JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. S. Biswas, learned counsel for the appellants in RSA No.17/2024, Mr. B.J. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the appellants in RSA No.26/2024 and also heard Mr. P. Chowdhury, learned counsel for the respondents in both the appeals. 2. By this common judgment and order, it is proposed to dispose of both the appeals, as the same have arisen out of the common judgment dated 12.09.2023 and decree dated 16.09.2023, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sonitpur, Tezpur, (herein after the first appellate Court) in Title Appeal No.4/2022, whereby the learned first appellate Court) has reversed the judgment and decree dated 28.10.2021, passed by the learned Munsiff No.2, Sonitpur, Tezpur, (herein after trial Court) in Title Suit No.66/2012. 3. For the sake of convenience, the status of parties as indicated in the Title Suit No.90/2020 is adopted in these appeals. 4. The background facts leading to filing of the present appeals are briefly stated as under:- “Late Dhaneshwar Baruah was the ancestor of the plaintiffs and the defendants both, who owned and possessed considerable landed property, and particularly, he had acquired 3 bigha of land under Dag No.275 (new) covered by P.P. No.73, and also acquired another 1 bigha 1 katha 1 lecha of land, under Dag No.274 (new) of P.P. No.102, under Goramari Mouza, in Sonitpur district. Both the plots of land are situated adjacent to each other and formed part of Schedule-'A' land. On the death of said Dhaneshwar Baruah, his three sons, namely, Late Moheswar Gogoi, Late Ramakanta Baruah and Late Pyari Mohan Baruah had inherited all the properties, including the suit land, left behind by Dhaneshwar Baruah. During the lifetime of Moheswar Gogoi, Ramakanta Baruah and Pyari Mohan Baruah, they have agreed to divide 4 bigha 1 katha 1 lecha of land equally, having 1 bigha and 2 katha each of them and accordingly, Late Moheswar Gogoi opted to take northern part, Late Pyari Mohan Baruah opted to take the southern part leaving the middle portion for Late Ramakanta Baruah. The names of Late Moheswar Gogoi, Late Ramakanta Baruah and Late Pyari Mohan Baruah were mutated in the revenue record. But, during their lifetime, they did not make partition of the aforesaid land. The names of Late Moheswar Gogoi, Late Ramakanta Baruah and Late Pyari Mohan Baruah were mutated in the revenue record. But, during their lifetime, they did not make partition of the aforesaid land. However, after the death of Moheswar Gogoi and Ramakanta Baruah, surviving brother, namely, Pyari Mohan Baruah and surviving son of Late Moheswar Gogoi, Tangkeshwar Gogoi and Prabin Baruah had demarcated their share in the year 2004 and accordingly, Pramila Baruah, Jatin Baruah, Prabin Baruah and Chandan Baruah were given 1 bigha and 2 katha land from 'A' schedule land i.e. 3 bigha and 1 bigha 1 katha 1 lecha land and the plaintiffs are in possession of the said land and they alleged that the defendant No.1 Uttam Baruah @ Uttam Gogoi, defendant No.6- Smt. Bakuli Baruah, defendant No.7-Shri Balen Baruah and defendant No.8-Shri Deepjyoti Baruah had made serious attempt to encroach into the land, measuring 1 bigha 2 katha in Schedule 'B' land of the plaintiffs and removed several numbers of valuable trees. The plaintiffs made objections against the illegal works of the defendants, but they did not pay any heed and started permanent construction over the Schedule 'B' land, which the plaintiffs had noticed on 20.05.2012. The plaintiffs made objections against the illegal works of the defendants, but they did not pay any heed and started permanent construction over the Schedule 'B' land, which the plaintiffs had noticed on 20.05.2012. The defendant No.1 had constructed structure on the northern side of the 'B' schedule land and encroaching 3 katha of land of the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos.6, 7 and 8 undertook construction on the southern boundary of the plaintiffs' land and being aggrieved, the plaintiffs, namely, Smt. Pramila Baruah, Jatin Baruah, Prabin Baruah and Chandan Baruah, had instituted the Title Suit No.66/2012, for a decree (a) that Schedule 'A' land is the ancestral property of the plaintiffs and the defendants and that the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/3 rd share therein with consequential relief of separate possession of 1/3 rd share i.e. 1 bigha 2 kathas of Schedule 'B' land by confirming plaintiffs' possession over more or less 4 kathas of Schedule 'D' land and delivery of possession to the plaintiffs the 3 kathas of land described in Schedule 'C' now, in illegal possession of the defendant No.1, by evicting the defendant No.1 therefrom demolishing the houses and structures erected by him by metes and bound, through the Collector, Sonitpur by demarcating in favour of the plaintiffs as per provision under Section 5 read with Order 20 Rule 18 of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE and (b) for granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their men and agents from interfering and obstructing with the plaintiffs' separate possession and enjoyment in 1/3 rd share in the Schedule 'A' suit land and the cost of the proceeding. The defendants had entered appearance, after receiving notice and filed their written statement and had also filed counter claim. They denied the right; title and interest of the plaintiffs over the Schedule 'B' land and seek their right, title and interest over the entire Schedule 'A' land by filing counter claim. The plaintiffs' side then filed written statement against the counter claim, denying the statement and averment made therein. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court had framed following issues:- (i) Whether there is a cause of action for the suit and whether there arose any cause of action in 2011, on 20.05.2012 and on 06.06.2012? The plaintiffs' side then filed written statement against the counter claim, denying the statement and averment made therein. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court had framed following issues:- (i) Whether there is a cause of action for the suit and whether there arose any cause of action in 2011, on 20.05.2012 and on 06.06.2012? (ii) Whether there is a cause of action for the counter claim and whether there arose any cause of action for the counter claim from 1964, on 06.05.1995, 30.08.2012 and on every subsequent date? (iii) Whether the suit property is properly valued and whether proper court fee is paid? (iv) Whether the counter claim is barred by limitation? (v) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and mis-joinder of unnecessary party? (vi) Whether the plaintiff has right, title and interest in the 1/3 rd share of the total 'A' schedule land? (vii) Whether the defendants have right, title in the entire 'A'schedule land including 'B' schedule land? (viii) Whether the defendants have acquired right, title over the entire 'B' schedule land by right of adverse possession? (ix) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the decree as prayed for? (x) Whether the defendants are entitled to the decree as prayed for? (xi) To what other relief/reliefs the plaintiffs are entitled? Thelearned Trial Court hadalso framed following two additional issues on 24.04.2015:- (xii) Whether the suit land is ancestral property of the plaintiffs and the defendants? (xiii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to separate possession to the extent of 1/3 rd share of the total suit land? Thereafter, recording evidence and hearing of both the parties, the learned Trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree, dated 28.10.2021, had decided the Issue No.(i) in affirmative in favour of the plaintiffs, Issue No.(ii) in affirmative in favour of the defendants, Issue No.(iii) in favour of the plaintiffs, Issue No.(iv) in affirmative, Issue No.(v) in negative, against the defendants, Issue No.(vi) in negative against the plaintiffs, Issue No.(vii) in affirmative to the defendants, Issue No.(viii) in affirmative to the defendants, Issue No.(ix) and (x) in negative against the plaintiffs, Issue No.(xi) in negative and Issue No.(xii) in negative and Issue No.(xiii) in negative against the plaintiffs and thereafter, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs on contest, without cost. However, the learned trial Court had decreed the counter claim of the defendants by declaring that the counter claimants have possessory right and acquired right, title over the Schedule 'A' land and also granted permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the plaintiffs, their men and agents, in interfering and obstructing the peaceful possession of the counter claimants over the entire Schedule 'A' land, which includes 'B', 'C' and 'D' schedule. Being aggrieved, three plaintiffs, namely, Jatin Baruah, Prabin Baruah and Chandan Baruah preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No.4/2022, before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sonitpur, Tezpur (First Appellate Court, in short). Then hearing learned counsel for both the parties, the learned First Appellate Court, has allowed the appeal on contest with cost and set aside the judgment and decree dated 28.10.2021 passed by the learned Munsifff No.2, Sonitpur, Tezpur, in Title Suit No.66/2012.” 5. Being aggrieved, this RSA No.17/2024 , is preferred by Uttam Baruah @ Uttam Gogoi, Smt. Makani Gogoi, Smt. Jharna Gogoi, Shri Suman Gogoi, Shri Biraj Gogoi @ Bul, on the following grounds:- I. That, the learned First Appellate Court had committed grave error in reversing the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court in Issue Nos.(ii), (vi). (viii), (ix), (x), (xi), (xii) and (xiii). II. That, the learned First Appellate Court had failed to appreciate the evidence of PW-1 in as much as the present appellants were in continuous peaceful possession of the suit land since the year 1952. III. That, the learned First Appellate Court had failed to appreciate the fact that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the right, title and interest of their predecessor-in-interest over the suit land by adducing any evidence. IV. That, the learned First Appellate Court had failed to appreciate the fact that the suit land was not an ancestral property of the predecessors of the present appellants and respondents, in as much as, the father of the defendant No.1- Late Moheshwar Gogoi had purchased a plot of land measuring 3 kathas and 18 lechas under Dag No.275 and hence, the finding arrived in respect of Issue No.(xii) by the learned First Appellate Court that the entire suit schedule land is the ancestral property is beyond any evidence. V. That, the learned First Appellate Court had failed to take into consideration the evidence adduced by PW-2 that the father of the respondents, Late Ramakanta Baruah, had left the suit land approximately 60 years ago and he further deposed that Late Ramakanta Baruah gave up his share of purchased land to his younger brother i.e. Pyari Mohan Baruah and since then the appellants were in peaceful possession of the suit land and therefore, it can be said that the respondents herein have no right to claim for 1/3 rd share in the suit schedule land. VI. That, the learned First Appellant Court had committed grave error in deciding the Issue No.(vii) against the appellants, in as much as from the land revenue records, it is evident that the father of the present appellants along with his brother Pyari Mohan Baruah, were in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit land since the year 1952. Thereafter, the appeal was admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether the findings of the First Appellate Court is perverse for non-consideration of the Exhibit- F(2) document, the Jamabandi copy of the patta No.92, as per which a total land measuring 3 kathas 18 lechas of land was purchased by Moheshwar Gogoi from Ghanashyam Baruah and Narendra Baruah? (ii) Whether the findings of the learned First Appellate Court that the suit schedule land is a joint family property is perverse for non- consideration of the evidence on record? (iii) Whether the learned First Appellate Court has followed the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 6. It is also to be noted here that the RSA No.26/2024 is preferred by Smt. Pinki Baruah, Ms. Januka Baruah and Ms. Manu Baruah and the same was also admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether the judgment dated 12.09.2023 and decree dated 16.09.2023, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sonitpur, Tezpur is justifiable in view of non-compliance of the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? Januka Baruah and Ms. Manu Baruah and the same was also admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether the judgment dated 12.09.2023 and decree dated 16.09.2023, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sonitpur, Tezpur is justifiable in view of non-compliance of the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (ii) Whether in absence of any evidence to the effect that the entire Sche dule ‘A’ property was the ancestral property of all the plaintiffs and defendants, the decree of partition could have been passed, even when the entries in the Jamabandi suggested that some parts of the said land was self-acquired? (iii) Whether the learned First Appellate Court was justified in deciding the Issue No.(xiii) and decreeing the suit by dismissing the counter claim in contravention of Section 27 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963, when the plaintiffs had admitted that the defendants had possessed the suit land since 1952? 7. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the appellants in RSA No.17/2024, submits that the learned First Appellate Court has not recorded any finding in respect of Exhibit-F and Exhibit-6 and the respondents herein had failed to establish that there was oral partition of the suit property and that the observation made by the learned Trial Court in paragraph No.53 has not been set aside by the learned First Appellate Court. Mr. Biswas also submits that while deciding the appeal, the learned First Appellate Court has failed to formulate any point for determination, as required by Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC. Mr. Biswas, further pointed out that Exhibits-5 and 6 have not been considered by the learned First Appellate Court and it had drawn inference, which is unwarranted. Mr. Biswas, further submits that the entire property is not the ancestral property, some are self-acquired property i.e. 3 kathas and 18 lechas of land and that the learned First Appellate Court has not considered Exhibit-F and F(1) in the impugned judgment and decree. 7.1 Mr. Mr. Biswas, further submits that the entire property is not the ancestral property, some are self-acquired property i.e. 3 kathas and 18 lechas of land and that the learned First Appellate Court has not considered Exhibit-F and F(1) in the impugned judgment and decree. 7.1 Mr. Biswas also submits that the Issue No.(vi) is decided against the plaintiffs as entire suit land was not the ancestral property, but self-acquired property of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant No.1 and the learned First Appellate Court has not considered the document Exhibit-F(1) and also the admission made by the witnesses and as such, the findings of the learned First Appellate Court are incorrect and the substantial questions of law Nos.(i) and (ii) are involved here in this appeal and under such circumstances, Mr. Biswas has contended to allow the appeal. Mr. Biswas has also filed written argument. In support of his submission, Mr. Biswas has referred the following decisions:- (i) Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By Lrs. , reported in (2001) 3 SCC 179 (ii) Md. Moniur Ali & Ors. v. Mustt. Safina Khatoon reported in (2018) 0 Supreme(Gau) 716 (iii) Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3845 (iv) Vidya Devi Alias Vidya Vati (Dead) By Lrs. v. Prem Prakash & Ors. , reported in (1995) 4 SCC 496 (v) Cheni Ram Bora v. Arun Chandra Bora , reported in 2021 (1) GLT 496 8. Mr. Mukherjee, learned counsel for the appellants, in RSA No.26/2024, had subscribed the submission so advanced by Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the appellants in RSA No.17/2024. However, he had supplemented the submission of Mr. Biswas by stating that the respondent Nos.6—8 are in adverse possession of the suit property and that no written statement was submitted by the plaintiffs in the counter claim and Exhibits-E(1) to E(27), the revenue payment receipts are not taken into account by the learned First Appellate Court and the possession of the suit land by the respondent Nos.6—8 become hostile w.e.f. 06.05.1995, whereas the suit was filed only in the year 2012 and that the defendants have been paying land revenue and exhibited several documents and the substantial questions of law Nos.(ii) and (iii) are involved in this appeal. He had also pointed out that no court fee has been filed for filing the composite appeal before the learned First Appellate Court and that the property is self- acquired property of the father of the defendant No.1 and under such circumstances, Mr. Mukherjee has contended to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree, so passed by the learned First Appellate Court. 9. Per contra, Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel for the respondents in both the appeals submits that the statements and averment made by the plaintiffs in paragraph Nos.5 and 6 are admitted by the defendants in their written statement in paragraph Nos.11 and 12 and that the defendant Nos.1—5 had filed their amended written statement, wherein they have abandoned the plea of adverse possession and the suit land is covering 4 bighas 1 katha 1 lecha of land and that Ramakanta Baruah was not given up his share. Mr. Chowdhury also submits that only oral statement regarding relinquishment of the share by Ramakanta Baruah is made and that the counter claim was abandoned by plaintiff Nos.1—5 and no issue was framed on counter claim and that the schedule in the plaint and the counter claim are same and in respect of Schedule 'A' land only claim is being made. 9.1 Mr. Chowdhury submits that the property was not partitioned and as such, the plea of adverse possession cannot be taken and that the admission regarding the ownership must be there.Referring to the evidence of PW-1, Mr. Chowdhury submits that he admitted in cross- examination that there was no distribution/partition of the suit land. Mr. Chowdhury has pointed out that there are many factual contradictions and though it is stated that there was relinquishment, but no such document has been shown and that the revenue payment receipt does not confer any right, title and interest. Mr. Chowdhury also pointed out that the counter claim was filed by defendant Nos.6-8 and no issue was framed on the counter claim. 9.2 Mr. Chowdhury has also pointed out that written statement was filed against the counter claim, which is apparent from the paragraph Nos.24 and 25 of the learned Trial Court's judgment and that no preliminary decree under Order 20 Rule 18 CPC, is required to be passed. 9.2 Mr. Chowdhury has also pointed out that written statement was filed against the counter claim, which is apparent from the paragraph Nos.24 and 25 of the learned Trial Court's judgment and that no preliminary decree under Order 20 Rule 18 CPC, is required to be passed. He also submits that no substantial question of law is involved herein, whatever substantial question of law was formulated at the time of admission the same are only question of law and there is no perversity in the impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court and no substantial question of law is involved and therefore, Mr. Chowdhury has contended to dismiss these appeals. Mr. Chowdhury also pointed out that no evidence was led in respect of the adverse possession. Mr. Chowdhury has also filed written argument. In support of his submission, Mr. Chowdhury has referred the following decisions:- (i) Narendra & Ors. v. Ajabrao (Dead) Through Lrs. reported in (2018) 11 SCC 564 (ii) Dagadabai (Dead) By Lrs. v. Abbas Alias Gulab Rustum Pinjari , reported in (2017) 13 SCC 705 (iii) Hemavathi & Ors. v. V. Hombegowda & Anr. [Civil Appeal Nos.5780-5781/2023, arising out of SLP(C) Nos.19975-19976/2022]; (iv) P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy , reported in 1956 SCC OnLine SC 51 ; and (v) Renu Devi v. Mahendra Singh & Ors. , reported in (2003) 10 SCC 200 10. In reply, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the appellants in RSA No.17/2024, submits that a preliminary decree has to be drawn up and that the decision of Renu Devi (supra) , so referred by the respondents is not applicable in the present appeal and similarly, the case of Hemavathi (supra) is also not applicable. Mr. Biswas also pointed out that except Annexure-A, there is no written statement and the learned First Appellate Court has failed to consider the document of the year 1941, and there was specific plea in respect of the adverse possession, since 1985 and the same has been admitted and under such circumstances, Mr. Biswas has contended to allow this appeal. 11. Biswas also pointed out that except Annexure-A, there is no written statement and the learned First Appellate Court has failed to consider the document of the year 1941, and there was specific plea in respect of the adverse possession, since 1985 and the same has been admitted and under such circumstances, Mr. Biswas has contended to allow this appeal. 11. Having heard the submission of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the memo of appeals and the grounds mentioned therein and also the impugned judgment dated 12.09.2023 and decree dated 16.09.2023, passed by the learned First Appellate Court and also the judgment and decree dated 28.10.2021 passed by the learned Trial Court, in Title Suit No.66/2012 and also carefully gone through the decisions referred by the learned counsel for both the parties, and the written argument submitted by Mr. Biswas and Mr. Choudhury. 12. It appears that substantial question No. III, in RSA 17 of 2024 and substantial question No. I, in RSA No. 26/2024, are substantially the same, which is whether the judgment dated 12.09.2023 and decree dated 16.09.2023, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sonitpur, Tezpur is justified in view of non-compliance of the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. And accordingly, both are taken up together for discussion. This substantial question of law concerned with formulation of point for determination and recording of finding with reasons thereof. 12.1 It is to be noted here that Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state- (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein. 13. A careful perusal of the impugned judgment and decree, so passed by the learned First Appellate Court indicates that the learned First Appellate Court has not formulated any point for determination while deciding the appeal, though Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure has mandated the same. 13. A careful perusal of the impugned judgment and decree, so passed by the learned First Appellate Court indicates that the learned First Appellate Court has not formulated any point for determination while deciding the appeal, though Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure has mandated the same. Now the question is, whether non-formulation of point for determination and discussion of the evidence to that effect, is fatal in the present appeals. This issue has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta and others v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation [Civil Appeal Nos.16956-16957/2017], in paragraph Nos.30 and 31 as follows:- " 30. Thus, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient. In this regard, useful reference may be made to G. Amalorpavam and others vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai and others [ (2006) 3 SCC 224 ], wherein this Court held as under: - ‘9. The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC hasto be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.’ 31. As already noted hereinabove, the High Court did set out all the issues framed by the Trial Court in the body of the judgment and was, therefore, fully conscious of all the points that it had to consider in the appeal. Further, we do not find that any particular issue that was considered by the Trial Court was left out by the High Court while adjudicating the appeal. Further, we do not find that any particular issue that was considered by the Trial Court was left out by the High Court while adjudicating the appeal. In effect, we do not find merit in the contention that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside on this preliminary ground, warranting reconsideration of the first appeal by the High Court afresh." 13.1 In the instant appeals, though the learned First Appellate Court has not formulated any point for determination, yet, it appears that the learned Court had discussed all the issues, so framed by the learned Trial Court and after discussion of the evidence, so brought on record, arrived at an independent finding in respect of all the issues with reasons and that being so, non-formulation of point for determination by the learned First Appellate Court, to the considered opinion would not violate the provision of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same cannot be held against the judgment and decree, so passed by the learned First Appellate Court, in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta (supra) . And that being so, the substantial question of law No.(iii) in RSA No.17/2024 and the substantial question of law No.(i) in RSA No.26/2024 have to be answered in negative and accordingly, the same stands answered. 14. It also appears that substantial question of law No.(ii) in RSA No.17/2024 and the substantial question of law No.(ii) in RSA No.26/2024, are also substantially the same and the same pertains to Issue Nos.(vi) and (vii), so framed by the learned Trial Court. While the learned Trial Court in respect of Issue No.(vi) as to whether the plaintiffs have right, title and interest over 1/3 rd share over total 'A' schedule land, decided the issue in negative and in respect of Issue No.(vii), the learned Trial Court has decided the issue in affirmative to the defendants. 14.1 The learned Trial Court had held that the plaintiffs' father Ramakanta Baruah had purchased the suit land jointly, which is admitted by the defendants and approximately 60 years ago, Ramakanta Baruah had gave up his share to his younger brother- Late Pyari Mohan Baruah and from the pleadings itself as well as the evidence rendered, it is clear that the plaintiffs do not have possession over the suit land. The plaintiffs have claimed share of land on the suit land, but had failed to prove that the suit land was owned and possessed by Late Dhaneswar Baruah and also failed to prove that sons of Late Dhaneswar Baruah, namely, Moheswar Gogoi, Ramakanta Baruah and Pyari Mohan Baruah had agreed equally to divide the suit land as 1/3 rd share of the total 'A' schedule land, as PW-1 himself admitted in his cross-examination that Late Moheswar Gogoi was the son of Mehuka Gogoi. 14.2 The learned Trial Court had also held thatDW-5, in his evidence stated that Exhibit- 'F' is the Jamabandi book of 1930 of Revenue Village & Mouza-Goroimari and Exhibit-'F(1)' is the Jamabandi of Patta No.92 and there was only one Dag No.258 in the said Patta and there were total 6 bighas 8 lechas of land and Moheswar Gogoi, son of Mehuka was the original pattadar at Serial No.8, and as per note dated 20.08.1941, of the said Jamabandi, land measuring 3 kathas 18 lechas was mutated in the name of Moheswar Gogoi, by way of purchase, from Ghana and Narendra and Exhibit-'6' is the chitha book of Jamabandi Dag No.274 identified by PW-3 and Exhibit-G(1) is the chitha of Dag No.258, of Revenue Village-Nij Goroimari and Dag No.258 was converted to Dag No.275 and total land of the said Dag was 6 bighas 1 lecha and Exhibit-H is the draft Jamabandi of village Nij Goroimari and Exhibit-H(1) is the draft P.P. No.79.And as per said draft jamabandi, the old Dag No.258, is converted into Dag No.275 and DW- 5 also stated in his evidence that another note dated 13.11.1946, in the Jamabandi reflects that as per order dated 17.07.1946, of the said Jamabandi, names of Moheswar, Dighala, Pyari and Sarulora have been mutated by way of purchase and possession in place of Ghana and Narendra. Therefore, the learned Trial Court held that it was clearly established that the plaintiffs' late father had purchased the land in the same Dag. 14.3 Thereafter, the learned Trial Court has arrived at the finding that the evidence of the defendants is more probable and thereafter, opined that the preponderance lies in favour of the defendants and thereafter, decided the issue in negative against the plaintiffs. 14.3 Thereafter, the learned Trial Court has arrived at the finding that the evidence of the defendants is more probable and thereafter, opined that the preponderance lies in favour of the defendants and thereafter, decided the issue in negative against the plaintiffs. 14.4 And in respect of Issue No.(vi), the learned Trial Court, considering the evidence adduced by the DW-1, DW-2, DW-3, DW-4 and DW-5, has held that the document as submitted by the plaintiffs reveals that the names of defendants are duly mutated in the record of right in respect of the suit property as the legal heirs of Late Moheswar Gogoi and Late Pyari Mohan Baruah. The exhibits also reveal the same. The evidence of PW-3 and DW-5 clarifies that the land record of P.P. No.73 and 102 of village Niz Goroimari, there is mention of the names of defendants with the plaintiffs and thereafter, the learned Trial Court has arrived at the finding that the defendants have their right, title and interest in the suit land. Thereafter, it had decided the issue in favour of the defendant. 15. However, while dealing with the aforementioned issues, the learned First Appellate Court in the impugned judgment and decree held that while the learned Trial Court itself affirmed the right of the plaintiffs, on scrutiny of evidence on record, determining the issue against plaintiffs is indeed wrong and needs to be interfered with. The learned appellate Court further went on to observe that the learned Trial Court had found that the predecessor of the plaintiffs had relinquished his right over the suit land and he left the suit land and shifted his residence to some other place and that the learned Trial Court denied the right, title and interest over the suit land of the plaintiffs on the principle of adverse possession. 15.1 Thereafter, the learned appellate Court proceeded to observe that the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/appellants submitted that where the defendants/respondents claim their right over the suit land on adverse possession, the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs/appellants cannot be denied and it is admitted by the defendants. In para no.52 of the impugned judgment, the learned Trial Court admittedly found that the suit land was not owned and possessed by the grandfather of the defendants/respondents Dhaneswar Baruah, but, owned by Moheswar Gogoi, Ramakanta Baruah and Pyari Mohan Baruah jointly. In para no.52 of the impugned judgment, the learned Trial Court admittedly found that the suit land was not owned and possessed by the grandfather of the defendants/respondents Dhaneswar Baruah, but, owned by Moheswar Gogoi, Ramakanta Baruah and Pyari Mohan Baruah jointly. Where the learned Trial Court from her own finding found that the predecessor of the plaintiffs/appellants were the joint owner of the suit land with the defendants and the proforma defendants, in such circumstances, denial of the right of the plaintiffs is absurd and need to be rectified. 15.2 The learned appellate Court also observed that the names of the plaintiffs appeared in the Jamabandi with the names of the defendants. Hence, relying the evidence of both the parties and the documents submitted thereof, it is of the view that the plaintiffs have the right, title and interest over the suit 'B' schedule land or 1/3 rd share of the 'A' schedule land. 15.3 In respect of Issue No.(vii), the learned first appellate Court has held that the learned Trial Court had found the names of the defendants and the plaintiffs in the land record, but so far as their share is concerned, after being calculated, it was found that the predecessor of defendant Nos.1—5 Late Moheswar Gogoi was the exclusive owner of land measuring 3 kathas 18 lechas, in both the Dag Nos.275 and 274 and co-owner of the land measuring 3 bighas 2 kathas and 3 lechas in both the Dag numbers, with the predecessor of the plaintiffs- Late Ramakanta Baruah, and predecessor of defendant Nos.6—8, Late Pyari Mohan Baruah. The issue though rightly decided in favour of the defendants that the defendants have the right, title and interest over the Schedule 'B' land, but the right, title of the plaintiffs cannot be denied as per admission of the defendants and materials on record. 15.4 The finding so recorded by the learned first appellate Court, while considered in the light of the submission advanced by learned counsel for both the parties and also in the light of the materials available on record, this Court is of the view that the learned First Appellate Court has rightly interfered with the finding, so recorded by the learned Trial Court. It appears from the paragraph 3 of the Counter Claim, dated 16.11.2012, that the Schedule 'A' land (suit land) was distinct and separate piece of land from the alleged land purchased by the predecessor of the defendant Nos. 1 to 5, wherein it is stated that during the lifetime of Late Maheswar Gogoi (father of Defendant Nos 1 to 5), Late Ramakanta Baruah (father of Plaintiffs) and Late Piyari Mohan Baruah (father of Defendant Nos 6 to 8) i.e. prior to 1964 the entire land of 4 Bighas 1 Katha 1 Lessa comprised in Dag Nos. 274 and 275, PP No.102 (Schedule A land) situated at Village Niz Goroiman under Mouza Goroimari, District Sonitpur, Assam were mutually agreed to be divided amongst Maheswar and Piyarimohan only without leaving any share for Ramakanta Baruah. And this was done in the year 1961/1962 and since then, they used to possess the entire suit land to the exclusion of Ramakanta Baruah. 15.5 Thus, this averment in the counter claim clearly reflects that the suit land being Schedule 'A' land is an ancestral property of the Plaintiffs /Respondents and the Defendant Nos. 1 to 8 and the same is in no way connected to the alleged purchase of the land by the father of Defendant Nos. 1 to 5. It also appears that no reason was assigned as to why Late Ramakanta Baruah was deprived of any share in the Schedule 'A' land. No evidence was led to that effect. Further, the Defendant Nos. 1 to 8 had claimed the entire Schedule 'A' land to the exclusion of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. Moreover, if some portion of the alleged land was purchased by the father of the defendant Nos. 1 to 5, fell within the Schedule 'A' land than in such a situation, the Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 would not give any share of the schedule 'A' land to the Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 who are claiming the Schedule 'A' land by way of adverse possession. 15.6 It also appears that the respondents/plaintiffs in paragraph 5 and 6 of the plaint had described in details the Schedule 'A' land being an ancestral property. And further it appears that the defendant Nos. 6 to 8 who are claiming the Schedule 'A' land by way of adverse possession. 15.6 It also appears that the respondents/plaintiffs in paragraph 5 and 6 of the plaint had described in details the Schedule 'A' land being an ancestral property. And further it appears that the defendant Nos. 1 to 8 in their common Written Statement, dated 16 th November, 2012 in paragraphs 11 and 12 and 13 (Page 27 of the RSA No. 17/2024) had admitted the fact that the Schedule 'A' land is an ancestral property. Relevant portion of the said paragraph are reproduced below for ready reference:- "11) That in respect of the avermen ts of Para 5 of the plaint that the ancestors of the plaintiffs and the defendants Late Dhaneshwar Baruah owned and possessed considerable landed property and particularly acquired 3 Bighas of land under Dag No. 275 and P.P. No. 73 and 1 Katha | Lessa under Dag No. 274 under P.P. No. 102 at Niz-goroimari under Mouza Goroimari, Dist. Sonitpur, Assam and that both the Dag Nos. 274 and 275 are adjacent to each other, thus comprises 4 Bighas | Katha and 1 Lessas are not denied. 12) That the averments of para 6 of the plaint that, "on the death of Dhaneswar Baruah his successors became entitled to-------------------- ------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- all their movable and immovable properties." is true. 13) That the averments of Para 7 of the plaint that "during the lifetime of Late Maheswar Gogoi, Late Ramakanta Baruah and Late Piyari Mohan Baruah------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------- the husband and father of the plaintiffs No. I to 4." are not true and are denied by the defendants. It is submitted herein that during the life time of Late Maheshwar Gogoi, Late Ramakanta Baruah and Late Piyari Mohan Baruah the entire land of 4 Bighas 1 Katha 1 Lessa comprised in Dag No. 274 and 275 were mutually agreed to divide amongst Maheshwar and Piyari Mohan only without leaving any share for Ramakanta Baruah. ----------------- ----------- ." 15.7 But, defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have filed their amended Written Statement, dated 5 th February, 2015, wherein defendants Nos.1 to 5 had taken a diametrically opposite stand and completely denied the statement and averment made in paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 13 in the plaint, and thereby they had denied the admission, which they had made in the first written statement. 1 to 5 have filed their amended Written Statement, dated 5 th February, 2015, wherein defendants Nos.1 to 5 had taken a diametrically opposite stand and completely denied the statement and averment made in paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 13 in the plaint, and thereby they had denied the admission, which they had made in the first written statement. Now it has to be seen the consequence of such contradictory and inconsistent plea taken by the defendants Nos. 1 to 5, herein in their amended Written Statement. 15.8. It is well settled that inconsistent and contradictory allegations in negation to the admitted position of facts or mutually destructive allegations of facts should not be allowed to be incorporated by means of amendment to the pleadings. The proposed amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated by costs. No amendment should be allowed which amounts to or relates in defeating a legal right accruing to the opposite party on account of lapse of time. Reference in this context can be made to Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Another, reported in 2022 Supreme(SC) 864. Then in the matter of Ram Niranjan Kajaria and others vs. Jugal Kishore Kajaria ; reported in (2015) 10 Supreme Court Cases 203, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "23. We agree with the position in Nagindas Ramdas and as endorsed in Gautam Sarup that a categorical admission made in the pleadings cannot be permitted to be withdrawn by way of an amendment. To that extent, the proposition of law that even an admission can be withdrawn, as held in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava, does not reflect the correct legal position and it is overruled." 15.9. In the aforesaid case [( Ram Niranjan Kajaria(supra)] Hon'ble Supreme Court, besides expressing the view that categorical expression made in pleading cannot be permitted to be withdrawn and overruled its earlier decision in Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Jyoti Sahay, reported in 1984 Supp SCC 594 , in which a contrary view is taken. 15.10. It worth mentioning in this context that though amended Written Statement was filed defendant Nos. 1 to 5, yet defendant No.6 to 8 have not filed amended Written Statement and as such the stand taken by them in the said Written Statement remains. And even if defendant Nos. 15.10. It worth mentioning in this context that though amended Written Statement was filed defendant Nos. 1 to 5, yet defendant No.6 to 8 have not filed amended Written Statement and as such the stand taken by them in the said Written Statement remains. And even if defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have filed their amended Written Statement, dated 5 th February, 2015, wherein they had taken a diametrically opposite stand and completely denied the statement and averment made in paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 13 in the plaint, and thereby they had denied the admission, the same is impermissible in view of the Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Another, (supra) and in the case of Ram Niranjan Kajaria (supra). 15.12. In view of aforesaid factual and legal matrix, the factum of admission that the Schedule 'A' land is an ancestral property, so made by the defendants Nos.1 to 8 in the Written Statement, dated 16 th November, 2012 in paragraphs 11 and 12 and 13 (Page 27 of the RSA No. 17/2024) cannot be ignored and its value and effect cannot be obliterated, notwithstanding filing of amended Written Statement by defendants Nos.1 to 5., while the defendant Nos. 6 to 8 did not file amended Written Statement and restricted their stand to the Written Statement dated 16 th November, 2012. 15.13. Thus, it becomes apparent that the learned first appellate Court has considered the evidence on the record and also the documents so exhibited during trial and arrived at a reasoned finding and to the considered opinion of this Court, the same warrant no interference of this Court.And on such count, the substantial question of law, so formulated by this Court in both the appeals, are found to be not flows out of the impugned judgment and decree, so passed by the learned first appellate Court and even if involved and flows out, in the given factual and legal matrix, the same have to be answered in negative and accordingly, the same stands answered. 16. Now, coming to the substantial question of law No.(i), in RSA No.17/2024, this Court finds that the learned First Appellate Court had, though not mentioned about the Exhibit-F(2), the Jamabandi of the patta No.92, in the impugned judgment and decree, yet, it appears that it had considered the Note dated 20.08.1941 and the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in respect of same. 16.1 However, it appears that the learned Trial Court, in its judgment at paragraph No.69 had observed that as per said jamabandi, total area of the entire Dag No. 344 was 2 kathas 1 lecha and the said Dag number was converted to Dag No.261. The learned Trial Court had also observed that the said jamabandi reflects that name of Maheswar Gogoi, son of Mehuka, was mutated as per order dated 16.07.1941, by way of purchase in respect of the entire Dag. 16.2 But the learned Trial court had observed that Maheswar Gogoi had purchased 3 kathas 18 lechas of land mutated in the name of Moheswar Gogoiby way of purchase from Ghanashyam and Narendra Baruah as per Note dated 20.08.1941 and thereafter, as per order dated 17.07.46 of the said jamabandi, the name of Maheswar, Dighala, Piari, and Sarulara had been muted in place of Ghana and Narendra. 16.3 While 3 kathas 18 lechas of land bearing Dag No. 275 and 274 was purchased by Maheswar Gogoi and Exhibit-F(2), the Jamabandi of the patta No.92, and as held by the learned trial Court in its judgment at para No.69 that total areas of the entire Dag No. 344 was 2 kathas 1 lecha and the said Dag number was converted to Dag No.261, then it is difficult to reconcile the said finding of the learned trial Court with that of the record. Moreover, the value of entry in revenue record is well settled in catena of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court. Reference in this context can be made to a decision in Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar vs. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund , reported in (2007) 13 SCC 565 , where in Hon'ble Supreme Court has been held as under:- " 12. A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the Evidence Act. The courts below, were, therefore, required to appreciate the evidence keeping in view the correct legal principles in mind." 16.4 Over and above, except the copy of jamabandi i.e. Exhibit- F(2), no sale deed was exhibited and proved to substantiate such claim by the defendants in the learned trial Court. Mr. The courts below, were, therefore, required to appreciate the evidence keeping in view the correct legal principles in mind." 16.4 Over and above, except the copy of jamabandi i.e. Exhibit- F(2), no sale deed was exhibited and proved to substantiate such claim by the defendants in the learned trial Court. Mr. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the respondents had rightly pointed this out during hearing and this Court finds substance in the same. 16.5 Mr. Biswas, the learned counsel for the appellant in RSA No. 26/2024, however, submits that the learned appellate Court had not considered the Exhibits-F and F1. But, the substantial question of law relates to Exhibit-F2 only. There was no such contention of the appellant to frame additional issue on that point. Mr. Biswas, the learned counsel for the appellant in RSA No.17/2024 had made no reference to the Exhibit-F-2 during hearing. His submissions confined to Exhibit-F and F-1 only, which are totally unconnected to the substantial question of law. It is to be noted here that sitting in second appeal, this Court has to confine its discussion only tothe substantial question of law, so framed. Reference in this context can be made to decision in Chacko v. Mahadevan reported in [ (2007) 7 SCC 363 ], wherein, dealing with the jurisdiction of Sections 96 and 100 CPC, Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down as under : " 6. It may be mentioned that in a first appeal filed under Section 96 CPC, the appellate court can go into questions of fact, whereas in a second appeal filed under Section 100 CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact of the first appellate court, and it is confined only to questions of law." 16.6 Reference in this context can also be made to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari (supra) . In paragraph No.9 of the said decision, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code. 16.7 In Thiagarajan v. Venugopalaswamy B. Koil, reported in (2004) 5 SCC 762 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 16.8 Again, in Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pilla i reported in (2005) 10 SCC 553 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 16.9 Again, in Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh reported in (2005) 12 SCC 270 , Hon'ble Supreme Court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. 16.10 Under the given factual matrix, no substantial question of law, No.(i) in RSA No.17/2024, as formulated above, is found to be flown out from the impugned judgment and decree of the learned First Appellate Court. And accordingly, the same stands answered. 17. Now, moving forward to the substantial question of law No.(iii) in RSA No.26/2024, this Court finds that the same relates to dismissing of the counter claim in contravention to Section 27 of the LIMITATION ACT . It is to be noted here that Section 27 of the Indian LIMITATION ACT , 1963 state that if a person fails to file a suit for possession of property within the prescribed period of limitation, their right to that property is extinguished. It is to be noted here that Section 27 of the Indian LIMITATION ACT , 1963 state that if a person fails to file a suit for possession of property within the prescribed period of limitation, their right to that property is extinguished. This provision, which re-enforced a concept of adverse possession, ensures legal certainty and stability by encouraging property owners to assert their right within given time frame, thereby preventing prolong dispute and ensuring that property claims are resolved efficiently. 17.1 In the cases in hand, though it appears that the defendants had claimed possessing the suit land since 1952, hostile to the plaintiffs, yet, the said plea has been abandoned by the defendants No. 1 to 5 in their amended written statement and the learned trial Court had made categorical observation in that regard in paragraph No. 49 of the judgment. It also appears that no evidence was also led by the defendants. 17.2 Further, from a perusalof paragraph No.3 of the Counter Claim, dated 19.11.2012, Annexure-3 of the Memorandum of Appeal of RSA No. 26/2024, that Schedule 'A' land comprising of 4 Bighas 1 Katha 1 lessa is admitted to be the ancestral property. And admittedly also, the said land was not partitioned orally. And if there was no partition of schedule 'A' land, there cannot be adverse possession against the co-owners of the ancestral property. The defendants had not produced any material to suggest that the plaintiffs and defendants were allotted their respective shares in the Schedule 'A' land and even if the defendants No.6 to 8 are in possession of the same, it cannot be termed as hostile and at best they may be termed as permissive occupier. That being so, Section 27 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963 cannot be applied herein this case, since to the schedule - 'A' land had not been partitioned. 17.3 The learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment had discussed the issue of adverse possession in Issue No.(viii), and had observed that -- if we carefully go through the principle as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme court in Dagadabi (dead) by legal representative vs. Abbas Ali Gulab Rostom Pinja ri reported in (2017) 13 SCC 705 , and in Ram Nagira Raivs Deo Kumar Rai By Lrs. reported in 2018 (10) SCJ 533 , and in Vidya Devi @ Vidya Voti (Dead) By Lrs. reported in 2018 (10) SCJ 533 , and in Vidya Devi @ Vidya Voti (Dead) By Lrs. vs. Premprakash and others, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 , as discussed by the learned trial Court and as submitted by the plaintiffs/appellants, we would find that both the principles are not fulfilled in the case. First of all the possession over the 'B' scheduled land by the defendant Nos. 6 to 8 was a permissive possession by the deceased father of the plaintiffs. Secondly, there is evidence on record that the defendants were not in continuous possession over the 'B' scheduled land and their point and time of possession has not clearly mentioned. It had also been held that - from the material on the case record, it is found that the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 and defendant Nos. 6 to 8 are in the initial possession over the 'B' scheduled land and it was only the plea of defendant Nos. 6 to 8 of adverse possession over the suit land. Thereafter, it went on to observe that the defendant Nos. 6 to 8 took no steps to ousted the other co-owner from the 'B' scheduled land and the defendant no- 1 to 5 and defendant no 6 to 8 are claiming that they were in the possession over the suit land. Moreover, the defendants had failed to prove as to when and on what date they were in the possession over the suit land and the nature of their possession thereto, which are the essential ingredients to be proved by the defendant side. Further, the defendant side could not prove whether the plaintiffs had knowledge of their adverse possession and was undisputed thereof. Thereafter, it had observed that - though the learned Trial Court found that the defendant side were in the possession over the suit 'B' scheduled land since 60 years, but no specific date was found from when the defendants were in the possession over that land. Hence, it is of the view that the determination of the learned Trial Court is wrong. The defendants cannot acquire any right, title in the 'B' scheduled land by right of adverse possession. Hence, it is of the view that the determination of the learned Trial Court is wrong. The defendants cannot acquire any right, title in the 'B' scheduled land by right of adverse possession. 17.4 Thus, it appears that while arriving at the aforesaid finding, the learned first appellate Court had discussed the relevant case laws, besides, considering the evidence on record and the finding of the learned trial Court and arrived at a finding supported by reasons. The appellants herein, had failed to demonstrate from the record and to convince this Court such finding and reasoning to be perverse. 18. Under the given factual scenario, this substantial questions of law has to be answered in negative and accordingly, the same stands answered. 19. This Court has also gone through the other decisions referred by learned counsel for both the parties. There is no quarrel at the bar about the proposition of law laid down in the said cases. But, to decide the substantial questions of law, so formulated herein this two appeals, reference to all those decision are found to be not necessary, except what has been discussed herein above. 20. In the result, this Court finds no merit in these appeals and accordingly, the same stands dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 21. The registry shall send down the record of the learned courts below with a copy of this judgment and order.