ORDER : ANOOP KUMAR DHAND, J. 1. By way of filing of this petition, a challenge has been led to the impugned order dated 11.11.2022 passed by the Labour Court, Kota in LCR Case No.191/1999 (CIS No.1775/2014) by which the termination order of the petitioner dated 18.02.1998 has been upheld and the same was found to be valid and proper. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as Machinist on 01.01.1983, and he continued on the said post till 18.02.1998. Counsel submits that the petitioner was transferred from the post of Machinist to Operator in Viscose department vide order dated 21.06.1997, but the petitioner made a request to the respondent to assign him the work of Machinist or provide adequate training to avoid any mishap. Counsel submits that no heed was paid to the said request of the petitioner and thereafter, two different charge-sheets were served upon the him, one with the allegation that in-spite of his transfer on 24.06.1997, he failed to join till 01.07.1997 and accordingly, he remained absent from service for seven days and the other charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner with the allegation that he failed to perform the duties of Operator and instigated the other employees of the respondent-employer to not to work. Counsel submits that on the basis of the aforesaid charge-sheets, the respondent took a decision to terminate the services of the petitioner vide order dated 18.02.1998. Counsel submits that both the enquiries have been conducted by one Enquiry Officer and on the basis of the said Enquiry, the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioner has been passed. Counsel submits that the reason of absence and the reason for not working as Operator was well explained by the petitioner before the authorities, but those reasons were not taken into account and consequently, the impugned action has been taken against the petitioner. Hence, under these circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-employer opposed the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the act of the petitioner amounts to misconduct, for which a detailed enquiry was conducted wherein subsequently the charges were found to be proved against the petitioner and accordingly, after due consideration, a decision was taken to terminate the services of the petitioner. Counsel submits that the aforesaid termination order dated 18.02.1998 was assailed by the petitioner by way of raising an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act of 1947') before the Labour Court, wherein, he himself accepted that the domestic enquiry was fair and he did not oppose the same. Counsel submits that even an order was passed by the Labour Court on 20.11.2019 in this regard and the case was confined to the proportionate punishment. Counsel submits that once the petitioner has accepted the domestic enquiry being fair, there is no reason or occasion available with him to question the said enquiry here before this Court. Counsel submits that the another aspect of the matter i.e. proportionate punishment, was taken into account by the Labour Court and it was found that the act and conduct of the petitioner was such, which warranted his termination and accordingly, the Labour Court by passing a reasoned order has rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 10 of the Act of 1947. Hence, under these circumstances, interference of this Court is not warranted. 4. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on the record. 5. This fact is not in dispute that the petitioner was initially appointed as Machinist and he had worked on the said post for a period of almost 15 years and thereafter, his services were transferred to other department/ wing/ branch of the respondent-employer, wherein, he was asked to do the operational work. It appears that some objection in this regard was raised by the petitioner and the same was not redressed by the respondent, that is why, two different charge-sheets were issued to the petitioner, one for remaining absent for a duration of seven days and other for not obeying the commands of the respondents and instigating other employees to not to work. No material is available on the record to show that the petitioner had instigated the co- employees to not to work. 6. The question remains for consideration of this Court is 'Whether absence of seven days from work and not obeying the command to do the operational work in other department/ wing/ branch is such, which warrants dismissal of the petitioner from service ?' 7. 6. The question remains for consideration of this Court is 'Whether absence of seven days from work and not obeying the command to do the operational work in other department/ wing/ branch is such, which warrants dismissal of the petitioner from service ?' 7. This court is conscious enough about the scope of interference with the decision of Disciplinary Authority. The scope of interference is very narrow and limited in such like matters, but the High Court has the power to mould the relief in case, the punishment/ penalty imposed shocks the judicial conscience. 8. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , has held in paras 2, 5 and 12 as under :- “2. This appeal and the companion appeal filed by the Union of India arise from the order of the Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 609 of 1986 dated March 14, 1989. Appellant's integrity, while he was working as Income-tax Officer, had come under cloud. On an investigation made by the C.B.I., it had stated to the respondent that though the evidence collected during investigation disclosed that the appellant had assets disproportionate to his known source of income, as the evidence was not strong enough to lay prosecution under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'), the competent authority might proceed against the appellant in a departmental inquiry.” “5. While resisting the contention, the learned Counsel for the Union argued that the Tribunal was not empowered to appreciate the evidence nor to consider the evidence on merits to reach a finding whether the appellant was in possession of disproportionate assets. The Tribunal went wrong in appreciating the evidence. The disciplinary authority had undoubted power and authority to impose punishment. On the facts found by the Inquiry Officer and disciplinary authority that the appellant was in possession of the assets disproportionate to the known source of his income, the Tribunal was unjustified in interfering with the punishment of dismissal from service, and ordering for compulsory retirement instead.” “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held that proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have never reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.” 9. In the instant case, when the petitioner was transferred from the present department/ branch, to work in another department/ branch as Operator, an application was submitted by the petitioner to assign him the similar work which is of Machinist, as he was not acquainted with the procedure of operational work, but no heed was paid by the respondent in this regard. The reason for submitting the said application by the petitioner was to avoid other work. The reason for submitting the said application by the petitioner was to avoid other work. This fact has come on record that the petitioner was directed to undertake the required training for the aforesaid purpose, but the petitioner refused to undertake the said training. 10. It is a settled proposition of law that an employee is bound to carry out the order of transfer and he/ she is duty bound to join at the transferred place of posting. Such employee has no right to remain absent without leave and the conduct of remaining absent without leave shall not be tolerated and such person should definitely suffer the punishment. But it is not necessary to be so harsh so as to terminate his service. 11. The doctrine of proportionality is thus well recognised concept of judicial review and if it is found that the punishment is disproportionate, then the same shall be open for the Courts to interfere under its limited scope of judicial review. 12. The principles of proportionality of punishment vis-a-vis misconduct have been recognised by the Courts of various European countries as well as British Courts. It has time and again been held that if the punishment imposed on an employee is out of proportion, the Court has power to interfere with the same. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services reported in (1984) 3 All. E.R. 935 , it has been held: "...Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality;, the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. The first ground I would call 'illegality;, the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community...." Their Lordships of the Apex Court have also recognised the theory of proportionality of punishment when they said that "an order imposing punishment, which is shockingly disproportionate or is highly excessive having regard to the gravity of misconduct, is liable to be declared as arbitrary and thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India." 13. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (1983)-II-LLJ-1 SC , the Apex Court held as unde: "...It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution..." 14. Similarly, in the case of Chairman cum Managing Director, Coal India Limited v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri reported in (2009) 15 SCC 620 , has dealt with the doctrine of proportionality and the limited scope of High Court under judicial review in paras 19, 20, 21 and 22 as under :- “19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, wellrecognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be : would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be : would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company's Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations. 22. Ordinarily, we would have sent the matter back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration on the question of punishment but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this exercise may not be proper. In our view, the demand of justice would be met if the Respondent No. 1 is denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months.” 15. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in the case concerning quantum of penalty, there should be compelling and strong circumstances which must be recorded and such interference cannot be on the basis of misplaced sympathy and generosity. Considering the said concept of rendering justice, this Court has no hesitation to hold as far as the present case at hand is concerned, that interference is called for, which is not based on misplaced sympathy or generosity, but on the basis of rendering equitable justice which is a hallmark of judicial review by which this Court is exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. 16. This Court, as stated above, has to take into consideration the interest of both the employee and the employer, while administering justice, without being unduly influenced by any sympathetic consideration. On the basis of the overall facts and circumstances, as discussed and narrated above, this Court is of the considered view that there must be fairness in decisions taken by the employer, particularly, in the matter of imposing punishment, when it takes away the very livelihood of the employee, which is not only going to affect him/ her, but will also affect his/ her family members. 17. Looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and looking to the previous record of fifteen years of service of the petitioner as well as bearing in mind the doctrine of proportionality, this Court is of the view that the punishment awarded by the authority is disproportionate. 18. The impugned order dated 18.02.1998 passed by the respondent-employer as well as the award dated 11.11.2022 passed by the Labour Court stands quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the respondent-employer for considering afresh the question of punishment and pass appropriate orders thereafter within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 19. Consequently, the instant writ petition stands allowed, in part. The respondent is directed to reinstate back the petitioner forthwith. 20. It is made clear that the petitioner would not be entitled to get any back wages for the intervening period. 21. In case, the petitioner is superannuated during pendency, appropriate orders be passed accordingly. 22. The stay application and all pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.