ORDER : 1. This Revision is filed against the order dated 28.02.2025 in Crl. M.P 2987/2022 in SC No.879/2017 by the Special Judge for the Trial of Offence under SC/ST (PoA), 1989, Ernakulam. It is an order dismissing the application under 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr.PC)/250 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The prayer of the petitioner to discharge is rejected by the Special Judge. Aggrieved by the same, this Revision is filed. 2. When this revision came up for consideration, this Court requested the counsel for the petitioner to argue about the maintainability of the revision, in the light of Sec. 14A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short 'Act, 1989'). This Court also appointed Adv. K.R.Vinod as Amicus curiae in this case to help the court. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and the Amicus curiae. 4. Adv. Vinod, who is appointed as the amicus curiae, submitted that no revision is maintainable because it is an order which is appealable under Sec.14A of the Act 1989. The counsel relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Shailendra Yadav @ Salu v. State of U.P. through Principal Secy. Home Lko in Crl. Appeal No. 2174 of 2024. The Amicus curiae also takes me through the judgment of this Court in Pareeth and others v. State of Kerala and Anr . 2021 KHC 131, Ghulam Rasool Khan and others v. State of U.P. and others , 2022 Legal Eagle (ALD) 807 and In Re: Provision of Section 14a of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act 2015 & Ors. 2018 Cri. L.J. 5010. The Public Prosecutor also submitted that the appeal is the remedy against an order dismissing an application for discharge. 5. This Court considered the contentions of the petitioner, amicus curiae and the Public Prosecutor. Admittedly, the impugned order is an order passed in a discharge petition. Section 14A of the Act 1989 deals with appeals. It will be better to extract Section 14A of the Act, 1989. “14A. Appeals. 5. This Court considered the contentions of the petitioner, amicus curiae and the Public Prosecutor. Admittedly, the impugned order is an order passed in a discharge petition. Section 14A of the Act 1989 deals with appeals. It will be better to extract Section 14A of the Act, 1989. “14A. Appeals. -- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(3)of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days. (4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal.” 6. A reading of Sec. 14A(1) would show that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. Therefore, an appeal under Sec. 14A is maintainable against the judgment, sentence or order. But the order should not be an interlocutory order. 7. The question to be decided is whether an order dismissing a discharge application is an interlocutory order and whether a revision is maintainable. It is a settled position that an order rejecting an application for discharge is not strictly an interlocutory order, and hence it can be challenged by filing an appeal. 7. The question to be decided is whether an order dismissing a discharge application is an interlocutory order and whether a revision is maintainable. It is a settled position that an order rejecting an application for discharge is not strictly an interlocutory order, and hence it can be challenged by filing an appeal. The Apex Court in Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. 2021 KHC 6274 observed like this: 15. “The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra), thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar of S.397 (2) of Cr.P.C. That apart, this Court in the above - cited cases has unequivocally acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases. As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising its afore - stated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for effective and timely administration of criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example, when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of process of law.” (Underline supplied) 8. From the above authoritative judgment and other judgments of the Apex Court, it is clear that an order passed in a discharge petition is not an interlocutory order, and it is an intermediate order. If that is the case, there is no doubt that an appeal is maintainable under Sec.14A of the Act, 1989. When a statutory appeal is maintainable against an order, this Court need not entertain a revision against that order invoking the powers under Secs. 438 and 442 of the BNSS. 9. Moreover, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in In Re Provision of Sec. 14a SC/ST Act's case (supra) considered this matter in detail. Relevant paragraphs in the above judgment are extracted hereunder: “91. 438 and 442 of the BNSS. 9. Moreover, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in In Re Provision of Sec. 14a SC/ST Act's case (supra) considered this matter in detail. Relevant paragraphs in the above judgment are extracted hereunder: “91. Turning to the provisions of S.397 Cr.P.C., we find that the 1989 Act, both in terms of S.14 - A as well as S.20 overrides the Cr.P.C. This is the evident and manifest legislative intent. The revisional jurisdiction would therefore clearly stand eclipsed and ousted by S.14 – A. 92. We therefore answer Question (B) by holding that while the constitutional and inherent powers of this Court are not "ousted" by S.14 - A, they cannot be invoked in cases and situations where an appeal would lie under S.14 - A. Insofar as the powers of the Court with respect to the revisional jurisdiction is concerned, we find that the provisions of S.397, Cr.P.C. stand impliedly excluded by virtue of the special provisions made in S.14 - A. This, we hold also in light of our finding that the word "order" as occurring in sub-section (1) of S.14 - A would also include intermediate orders. 10. Moreover, this Court in Pareeth's case (supra), observed like this : “3. Similarly, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court had the opportunity to consider the constitutional validity of S.14A of the Act in the decision In re: Provisions of 14A of the SC - ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015, 2018 CrlLJ 5010, and held that while the constitutional and inherent powers of this Court are not "ousted" by S.14A, they cannot be invoked in cases and situations where an appeal would lie under S.14A. Insofar as the powers of the Court with respect to the revisional jurisdiction is concerned, it was found that the provisions of S.397, Cr.P.C. stand impliedly excluded by virtue of the special provisions made in S.14A. 4. In Ravindra Thakur and Another v. State of Bihar , 2017 KHC 4880 : 2017 Cri. Insofar as the powers of the Court with respect to the revisional jurisdiction is concerned, it was found that the provisions of S.397, Cr.P.C. stand impliedly excluded by virtue of the special provisions made in S.14A. 4. In Ravindra Thakur and Another v. State of Bihar , 2017 KHC 4880 : 2017 Cri. L.J. 4050 a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held that by virtue of amendment of S.14 of the Act, the accused has been given right to file an appeal before the High Court against an order of refusing bail of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, at the same time an appeal shall lie also against an order of granting bail by the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, at the instance of any aggrieved person. In the instant case, the accused had applied for bail before the Special Court, and the same was rejected. The only remedy available to him is to file an appeal under S.14A(2) of the Act. Hence, the objection raised by the Registry is perfectly justified and therefore upheld.” 11. Similarly, this Court in Swapna v. State of Kerala, 2022 KHC 5489 observed like this : “10. I am in full agreement with the principles laid down in Sindhu Gopalakrishnan - s case (supra). As mentioned above, it was categorically observed by this Court that the order passed in that case was not interlocutory in nature, as the decision on the prayers sought for by the petitioner was likely to affect the rights and liabilities of the parties, at the final stage of proceedings. In such circumstances, the said order cannot be treated as an interlocutory order, on the other hand, it would be an intermediary order which is distinct from the interlocutory order but not a final order. S.14A (1) of SC ST Act is pari materia with S.397 (2) of Cr.P.C and principles laid down in the said judgment are squarely applicable to these cases as well. As per S.14A(1), what is prohibited is only an appeal against an interlocutory order. In this case decision of potency test is something which will have substantial impact upon the prosecution case or defense case as the case may be, at the final stage of the proceedings and therefore under no circumstances it can be treated as a mere interlocutory order. In this case decision of potency test is something which will have substantial impact upon the prosecution case or defense case as the case may be, at the final stage of the proceedings and therefore under no circumstances it can be treated as a mere interlocutory order. In such circumstances, I am of the view that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent against the maintainability of the appeals is without any merit and hence rejected. “ 12. In the light of the above decisions, it is clear that if an order which is not an interlocutory order is passed by a Special Judge under the Act, 1989, it is appealable as per Sec.14A of the Act 1989. The order rejecting an application for discharge is not an interlocutory order. 13. Therefore, this revision is not maintainable. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that liberty may be given to file an appeal. The liberty is granted. Accordingly, the revision is disposed of, granting liberty to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order by filing an appeal under Sec.14 A of the Act, 1989. The Registry will forthwith return the certified copy of the impugned order to the counsel for the petitioner.