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2025 DIGILAW 1735 (JHR)

Maa Tara Stone Works v. State of Jharkhand

2025-08-21

ARUN KUMAR RAI, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2025
JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking for the following reliefs: - “For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction, including Writ of Certiorari, for quashing order passed by Respondent No.3 contained in Memo No. 276/M, dated 04.03.2025, (Annexure-10) wherein application filed by Petitioner for renewal of its mining lease over an area of 2.80 acres, situated at Mouza Suraidih, Thana Hiranpur, Plot No. 63 (part), 64(part) and 65(part) in the District of Pakur, has been rejected in a most illegal and arbitrary manner. (ii) For issuance of further appropriate writ/order/direction, including Writ of Mandamus, directing Respondents to consider and consequentially grant renewal of mining lease in favour of Petitioner, pertaining to mining lease of stone boulders over an area of 2.80 acres, situated at Mouza Suraidih, Thana Hiranpur, Plot No. 63 (part), 64(part) and 65(part) in the District of Pakur, for a period of 10 years commencing from 01.04.2022 to 31.03.2032. (iii) For issuance of further appropriate writ/order/direction, including Writ of Declaration, declaring that amendment carried out under Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules , 2004 (for short ’JMMC Rules’) vide Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 (Annexure-2), Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2019 (Annexure-3) and Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2020 (Annexure-4) do not prohibit grant of renewal of mining lease, but only provides, inter alia, that any new lease over 3 hectares of land would be granted in terms Jharkhand Minor Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2017 (Annexure-5). (iv) For issuance of any other appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, requires to be enumerated, which read as under: - (i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that the petitioner was granted mining lease over an area of 2.80 acres, situated at Mouza Suraidih, Thana Hiranpur, Plot No.63 (part), 64(part) and 65(part) in the District of Pakur, for a period of 10 years from 07.06.2010 to 05.06.2020. In terms of provisions of JMMC Rules, 2004, the period of said mining lease was extended up to 31.03.2022 by supplementary lease deed for extension of minor minerals dated 30.12.2020. In terms of provisions of JMMC Rules, 2004, the period of said mining lease was extended up to 31.03.2022 by supplementary lease deed for extension of minor minerals dated 30.12.2020. (ii) The writ petitioner, prior to expiry of its Mining lease deed, on several occasions attempted before the respondent- authorities for filing application for renewal of mining lease but such application for renewal of mining lease was not being accepted by the respondent authorities. The respondent-State of Jharkhand, on the pretext of alleged amendment carried out under JMMC Rules, 2004 was not granting any renewal of mining lease. (iii) The writ petitioner has been further advised to annex provisions of JMMC (Auction) Rules, 2017 and from bare perusal of the said Auction Rules also, it would be evident that the said Auction Rules only contemplates grant of fresh mining lease/concession through auction and does not deal with the applications pertaining to renewal of mining lease. (iv) Despite the fact that such right of renewal has been stipulated in statutory lease deed itself, respondent-authorities on the pretext of aforesaid amendment, were not extending benefit of renewal of mining lease nor were giving extension of renewal of mining lease. In this context, it is stated that the petitioner is in possession of a document pertaining to renewal of its mining lease, wherein the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, in respect of the said applicant for renewal of mining lease, clearly stated that in view of the amendment made in JMMC Rules, 2004, there is no provision for renewal of mining lease. In fact, said understanding of Deputy Commissioner, Koderma was the prevalent understanding of the concerned authorities across the State of Jharkhand, due to which, no renewal applications were being accepted by the respondent-authorities. (v) The writ petitioner was repeatedly approaching respondent-authorities for acceptance of its applications for renewal of mining lease and ultimately, petitioner’s application for renewal of its mining lease was accepted on 10.01.2025. (vi) The said application for renewal of mining lease has been rejected by the respondent-Deputy Commissioner cum District Magistrate, Pakur, vide its order contained in memo no.276/M dated 04.03.2025 on the sole ground that the said application for renewal has not been filed within stipulated time in terms of Rule 23 of JMMC Rules, 2004. (vii) The said order dated 04.03.2025 is under challenge in the present writ petition. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner 3. (vii) The said order dated 04.03.2025 is under challenge in the present writ petition. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner 3. Ms. Shruti Shekhar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that the authority concerned while passing the impugned order dated 04.03.2025 has not appreciated the prevalent rule, i.e., JMMC Rule in the right perspective. 4. It has been contended that the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. , vide order dated 06.02.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024 wherein, the issue of applicability of Rule 9 has also been taken into consideration by applying the implication of Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules 2004, and has observed that the notification issued amending Rule 9 providing for grant of lease through public auction cannot be extended in the matter pertaining to renewal of mining lease. 5. It has further been contended that the application for renewal of mining lease has been rejected by the respondent-Deputy- Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Pakur, vide order dated 04.03.2025 on the sole ground that the said application for renewal has not been filed within stipulated time in terms of Rule 23 of Rules, 2004 but the time limit for filing application for renewal as prescribed under Rule 23(1) of Rule 2004 is not mandatory and merely directory in nature. 6. On the aforesaid grounds, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that order impugned require interference by this Court. Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent-State 7. Per Contra, Mr. Shray Mishra, AC to AG appearing for the respondent-State has submitted by taking aid of the provision of Rule 9 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules , amended as 2017 and 2019, wherein, it has been provided that on or after 31.03.2022, there cannot be renewal of licenses even by way of extension, rather, the licenses are to be granted only by virtue of auction. 8. It has been contended that the quasi-judicial authority, on consideration of legal implication of Rule 23 of Rule 2004, since, has passed an order, hence, the same does not require any interference. 9. Learned State Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by another Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 10.09.2024 passed in the case of Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. 9. Learned State Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by another Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 10.09.2024 passed in the case of Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. [In W.P.(C) No.4950 of 2024]. 10. Further, reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Ghosh Stone Works represented through its Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. , reported in (2023) SCC OnLine Jhar 3182. 11. Learned State Counsel has further submitted that the order, upon which, reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, since, the said order has been passed without taking into consideration the view already taken by the Co-ordinate Benches in the aforesaid two cases. 12. It has further been contended that the order, which has been passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court dated 06.02.2025 in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, wherein, the consideration has been given with respect to the issue of Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules, but if the provision of Rule 23 will be taken into consideration, the same will only with respect to the process of making application for the purpose of renewal. 13. The submission has also been made that the provision of Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules, is to be taken into consideration along with the provision of Rule 9(?) wherein it has been stipulated that in any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020 and later on by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022. 14. On the basis of the aforesaid grounds, the learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that since the authority concerned has passed the order impugned as per the mandate of the existing Rule 2004, as such, the same requires no interference. Analysis 15. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the reasons assigned by the authority concerned negating the claim of the writ petitioner. 16. The issue which requires consideration, i.e., (i) Whether the time limit for filing application for renewal as prescribed under Rule 23(1) of Rule 2004 is not mandatory and merely directory in nature. 16. The issue which requires consideration, i.e., (i) Whether the time limit for filing application for renewal as prescribed under Rule 23(1) of Rule 2004 is not mandatory and merely directory in nature. (ii) Whether the application filed after the cut-off date, i.e., 31.03.2022 can be fit to be entertained by the authority for the purpose of renewal of the lease. (iii) Whether acceding to the prayer made on behalf of the writ petitioner, will it not amount to violation of the provision of Rule 9( ), wherein, the embargo has ? been put under the statute for no renewal of the lease license on or after 31.03.2022 and even, if the license has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2022, the same will lost its force on 31.03.2022. (iv) Whether the order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 06.02.2025 in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024 in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. , is to be considered on the principle of judicial discipline if there is no consideration of the earlier two judgments passed by the Coordinate Benches of this Court in the aforesaid case. (v) Whether the order passed by the Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. , is held to be per incuriam 17. Issue no.(i) to (iii) are interlinked and as such, the same are to be taken up together. However, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being dealt with separately. 18. This Court, before dealing with the issue no.(i) to (iii), therefore, is thought it proper to deal with the issues, i.e., issue no.(iv) and (v), since, the learned counsel for the petitioner has given much emphasis upon the applicability of the order dated 06.02.2025 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024 ( Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. ). 19. This Court, in order to consider the applicability of the order dated 06.02.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, needs to refer herein the order passed by the Coordinate Bench, which is being referred hereinbelow: - 1. In this writ petition, petitioners assail order dated 29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining Officer, Koderma refusing to grant renewal of the mining lease granted to the petitioners from 11.02.2015 to 10.02.2025. 2. In this writ petition, petitioners assail order dated 29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining Officer, Koderma refusing to grant renewal of the mining lease granted to the petitioners from 11.02.2015 to 10.02.2025. 2. In the impugned order, it is mentioned that because the land is Gair Majarua land and there is no provision for grant of renewal of mining lease for such a land, the application for renewal of mining lease is being rejected. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed before us Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules , 2004 which provides for renewal of mining lease. The said rule nowhere prohibits grant of renewal in respect of a mining lease of Gair Majarua land. When there is no such prohibition for renewal of a mining lease of such a category of land, the respondents cannot invent such a prohibition and seek to reject the renewal application of the petitioners. 4. Reliance by the respondents on the notification issued on 22.02.2017 and 08.03.2019 amending the Rule 9 of the above rules is of no avail, since the said rule only provides for grant of mining lease for the first time through a public auction, and there has been no amendment to Rule 23 which deals with renewal of mining leases at all. 5. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. Order dated 29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining Officer, Koderma is set-aside and the respondents are directed to renew the mining lease granted to the petitioners forthwith subject to the petitioners complying with all other formalities. 20. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the Coordinate Bench has considered the applicability of Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules , 2004. 21. The reliance which has been placed on behalf of the respondent about the applicability of Rule 9 of the above Rules has been held to be not availed. 22. This Court, therefore, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision of Rule 9(?), Rule 9(?), Rule 9(?) and Rule 9(?) of the JMMC Rules for the purpose of consideration of lis. 23. 22. This Court, therefore, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision of Rule 9(?), Rule 9(?), Rule 9(?) and Rule 9(?) of the JMMC Rules for the purpose of consideration of lis. 23. It is evident from Rule 9 particularly Rule 9 (?) and (?), wherein, the issue of renewal of lease/license has been dealt with initially for the period of 90 days thereafter, it was extended upto the period of 180 which is to be renewed on the basis of making proper application by the applicant. The provision of Rule 9(?) provides that in any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020 by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022. 24. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of the lease will be upto 31.03.2022. 25. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9(6) as referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction. 26. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (?)(12) as quoted and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9(?) will be applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares. 27. The provision of Rule 23 speaks about the procedure for filing an application for the purpose of renewal of lease. The occasion to insert the provision as under Rule 23 is to comply with the procedure by the applicant, which is required at the time of filing an application for renewal of license, if any applicant is making an application in view of the provision of Rule 9(?). 28. But, the specific provision has been given under Rule 9 (?) putting complete restriction of renewal on or after 31.03.2022, rather, the allotment is to be made only through auction. 29. 28. But, the specific provision has been given under Rule 9 (?) putting complete restriction of renewal on or after 31.03.2022, rather, the allotment is to be made only through auction. 29. The aforesaid issue has been taken into consideration in the judgment passed by the Coordinate Benches in two cases, i.e., in the cases of Ghosh Stone Works represented through its Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. and Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. 30. We have considered the said judgments and found therefrom that the consideration has been given regarding Rule 9(?) in the situation, wherein, the issue of renewal of license is to be granted beyond the period of 31.03.2022 or not. 31. The Coordinate Benches have passed order by taking the implication of Rule 9(?) and Rule 9(?), which is based upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Goa Foundation Vrs. Union of India and Ors. , reported in (2014) 6 SCC 590 , holding therein that there cannot be any extension contrary to the statutory command. 32. The issue of applicability of the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. , is being considered by this Court. 33. This Court, on consideration of the judgment passed in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors ., has found that the date of judgment is dated 06.02.2025, while, the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench in the case of Ghosh Stone Works and Ors. , is dated 29.11.2023 and in the case of Rang Nath Singh is dated 10.09.2024, respectively. 34. These two judgments are prior to the order dated 06.02.2025 passed in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors . But, there is no consideration of the said judgments in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. [W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024]. 35. We are conscious that if two conflicting views are there, then, the matter is to be referred to the larger Bench on the principle of judicial discipline. 36. We are further conscious that the judicial discipline warrants the order passed by the Coordinate Benches are to be given adhered to. 37. [W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024]. 35. We are conscious that if two conflicting views are there, then, the matter is to be referred to the larger Bench on the principle of judicial discipline. 36. We are further conscious that the judicial discipline warrants the order passed by the Coordinate Benches are to be given adhered to. 37. But, we are also conscious that if the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench without taking into consideration of the judgment passed by the same Corum which is earlier to the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench, then, the principle of judicial discipline is not to be made applicable. 38. The principle of per incuriam has been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 , for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being referred as under: - “ Per incuriam — Doctrine 64. “Incuria” literally means “carelessness”. In practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. The courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. Thus the “quotable in law”, is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority. 65. In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [ (1975) 2 SCC 232 : AIR 1975 SC 907 ] this Court held : (SCC p. 235, para 7) “7. … where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission.” 39. Further, the concept of per incuriam was examined by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa , (2015) 2 SCC 189 where it was held that decision can be said to be given per incuriam when the court of record has acted in ignorance of any previous decision of its own, or a subordinate court has acted in ignorance of a decision of the court of record, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: “ 46. Before I consider the correctness of the aforementioned decisions, it would be necessary to elaborate upon the concept of “per incuriam”. Before I consider the correctness of the aforementioned decisions, it would be necessary to elaborate upon the concept of “per incuriam”. The Latin expression “per incuriam” literally means “through inadvertence”. A decision can be said to be given per incuriam when the court of record has acted in ignorance of any previous decision of its own, or a subordinate court has acted in ignorance of a decision of the court of record. As regards the judgments of this Court rendered per incuriam, it cannot be said that this Court has “declared the law” on a given subject-matter, if the relevant law was not duly considered by this Court in its decision. In this regard, I refer to State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [ (1991) 4 SCC 139 ] , wherein R.M. Sahai, J. in his concurring opinion stated as follows : (SCC p. 162, para 40) “40. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority’.” 40. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition that the word “per incuriam” has been interpreted if any order/judgment has been passed by the Court in complete ignorance of the judgment already passed on the same issue or ignorance of any statutory provision, then, such judgment will come under the fold of principle of per-incuriam, exactly same is the case herein, since, in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. , even though, the views have been taken by the Co-ordinate Benches in the cases of Ghosh Stone Works represented through its Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. [W.P.(C) No.1511 of 2018] and Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. [W.P.(C) No.4950 of 2024], since have not been produced, hence, there is no consideration thereof. 41. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors ., is having no binding effect on the principle of judicial discipline. 42. Accordingly, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being answered. 43. 41. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors ., is having no binding effect on the principle of judicial discipline. 42. Accordingly, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being answered. 43. So far as the issue nos.(i) to (iii) are concerned, the admitted case of the writ petitioner is that after expiry of the existing lease, i.e., after 31.03.2022, the renewal application for lease has been filed. The further admitted fact is that the lease has already been expired in the year, 2022. The application for renewal of lease has been made before the authority concerned but the same has been dismissed on the ground of applicability of provision of Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules . 44. The factual aspect therefore is not in dispute that the application for renewal has been made for renewal of license after 31.03.2022. 45. The argument has been advanced by taking aid of Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules but as has been referred that the Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules lays down the procedure for making application for the purpose of renewal in a case where the application is to be filed under Rule 9(?) of the JMMC Rules and once the application is being filed, then, the lease is to be renewed either by way of renewal or extension but in no case, it is beyond the period of 31.03.2022 in view of the provision of Rule 9(? ). 46. Herein, the petitioner has approached the authority for renewal of the lease after expiry of lease, beyond the stipulated period as provided under Rule 23(1) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules , 2004, which is the condition precedent for filing of such application. 47. Further, the authority concerned has taken into consideration the aforesaid statutory restrictions as well as the application of Rule 23 of Rule, 2004 and accordingly, rejected the claim of the writ petitioner. 48. 47. Further, the authority concerned has taken into consideration the aforesaid statutory restrictions as well as the application of Rule 23 of Rule, 2004 and accordingly, rejected the claim of the writ petitioner. 48. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that time limit as has been stipulated in the Rule 23 of Rule 2004 is not mandatory, rather, it is directory, but the said submission is not acceptable due to the application of the principle of harmonious construction of the statutory provision and herein as per the mandate of Rule 2004, the Rule 9 should be read with the Rule 23 of rule 2004. 49. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan vs. Mohd. Shafi , reported in (2001) 8 SCC 540 while taking into consideration the core of harmonious consideration has observed that the statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. It has further been observed that the well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” is not harmonious construction, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is being quoted as under: “ 8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” is not harmonious construction. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” is not harmonious construction. With respect to law relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [ (1990) 1 SCC 277 ] held: (SCC p. 284, para 16) “16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. ‘Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged’ as Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. (Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425 (1918)] ) Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said: ‘Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.’ (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547, 553] )” 50. Thus, it is settled position of law that the statute is to be taken into consideration harmoniously and not on the basis of picking one provision whose suits the litigant and leaving another provision which is against the interest of the litigant concerned. Otherwise, the same will be in defiance of the principle of harmonious construction of the statutory provision and in that view of the matter, the very object of the statutory command will be frustrated, which has been mandated in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Goa Foundation (supra) 51. It needs to refer herein, in view of Rule 23(1) of JMMC Rules, 2004 that applicant has to submit the renewal application at least 180-90 days prior to the date of expiry of the lease period. 52. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that even if application for renewal of lease would have been filed within the stipulated time, then, the said application is not fit for consideration in the light of statutory restriction as provided under Rule 9(?) as discussed and referred hereinabove. 53. 52. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that even if application for renewal of lease would have been filed within the stipulated time, then, the said application is not fit for consideration in the light of statutory restriction as provided under Rule 9(?) as discussed and referred hereinabove. 53. Further, it needs to refer herein that the law is well settled that if any statutory provision is there, the same is to be complied with in its strict sense and the action is to be taken based upon the statutory provision without any deviation. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala , (1999) 3 SCC 422 , wherein it has been held at paragraphs-31 & 32 as under: "31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: "[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all." 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law." 54. Reference may also be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. v. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad (in Civil Appeal No. 5138-40/2007) , reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690 , wherein it has been held at paragraph-14 as under: "14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that : 26.... it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” 55. Further, it needs to refer herein that the writ petition has been filed for issuance of Writ of Certiorari for interfering with the decision taken by the Mines Commissioner, as available in the order dated 04.03.2025 appended as Annexure-10. 56. We are aware with the settled position of law of issuance of Writ of Certiorari, which can only be issued if there is any error apparent on record or there is gross miscarriage of justice, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477 wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held as under: “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 57. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as hereunder: - “21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 58. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 , their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob’s case (supra). 13. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob’s case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 59. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court to issue Writ of Certiorari and basing upon the reason assigned hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the authority concerned, cannot be said to suffer from an error, hence, the same is not fit to be interfered with. 60. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in view of the restriction imposed under the statute for leasing out the mining hold area only on the basis of auction as provided under Rule 9 of Rule 2004, having been considered by this Court in the case of Ghosh Stone Works represented through its Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. and Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. (Supra) , therefore, the instant writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 61. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed. 62. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.