Prayer: Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant appeals, under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, have been filed for setting aside order dated 09.01.2014 passed by learned Appellate Tribunal, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, at New Delhi in connection with MP-PMLA-690-/LKW/2013 (COD) & FPA- PMLA-522/LKW/2013 [in A.C. (S.B.) No. 5 of 2014]; MP- PMLA-688-/LKW/2013 (COD) & FPA-PMLA-520/LKW/2013 [In A.C. (S.B.) No. 6 of 2014]; MP-PMLA-689-/LKW/2013 (COD) & FPA-PMLA-521/LKW/2013 [In A.C. (S.B.) No. 7 of 2014] and; MP-PMLA-592-/LKW/2013 (COD) & FPA-PMLA- 489/LKW/2013 [In A.C. (S.B.) No. 8 of 2014], whereby and whereunder the learned Tribunal has dismissed the application for condonation of delay and consequently dismissed the appeal. Further prayer has been made for setting aside the order dated 11.10.2012 passed by the adjudicating authority in original complain case no. 146 of 2012 by which the learned adjudicating authority has confirmed the provisional attachment no. 01/2012 dated 18.05.2012. 2. Since all the appeals arise out of the common order dated 09.01.2014, as such with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, they are taken up together and are being disposed of by this common order. Factual Matrix 3. Since common facts is involved in these matters, as such for the sake of convenience, the factual aspect of AC (SB) No. 5 of 2014 is referred as under: 4. On 15.10.2009 and 21.10.2009 searches were conducted by the Income Tax Department at Ranchi and village home residences of the Manoj Kumar, in course of which four different Panchnama (Seizure Lists) were prepared relating to recovery and seizure of (a) 169 Fixed Deposit Receipts investing Rs. 12,54,45,499.00 with Uttar Bihar Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Magarpal Murtaza Branch, Chapra, out of fixed deposit of Rs. 12,54,45,499.00, fixed deposit of Rs. 25,00,000/- was in the name appellant; (b) 24 Fixed Deposit Receipts worth Rs. 12,75,000.00 invested with United Bank of India, R.K. Mission Extension Counter, Morabadi, Ranchi; (c) Rs. 4,49,000.00 in the saving account of Manoj Kumar and Miss Summy Priya, daughter of Manoj Kumar from United Bank of India, R.K. Mission Extension Counter, Morabadi, Ranchi and (d) Rs. 23,77,977.00 recovered from Saving Bank Account of Manoj Kumar, Subodh Kumar Singh, Sujit Kumar, Smt. Renu Singh and Miss Summy Priya from Uttar Bihar Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Magarpal Murtaza Branch, Chapra. 5. 23,77,977.00 recovered from Saving Bank Account of Manoj Kumar, Subodh Kumar Singh, Sujit Kumar, Smt. Renu Singh and Miss Summy Priya from Uttar Bihar Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Magarpal Murtaza Branch, Chapra. 5. The Additional Director of Income Tax (Investigation) referred the matter to the Vigilance Department due to his proximity with I.G. (Vigilance) against the guidelines issued by C.B.D.T., pursuant to which an F.I.R. vide Vigilance P.S. Case No. 23/2009 dated 02.12.2009 was registered by Vigilance Bureau, Ranchi. In course of investigation, the Vigilance Bureau conducted fresh search of all the premises of Manoj Kumar/appellant(s). Pursuant to filing of an F.I.R. Manoj Kumar was taken into custody and therefore, he could not make proper representation. He, however, was granted bail by the High Court. 6. Pursuant to the investigation the Vigilance Bureau, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi filed a Final Report bearing No. 15/2010 dated 15.04.2010 before the Learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Ranchi for the offence under section 13(1) (e) and section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sections 467, 468, 469, 471 and 420 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE only against Manoj Kumar. Though cognizance has been taken by the concerned court, till date no order has been passed on the point of framing of charges against the sole accused Manoj Kumar, against whom Final Form was submitted. Despite the fact that as is evident from the above referred submission that all the bank accounts and fixed deposit receipts were already seized by the Income Tax Authorities and the same were still in their possession, which was well within the knowledge of the Enforcement Directorate authorities, the said authority issued a provisional Attachment Order No. 1/2012 under Section 5 (1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the P.M.L. Act) on 18.05.2012. 7. The complainant / respondent filed a complaint before the Learned Adjudicating Authority vide Original Complaint No. 146/2012 for confirmation of the provisional attachment order no.-1/2012 dated 18.05.2012 in terms of Section 5 (5) of the P.M.L. Act in E.C.I.R. No./02/Pat.2011/AD dated 22.6.2011. 8. Being aggrieved with the same, the appellants approached before the Appellate Tribunal against impugned judgment dated 11 th October, 2012 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in Original Complaint No. 146 of 2012 dated 12 th June, 2012 confirming the provisional attachment order no. 8. Being aggrieved with the same, the appellants approached before the Appellate Tribunal against impugned judgment dated 11 th October, 2012 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in Original Complaint No. 146 of 2012 dated 12 th June, 2012 confirming the provisional attachment order no. 01/2012 dated 18th May, 2012 passed under the PMLA, but with delay of 168 days. 9. The learned Tribunal considering the submissions advanced by the parties, has dismissed the applications for condonation of delay and as such the appeal preferred by the appellants also stand dismissed. 10. Aggrieved with the order passed by the learned appellate tribunal, the appellants have approached this, Court. 11. It appears from the factual aspect that against the attachment proceeding, which culminated into attachment of the property in question, the appellant approached the appellate authority but since the same was barred by limitation, hence, the appeal was filing along with the delay condonation application filed under Section 26 (3) of the PMLA, 2002, taking inter alia, the ground that since the appellant, Manoj Kumar, was feeling restlessness in the last week of November, 2012 and his condition started deteriorated as such he has taken to City Trust Hospital and Research Centre, Ranchi on 1 st December, 2012 where he was diagnosed by the doctor to be suffering from Myocardial Ischemia and his treatment was started. The applicant remained in rest till 23 rd January, 2013. 12. In support thereof, a certificate dated 23 rd January, 2013 was issued by the concerned hospital which has been filed by the appellant with the delay condonation application. Further ground has been taken that on 24th January, 2013 the appellant felt severe chest pain, therefore, he was again admitted to the said hospital, where after examination it was found that he had suffered a heart attack [Myocardial Infraction]. 13. The appellant remains in ICU and was discharged on 20th May, 2013 from the hospital. Submission has been made that he was suffering from Myocardial Infraction, Jaundice etc. which can be ascertained from his discharge slip dated 20 th May, 2013 of City Trust Hospital and Research Centre, Ranchi, copy of which has been filed along with the application. 14. The appellant remains in ICU and was discharged on 20th May, 2013 from the hospital. Submission has been made that he was suffering from Myocardial Infraction, Jaundice etc. which can be ascertained from his discharge slip dated 20 th May, 2013 of City Trust Hospital and Research Centre, Ranchi, copy of which has been filed along with the application. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED has taken the ground that copy of discharge slip and the certificate from City Trust Hospital & Research Centre, Ranchi are not certified to be true copies and no reliance can be placed upon them. He contended that the above two documents filed by the applicant are not sufficient to infer sufficient cause condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The veracity of the alleged documents has also been challenged by the learned counsel for the respondent on the following pleas: - i. The copies of prescriptions of medical treatment to Manoj Kumar by the Hospital from 1.12.2012 to 23.1.2013 has not been filed with the application. ii. Certificate from Hospital advising rest to the Appellant, Manoj Kumar from 1.12.2012 to 23.1.2013 was issued on 23.1.2013 that is after the alleged period of rest had expired. No prescriptions or advise issued to the appellant from time to time advising rest has been filed reflecting that the certificate has been procured by the Appellant. iii. Discharge slip does not indicate the nature of medical treatment given to Manoj Kumar nor any other relevant record has been produced to show as to what treatment was prescribed and given to the said Appellant. iv. No documents showing details of treatment given by the Hospital to Manoj Kumar when he was allegedly admitted in ICU for the period from 24.1.2013 to 20.5.2013 has been filed with the applications. v. Copies of medical treatment bills from City Trust Hospital & Research Centre for treatment in ICU of Manoj Kumar have not been filed by the applicants. vi. The appellant, Manoj Kumar Singh has not even disclosed the name of the Doctor who had treated him and had advised rest and treated him during the period he was allegedly admitted in ICU.” 15. vi. The appellant, Manoj Kumar Singh has not even disclosed the name of the Doctor who had treated him and had advised rest and treated him during the period he was allegedly admitted in ICU.” 15. The appellate authority after considering the averments made in the delay condonation application and arguments advanced by the parties and law laid down in this regard dismissed the delay condonation application stating that the cause which has been shown cannot be said to be sufficient to condone the delay and consequently, the appeals preferred by the appellants also stand dismissed. 16. This Court, on perusal of the impugned order passed in the appeal, has found that the appellate authority while deciding the application filed for condoning the delay has also entered into the merit of the issue. Submission of the learned counsel for appellants: 17. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the order by which the delay condonation application has been rejected cannot be said to be just and proper since the appellant was suffering from cardiac disease and to that effect medical prescriptions were appended with the application, which itself suggest that the appellant due to the unavoidable circumstances could not be able to prefer appeal within the period of 45 days as required. 18. It has been contended that the authority has not appreciated the medical prescriptions issued by the Hospital in which the appellant was indoor patient and as such the delay has been caused. 19. It has also been contended that while not condoning the delay rather dismissing the delay condonation application the tribunal has entered into merit also, which was not warranted reason being that once the delay has been refused to be condoned it was not available for the authority to enter into the merit of the case, therefore, the present appeal. Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-ED: 20. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondents-ED has submitted that the ground which has been agitated for the purpose of showing sufficient cause in condoning the delay has properly been appreciated by the authority, which would be evident from the finding so recorded in the impugned order. 21. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondents-ED has submitted that the ground which has been agitated for the purpose of showing sufficient cause in condoning the delay has properly been appreciated by the authority, which would be evident from the finding so recorded in the impugned order. 21. It has further been submitted that all the certificates/prescriptions issued by the concerned hospital has been disbelieved since the photocopy of the said petition has been filed without any valid prescriptions and even the report showing the reason said to be unavoidable. 22. The submission has been made that there is no dispute that once the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation then it was not available for the appellate tribunal to enter into the issue of merit. 23. It has also been submitted that the order impugned may be confined only to the issue of limitation and so far as the discussion so made on the issue of merit concerned, the same can be ignored by making observation that the said finding will not come in the way of the further adjudication of the pending issues. Analysis 24. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the memo of appeal as also the impugned order. 25. The issue which requires consideration is as to: I. Whether the consideration so made while dealing with the issue of limitation is unjustified? II. Whether it was available for the authority also to enter into the merit once the application filed for delay condonation has been rejected? III. Whether the discussion so made on the issue of merit even has been passed can the impugned order be restricted only to the issue of limitation? 26. All the issues since are inter-linked, as such they are taken up together. 27. The issue of limitation is first to be considered since herein the delay condonation application has been filed to condone the delay in filing the appeals. The ground has been referred showing the medical ailments suffering from cardiac issues. Medical certificates/prescriptions have been annexed said to be issued by the concerned hospital. 28. This Court before considering the reason assigned in the delay condonation application needs to refer herein what constitutes 'sufficient cause'. 29. The ground has been referred showing the medical ailments suffering from cardiac issues. Medical certificates/prescriptions have been annexed said to be issued by the concerned hospital. 28. This Court before considering the reason assigned in the delay condonation application needs to refer herein what constitutes 'sufficient cause'. 29. Furthermore, there is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis. 30. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351 . 31. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim , (1939-40) 67 IA 416 , relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that: “A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.” 32. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala , (1997) 7 SCC 556 , the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under: “6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” 33. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.” 33. While considering the similar issue, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy , (2013) 12 SCC 649 , wherein, it has been held as under: “21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 34. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide motive and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay. 35. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. , (1962) 2 SCR 762 has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:- “ 12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5 . It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5 . If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. 36. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. 36. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part. 37. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of 'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder: - “ 9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [ AIR 1964 SC 1336 ] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [ (1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953 ] , Parimal v. Veena [ (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150 ] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [ (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629 ] 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [ AIR 1964 SC 993 ] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [ (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 ] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [ (2005) 7 SCC 510 ] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 ] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] 14. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [ (2005) 7 SCC 510 ] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537 ] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701 ]. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 38. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan , (1969) 2 SCC 770 , Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti , (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai , (2012) 5 SCC 157 . 39. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder: “ 12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.” 40. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. 41. 41. This Court from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements has found that the delay can be condoned irrespective of period of delay but the said consideration must be passed upon the explanation if found to be sufficiently explained. 42. This Court on the basis of aforesaid settled position of law is now proceeding to examine the finding so recorded by the authority as to whether proper appreciation of the ground(s) so agitated in the delay condonation application is there or not. 43. It is evident from the delay condonation application that the ground has been taken for cardiac problem supported by medical prescriptions. But it has been disputed by learned counsel for the respondents-ED taking the ground that the copies of prescriptions of medical treatment to Manoj Kumar by the Hospital from 1.12.2012 to 23.1.2013 has not been filed with the application. Further ground has been that the Certificate from Hospital advising rest to the Appellant, Manoj Kumar from 1.12.2012 to 23.1.2013 was issued on 23.1.2013 that is after the alleged period of rest had expired. No prescriptions or advise issued to the appellant from time to time advising rest has been filed reflecting that the certificate has been procured by the Appellant. So far Discharge slip is concerned, it does not indicate the nature of medical treatment given to Manoj Kumar nor any other relevant record has been produced to show as to what treatment was prescribed and given to the said Appellant, therefore, it cannot be relied upon. Even No documents have been placed before the court showing details of treatment given by the Hospital to Manoj Kumar when he was allegedly admitted in ICU for the period from 24.1.2013 to 20.5.2013. Even the Copies of medical treatment bills from City Trust Hospital & Research Centre for treatment in ICU of Manoj Kumar have not been filed by the appellant- Manoj Kumar and name of the doctor under whom he was under treatment has also not been disclosed. 44. Furthermore, the other appellants were also there, who could have filed the appeal in time without waiting for filing of appeal by the appellant-Manoj Kumar but they also chosen not to file appeal within time rather they chose to wait for filing of appeal by appellant-Manoj Kumar and this aspect of the matter has not been explained by the appellants. 45. 45. This Court is in agreement with the reasoning so given in arriving at the conclusion for showing no sufficient cause in condoning the delay. 46. The basic reason which this Court has found after going through the delay condonation application that although the petitioner is said to suffer from cardiac disease and but no medical prescription has been appended rather only the certificate issued by the concerned hospital is there. Though Pathological reports have been furnished. We have perused the pathological report and in one of the reports, the parameter appears to be normal. 47. This Court has also considered while pointing out on behalf of learned counsel for the respondent-ED that in a case of cardiac disease, the angiography report is the best way to ascertain the cardiac disease but there is no such report. The aforesaid contention advanced on behalf of the respondent-ED cannot be disputed. 48. This Court considering the aforesaid fact is of the view that the delay if said to be not sufficiently explained can be said to suffer from an error and in that view of the matter, the stand which has been taken on behalf of the appellant in approaching the competent forum cannot be said to be with due diligence. 49. This Court taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that the impugned order so far dismissal of appeal on the ground of delay in filing the appeals is concerned does not require any interference. 50. Hence, all the appeals are hereby dismissed. 51. So far as the entering into the issue of merit by the appellate tribunal is concerned, there is no dispute that once the lis is being decided on the issue of limitation, it is not available either for the court of law or the quasi-judicial authority/functionary to enter into the issue of merit but here the issue on merit has also been discussed and the case has been dismissed even on merit. 52. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara v. Labour Court, Bhilwara , (2009) 3 SCC 525 , has opined that while deciding an application for condonation of delay the Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case. 53. 52. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara v. Labour Court, Bhilwara , (2009) 3 SCC 525 , has opined that while deciding an application for condonation of delay the Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case. 53. It has also been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 1927 that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 54. It needs to refer herein the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Cour rendered in the case of H. Guruswamy & Ors v. a. Krishnaiah since deceased by Lrs., civil appeal no. 317 OF 2025 wherein it has been observed that "Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. 55. In the aforesaid judgment it has also been held that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 56. Thus, the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 57. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 57. This Court in view of the aforesaid settled position of law is of the view that the part of the order whereby and whereunder the discussion has been made on the issue of merit and case has been dismissed on merit, is unwarranted reason being that if the application has been dismissed on the ground of limitation itself then the issue on merit ought not to have been discussed and while doing so tribunal has committed error. 58. But the question is that if the said error is present then what benefit the appellants will get. If the lis has been dismissed on the ground of limitation the consequence would be dismissal of appeal also, although not on merit but on the issue of limitation. 59. Accordingly, all the issues are answered. 60. In view thereof, all the appeals stand dismissed. 61. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.