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2025 DIGILAW 1712 (TS)

Kshatri Santhosh Kumar v. State of Telangana represented by Public Prosecutor

2025-12-05

JUVVADI SRIDEVI

body2025
ORDER : Juvvadi Sridevi, J. This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused seeking to quash the proceedings against him in C.C.No.3728 of 2021 pending on the file of the learned X Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, (for short ‘the learned trial Court’) registered for the offences under Sections 341, 506 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’). 2. Heard Ms. D.Shalini Sharavanthi, learned counsel, representing Sri D. Srinivas Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State- respondent No.1 as well as Sri C. Kumar, learned counsel for the unofficial respondent No.2. Perused the record. 3(a). The brief facts of the case are that the respondent No.2 along with his family, has been residing in Flat No.801, C-Block, Amsri Central Court, Old Lancer Lines, Secunderabad, for the past ten years. The petitioner- accused purchased Flat No.901, C-Block, Amsri Central Court, Old Lancer Lines, Secunderabad, which is situated directly above the flat of the respondent No.2. After purchasing the said flat, the petitioner-accused undertook extensive renovation by carrying out major structural changes in the existing layout, including demolition of certain walls, in violation of the norms and conditions prescribed by the Amsri Central Court Association. Although the Association initially granted two months’ time for completion of the renovation, the petitioner-accused took nearly eleven months to finish the work. 3(b). It is further alleged that during the renovation period, the petitioner-accused allegedly carried out drilling, hammering, and other heavy work from early morning till late night, causing excessive noise and vibrations, due to which the respondent No.2 and his family suffered severe inconvenience, mental agony, and distress. The Respondent No.2 approached the Association’s committee members on several occasions seeking redressal, but no action was taken. Consequently, the respondent No.2 approached the learned III Senior Civil Judge, Secunderabad, and filed a petition in February 2019, which is still pending adjudication. 3(c). It is further alleged that for the past twenty months, there has been continuous water leakage from the petitioner-accused’s washroom into the master bedroom of the respondent No.2. Despite repeated personal requests and written communications, the petitioner-accused failed to attend to the issue and displayed a negligent and indifferent attitude. The respondent No.2 again approached the Association members, but they too failed to take appropriate steps to resolve the problem. Despite repeated personal requests and written communications, the petitioner-accused failed to attend to the issue and displayed a negligent and indifferent attitude. The respondent No.2 again approached the Association members, but they too failed to take appropriate steps to resolve the problem. As a result, the leakage has progressively worsened, causing substantial damage to the walls, doors, and flooring of the respondent No.2’s flat. The foul smell has made it extremely difficult to use the room, and on several occasions, members of the respondent No.2’s family allegedly experienced electric shocks while inadvertently touching the wet walls. Due to the damp and slippery flooring, they also slipped multiple times. 3(d). It is further alleged that about one month ago, while the respondent No.2 was attempting to leave his flat, the petitioner-accused wrongfully restrained him and obstructed his movement. It is also alleged that about ten days ago, when the respondent No.2 requested the petitioner-accused to carry out repairs to rectify the leakage, the petitioner-accused refused and criminally intimidated the respondent No.2 by threatening him with dire consequences if he failed to withdraw the pending civil case. Hence, the respondent No.2 lodged the present complaint seeking necessary action against the petitioner-accused. 4(a). Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused submitted that the petitioner has nothing to do with the alleged offences and that all the allegations levelled in the charge sheet are false, baseless, and motivated. It is contended that the respondent No.2 had earlier instituted a civil suit in O.S.No.73 of 2019 on the file of the learned III Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Courts, Secunderabad, against the petitioner-accused and two others, seeking damages, perpetual injunction, and a direction to the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation to take appropriate action against the petitioner-accused. The said suit is still pending for adjudication. It is submitted that on the very same set of facts, the respondent No.2 has now filed the present criminal case, thereby giving rise to a clear abuse of process. 4(b). It is further submitted that the Police, without conducting any proper or fair investigation, mechanically filed the charge sheet. It is contended that no illegal constructions were ever made by the petitioner-accused and that there is an inordinate delay in lodging the complaint, which remains unexplained. The present criminal proceedings have been initiated only to harass the petitioner and to pressurize him in the pending civil dispute. It is contended that no illegal constructions were ever made by the petitioner-accused and that there is an inordinate delay in lodging the complaint, which remains unexplained. The present criminal proceedings have been initiated only to harass the petitioner and to pressurize him in the pending civil dispute. The averments made in the charge sheet do not disclose the essential ingredients necessary to attract the offences punishable under Sections 341, 506, and 427 IPC. The dispute, at its core, is purely civil in nature, but respondent No.2 is attempting to impart a criminal colour to a civil dispute with an ulterior motive. 4(c). With the above submissions, while praying to quash the proceedings against the petitioner, he relied upon a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , 2025 INSC 1153 wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.17 to 21 that: “ 17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. M/s. NEPC India Ltd., it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite: “9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 18 . Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others, it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 18 . Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others, it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam, this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process. 19 . Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, this Court disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context: “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant – herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.4. However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant. 10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690 . In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs.25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. 12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature. 13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. 14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing anything further. If the Respondent No.4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.25,00,000/- to the Respondent No.4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That’s not what is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the  “State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others” Reported in 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335.” 20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it is manifest that the dispute – concerning repayment of loan money and the alleged coercion in execution of documents – is purely civil in character. The essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick succession, particularly after the appellant had already initiated lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of mala fides. 21. The High Court, in refusing to quash the proceedings, misdirected itself in law by failing to apply the ratio laid down in Bhajan Lal, and the subsequent authorities referred to above, which uniformly hold that the machinery of criminal law cannot be permitted to be misused for settling civil disputes or to wreak vengeance.” 5. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-respondent No.1 as well as the learned counsel for the unofficial respondent No.2 contended that there are triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioner at this juncture and the matter is to be decided after conducting trial by the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Petition. 6. 6. Having regard to the submissions made on either side and upon a perusal of the material on record, it is evident that the petitioner-accused and respondent No.2 are residents of the same apartment, occupying flats on the ninth and eighth floors respectively. It is also an admitted fact that the respondent No.2 has instituted a civil suit in O.S. No.73 of 2019 on the file of the learned III Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Courts, Secunderabad, against the petitioner-accused and two others, seeking damages, perpetual injunction, and a direction to the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation to take appropriate action against the petitioner-accused. The said suit is pending for adjudication. 7. In order to attract the penal provisions under Sections 341, 506, and 427 of IPC, there shall be specific allegations that the petitioner-accused wrongfully restrained the respondent No.2 from proceeding in any direction in which he or she had a right to move, for attracting the offence under Section 341 of IPC. Further, there must be averments indicating that the accused criminally intimidated the respondent No.2 by issuing threats to cause injury to their person, reputation, or property, for attracting the offence under Section 506 IPC. To invoke Section 427 IPC, the respondent No.2 must disclose that the accused committed mischief and caused loss or damage amounting to fifty rupees or more to the property of the respondent No.2. Only when such foundational facts are specifically pleaded the above offences can be said to be made out. 8. A careful perusal of the record discloses that the FIR in the present case was lodged in the year 2021, whereas the complaint refers to incidents allegedly occurring in 2019, including averments that pertain to an ongoing civil dispute. It is an admitted fact that the respondent No.2 had already instituted a civil suit, which is pending for adjudication. Upon a meticulous examination of the material on record, except stating that “threatened the respondent No.2 with dire consequences,” there are no specific details as to the exact words uttered, the nature of the threat, or the manner in which any such threat was made with the requisite intention to cause alarm in the mind of the respondent No.2. It is also admitted that the petitioner-accused and the respondent No.2 reside on different floors of the same apartment. It is also admitted that the petitioner-accused and the respondent No.2 reside on different floors of the same apartment. However, the charge sheet, which is the outcome of the investigation, does not disclose when, where, or under what circumstances the respondent No.2 was allegedly wrongfully restrained. Furthermore, the Police failed to conduct any panchanama or collect material evidence showing the alleged loss or damage said to have been caused by the petitioner-accused. The overall facts clearly indicate that the dispute between the parties is civil in nature. It is also significant to note that the civil suit was instituted prior to the initiation of the present criminal proceedings and it is pending before the competent civil court, where the respective rights and obligations of the parties can be effectively adjudicated. Therefore, continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and the same is liable to be quashed. 9. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused in C.C.No.3728 of 2021 pending on the file of the learned X Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, are hereby quashed. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.