ORDER : 1. The revision petitioner is the accused in C.C. No.175 of 2011 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-1, Thiruvananthapuram. She stood trial for committing an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 before that court and was convicted and sentenced thereunder. The accused carried the matter in appeal by filing Crl.Appeal No.398 of 2012 before the Additional Sessions Court- IV, Thiruvananthapuram. The said court, vide judgment dated 27.08.2016, allowed the appeal in part and while upholding the conviction, modified the sentence. 2. The case of the complainant is that the accused had borrowed an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- from him and had issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 20.05.2008 for discharging the said liability. When the cheque was presented for collection it got dishonoured for the reason that funds were insufficient. The statutory notice issued also did not evoke any response and the cheque amount remained unpaid. Hence, the complainant approached the trial court by filing C.C. No.175 of 2011. 3. In the trial court, from the side of the complainant, PW1 was examined and Exts.P1 to P5 documents were marked. When the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., she denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against her in evidence and contended that she is innocent. The accused stated that she had no financial transactions with the complainant. From the side of the accused, DW1 and DW2 were examined. The trial court on an appreciation of the evidence on record, found the accused guilty and convicted her under Section 138 of the NI Act. It sentenced the accused to pay a fine of Rs.6,80,000/- under Section 138 of the NI Act, with a default clause. 4. In the appeal preferred by the accused, the appellate court even though has stated that the appeal is allowed in part, has sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs.6,80,000/- with 9% interest from the date of transaction, till realisation, with a default clause. The fine amount, if realised, was ordered to be paid to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C. 5. When the matter was taken up for consideration today, Adv.Anil Kumar C.R., the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the revision petitioner is no more. The fine amount, if realised, was ordered to be paid to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C. 5. When the matter was taken up for consideration today, Adv.Anil Kumar C.R., the learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the revision petitioner is no more. But he also submitted that he ready to make submissions on merits in this case and hence, he was heard along with Adv.Biju Balakrishnan, the counsel for the 2 nd respondent. Perused the records. 6. Sri.Adv.Anil Kumar submitted that both the trial court and the appellate court have not appreciated the evidence in a proper perspective and has arrived at a wrong conclusion of guilt against the accused. He argued that the blank signed cheque kept by the accused has been taken away by her husband and handed over to the complainant, for discharging his liability towards the complainant, in a transaction attached to the financial institution run by the husband of the accused. He further submitted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not take into consideration the evidence of DW1 and DW2 on this point and has wrongly found the accused guilty of the offence. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent supported the impugned judgments and contended that there are no grounds to interfere with the same. He argued that the evidence of PW1 regarding the transactions and the issuance of the cheque, is credible and cogent and the accused has not adduced any reliable evidence to rebut the statutory presumptions. He also argued that the evidence of DW1 and DW2 are not credible and cogent and the accused is not having a consistent version regarding the transactions. Hence, he prayed this criminal revision petition be dismissed. 8. The materials on record show that PW1 has filed a proof affidavit in tune with the averments in the complaint. He stated that the accused had borrowed Rs.5,00,000/- from him and in order to repay the said amount, has issued Ext.P1 cheque dated 20.05.2008. When the cheque was presented for collection it got dishonored and the statutory notice issued did not evoke any response. His evidence also shows that the accused herself has filled and signed the cheque in front of him and has handed it over to him. 9. When the cheque was presented for collection it got dishonored and the statutory notice issued did not evoke any response. His evidence also shows that the accused herself has filled and signed the cheque in front of him and has handed it over to him. 9. The evidence of PW1 coupled with Ext.P1 cheque is sufficient to hold that the complainant has discharged the initial onus cast upon him to prove the execution of the cheque and in establishing the basis for drawing the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. Now it is for the accused to rebut the said presumptions at least by preponderance of the probabilities. In the present case, the version of the accused is that she was having no transactions with the complainant and her husband, who is having financial transactions with the complainant, had taken away her cheque and has handed it over to him. It is to be seen that in order to substantiate the afore contentions, the accused herself got examined as DW1 and also examined her husband as DW2. Both the trial court and the appellate court, did not believe the testimonies of these witnesses. It is true that both DW1 and DW2 stated that the complainant has after threatening DW2, obtained the cheque from him. It is also true that they have stated that DW2 has taken away the blank cheque of DW1 and has handed it over to the complainant. But at the outset itself, it is to be seen that no complaints have been raised by DW1 or DW2 before any authority, till date, against the complainant for threatening and obtaining the cheque. It is also not believable that the accused would have kept a signed blank cheque in her house, so that DW2 or anyone else can lay their hands upon it. Further, the date, month or year during which the alleged threat was imparted and the cheque obtained is not forthcoming from the side of the accused. Be that as it may, it is very interesting to take note that when DW2 was examined in chief, a leading question was put to him that he has forcibly taken away the cheque from DW1, to which he replied in negative. Be that as it may, it is very interesting to take note that when DW2 was examined in chief, a leading question was put to him that he has forcibly taken away the cheque from DW1, to which he replied in negative. It is again interesting to note that it is to a leading question which is to the effect that the complainant has obtained the cheque after threatening him, DW2 has answered in the affirmative. It is a settled law that the answers to such leading questions cannot be taken into consideration while appreciating the evidence. In the light of the afore discussions, I have no doubt in my mind that the accused has failed to rebut the statutory presumptions available in favour of the complainant. 10. Now the question to be considered is regarding the sentence imposed by the appellate court. It appears that in the appeal filed by the accused challenging his conviction and sentence, the appellate court, while modifying the sentence, has in fact enhanced the sentence. As stated earlier, the trial court has sentenced the accused only to pay a fine of Rs.6.80 lakhs with a default clause. But the impugned appellate judgment would go to show that the said sentence has been modified to one of simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and also to pay a fine of Rs.6,80,000/- with interest at 9% from the date of transaction, till realisation. It cannot be disputed that, going by Section 386(b)(iii) Cr.P.C., while entertaining an appeal from a conviction, the appellate court, though entitled to alter the finding and nature and extent of the sentence, cannot enhance the sentence. If so, the imposition of sentence till the rising of the court and the direction to pay an additional amount as a fine than as ordered by the trial court definitely, will amount to enhancement of sentence, which is impermissible in law. 11. Be that as it may, it is to be taken note that Section 138 of the N.I. Act enables the court only to impose a fine, which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque. In the present case, it is to be seen that the appellate court has not imposed a specific/certain amount as a fine on the accused and has instead imposed a fine of Rs.6,80,000/- with 9% interest. In the present case, it is to be seen that the appellate court has not imposed a specific/certain amount as a fine on the accused and has instead imposed a fine of Rs.6,80,000/- with 9% interest. The fine thus calculated will go on varying with the passing of days and can even cross the barrier prescribed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, i.e., twice the amount of the cheque. Now, even if the courts are to follow the dictum laid down in Vijayan v. Baby , AIR 2012 SC 528 and impose a fine taking into consideration the interest factor, the fine thus imposed can never cross the limits prescribed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In other words, I may say that the courts are bound to quantify the fine within the limits prescribed under Section 138 , even while applying the dictum of the apex court in Vijayan's case (supra), and must see that the amount of the fine thus quantified, does not exceed twice the cheque amount [Also see Shabeer M. v. Anitha Bajee and Another , 2022 (6) KHC 704 ]. If so, I find that the order passed by the appellate court directing the accused to pay a fine of Rs.6,80,000/- with 9% interest, till realisation, cannot be sustained. 12. In the light of the afore discussions, I hold that the sentence as imposed by the appellate court as such is not legally sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the view that it would only be just and proper to reinstate the sentence as imposed by the trial court. In the result, this revision petition is allowed in part as follows: 1. The conviction of the revision petitioner/accused under Section 138 of the N.I.Act, in CC No.175 of 2011 by Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Thiruvananthapuram and as confirmed in Crl. Appeal No.398 of 2012 by the Additional Sessions Court -IV, Thiruvananthapuram is upheld. 2. The sentence imposed on the revision petitioner/accused by the appellate court is set aside and the revision petitioner/accused is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.6,80,000/- under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. 3. In case of default in payment of fine, the revision petitioner/accused will undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months.