ORDER : KULDEEP MATHUR, J. 1. The present Civil First Appeal has been preferred against the order dated 11.05.2023 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned trial Court’), whereby the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘C.P.C.’), read with Sections 17 , 34, and 35 of the SECURITISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTEREST ACT , 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SARFAESI Act’), was allowed, and consequently, Civil Original Suit No. 08/2023 (CIS No. 25/2023), titled ‘ Parasmal and Ors. v. Prakash Chandra and Ors. ’, was rejected. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants–plaintiffs submitted that the appellants–plaintiffs and respondents–defendants Nos. 1 to 19 are close relatives. The suit property situated at Pabu Chowk, Nai Line, Gangashahar, District Bikaner, is a pattasuda property belonging to late Shri Pannalal Marothi, who had five sons and one daughter, namely, Deepchand, Trilokchand, Kisturchand, Bhanwarlal, Jaskaran, and Jassudevi. Each descendant was entitled to a one-sixth share in the property. However, since Shri Trilokchand died issueless, the remaining descendants became entitled to an equal one- fifth share each in the property. The appellants–plaintiffs are the sons of Smt. Jassudevi, the daughter of late Shri Pannalal Marothi. 3. Learned counsel submitted that when the respondents– defendants Nos. 1 to 19 refused to give the appellants– plaintiffs their due share in the suit property on the pretext that the same had been mortgaged with respondent– defendant No. 20, i.e., the Branch Manager, Punjab National Bank, the appellants–plaintiffs were constrained to file a suit for partition before the learned trial Court. 4. During the pendency of the said partition suit, respondents–defendants Nos. 20 and 21, i.e., Punjab National Bank, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. and Sections 17 , 34, and 35 of the SARFAESI Act, contending that defendant No. 1, Prakash Chandra, had availed a loan of Rs. 2,41,20,000/- from the Bank and had mortgaged the suit property as security for the said loan. Upon his failure to repay the outstanding dues, proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were initiated, and the suit property was auctioned by the Bank on 29.11.2022. 5. 2,41,20,000/- from the Bank and had mortgaged the suit property as security for the said loan. Upon his failure to repay the outstanding dues, proceedings under the SARFAESI Act were initiated, and the suit property was auctioned by the Bank on 29.11.2022. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the learned trial Court, by the impugned order, allowed the said application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., holding that the appellants–plaintiffs ought to have approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) to challenge the actions of Punjab National Bank, as the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate matters pertaining to properties governed by the SARFAESI Act. He contended that the learned trial Court, while allowing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C., failed to properly examine the averments made in the plaint as well as the documents placed on record. The suit had been instituted by the appellants–plaintiffs seeking partition of the ancestral property, over which defendants Nos. 1 to 19 had allegedly obtained a loan without having any right, title, or interest therein. It was submitted that the appellants–plaintiffs had committed no default in respect of the said loan transaction and were in no manner connected with or liable for the loan availed by defendants Nos. 1 to 19. Therefore, the appellants–plaintiffs were entitled to a decree of partition. 6. It was further urged that since the mortgaging of the suit property by defendants Nos. 1 to 19 was done without any valid title or interest and in an illegal manner, the suit for partition of ancestral property and permanent injunction filed by the appellants–plaintiffs ought not to have been rejected by allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. On these premises, learned counsel for the appellants prayed that the impugned order dated 11.05.2023 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Bikaner, be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors., (2025) 4 SCC 38 , and Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (Dead) by Lrs. & Anr. v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 220 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents–defendants Nos. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors., (2025) 4 SCC 38 , and Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (Dead) by Lrs. & Anr. v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 220 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents–defendants Nos. 20 and 21 submitted that respondent–defendant No. 1, Shri Prakash Chandra, being the proprietor of M/s Laxmi Food Products, had availed credit facilities to the tune of Rs. 2,41,20,000/- from the respondent Bank. For the said credit facilities, Shri Ashok Kumar and Shri Dheeraj Marothi stood as guarantors. To further secure the aforesaid facilities, respondent–defendant No. 1, Prakash Chandra, created an equitable mortgage by depositing the original title deeds of the immovable property in question. 8. It was submitted that the borrower and his guarantors failed to repay the dues in accordance with the agreed terms and conditions, whereupon the loan account was classified as a ‘Non-Performing Asset (NPA)’ on 31.12.2021. Consequently, after following the due procedure prescribed under the SARFAESI Act, the respondent Bank initiated measures to recover its outstanding dues. 9. Symbolic possession of the mortgaged property was taken on 23.03.2022, and possession notices were duly served upon the borrower and published in two daily newspapers. As the borrower still failed to discharge the outstanding liability, the Bank, in accordance with Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, preferred an application before the District Magistrate, Bikaner, seeking actual possession of the secured assets. The said application was allowed vide order dated 01.11.2022. Thereafter, the mortgaged property was put to auction on 29.11.2022, wherein M/s Arihant Online Solution Private Limited emerged as the highest bidder with a bid amount of Rs. 1,87,50,000/-. The said bid was duly accepted, and the auction purchaser deposited the entire sale consideration. 10. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellants– plaintiffs were at all material times fully aware of the proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank under the SARFAESI Act. They had, in fact, filed Securitisation Application No. 318/2023 titled ‘Paras Mal & Anr. v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.’ before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur, challenging the Bank’s action. 11. Before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the appellants– plaintiffs contended that respondent–defendant No. 1, Prakash Chandra, had no authority to mortgage the property in question until the partition of the estate of late Shri Pannalal Marothi among all his legal heirs. v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.’ before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur, challenging the Bank’s action. 11. Before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the appellants– plaintiffs contended that respondent–defendant No. 1, Prakash Chandra, had no authority to mortgage the property in question until the partition of the estate of late Shri Pannalal Marothi among all his legal heirs. In rebuttal, the respondent Bank and the auction purchaser submitted that the loan was sanctioned only after due verification of the title documents, including a registered release deed executed by the concerned parties, evidencing the ownership of Prakash Chandra over the mortgaged property. It was further submitted that as per the said registered release deed, the assets of late Pannalal devolved upon his sons, namely, Shri Deepchand, Shri Trilokchand, Shri Kisturchand, Shri Bhanwarlal, and Shri Jaskaran. Therefore, Smt. Jassudevi, daughter of late Pannalal Marothi and mother of the appellants–plaintiffs, could not claim any share in the said property. 12. After hearing all parties, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur, dismissed S.A. No. 318/2023 by a detailed and reasoned order dated 25.10.2023. Learned counsel thus submitted that, in view of the express provisions of Sections 17 and 34 of the SARFAESI Act, the learned trial Court had rightly allowed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in IEEE Mumbai Section Welfare Association v. Global IEEE Institute for Engineers , 2025 SCC Online SC 1756, and Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal & Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 479 14. Lastly, learned counsel contended that the appellants– plaintiffs had instituted the partition suit before the learned trial Court solely with the ulterior motive of creating obstacles in the lawful recovery proceedings and to deprive M/s Arihant Online Solution Private Limited, the bona fide auction purchaser, from enjoying the property purchased by it in the e-auction after depositing the entire consideration amount. On these premises, learned counsel urged that the present first appeal be dismissed and the order dated 11.05.2023 passed by the learned trial Court be affirmed. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties at the Bar. Perused the material available on record. 16. Sections 13, 17 and 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are reproduced below for ready reference:– 13. Enforcement of security interest. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties at the Bar. Perused the material available on record. 16. Sections 13, 17 and 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are reproduced below for ready reference:– 13. Enforcement of security interest. —(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of secured debt or any instalment thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non- performing asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under sub-section (4). Provided that— (i) the requirement of classification of secured debt as non-performing asset under this sub-section shall not apply to a borrower who has raised funds through issue of debt securities; and (ii) in the event of default, the debenture trustee shall be entitled to enforce security interest in the same manner as provided under this section with such modifications as may be necessary and in accordance with the terms and conditions of security documents executed in favour of the debenture trustee. (3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of secured debts by the borrower. (3) The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of secured debts by the borrower. (3A) If, on receipt of the notice under sub-section (2), the borrower makes any representation or raises any objection, the secured creditor shall consider such representation or objection and if the secured creditor comes to the conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate 3[within fifteen days] of receipt of such representation or objection the reasons for non-acceptance of the representation or objection to the borrower: Provided that the reasons so communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons shall not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 or the Court of District Judge under section 17A. (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely:— (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; (b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset: Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt: Provided further that where the management of whole of the business or part of the business is severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security for the debt; (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. (5) Any payment made by any person referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (4) to the secured creditor shall give such person a valid discharge as if he has made payment to the borrower. (5A) Where the sale of an immovable property, for which a reserve price has been specified, has been postponed for want of a bid of an amount not less than such reserve price, it shall be lawful for any officer of the secured creditor, if so authorised by the secured creditor in this behalf, to bid for the immovable property on behalf of the secured creditor at any subsequent sale. (5B) Where the secured creditor, referred to in sub-section (5A), is declared to be the purchaser of the immovable property at any subsequent sale, the amount of the purchase price shall be adjusted towards the amount of the claim of the secured creditor for which the auction of enforcement of security interest is taken by the secured creditor, under sub-section (4) of section 13. (5C) The provisions of section 9 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949) shall, as far as may be, apply to the immovable property acquired by secured creditor under sub-section (5A). (6) Any transfer of secured asset after taking possession thereof or take over of management under sub-section (4), by the secured creditor or by the manager on behalf of the secured creditor shall vest in the transferee all rights in, or in relation to, the secured asset transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of such secured asset. (7) Where any action has been taken against a borrower under the provisions of sub-section (4), all costs, charges and expenses which, in the opinion of the secured creditor, have been properly incurred by him or any expenses incidental thereto, shall be recoverable from the borrower and the money which is received by the secured creditor shall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, be held by him in trust, to be applied, firstly, in payment of such costs, charges and expenses and secondly, in discharge of the dues of the secured creditor and the residue of the money so received shall be paid to the person entitled thereto in accordance with his rights and interests. (8) Where the amount of dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him is tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date of publication of notice for public auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets,— (i) the secured assets shall not be transferred by way of lease assignment or sale by the secured creditor; and (ii) in case, any step has been taken by the secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of the assets before tendering of such amount under this sub-section, no further step shall be taken by such secured creditor for transfer by way of lease or assignment or sale of such secured assets. (9) Subject to the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in the case of] financing of a financial asset by more than one secured creditors or joint financing of a financial asset by secured creditors, no secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise any or all of the rights conferred on him under or pursuant to sub-section (4) unless exercise of such right is agreed upon by the secured creditors representing not less than sixty percent in value of the amount outstanding as on a record date and such action shall be binding on all the secured creditors: Provided that in the case of a company in liquidation, the amount realised from the sale of secured assets shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956): Provided further that in the case of a company being wound up on or after the commencement of this Act, the secured creditor of such company, who opts to realise his security instead of relinquishing his security and proving his debt under proviso to sub- section (1) of section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), may retain the sale proceeds of his secured assets after depositing the workmen's dues with the liquidator in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of that Act: Provided also that liquidator referred to in the second proviso shall intimate the secured creditor the workmen's dues in accordance with the provisions of section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and in case such workmen's dues cannot be ascertained, the liquidator shall intimate the estimated amount of workmen's dues under that section to the secured creditor and in such case the secured creditor may retain the sale proceeds of the secured assets after depositing the amount of such estimate dues with the liquidator: Provided also that in case the secured creditor deposits the estimated amount of workmen's dues, such creditor shall be liable to pay the balance of the workmen's dues or entitled to receive the excess amount, if any, deposited by the secured creditor with the liquidator: Provided also that the secured creditor shall furnish an undertaking to the liquidator to pay the balance of the workmen's dues, if any. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, — (a) “record date” means the date agreed upon by the secured creditors representing not less than 2[sixty per cent.] in value of the amount outstanding on such date; (b) “amount outstanding” shall include principal, interest and any other dues payable by the borrower to the secured creditor in respect of secured asset as per the books of account of the secured creditor. (10) Where dues of the secured creditor are not fully satisfied with the sale proceeds of the secured assets, the secured creditor may file an application in the form and manner as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction or a competent court, as the case may be, for recovery of the balance amount from the borrower. (11) Without prejudice to the rights conferred on the secured creditor under or by this section, the secured creditor shall be entitled to proceed against the guarantors or sell the pledged assets without first 20 taking any of the measured specifies in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (4) in relation to the secured assets under this Act. (12) The rights of a secured creditor under this Act may be exercised by one or more of his officers authorised in this behalf in such manner as may be prescribed. (13) No borrower shall, after receipt of notice referred to in sub-section (2), transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business) any of his secured assets referred to in the notice, without prior written consent of the secured creditor. “17. Application against measures to recover secured debts. —(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed, to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation. Explanation. —For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section. (1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction— (a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises; (b) where the secured asset is located; or (c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub- section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,— (a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and (b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub- section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt. (4A) Where— (i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy,— (a) has expired or stood determined; or (b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or (c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or (d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under subsection (2) of section 13 of the Act; and (ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application: Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1). (6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder.” “34. Civil court not to have jurisdiction. —No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).” 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal & Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 479 , was pleased to observe as under:– “24. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the secured creditor on the secured assets and when the secured creditor proposes to proceed against the secured assets, sub- section (4) of Section 13 envisages various measures to secure the borrowers debt. One of the measures provided by the statute is to take possession of secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or realising the secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any of the “measures” referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under Section 17 . Any person aggrieved by any of the “measures” referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under Section 17 . The opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no civil court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding “in respect of any matter” which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine. The expression “in respect of any matter” referred to in Section 34 would take in the measures provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. Consequently, if any aggrieved person has got any grievance against any “measures” taken by the borrower under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. The civil court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as well.” [Emphasis supplied] 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (Dead) by Lrs. & Anr. v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 220 , dealing with the question of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in relation to mortgaged properties qua which proceedings under the SARFAESI Act have been initiated, was pleased to observe that the DRT has jurisdiction with respect to “measures” taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) and that, in respect of such matters, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is ousted. However, under Section 17 , the DRT has no power to partition properties, and hence, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to grant a decree of partition cannot be said to be ousted. Paragraphs 22 and 25 of the said judgment are reproduced below for ready reference:– “The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. Paragraphs 22 and 25 of the said judgment are reproduced below for ready reference:– “The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to determine all disputes of civil nature unless the same is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of a civil court requires strict interpretation. The court, it is well settled, would normally lean in favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted. (See Sahebgouda vs. Ogeppa [ (2003) 6 SCC 151 : (2003) 3 Supreme 13 ] .) Even otherwise, the civil court's jurisdiction is not completely ousted under the Companies Act, 1956. xxxxx 25. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the civil suit was maintainable. In any event, we fail to understand and rather it is strange as to how the High Court while rejecting relief to the original plaintiff (late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal), granted a similar relief in favour of the first respondent herein.” [Emphasis supplied] 19. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Central Bank of India & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Jain & Ors., (2025) 4 SCC 38 , while reiterating that the Civil Court retains jurisdiction over matters which the DRT is not empowered to decide, such as disputes related to the validity of sale deeds or title disputes, and that the DRT’s jurisdiction is limited to examining whether the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act are in accordance with law, was pleased to observe in the operative portion of the judgment as under:– “44. Before we close this litigation, we deem it necessary to observe that Banks should remain very careful with inadequate title clearance reports, more particularly, when such reports are obtained cheaply and at times for external reasons. This concerns the protection of public money and is in the larger public interest. Before we close this litigation, we deem it necessary to observe that Banks should remain very careful with inadequate title clearance reports, more particularly, when such reports are obtained cheaply and at times for external reasons. This concerns the protection of public money and is in the larger public interest. Therefore, it is essential for the Reserve Bank of India and other stakeholders to collaborate in developing a standardized and practical approach for preparing title search report before sanctioning loans and also for the purpose of determining liability (including potential criminal action) of the Officer who approves loan. Additionally, there should be standard guidelines for fees and costs associated with title search reports so as to ensure that they maintain high quality.” 20. In the above backdrop, this Court, upon a reading of the relevant provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India finds that while the DRT, being a creature of the The Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, has limited jurisdiction confined to examining the measures taken under the SARFAESI Act, the Civil Courts retain jurisdiction to decide independent civil disputes such as ownership, title, or partition, which are outside the ambit of the SARFAESI framework. In other words, while the DRT has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with disputes related to the measures taken by secured creditors under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to deal with and decide disputes not covered under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. The partition suit instituted by the petitioner- plaintiff therefore cannot be held to be barred by law under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. 21. In the present case, the suit property situated at Pabu Chowk, Nai Line, Gangashahar, Bikaner, was mortgaged by respondent–defendant No. 1, being the proprietor of M/s Laxmi Food Products, with respondents–defendants Nos. 20 and 21 for availing a loan of Rs. 2,41,20,000/-. The loan account was declared NPA on 31.12.2021, whereafter the respondent– defendant Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act for recovering its outstanding dues. Symbolic possession of the mortgaged property was taken on 23.03.2022. The mortgaged property was thereafter put to auction on 29.11.2022 where M/s Arihant Online Solution Pvt. Ltd. submitted the highest bid of Rs. 1,87,50,000/-, deposited the entire sale consideration, and the bid was accepted. 22. Symbolic possession of the mortgaged property was taken on 23.03.2022. The mortgaged property was thereafter put to auction on 29.11.2022 where M/s Arihant Online Solution Pvt. Ltd. submitted the highest bid of Rs. 1,87,50,000/-, deposited the entire sale consideration, and the bid was accepted. 22. After the auction of the mortgaged property, the petitioners–plaintiffs, for the first time, came into the picture and filed a partition suit before the learned District Judge, Bikaner. During the pendency of the civil suit, an application was also filed before the DRT, Jaipur, alleging that the borrower, Prakash Chandra, had no right to mortgage the property until the partition of the property owned by late Shri Pannalal Marothi and demarcation of shares of all co-owners. The DRT, Jaipur, vide order dated 25.10.2023, dismissed the application filed by the petitioners–plaintiffs, holding that the applicants had failed to prove, on the basis of any documentary evidence, that they had any share in the mortgaged property. The application filed by the respondent Bank dated 20.03.2023 under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. read with Sections 17 , 34, and 35 of the SARFAESI Act came to be considered by the learned trial Court, which, vide order dated 11.05.2023, accepted the same and rejected the partition suit, observing that the suit is barred by law and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide disputes relating to mortgaged properties that have already been auctioned under the SARFAESI Act. 23. Coming to the facts of the instant case, it is noticed that the mortgaged property has been validly auctioned by the secured creditor (respondent–defendant Bank). The auction purchaser has already deposited the entire sale consideration, and the rights of the borrower and co-borrowers in the secured asset thus stand extinguished. No relief in Civil Original Case No. 08/2023 (CIS No. 25/2023), titled ‘Paras Mal & Ors. v. Prakash Chandra & Ors.’, in respect of the proceedings initiated by the respondent–defendant Bank against the borrower under the SARFAESI Act, has been claimed or prayed for. In the civil suit for partition, the petitioners–plaintiffs, claiming themselves to be sons of Smt. Jassudevi, daughter of late Shri Pannalal Marothi, have prayed for determination of their share in the property by metes and bounds, which is essential for a valid partition. In the civil suit for partition, the petitioners–plaintiffs, claiming themselves to be sons of Smt. Jassudevi, daughter of late Shri Pannalal Marothi, have prayed for determination of their share in the property by metes and bounds, which is essential for a valid partition. However, in view of the fact that the property sought to be partitioned has already been auctioned, it cannot now be divided by metes and bounds amongst the legal heirs. The auction proceedings dated 29.11.2022 cannot be invalidated or interfered with by the learned trial Court, as the auction sale under the SARFAESI Act can be questioned only before the DRT. 24. In the above factual situation, while the partition suit filed by the petitioners–plaintiffs seeking determination of their share in the suit property, said to be inherited by them from late Shri Pannalal Marothi and jointly owned by respondents– defendants Nos. 1 to 19, is maintainable, the physical division of the property is not permissible in the present case. The learned trial Court, in these circumstances, shall be required to decide the share of the petitioners–plaintiffs in the sale proceeds of the property in dispute instead. 25. In the result, the instant Civil First Appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 11.05.2023 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Bikaner, is set aside. The partition suit filed on behalf of the petitioners–plaintiffs is held to be maintainable. The learned trial Court is directed to proceed in the matter in accordance with law and, since physical division of the suit property is not feasible, it may, after determining the share of the petitioners–plaintiffs in the suit property, if any, may direct distribution of their proportionate share from the sale proceeds, if found entitled. 26. All pending applications stand disposed of. No order as to costs.