ORDER : ANAND SHARMA, J. 1. Facts of this petition would reveal that the manner, in which criminal law is being misused in a matter of purely civil nature just to exert undue pressure and to wreak vengeance. 2. Petitioner has challenged FIR No.174/2015 dated 08.10.2015 registered at Police Station-Mangaliawas, District- Ajmer for offence under Sections 420 , 467, 468, 471 & 120B of IPC . 3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the fundamental dispute is in respect of land bearing Khasra No.561, Village- Amargarh, District-Ajmer. Erstwhile, Khatedar of the aforesaid land was complainant-Beeja. The complainant executed one registered sale deed dated 30.12.1985 in favour of Sh. Gulab Chand. It was mentioned in the sale deed that while executing the same, the vendor/complainant-Beeja has received sale consideration and handed over possession of the land to purchaser-Sh. Gulab Chand. Till this date, the said sale deed dated 30.12.1985 is a legal and valid document and has not been cancelled or quashed by any Competent Court or any other appropriate Authority. Further, pursuant to aforesaid sale deed, necessary mutation order was passed by the Revenue Authorities and name of purchaser-Sh. Gulab Chand was entered in Jamabandi, which is placed on record as Annexure-3. 4. Thereafter, purchaser-Sh. Gulab Chand died and after his death, names of his legal heirs Narendra, Sohan, Mohan, Suresh, Ramkanya and Seema were entered in the Jamabandi as Khatedar of the aforesaid land bearing Khasra No.561. The aforesaid revenue entries have also never been challenged by the complainant. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that thereafter, undivided share of sons of aforesaid Late Sh. Gulab Chand namely Narendra, Sohan, Mohan and Suresh was sold by them to one Sh. Kaila Singh S/o Sh. Sayar Singh vide registered sale deed dated 26.03.2015 (Annexure-5) and in turn Sh. Kaila Singh further sold that same to one Sh. Mohan on 03.07.2015 by way of executing registered sale deed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that thereafter Sh. Mohan sold that aforesaid land to the petitioner by executing registered sale deed dated 03.07.2015 and remaining undivided share of the daughters of Late Sh. Gulab Chand was purchased by the petitioner by way of separate sale deed dated 30.03.2015. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that thereafter Sh. Mohan sold that aforesaid land to the petitioner by executing registered sale deed dated 03.07.2015 and remaining undivided share of the daughters of Late Sh. Gulab Chand was purchased by the petitioner by way of separate sale deed dated 30.03.2015. It is further submitted that thus, the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and after paying the due consideration, the land has been purchased by him through a registered sale deed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also submit that the petitioner has exercised all due caution and vigil while purchasing the said land. However, just to create undue pressure upon the petitioner and to extort undue money, in quite malicious manner, FIR through a criminal complaint has been registered by the complainant on 08.10.2015. He submits that the complainant had already sold the land in question around 30 years back to other person by way of registered sale deed and he has no right, title and interest in the said land after selling the same. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even bare reading of the FIR would not make out any of the ingredients of Sections 420 , 467, 468, 471 & 120B of IPC . He also submits that the FIR is absolutely silent with regard to any dishonest intention whatsoever on the part of the petitioner, nor is there any allegation against the petitioner with regard to any inducement or causing undue loss to the complainant. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasizes that forgery has been defined under Section 463 IPC and there is no whisper at all in the entire FIR, so as to lead to inference of any allegation with regard to committing forgery by the petitioner and as such there is no question of making out any offences against the petitioner under Sections 467 , 468 & 471 of . The petitioner has purchased the land through registered sale deed strictly in accordance with the law and is lawfully Khatedar of the aforesaid land. Hence, in case, he is permitted to be prosecuted pursuant to impugned FIR, it would be perpetuating the illegalities committed by the police authorities in registering an FIR in a matter revealing purely a civil dispute that has nothing to do with the petitioner. 10. Hence, in case, he is permitted to be prosecuted pursuant to impugned FIR, it would be perpetuating the illegalities committed by the police authorities in registering an FIR in a matter revealing purely a civil dispute that has nothing to do with the petitioner. 10. Learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the complainant seriously opposed the petition. 11. Learned counsel for the complainant submits that he has been cheated by Late Sh. Gulab Chand, who died somewhere in the year 2010 and although, Late Sh. Gulab Chand persuaded the complainant to execute the sale deed, yet the amount agreed was not actually paid to the complainant. It is also submitted that although Late Sh. Guland Chand agreed to revert back the land to the complainant but he did not fulfill his promise. 12. Learned counsel for the complainant further submits that since the action of Late Sh. Gulab Chand was dishonest and malicious, therefore, all the subsequent sale deeds suffers from the defect arising out of the dishonest action taken by Late Sh. Gulab Chand and the petitioner is since beneficiary of the dishonest act committed by Late Sh. Gulab Chand, therefore, cognizable offence is made out against him. Hence, the petition filed by the petitioner is totally misconceived and is liable to be rejected. 13. Heard learned counsels for both the parties and perused the record. 14. There is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned FIR is totally silent and does not refer any content whatsoever so as to make out any cognizable offence against the petitioner. The series of transaction mentioned in the FIR itself would reveal that the land was firstly sold by the complainant to Late Sh. Gulab Chand and after his death, by the legal heirs of Late Sh. Gulab Chand to Sh. Kaila Singh, who further sold it to Sh. Mohan and from Sh. Mohan as well as from legal heirs of Late Sh. Gulab Chand, petitioner has purchased the aforesaid land. All these transactions have taken place through registered sale deeds. Admittedly, at no point of time has any of the registered sale deeds been challenged by the complainant. Kaila Singh, who further sold it to Sh. Mohan and from Sh. Mohan as well as from legal heirs of Late Sh. Gulab Chand, petitioner has purchased the aforesaid land. All these transactions have taken place through registered sale deeds. Admittedly, at no point of time has any of the registered sale deeds been challenged by the complainant. The sale deed dated 30.12.1985 was executed by the petitioner 30 years back from the date of lodging of FIR and reveals that he had already handed over the possession of land to the purchaser and also received the sale consideration. Thus, the entire FIR is not revealing any cause of action accrued to the complainant after 30 years for raising any grievance, which allegedly took place 30 years back while executing the sale deed dated 30.12.1985. 15. It has also not been disputed by the learned counsel for the complainant that pursuant to sale deed dated 30.12.1985, revenue entries were opened in favour of the purchaser in the said sale deed and subsequently in favour of purchaser's legal heirs. It has also been admitteded by the learned counsel for the complainant that there were no direct transaction between the petitioner and the complainant at any point of time. Thus, the contents of FIR in itself would reveal that dispute, if any, is purely of a civil nature and invoking criminal jurisdiction in such a purely civil matter reflects a malicious mind of the complainant. It is also a matter of surprise that without examining the necessary ingredients for making out any cognizable offences, in quite mechanical manner directions were given by the learned Magistrate to register FIR under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. Needless to mention here that the learned Magistrate before whom the criminal complaint is filed, cannot act as a post office just to further process the same to the police station with a direction to register an FIR. Before passing any such order, it is incumbent upon the learned Magistrate to examine the complaint and to satisfy himself with regard to the fact that the cognizable offences are prima facie made out on the basis of allegations in the FIR along with material placed on record with the same. In the instant case, no such examination appears to have been made by the learned Magistrate. 16. In the instant case, no such examination appears to have been made by the learned Magistrate. 16. The fundamental principles for exercising inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 SUPP (1) SCC 335, the Supreme Court has observed in the following manner: “ (102) In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Ch. XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under S. 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under S. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of S. 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 17. In the case of Anukul Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has deprecated registration and prosecution in the cases which are apparently of civil nature and following observations have been given: "17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite: “9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam, this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process. 19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context: “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No. 4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant - herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No. 4. However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant. 10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. 10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh”, (2024) 10 SCC 690 . In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. 12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature. 13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. 14. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. 14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing anything further. If the Respondent No. 4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That's not what is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal”, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335” 20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it is manifest that the dispute- concerning repayment of loan money and the alleged coercion in execution of documents-is purely civil in character. The essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick succession, particularly after the appellant had already initiated lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of mala fides." 18. The essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick succession, particularly after the appellant had already initiated lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of mala fides." 18. In the light of foregoing discussion and since no cognizable offence is made out from bare reading of the FIR; as well as considering the fact that the dispute, if any, is of purely civil nature, this Court finds it just and proper to invoke inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, FIR No.174/2015 registered at Police Station-Mangaliawas, District- Ajmer against the petitioner for alleged offences under Sections 420 , 467, 468, 471 & 120B of IPC is hereby quashed and set aside. 19. Accordingly, the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is allowed. 20. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.