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2025 DIGILAW 1723 (KER)

Neethu D/o Mohanan v. Pradeep S/o Kumaran

2025-06-26

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, M.B.SNEHALATHA

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JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. The petitioner, who is the wife of the first respondent but living estranged from him on account of severe matrimonial strife between them, is enraged that the latter made unsubstantiated allegations about her in an Original Petition filed by him before the learned Family Court, Kattappana, seeking divorce; and then published the same for the knowledge of her relatives, friends and even strangers. 2. The above said Original Petition filed by the first respondent was dismissed; and then, seeking damages for defamation, she filed O.P. (RM) No.79/2020 before the learned Family Court. 3. It transpires that the first respondent resisted the Original Petition above mentioned, inter alia, on the ground that it is not maintainable before the learned Family Court and after hearing both sides, the said Court has entered a finding, underpinned on the declarations in Rarima R v. Rejulal K.V. and another , ILR 2023 (1) Ker. 860, approving the contention of the first respondent against the maintainability of the Original Petition before it; thus returning it to be presented before the appropriate forum. 4. The appellant challenges the impugned judgment as being illegal and untenable, arguing that an earlier judgment of this Court, namely Rajesh P.P. and Another v. Deepthi P.R. 2021 (4) KHC 242 , declares the law beyond pale of doubt that an original petition can be maintained by a wife even against her husband - whether divorced or otherwise - for compensation for defamation. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents, Sri.George Mathew, however, contended that the order of the learned Family court is without error because, Rajesh P.P. (supra) involved a factual matrix wholly different and distinct from that projected in this case. He pointed out that, in the said precedent, the claim was not for damages alone, but was only a corollary one, along with the primary plea for return of gold ornaments, household articles and cash - forming the petitioner therein’s patrimony. He argued that, in such a scenario, when the primary, or main reliefs, are ones which were maintainable before the learned Family court, an additional or accompanying plea for damages for marital tort is certainly actionable before the said Court. He argued that, in such a scenario, when the primary, or main reliefs, are ones which were maintainable before the learned Family court, an additional or accompanying plea for damages for marital tort is certainly actionable before the said Court. He then predicated, relying on Rarima R. (supra) that, however, in a situation where the Original Petition contains solely a claim for damages for defamation, the learned Division Bench has rendered it apodictic that such would not be maintainable before the learned Family Court, since the marital status/relationship between the parties would induce no impact on the ultimate decision. He thus, prayed that this appeal be dismissed. 6. It becomes obvious, when one hears the learned counsel for the parties as above, that the real issue in this case revolves on the interplay of the decisions of this Court in Rarima R. (supra) and Rajesh P.P. (supra). Without contest, the decision of this Court in Rajesh P.P. (supra) is one earlier in time; and that it is not referred to in Rarima R. (supra). 7. However, it ought to be borne in mind that, in Rajesh P.P. (supra), the learned Division Bench encountered a factual situation of a divorced wife suing her former husband for return of gold, household articles and cash; and, along with it, she also sought damages to a certain sum on the ground that the latter had denigrated her, making unsubstantiated allegations that she is mentally unwell. It was in such specific factual scenerio that the learned Bench of this Court held that the Original Petition is maintainable before the Family Court; further holding that all wrongs should be available to the parties for seeking redressal before the said Court and that marital torts, if established, are liable to be compensated by the wrongdoer. 8. However, in Rarima R. (supra), the circumstantial backdrop presented was wholly distinct, where the wife filed the Original Petition seeking damages against her husband, with no other relief sought. The learned Division Bench held as under, after evaluating several relevential precedents: “13. What emerges from the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions is that the dispute must have a nexus with the marital relationship. Here, the husband and the father-in-law allegedly described the appellant as a mentally ill person. There was libel as well as slander. What emerges from the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions is that the dispute must have a nexus with the marital relationship. Here, the husband and the father-in-law allegedly described the appellant as a mentally ill person. There was libel as well as slander. The cause of action for the appellant to claim compensation is the injury allegedly caused in her reputation on account of such libel and slander. It is an action for tort. A tort is a civil wrong and that by itself constitutes cause of action. Whether or not she is married to the 1 st respondent, the alleged statements made by the respondents if defamatory, is a sufÏcient cause of action. When the sole reason for claiming compensation is such statements, the marital relationship between the appellant and the 1 st respondent does not have any relevance of role in resolving such a dispute. The relationship between the appellant and the respondents would not make any impact in the ultimate decision. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that the dispute involved in O.P.No.400 of 2019 has any nexus to the marital relationship or is a dispute in the circumstances arising out of the marital relationship.” 9. A close reading of the facts involved in the afore two judgments perspicuously show that, in Rajesh P.P. (supra), the wife had sued the husband seeking damages for cruelty; whereas, in Rarima (supra), the claim of the petitioner therein was for damages for defamation against her. Further, in the former, as already said above, the Original Petition contained several reliefs, each of which were admittedly maintainable before the learned Family Court and, in addition, was a plea for damages for cruelty. Indubitably, when all the other reliefs were capable of being adjudicated by the learned Family Court, the learned Division Bench held that the damages for the marital tort, alleged on the ground of cruelty, is also maintainable before it. 10. In contradistinction, in Rarima (supra) since the plea for damages was based on the allegation of defamation and since it was impelled as a single plea, without any other accompanying relief, the view taken by another Division Bench was, as we have extracted above, that it would not be maintainable before the Division Bench. 11. 10. In contradistinction, in Rarima (supra) since the plea for damages was based on the allegation of defamation and since it was impelled as a single plea, without any other accompanying relief, the view taken by another Division Bench was, as we have extracted above, that it would not be maintainable before the Division Bench. 11. The facts in the case at hand aligns with those that were noticed in Rarima (supra) because, admittedly, the appellant herein has filed O.P.(RM)No.79/2020 before the learned Family Court, seeking damages for defamation allegedly caused to her by the respondents on account of the latter's imputations against her in an earlier Original Petition filed for divorce, which reportedly stands dismissed. 12. We cannot hence find the view of the learned Family Court to be in error particularly, because it has acted in conformity with the declarations in Rarima R. (supra); to thus return the Original Petition to the appellant for being presented before the appropriate forum. 13. In such circumstances, this appeal is dismissed. After we dictated this part of the judgment, Sri. Tom E. Jacob - learned counsel for the appellant sought that the time frame for his client, to present the Original Petition before the appropriate forum, be extended till 31.07.2025. This plea is certainly justified and we, therefore, so order.