JUDGMENT : A.D. MARIA CLETE, J. Heard. 2. The petitioner in this writ petition seeks a direction to the first respondent, described as the Chairman of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (presently Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (TANGEDCO)), to pay a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs within a time frame to be fixed by this Court. The petitioner also prays for employment in the administrative wing of the Corporation, contending that his health condition has rendered him incapable of performing his existing duties. 3. Notice was ordered on 19.02.2020 in the writ petition, with private notice being permitted. Despite service of notice, respondents 4 and 5, who are licensed inspectors, have not entered appearance. Subsequently, when the matter was listed on 13.10.2023, fresh notice was directed to respondents 1, 2, and 4 to 6. In response, the 2 nd respondent has filed a counter affidavit dated 12.02.2025 on his behalf and on behalf of respondents 1 to 6. 4. The petitioner’s case is that he joined the respondent as a contract labourer in the year 2006. On 08.04.2019, while discharging his duties, he sustained grievous injuries in an electrical accident and was admitted to the hospital for treatment. The petitioner holds a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science (B.Sc.) and was employed as a contract labourer, receiving a consolidated salary. During the cyclonic storm "Gaja" that struck Tamil Nadu, the petitioner was deputed to undertake repair work in the affected areas and was paid a daily wage of Rs. 1,000/- for his services. 5. On 08.04.2019, the petitioner was deputed by the 3 rd respondent, an electrical contractor, to carry out work near Mathangal Mottur Main Road on an electrical pole carrying high-tension wires. During the course of work, he sustained severe injuries due to an accident, suffering burns on his chest and grievous injuries to his head, thighs, and other parts of his body. He was immediately admitted to the Christian Medical College (CMC) Hospital, Vellore, where he underwent treatment. The petitioner’s mother lodged a police complaint, following which an FIR was registered as FIR No. 401/2019 dated 22.06.2019 by the Ranipet Police Station. After receiving medical care, the petitioner was discharged from the hospital on 05.05.2019 and was advised to undergo follow-up treatment. He was immediately admitted to the Christian Medical College (CMC) Hospital, Vellore, where he underwent treatment. The petitioner’s mother lodged a police complaint, following which an FIR was registered as FIR No. 401/2019 dated 22.06.2019 by the Ranipet Police Station. After receiving medical care, the petitioner was discharged from the hospital on 05.05.2019 and was advised to undergo follow-up treatment. The petitioner’s injuries were diagnosed as second-degree deep to third-degree electric burns (flash and contact) of face, chest, both lower limbs, and scalp, involving 9% of TBSA, with severe rhabdomyolysis pyogenic osteomyelitis right parieto-occipital scalp. 6. Subsequently, the petitioner continued to undergo medical treatment and, to date, has incurred an expenditure of over Rs. 5.5 lakhs towards medical expenses. The extent of his disability has been assessed at 70%, significantly impairing his ability to work and leaving him without any other source of income. The petitioner issued a legal notice dated 15.10.2019 to the respondents, seeking compensation. However, in the absence of any response, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 7. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is admitted that the petitioner was employed as a contract labourer under a K2 contract with the 3 rd respondent. It is further stated that TANGEDCO had entered into a contract with the 3rd respondent on 01.08.2018 for the erection of poles, transportation of electrical poles, paving of HT/LT lines, and allied works under the Integrated Power Development Scheme (IPDS) within the Ranipet Municipality, specifically in the Navalpur section of the Vellore Electricity Distribution Circle. 8. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit dated 28.02.2025, denying the contention that the petition allegedly sent by his coworkers was voluntary. He has also refuted the claim that his act of climbing the pole for repair work was undertaken on his own accord. Instead, he asserts that it was done under the direct instructions of the Executive Engineer, who is the 2 nd respondent herein. In this context, it is pertinent to refer to paragraphs 5 and 7 of the reply affidavit, which are as follows: “5.The letter dated 8-4-2019 (8-4-2018) is disputed. It has been created for the purpose of this case. The photographs attached to the letter might have been attached to the loose sheets to create letter dated 8-4-2018. In this context, it is pertinent to refer to paragraphs 5 and 7 of the reply affidavit, which are as follows: “5.The letter dated 8-4-2019 (8-4-2018) is disputed. It has been created for the purpose of this case. The photographs attached to the letter might have been attached to the loose sheets to create letter dated 8-4-2018. The Counter Affidavit and the Typed Set states that the alleged letter signed by the other workers was dated as 8-4-2019 in the index column. Whereas, in the typed set furnished at page 28 the letter bears the date as 8-4-2018 and in the contents of the letter the date of the accident said to have happened on two dates 8-4-2019 and 8-4-2018. On 8-4-2019 the date of accident, I was taken to the Hospital with serious burn injury, without attending me, the respondents were busy to obtain a letter from co-workers. Hence, the false allegations that the co- workers executed the letter dated 18-4-2019 or 18-4-2018 is false prima facie deliberately created for the purpose of this case or obtained from others on coercion.” “7.Only on instruction from the Executive Engineer who directly gave instructions to me I carried out the work. I am not a third party claimed the electricity pole at my volition; but climbed the electricity pole only on the specific instructions of the Executive Engineer and contractor to carry out the repairs. Therefore, the allegation that I have voluntarily climbed the pole is false. When I have been asked to carry out the repair work at the instructions of the Executive Engineer, no necessity to get any permission.” 9. It was admitted that the contractor had been assigned repair work in accordance with the agreement and that the workers were carrying out their duties on 08.04.2019. It was further contended that the petitioner, acting unilaterally and without assistance from the respondent Junior Engineer or other contract labourers, climbed a high-tension (HT) electric pole to tie the LT neutral wire. In the process, he allegedly came into contact with another HT electric line passing overhead, resulting in burn injuries. It was also asserted that the petitioner had not informed the Junior Engineer (R6) before climbing the high-tension electric pole and had failed to take necessary precautionary measures. According to the respondents, the injury sustained by the petitioner was a consequence of his own negligence. 10. It was also asserted that the petitioner had not informed the Junior Engineer (R6) before climbing the high-tension electric pole and had failed to take necessary precautionary measures. According to the respondents, the injury sustained by the petitioner was a consequence of his own negligence. 10. The respondent further contended that the allegation regarding the work being carried out under the supervision of the Junior Engineer (R6) and in the presence of 15 contract labourers was categorically denied. It was stated that no prior information was given to the Junior Engineer, nor was any permission obtained for the work. The Board had received a letter from the contract workers dated 08.04.2019, signed by 15 workers, a copy of which is enclosed in the typed set. The letter is a neatly typed, five-page document containing not only the names and signatures of the workers but also their photographs. The pages are formatted uniformly on five quarter-size sheets. The date on the letter is written in ink as 08.04.2018. However, there is a glaring inconsistency in the document, as the date on the letter is handwritten as "08.04.2018," while the same incorrect date is typed in the second paragraph. Contrarily, the fourth paragraph mentions the date of the accident correctly as "08.04.2019." This discrepancy casts serious doubt on the authenticity of the document itself. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that contract workers would collectively sign a joint petition attributing negligence and disregard of safety protocols to a fellow worker. This inherent improbability adds to the suspicion surrounding the document's genuineness. 11. To establish the liability of the contractor (R3) for payment under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a K2 Agreement and an Indemnity Bond executed by him have been filed in the typed set. The K2 Agreement, executed between the Superintending Engineer, Vellore Distribution Circle, and the 3rd respondent (R3) on 01.08.2018, reads as follows: - “With reference to the letter cited above, a copy of K2 Agreement bearing No.068/18-19 Dt.01.8.2018 executed by you, Works contract for erection of poles, transportation of poles paying of HT/LT lines and other allied works under IPDS Scheme in Ranipet Municipality in Navalpur section of Vellore EDC is sent herewith. It is requested to carry out the work as per K2 Agreement.” 12. It is requested to carry out the work as per K2 Agreement.” 12. Although the counter affidavit repeatedly asserts that the contract workers are required to carry out their duties under the supervision and control of the Junior Engineer, no such stipulation is found in the award of the contract. Furthermore, paragraph 9 of the contract mandates that the workmen be insured under the Employees' State Insurance (ESI) Scheme, and it places the responsibility on the contractor to ensure compliance. However, it has come to light that the workers are not covered under the ESI Scheme. Similarly, paragraph 17 of the contract pertains to insurance requirements, specifying the need for both insurance and an accident risk insurance policy. The relevant clauses are outlined as follows: - “17. Insurance a. Accidents and Insurance : It is incumbent on the part of the contractor to see that it shall be his sole responsibility to protect the public and his employee against any accidents from any cause and he shall indemnify the TANGEDCO against any claims thereunder by way of accident risk insurance demand for all purpose of relief. Failing the same or otherwise the contractor alone will be responsible to meet the compensation awarded under the said Act. The contractor should not commence the work without taking Insurance policy under the name of the work for the schedule completion period and any extension there of from the date of taking over of the site. Further penalty will also be levied for the period without insurance coverage. b.Accident risk insurance policy: The contractor should satisfy the Concerned EE/O&M/that an accident Risk Insurance Policy is taken before taking over the work. And also satisfy the field officers that policy / policies is / are kept in force, till the work is completed and works are taken over by the Board on the issue of completion certificate.” 13. This apart para 19 of the agreement it was also stated as follows: “19. Power to recover dues to board: In case any loss to be compensated by the contractor to the Tangedco, the Tangedco shall be entitled to retain or deduct the amount due to the Board from any money that may be due or may become due to the contractor from any other contract or any other amount whatsoever. The existence of this clause was also admitted in the counter affidavit. 14. The existence of this clause was also admitted in the counter affidavit. 14. The counsel for TANGEDCO submitted two circulars pertaining to the full board proceedings dated 29.04.2013 and the modified circular dated 16.10.2019. As per the latest circular, namely (Per.) (FB) TANGEDCO Proceedings No.6, Administrative Branch, dated 16.10.2019, the compensation payable for non-fatal accidents is specified as follows: -In the case of loss of two limbs or two eyes, the compensation amount is fixed at Rs. 2 lakhs. -In the case of loss of one limb or one eye, the compensation amount is fixed at Rs. 1 lakh. The enhanced rate of compensation is applicable to incidents reported on or after 29.07.2019. The Chief Engineer (Personnel) of the Board is designated as the competent authority to sanction the said amount. However, a perusal of the counter affidavit reveals that even this minimum compensation amount has not been paid to the petitioner, who sustained severe injuries and continues to undergo medical treatment. 15. The counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai v. Secretary, Department of Municipal Administration and Water Supply , reported in 2020 (1) CTC 522 , to substantiate the contention that a writ court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can grant compensation. In support of this proposition, the counsel referred to the following passages from paragraphs 27, 28, and 29 of the said judgment, which are as follows: - “27. .The issue with regard to power and jurisdiction of this Court in awarding compensation has been categorically declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in very many judgments holding that the party need not be driven to file Civil Suit before the Civil Court, when there is violation of fundamental right. .The issue with regard to power and jurisdiction of this Court in awarding compensation has been categorically declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in very many judgments holding that the party need not be driven to file Civil Suit before the Civil Court, when there is violation of fundamental right. A full bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa and others reported in (1993) 2 Supreme Court Cases 746 has categorically stated that a claim in public law for compensation for contravention of human rights and fundamental rights, either Article 32 or 226 can be invoked.” “28.A learned Single Judge of this court in the case of M.Gangachalam v. State of Tamil Nadu has cited a list of judgments wherein it was held that Article 226 can be invoked for awarding compensation” 29.The very existence of the Court is only to do justice and it is not the duty of this Court to direct the parties to approach the forums created under law whenever there is a violation of fundamental rights and human rights of the party. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2014) 2 Supreme Court Cases 532, Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary and Others held that Constitutional Courts are sentinels of justice and have been vested with extraordinary powers of judicial review to ensure that rights of citizens are duly protected. In yet another decision reported in (1996) 5 Supreme Court Cases 54 , Shangrila Food Products Ltd and Another v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. The compensation granted by the learned Single Judge is found to be inadequate. Hence, this Court has power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enhance and award just compensation to the victim as per medical records and his medical conditions.” 16. In concluding so, the Division Bench enhanced the compensation to Rs. 63,26,000/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, thereby modifying the order of the Single Bench which had awarded Rs. 5 lakhs. In concluding so, the Division Bench enhanced the compensation to Rs. 63,26,000/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum, thereby modifying the order of the Single Bench which had awarded Rs. 5 lakhs. On the contrary, the counsel for TANGEDCO placed reliance on the judgment in Saraladevi v. The Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., rendered in W.A. No. 1320 of 2022 dated 12.07.2022, and drew attention to the following passages from paragraphs 22 to 24, which read as follows: - “22. The High Court can exercise jurisdiction to award compensation in cases where the negligence is on the face of it or is not disputed or denied by the other side and not in every case, otherwise the High Court would convert itself into a civil court to examine and decide the question of fact, which may be of negligence or determination of compensation. It is more so, when a serious dispute is raised by the TANGEDCO about the existence of the bus stand near the transformer. The issue aforesaid has not been dealt with by the learned Single Judge, despite specific averment made in the counter affidavit of the TANGEDCO. The decision was given by the learned Single Judge cursorily without taking into consideration the rival claims. 23. In view of the aforesaid, we find that the learned Single Judge ought not to have exercised his jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, that too, without dealing with the contentions of the TANGEDCO/TNEB. We find reasons to cause interference in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. The Court should not have exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, rather the parties should have been relegated to Civil Court for computation of the amount of compensation. 24. In view of the findings aforesaid, nothing would remain in the Writ Appeal preferred by the claimant to enhance the amount, rather that issue is kept open, and accordingly, the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge in both the Writ Petitions, are set aside, however, with liberty to the claimant to maintain and take appropriate remedy arising out of the accident. As per the policy of the TANGEDCO, the claimant would be entitled to seek compensation of Rs.2 lakhs to the victim, as was applicable at the time of accident." 17. As per the policy of the TANGEDCO, the claimant would be entitled to seek compensation of Rs.2 lakhs to the victim, as was applicable at the time of accident." 17. In that case, the learned Single Judge had granted compensation arising out of a fatal accident caused by the explosion of a transformer. TANGEDCO, however, relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi reported in 2000 (4) SCC 543 , wherein it was held that parties who suffered fatal accidents should approach the civil court and not bypass the regular legal process. The allegation that TANGEDCO had negligently placed a transformer near a bus stand, leading to its explosion, was categorically denied by them. However, the present case stands on a different footing. The petitioner is not a stranger to the Board but an individual who sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. Although engaged through a contractor under a K2 agreement, the accident occurred while performing duties on behalf of the Board. 18. Now it is to be examined is whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the accident that occurred during the course of his employment, resulting in severe injuries and rendering him unfit for further employment. In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the K2 Agreement dated 01.08.2018, which is supported by an indemnity bond executed by the 3 rd respondent. The letter from the Superintending Engineer to the 3 rd respondent dated 07.07.2018, listing the contractual works, explicitly states in paragraph 9 that the contractor is mandated to insure all the workers under the Employees' State Insurance (ESI) scheme and to obtain a main code number for himself. Had the contractor duly obtained ESI coverage for the workers, particularly considering that the workers had been engaged for more than 2½ years as per the statement by the petitioner, and calculated from the K2 Agreement dated 01.08.2018, they would have been employed for at least 8 months before the accident, which occurred on 08.04.2019. In such a situation, the claim for compensation and medical treatment against TANGEDCO would not have arisen, as the workers would have been covered under the ESI scheme. 19. In such a situation, the claim for compensation and medical treatment against TANGEDCO would not have arisen, as the workers would have been covered under the ESI scheme. 19. In the absence of ESI coverage, the provisions of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 would squarely apply, and the bar under Section 53 of the ESI Act would not be applicable in such cases. The definition of the term "employer" under Section 2 (e) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 clearly encompasses TANGEDCO’s liability in providing compensation. The relevant provision is as follows: - “(e) "employer" includes anybody of persons whether incorporated or not and any managing agent of an employer and the legal representative of a deceased employer, and, when the services of a employee are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the employee has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, means such other person while the employee is working for him” 20. Section 3 (1) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 sets out the liability of an employer to pay compensation in the event of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The provision reads as follows: “3. Employer's liability for compensation.- (1) If personal injury is caused to a employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable (a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the employee for a period exceeding three days; (b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death or permanent total disablement caused by an accident which is directly attributable to— (i) the employee having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or (ii) the wilful disobedience of the employee to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of employees, or (iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the employee of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of employee” 21. TANGEDCO, being fully aware of its liability to pay compensation, has astutely attempted to set up a defense based on the exception found under Section 3 (1)(b)(ii) of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923. In this regard, the 2 nd respondent, who is the Executive Engineer, has filed a counter affidavit dated 12.02.2025, claiming to do so on behalf of respondents (R1, R2, R6). It is indeed ironic that the 3 rd respondent, being a private contractor, has not filed any counter affidavit on his own behalf. Admittedly, the 3 rd respondent is a K2 contractor and is purported to be the employer for all workmen engaged under the contract, including the petitioner. He had undertaken to execute the contracted works on behalf of TANGEDCO, for which he received payments as per the terms of the contract. As per the K2 agreement, the workers employed by the 3 rd respondent are considered his employees and not that of the Board. Consequently, in relation to the accident, it was incumbent upon the 3 rd respondent to file the counter affidavit. The 2 nd respondent neither has the legal authority nor is he an authorized representative to file a counter affidavit on behalf of R3. Furthermore, no authorization from the 3 rd respondent has been produced to substantiate the claim made by the 2 nd respondent, who has categorically denied any liability on the part of TANGEDCO. 22. In an attempt to cleverly evade liability, a letter was purportedly obtained from all 15 workers engaged under the K2 contract taken by the 3 rd respondent (R3). The petitioner, in his reply affidavit, has rightly questioned the genuineness of this letter and has convincingly pointed out how the document appears to be fabricated solely for the purpose of this case, aimed at absolving TANGEDCO from its obligation to provide compensation. This Court finds no hesitation in rejecting the said document as a valid piece of evidence for denying the petitioner’s allegations as made in his sworn statement filed before this Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the facts of this case are in dispute. On the contrary, the documents produced by TANGEDCO appear to be highly suspicious and lack credibility, as we can see below. 23. Therefore, it cannot be said that the facts of this case are in dispute. On the contrary, the documents produced by TANGEDCO appear to be highly suspicious and lack credibility, as we can see below. 23. Upon examining the K2 contract in conjunction with the work order issued by the Superintending Engineer dated 07.07.2018, it becomes evident that paragraph 1 of the letter stipulates the following: “1. Acceptance With reference to your offer and other correspondences cited above, I acting for and on behalf of the order and the direction of the Tamil Nadu Generation & Distribution Corporation Limited accept your offer for Works Contract for erection of poles, transportation of poles paving of HT/LT lines and other allied works, in Navalpur section in Vellore EDC under IPDS scheme in Urban Ranipet Sub Division subject to the condition stipulated in the specification cited under ref 1. The period of contract is 180 days from the date of handing over of site by EE/O&M/Ranipet as the clause (5) of this order.” 24. While the date of the K2 agreement is recorded as 01.08.2018, the date of awarding the works contract by the Superintending Engineer is stated as 07.07.2018. If the contract period of 180 days is calculated from this date, it would have come to an end by 06.01.2019. However, the accident in question admittedly occurred on 08.04.2019, by which time the workers were no longer engaged under any valid contract but were working directly under the control of the Electricity Board. There is a conspicuous absence of any explanation from TANGEDCO regarding how these workers continued to be employed from 01.08.2018 till April 2019 when no contract was in force beyond the stipulated 180- day period as per the K2 agreement. Even from the petition allegedly sent by the other workmen, the averments clearly indicate that these workers had been working for nearly 9 months under the contract executed by the 3 rd respondent (R3), despite the fact that the contract itself was valid only for a period of 6 months. This inconsistency raises serious questions regarding the manner in which the workers were engaged beyond the contractual period. 25. Even assuming that the statements of these workers are to be taken into account, it is evident that on 08.04.2019, they were performing work related to TANGEDCO. This inconsistency raises serious questions regarding the manner in which the workers were engaged beyond the contractual period. 25. Even assuming that the statements of these workers are to be taken into account, it is evident that on 08.04.2019, they were performing work related to TANGEDCO. It is quite plausible that they were unaware that their so-called contractor, R3, did not have any subsisting contract with TANGEDCO at that time. Therefore, the workers, including the petitioner, must be deemed to have been working directly under the control and supervision of TANGEDCO on that date. Consequently, the accident sustained by the petitioner must be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of employment with TANGEDCO itself. 26. Under Section 10B of the Employees’ Compensation Act, it is the statutory duty of the employer to promptly report any serious bodily injury by submitting a report to the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation. However, in the present case, no such report was submitted by TANGEDCO. On the contrary, it was the petitioner’s mother who took the initiative to admit him to the Wallajah Government Hospital, and subsequently to Christian Medical College, Vellore, where he underwent treatment, including plastic surgery, to address the severe disfigurement of his body and face. The photographs attached to the typed set vividly depict the petitioner’s grievous condition, which would evoke shock and empathy in anyone—except TANGEDCO. Moreover, in the counter affidavit filed by the 2 nd respondent on behalf of TANGEDCO, there is a conspicuous absence of any statement indicating who informed the police about the incident or whether any report was submitted to the Commissioner, as mandated by law. This glaring omission highlights a blatant disregard of the statutory obligation on the part of TANGEDCO. 27. It was the petitioner’s mother who lodged the First Information Report (FIR) at the Ranipet Police Station, as already noted. The conduct of the company and its officials in this regard is highly questionable and deserves strong condemnation. In his affidavit, the petitioner, in paragraph no. 6, has stated as follows: - “I had spent more than Rs.5,50,000/- for medical Expenses till date and have to incur further heavy expenses to get treatment for recovery. The burn injuries are very severe and scars are permanent in nature. The total disability is fixed at 70%. In his affidavit, the petitioner, in paragraph no. 6, has stated as follows: - “I had spent more than Rs.5,50,000/- for medical Expenses till date and have to incur further heavy expenses to get treatment for recovery. The burn injuries are very severe and scars are permanent in nature. The total disability is fixed at 70%. As the injury arose in the course of employment with the TNEB as the employer along with contractors are vicariously liable to compensate for my injury, loss of job and for permanent disability. My future life ambitions are shattered and irretrievable.” 28. The 2 nd respondent, who has filed a counter affidavit on behalf of TANGEDCO, has neither specifically nor generally denied these averments. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that TANGEDCO has no credible information to dispute these claims. As a public sector undertaking, TANGEDCO is expected to act as a model employer by upholding and implementing all applicable labour legislations. However, in this case, they have failed to extend even the most basic assistance to the petitioner, who was grievously injured while performing his duties for TANGEDCO. There was a complete absence of any humanitarian gesture towards the petitioner, reflecting a callous attitude solely aimed at evading liability arising from the accident. As rightly pointed out by the petitioner in the reply affidavit, while he was lying injured and in dire need of medical care, TANGEDCO officials were preoccupied with collecting signatures from co-workers to falsely attribute negligence to him. Such conduct is not only reprehensible but also defies belief, as no reasonable person would accept this fabricated narrative. 29. The decision relied upon by the respondent, TANGEDCO, that the affected person must approach the civil court, is not applicable to the present case. Firstly, the petitioner was performing duties on behalf of TANGEDCO, and secondly, the liability to pay compensation in the event of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment is a clear statutory obligation imposed on the employer under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923. In such cases, the Act mandates the employer to deposit the compensation before the Commissioner without any request from the employee. Moreover, TANGEDCO is obligated to provide a reasonable explanation as to how they continued to engage the services of the contractor’s workers when the contract had already ceased to exist. In such cases, the Act mandates the employer to deposit the compensation before the Commissioner without any request from the employee. Moreover, TANGEDCO is obligated to provide a reasonable explanation as to how they continued to engage the services of the contractor’s workers when the contract had already ceased to exist. The absence of any such explanation further reinforces the employer’s liability in the present circumstances. 30. TANGEDCO, being fully aware of the provisions of Section 12 (2) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, had already incorporated a similar clause in paragraph 19 of the agreement, which has been extracted earlier. Therefore, it is not open to TANGEDCO to contend that the compensation, if any, is payable solely by the 3 rd respondent (R3) and not by TANGEDCO. Such a contention does not hold water. As noted earlier, there was no subsisting contract between TANGEDCO and R3 at the time of the accident. In any event, TANGEDCO, as the principal employer, is liable to pay the compensation and, if necessary, recover the same from the contractor, provided the contractor is found liable to pay. In this context, the relevant provision of Section 12 (2) of the Employees’ Compensation Act reads as follows: - “12 Contracting: (1) xxx (2) Where the principal is liable to pay compensation under this section, he shall be entitled to be indemnified by the contractor, or any other person from whom the employee could have recovered compensation and where a contractor who is himself a principal is liable to pay compensation or to indemnify a principal under this section he shall be entitled to be indemnified by any person standing to him in the relation of a contractor from whom the employee could have recovered compensation and all questions as to the right to and the amount of any such indemnity shall, in default of agreement, settled by the Commissioner..” 31. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the stand taken by the respondent, TANGEDCO, and in accepting the petitioner’s claim for compensation arising out of the accident, which occurred during the course of his employment. The exception pleaded by TANGEDCO based on Section 3 (1)(b)(ii) of the Employees’ Compensation Act has not been substantiated to the satisfaction of this Court. The exception pleaded by TANGEDCO based on Section 3 (1)(b)(ii) of the Employees’ Compensation Act has not been substantiated to the satisfaction of this Court. In any event, this Court finds no merit in the defense put forth by TANGEDCO, as no tangible evidence has been produced to support their contention. It is evident that TANGEDCO has been engaging in clear unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2 (ra) read with V Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act . The practice of engaging employees as contract labourers without having any written contract is a glaring violation of the law and is explicitly prohibited under Section 2 5-T of the Industrial Disputes Act . The penalty for such unfair labour practices is prescribed under Section 2 5-U of the Act. TANGEDCO's conduct in this case clearly demonstrates a blatant disregard for statutory obligations and labour welfare, warranting the intervention of this Court to secure the rightful compensation to the injured petitioner. 32. The purpose of providing compensation for employment-related injuries, and in this context, the objective of the Employees' State Insurance (ESI) Act, was succinctly outlined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Regional Director, ESI Corporation v. Francis De Costa , reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 100. The Court observed as follows: - “in the realm of interpretation of statutes Rule of Law is a dynamic concept of expansion and fulfillment for which the interpretation would be so given as to subserve the social and economic justice envisioned in the Constitution. Legislation is a conscious attempt, as a social direction, in the process of change. The fusion between the law and social change would be effected only when law is introspected in the context of ordinary social life. Life of the law has not been logic but has been of experience. It is a means to serve social purpose and felt necessities of the people. In times of stress, disability, injury, etc. the workman needs statutory protection and assistance. Life of the law has not been logic but has been of experience. It is a means to serve social purpose and felt necessities of the people. In times of stress, disability, injury, etc. the workman needs statutory protection and assistance. …..The Act supplant the action at law, based upon not on the fault but as an aspect of social welfare, to rehabilitate a physically and economically handicapped workman who is adversely effected by sickness, injury or livelihood of dependents by death of a workman.” xxx “In the context of the claims of the labour for social justice under welfare legislation, the principle is that the employer and the employees are so inter-related and depend on each other, than it is in the interest of each that the other should survive, and it is in the interest of society that both should be kept functioniong in harmony with each other.” 33. The only question that now remains to be addressed is the quantum of compensation payable to the petitioner. The petitioner has claimed a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs as compensation, including medical expenses, which continue to accrue even at present. His statement in the affidavit that Rs. 5.5 lakhs have already been spent on medical treatment has not been disputed by TANGEDCO. In view of the undisputed nature of the medical expenses, this Court is inclined to award Rs. 5 lakhs towards medical expenses incurred by the petitioner. Further, considering the grievous nature of the injuries and the resulting disability, the quantum of compensation is fixed at Rs. 10 lakhs. While this amount may not fully compensate for the immense loss suffered by the petitioner while discharging his duties for TANGEDCO, it seeks to address, to some extent, the irreversible consequences that have befallen him.