JUDGMENT : K.S.MUDAGAL, J. Challenging the order of rejection of his bail application, accused No.4 in Spl.C.No.152/2021 on the file of XLIX Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge (Special Judge for the trial of NIA Cases) (CCH-50), Bengaluru has preferred this appeal. 2. Appellant and 145 others have been charge sheeted in the said case for the offences punishable under Sections 15, 16, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short ‘UAP Act’), Sections 143, 147, 307, 436, 353, 332, 333, 427, 504, 506 read with Sections 149 and 34 of IPC, Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 2 of the Karnataka Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981 (for short ‘KPDLP Act’). Against appellant Sections 16, 18 and 20 of UAP Act, Sections 120B, 34, 149 read with Sections 143, 145, 147, 188, 427, 436 and 353 of IPC and Section 2 of KPDLP Act was invoked. 3. Appellant filed bail application before the trial Court claiming that he is falsely implicated in the case and he is in judicial custody since five years without trial. The same was opposed by the prosecution. The trial Court on hearing the parties by the impugned judgment and order has rejected his bail application on the following grounds: (i) That there is material to show the involvement of the appellant in the crime. (ii) Delay in trial is because of the calculated acts of the accused themselves. Therefore appellant cannot make the same as ground. (iii) Section 43D(5) of UAP Act bars grant of bail as prima-facie case is forthcoming against the appellant. The said order is challenged in the above case. 4. Heard both side. 5. Sri Siddika Aisha, learned Counsel for the appellant reiterating the grounds of appeal and grounds urged before the trial Court contended that the appellant is falsely implicated in the case and he is in custody without trial since five years. She contended that co- accused is granted bail, therefore, appellant is entitled to bail. In support of her submissions, she relied on the following judgment: i) Mohammed Kaleem Ahmed vs. NIA, Crl.A.No.1722/2025 (DD 14.10.2025) 6. Per contra, Sri P.Prasanna Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor justifies the impugned order on the ground that there is sufficient material to show involvement of the appellant in antinational activities. In support of her submissions, she relied on the following judgment: i) Mohammed Kaleem Ahmed vs. NIA, Crl.A.No.1722/2025 (DD 14.10.2025) 6. Per contra, Sri P.Prasanna Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor justifies the impugned order on the ground that there is sufficient material to show involvement of the appellant in antinational activities. He submits that the appellant did not even spare the police, the police station, delay in trial is not due to any act on the part of the prosecution, it was the strategy of the accused themselves which has led to the delay. So far as granting bail to some of the co-accused, he submits that they were not facing allegations of offences under UAP Act. Therefore parity does not apply, whereas the bail application of the similarly situated accused were rejected by the trial Court and confirmed by this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court. He submits that the judgment in Crl.A.No.1722/2025 relied on by appellant’s Counsel isunconnected to this case and is not applicable. Whereas Crl.A.No.1425/2025 (21 (NIA)) preferred by accused No.4 against the similar order has been dismissed by this Court. He relies on the said judgment. 7. In support of his submissions, he relies on the following judgment: i) National Investigating Agency vs. Zahoor Ahmed Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 8. On hearing both sides and on examination of the materials on record, the point that arises for consideration is “whether the impugned order of rejection of the bail application of the accused is sustainable ” Analysis 9. Case of the prosecution in brief is as follows: (i) That prime accused in the case with some political aspirations to grab votes of Muslims, conspired to create unrest in the society on religious lines and in that direction to provoke others, accused No.19 made facebook post belittling Hindu deities to invoke reaction of Naveen, a nephew of Shri Akhanda Srinivasa Murthy, MLA of Pulakeshi Nagar constituency, taggedhim to the said post. In response to such post, Naveen posted some message about Prophet Mohammed on his facebook. (ii) That on 11.08.2020 at 7.45 p.m. Moulvi named Sri Firdous Pasha had lodged the complaint before D.J.Halli Police Station against Naveen alleging blasphemy of Prophet Mohammed and hurting religious sentiments of persons belonging to particular religion. Based on such complaint, first information report was registered against him. (ii) That on 11.08.2020 at 7.45 p.m. Moulvi named Sri Firdous Pasha had lodged the complaint before D.J.Halli Police Station against Naveen alleging blasphemy of Prophet Mohammed and hurting religious sentiments of persons belonging to particular religion. Based on such complaint, first information report was registered against him. Despite that at 8.00 p.m. appellant/accused No.4 accompanied by 50 persons gathered at D.J.Halli police station demanding arrest of Naveen. With extreme religious ideologies, on social network like Whatsapp, phone calls etc. he started instigating others to assemble at D.J.Halli police station. Thus huge number of accused assembled at D.J.Halli police station and started insisting to register their complaints though case was already registered. They started demanding to handover Naveen to them. Ultimately, the mob turned into assembly of 800 to 1500 people, shouting slogans against the police about pouring petrol and police station shall be burnt. Despite attempt of the police to control them, at 8.45 p.m. aggressive group forcibly entered into D.J.Halli police station with weapons, stones, sticks, rods and started damaging the police station building and attacked the police personnel. (iii) Ultimately, proclamation under Section 144 of Cr.P.C was imposed and through public announcement requisition was made to disperse the mob. But the mob did not heed to that. Ultimately, mob over powering the police proceeded to cellar and set fire to sixty seven (67) vehicles including both four wheelers and two wheelers parked in the police station. The police resorted to lathi charge and tear gas charging. That also did not yield any result. After issuance of warning to the mob, police were forced to take recourse to firing to disperse the mob. The mob attempted to grab the weapons of the police. In police firing several people were injured, two persons died at the spot and many police personnel also suffered injuries in the hands of attackers. 10. The allegations against accused No.4/appellant is that being the member of such terrorist gang he conspired with co-accused and with common intention, he mobilized many people at the scene of offence, provoked them, gave them directions to get petrol, burn the Police Station and Police, which led to violent acts of damaging the property in the police station, obstructing the police from performing the duties and pouring petrol on vehicles and burning them. Reg. Prima facie case: 11. Reg. Prima facie case: 11. So far as prima-facie case, appellant does not dispute occurrence of the incident, but claims that he is falsely implicated due to political rivalry. Legal principles in consideration of bail applications is no more res integra. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali ‘s case referred to supra, relying on several of its earlier judgments, has laid down the following principles: (i) At the stage of consideration of bail application, the duty of the Court is to satisfy whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusation against the accused is prima-facie true; (ii) For that purpose, the Court has to examine the materials or the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer with reference to the accusations; (iii) Degree of satisfaction of prima-facie case at bail stage is lighter than such satisfaction at the stage of framing of charges or trial (iv) It is necessary on the part of the Court to see that culpability of the accused and involvement of the accused in commission of organized crime is direct or indirect; (v) Antecedents and propensities of the accused, nature and the manner in which the offence is committed; & (vi) Once the charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion is founded upon the materials before the Court. 12. The trial Court relied on the charge sheet materials and the statements of LWs.25, 28 to 32, 36, 37, 120 and 123 to speak about the incident, presence of appellant along with other accused. Those witnesses spoke about appellant along with other accused instigating other members of the mob to burn the Police station and the Police with Petrol, consequently mob vandalizing police station, pouring petrol and burning vehicles in the police station and obstructing the police from performing their duties. As per the statements of those witnesses the appellant even gave provocative interview to Youtube channel inciting the viewers and crowd against Police. 13. The Investigating Officer has seized the Mobile phone of the appellant and collected the CDRs, which showed that he was in contact with accused No.9 and others during the incident. The said CDRs have showed his presence at the DJ Halli PS at the relevant time. The data collected from his digital device contained the videos relating to the incident and speech rendered by accused No.1. The said CDRs have showed his presence at the DJ Halli PS at the relevant time. The data collected from his digital device contained the videos relating to the incident and speech rendered by accused No.1. Hence, the trial Court was justified in holding that there was prima-facie material against the appellant. Reg. Delay in trial: 14. So far as delay in trial, the trial Court in para 41 of the impugned order has observed that the accused themselves have delayed the trial by repeatedly filing applications and such applications were filed consecutively by each of the accused, though common advocate was representing same set of accused. Having regard to that learned Special Public Prosecutor was asked to submit the list of applications filed by the accused and their results. 15. In Crl.A.No.1425/2025 relating to accused No.5 in the very same case, when similar contention regarding delay in trial was taken, the learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted the statement of applications filed by the accused before the trial Court and this Court. The same is extracted herein, which are as follows: Bail Applications /Interim bail Applications Application seeking examination of sanction order Application for transfer of cases Application under Section 229 of Cr.P.C. (Plead Guilty) Application for discharge Petitions and Appeals filed before this Court 16. The above statement clearly shows that the accused themselves are delaying the proceedings, strategically to make such delay a ground to seek bail. Examination of the earlier orders of the trial Court on the official website of the concerned Court shows that since 2021, though the matter was being posted for hearing regarding framing of charges, by filing one or the other applications, accused themselves are causing obstructions in achieving progress in the case. They further show that as one or the other accused did not appear on the appointed date, non-bailable warrants and proclamations were being issued by the trial Court. Applications for bail or discharge are being filed consecutively by individual accused instead of filing them collectively, though many of them are represented by common advocate. Other strategy is that they keep changing advocates and changed lawyers seek adjournments. Therefore delay cannot be attributed either to the prosecution or to the trial Court. The accused being themselves the cause for delay, cannot seek reward of bail for such delay. Reg. Parity: 17. Other strategy is that they keep changing advocates and changed lawyers seek adjournments. Therefore delay cannot be attributed either to the prosecution or to the trial Court. The accused being themselves the cause for delay, cannot seek reward of bail for such delay. Reg. Parity: 17. There is no dispute that similarly situated accused i.e. accused No.6 approached this Court in Crl.A.No.1631/2023 challenging rejection of his bail application. The same on hearing came to be dismissed by this Court on 25.01.2024. The said order has attained finality. 18. It was contended that co-accused is granted bail by this Court in Crl.A.No.1722/2025 (21 NIA). Reading of the said order shows that that appeal arose out of Spl.Case No.141/2021 not from Spl.Case No.152/2021 viz., the present case. In that case the co-accused of appellant therein was granted bail by Hon’ble Supreme Court and applying parity, bail was granted to the said appellant. As this is totally different case and overt acts are different, there is no merit in the contention that parity applies. 19. Mahatma Gandhi famously stated, "The true source of rights is duty. If we all discharge our duties, right will not be far to seek". His another related quote is “Right is duty well performed". Appellant is seeking bail on the ground that his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution is violated. He gets that right only when he adheres to his fundamental duties, encapsulated in Article 51A of the Constitution. 20. For the purpose of this case, following fundamental duties under Article 51A (c)(e)(i) of the Constitution are relevant and the same reads as follows: “ 51A. Fundamental duties. - It shall be the duty of every citizen of India (a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem; (b) ……………….…………………………………………………… (c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India (d) …………………………………………………………………… (e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities ; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women; (f) .…………………………………………………………………… (g) …………………………………………………………………… (h) …………………………………………………………………… (i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence .” 21. Since there is prima-facie material to show that the appellant had indulged in vandalizing the police station, assaulted the police to obstruct them from discharging their duties and caused them injuries, indulged in damage to the public properties and violence denting harmony amongst the people on religious lines, in breach of the above referred fundamental duties and accused themselves have delayed the proceedings, they cannot seek benefit of Article 21 of the Constitution. There is no merit in the contention that the impugned order of the trial Court is unsustainable. Hence the following: ORDER The appeal is dismissed.