ORDER : MUKESH RAJPUROHIT, J. 1. The instant Misc. Petition under Sections 528 BNSS (482 Cr.PC.) has been filed against the order dated 18.08.2022 passed by the learned ACJM, No.1, Bhilwara in Case No. 4347/2012, whereby the learned magistrate took cognizance of the protest application filed against the FIR 542/2019 registered at P.S. Kotwali, Bhilwara. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant. Perused the material available on record. 3. Bereft of elaborate details briefly stated the facts necessary for the disposal of this petition are that the respondent no.4, the complainant, lodged a complaint in the year 2019 alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC . The allegation therein was that the brother of the complainant, namely Dr. Vinod Choudhary (the present petitioner), in connivance with certain other persons, fraudulently sold ancestral property, including the complainant’s share therein to one Navratan Surya, on the strength of a forged and fabricated compromise deed purportedly submitted before a court of law. Pursuant to the said complaint, an investigation was conducted; however, the police submitted a final negative report, opining that the dispute relates to the distribution of ancestral property, and is of a civil nature. Aggrieved by the filing of the negative report, the respondent–complainant preferred a protest petition under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C, seeking re-investigation of the matter. The learned Trial Court, upon consideration, took cognizance of the protest petition and directed a re-investigation into the criminal complaint. 4. Assailing the aforesaid order of cognizance and re-investigation, the present petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, seeking quashing and setting aside of the order dated 18.08.2022 passed by the learned ACJM Court No. 01, Bhilwara in Case No. 4347/2012 titled Rajesh Choudhary vs. State of Rajasthan. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner wants to delve into the merits of the case. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, before going into any merits of the case has challenged the base of the present petitioner and the manner in which it is filed. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner wants to delve into the merits of the case. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, before going into any merits of the case has challenged the base of the present petitioner and the manner in which it is filed. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has wrongly approached the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C when an alternate remedy is available to him under u/s 397 of Cr.P.C., therefore, the present petition is not maintainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has then relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Maharastra & Anr. passed in Criminal Appeal No. 2055 of 2007 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2272 of 2007) dated 17 th December 2008, wherein the court said: “8. Indisputably issuance of summons is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 of the Code. This Court in a large number of decisions beginning from R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 to Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka, [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 ] has laid down the criterion for entertaining an application under Section 482 . Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under of the Code. Even where a revision application is barred, as for example the remedy by way of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 this Court has held that the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be available. (See Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] ). Even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Sessions is barred under Section 397 (2) of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available. 9. The power of the High Court can be exercised not only in terms of Section 482 of the Code but also in terms of Section 483 thereof. The said provision reads thus :- "483. 9. The power of the High Court can be exercised not only in terms of Section 482 of the Code but also in terms of Section 483 thereof. The said provision reads thus :- "483. Duty of High Court to exercise continuous superintendence over Courts of Judicial Magistrates:- Every High Court shall so exercise its superintendence over the Courts of Judicial Magistrates subordinate to it as to ensure that there is an expeditious and proper disposal of cases by such Magistrates." 10. Inherent power of the High Court is not conferred by statute but has merely been saved thereunder. It is, thus, difficult to conceive that the jurisdiction of the High Court would be held to be barred only because the revisional jurisdiction could also be availed of. (See Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and another, [ (1997) 4 SCC 241 ] ). In fact in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and others, [ (2004) (7) SCC 338 ) ] to which reference has been made by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in V.K. Jain and others (supra) this Court has clearly opined that when a process is issued, the provisions of Section 482 of the Code can be resorted to.” 8. Placing reliance upon the same the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the High court has vast powers conferred upon it u/s 482 Cr.P.C therefore, the present petition is very well maintainable before the High court. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and the judgment was reserved on the ground of maintainability. 10. This court has gone to the bare reading of section 482 Cr. P.C. which states that: “482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 11. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is thus of the widest amplitude, preserving the inherent powers of the High Court to intervene in cases where the ordinary process of law may result in injustice. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is thus of the widest amplitude, preserving the inherent powers of the High Court to intervene in cases where the ordinary process of law may result in injustice. The legislative intent behind this provision is to ensure that the High Court, as a court of record and guardian of justice, has inherent power in preventing abuse of the process of any court or in securing the ends of justice. 12. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. in Criminal Appeal No. 842 of 2016 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 3314 of 2009] dated 5 th September, 2016 wherein while clearing the air regarding the same has categorically stated that the availability of an alternate remedy not a ground to bar a petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C., the relevant paras are reproduced herein: “5. Mr. P.K. Goswami learned senior advocate for the appellants supported the view taken by this Court in the case Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra). He pointed out that in paragraph 6 of this judgment Justice S. B. Sinha took note of several earlier judgments of this Court including that in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab; AIR 1960 SC 866 and Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka; (2008) 3 SCC 574 for coming to the conclusion that “only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, ………, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code.” Mr. Goswami also placed strong reliance upon judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. in a Division Bench in the case of Raj Kapoor and Ors v. State and Ors; (1980) 1 SCC 43 . Relying upon judgment of a Bench of three Judges in the case of Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra; (1977) 4 SCC 551 and quoting therefrom, Krishna Iyer, J. in his inimitable style made the law crystal clear in paragraph 10 which runs as follows: “10. The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under stands repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. The opening words of contradict this contention because nothing of the Code, not even , can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of . The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under stands repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. The opening words of contradict this contention because nothing of the Code, not even , can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of . Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond mistake. While it is true that is pervasive it should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code, such, for instance, in Section 397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in some situations between the two provisions and a happy solution “would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction”. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction”. In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The present case falls under that category where the accused complain of harassment through the court’s process. Can we state that in this third category the inherent power can be exercised? In the words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556, para 10) “The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible.” I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is not rebuffed in the case situation before us. Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order under cessation need not take up this court’s time. Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order under cessation need not take up this court’s time. Our conclusion concurs with the concession of counsel on both sides that merely because a copy of the order has not been produced, despite its presence in the records in the court, it is not possible for me to hold that the entire revisory power stands frustrated and the inherent power stultified.” 6. In our considered view any attempt to explain the law further as regards the issue relating to inherent power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is unwarranted. We would simply reiterate that begins with a non-obstante clause to state: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” A fortiori, there can be no total ban on the exercise of such wholesome jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. “abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more.” We venture to add a further reason in support. Since Section 397 Cr.P.C. is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Cr.P.C. only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable. 7. As a sequel, we are constrained to hold that the Division Bench, particularly in paragraph 28, in the case of Mohit alias Sonu and another (supra) in respect of inherent power of the High Court in of the Cr.P.C. does not state the law correctly. We record our respectful disagreement. 8. A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable. 7. As a sequel, we are constrained to hold that the Division Bench, particularly in paragraph 28, in the case of Mohit alias Sonu and another (supra) in respect of inherent power of the High Court in of the Cr.P.C. does not state the law correctly. We record our respectful disagreement. 8. In our considered opinion the learned Single Judge of the High Court should have followed the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra) and other earlier cases which were cited but wrongly ignored them in preference to a judgment of that Court in the case of Sanjay Bhandari (supra) passed by another learned Single Judge on 05.02.2009 in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 289 of 2006 which is impugned in the connected Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 4744 of 2009. As a result, both the appeals, one preferred by Prabhu Chawla and the other by Jagdish Upasane & Ors. are allowed. The impugned common order dated 02.04.2009 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan is set aside and the matters are remitted back to the High Court for fresh hearing of the petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the light of law explained above and for disposal in accordance with law. Since the matters have remained pending for long, the High Court is requested to hear and decide the matters expeditiously, preferably within six months.” 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. Criminal Appeal No. 1179 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 2499 of 2015) dated 28-11-2016, while considering the view taken in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco (Supra) and Prabhu Chawla (Supra), stated that an alternate remedy is not a bar to section 482 Cr.P.C. The relevant para is reproduced here as that: “9. In view of the above settled law, mere availability of alternative remedy cannot be a ground to dis-entitle the relief under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and, apart from this, we feel that the learned Judge, without appreciating any of the factual and legal position, in a mechanical way, passed the impugned order, which warrants interference by this Court. In view of the above settled law, mere availability of alternative remedy cannot be a ground to dis-entitle the relief under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and, apart from this, we feel that the learned Judge, without appreciating any of the factual and legal position, in a mechanical way, passed the impugned order, which warrants interference by this Court. Accordingly, the order of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court for reconsideration in the light of the settled legal position.” 14. Therefore, from the bare perusal, it is evident that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is intended to be invoked sparingly, but wherever the facts disclose manifest abuse of process or a clear need to secure the ends of justice, the High Court is fully empowered to act in exercise of its inherent powers. 15. The concern expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that if orders otherwise revisable under the Code of Criminal Procedure are, by reason thereof, entirely excluded from the ambit of Section 482 , then the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court would stand reduced to being invokable only in respect of “petty interlocutory orders”, is unquestionably justified. This Court respectfully concurs with and remains guided by the said principle. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (Supra) and subsequently in Prabhu Chawla (Supra) has categorically held that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not curtailed merely because an alternative remedy of revision is available under Section 397 Cr.P.C. The existence of such a remedy does not, by itself, bar the exercise of inherent jurisdiction where intervention is necessary to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice. 17. This Court, having considered the rival submissions and examined the settled legal position, finds that the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the present petition is not sustainable. 18. Accordingly, the objection as to maintainability stands rejected. 19. List the matter for arguments on the merits before the appropriate Bench as per the roster.