for extending an official favour. Insofar as the petitioner-accused No.2 is concerned, even according to the charge sheet, no official favour of any nature was pending with him in relation to the de-facto complainant. 10. Apparently, the petitioner-accused No.2 had already been transferred from the said post and had joined at his new place of posting, and that he was present in the office on the relevant date only for completing pending work. However, no material has been placed by the prosecution to demonstrate that he had full custody or control over the table drawer from which the amount was recovered. However, no material has been placed by the prosecution to demonstrate that he had full custody or control over the table drawer from which the amount was recovered. It is also pertinent to note that no part of the alleged bribe money was recovered from the personal possession of the petitioner- accused No.2. Therefore, the mere recovery of a portion of the tainted currency from an office drawer, in the absence of proof of the petitioner’s exclusive or personal custody over that drawer or of any direct act of receiving the money, does not conclusively establish voluntary acceptance. The fact of the petitioner’s transfer and the absence of evidence showing his exclusive control over the drawer at the relevant time further weakens any inference of acceptance. Consequently, the essential ingredient of proof of demand or offer and acceptance, or of cogent circumstantial evidence unerringly pointing to such acceptance, is absent in the present case. 11. In order to substantiate a charge of criminal conspiracy requires cogent material demonstrating a common intention or a meeting of minds to commit the substantive offence. On a careful scrutiny of the entire material available on record, the prosecution has not placed any material to show that the petitioner-accused No.2 and the accused No.1 had agreed to demand or accept illegal gratification from the complainant. The available material does not establish any linkage indicative of a criminal conspiracy between the accused No.1 and the petitioner- accused No.2. As seen from the record, the prosecution has relied upon mobile phone conversations between the complainant and the accused No.1 in support of certain allegations, however, no call data, conversations, or any other mode of communication between the accused No.1 and the petitioner-accused No.2 has been produced to substantiate the charge of criminal conspiracy or to demonstrate the petitioner’s involvement. The foundational facts necessary for drawing a presumption under Section 20 of the Act, or for establishing the offence under Section 7 of the Act read with Section 120B of IPC, are absent insofar as the petitioner-accused No.2 is concerned. Therefore, the continuation of criminal proceedings against him would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and the same is liable to be quashed. 12. Therefore, the continuation of criminal proceedings against him would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and the same is liable to be quashed. 12. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.2 in C.C.No.2 of 2022 pending on the file of the learned I Additional Special Judge for Central Bureau of Investigation Cases, Hyderabad, are hereby quashed. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.