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2025 DIGILAW 1742 (KER)

Anjaneyalu S/o. Nadipe Naganna v. Union Of India

2025-06-30

K.V.JAYAKUMAR, RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V.

body2025
JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. The above captioned Criminal Appeal is preferred by the 2nd accused in S.C.No.3/2022/NIA challenging the order dated 20.3.2025 in Crl. M.P.No.20/2025 on the file of the Special Court for Trial of NIA cases, as per which the application for regular bail preferred by the appellant was dismissed. 2. Gist of the prosecution allegation 2.1. Credible information was allegedly received by the Central Government concerning the involvement of a) Sanjay Deepak Rao @ Vikas, a Central Committee Member of the Western Ghats Special Zonal Committee (WGSZC) of the proscribed terrorist organization CPI (Maoist); b) Pinaka Pani @ Pani and Varalakshmi, members of the Revolutionary Writers Association, a frontal organization of CPI (Maoist) operating in Andhra Pradesh; c) Sreekanth of Wayanad; and d) Anjayanelu @ Anji @ Sudhakar of Andhra Pradesh, along with others were making efforts to radicalise Chaithanya @ Surya with a view to recruit him into the the proscribed terrorist organization CPI(Maoist) and to provide training with the objective to carry out acts so as to threaten the security, unity, integrity, and sovereignty of the Union of India. 2.2. Considering the grave nature of the offence and the opinion that a scheduled offence under the National Investigation Agency Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘NIA Act’) had been committed, the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India ordered the registration of a Crime by the NIA and consequently RC01/2022/NIA/KOC was registered under Sections 18, 18A, 18B, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 & Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The accused in the above crime registered by the NIA on 03.02.2022 are Sanjay Deepak Rao (A-1), Pinakapani (A-2), Varalakshmi (A-3), Sreekanth (A-4), Chaithanya (A-5) and Anjayanelu (A-6). 2.3. On completion of the investigation, a report was laid initially on 3.9.2022 before the NIA Special Court, arraying Chaithanya @ Surya (A-5) and Anjayanelu @ Sudhakar @ Anji (A-6) as the accused and the same was taken on file on 22.9.2022. 2.4. Investigation was carried out against the rest of the accused. A Supplementary Final Report was submitted arraying Sanjay Deepak Rao (A-1) on 05.07.2024. 2.5. In the course of the further investigation, it was revealed that in addition to the accused already arrayed, certain others were also involved. 2.4. Investigation was carried out against the rest of the accused. A Supplementary Final Report was submitted arraying Sanjay Deepak Rao (A-1) on 05.07.2024. 2.5. In the course of the further investigation, it was revealed that in addition to the accused already arrayed, certain others were also involved. The NIA, based on investigation, concluded that (i) Akki Raju Hargopal (ii) Bussireddy Kondareddy, (iii) BG Krishnamurthy and (iv) R. Ragaveendran played a pivotal role in the conspiracy to recruit Chaithanya (A-5) and Anjayanelu (A-6) to the Western Ghats Special Zone Committee of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist). Accordingly, the original status of the accused was rearranged as Akki Raju Hargopal (A-1), Sanjay Deepak Rao (A-2), Pinakapani (A-3), Varalakshmi (A-4), Bussireddy Kondareddy (A-5), R. Ragaveendran (A-6), BG Krishnamurthy (A-7), Sreekanth (A-8) Chaithanya (A-9) and Anjayanelu (A-10). 3. The Charge against the appellant . 3.1. As per the Charge, the specific allegation is that the appellant Velagutra Anjayanelu @ V Anjineyulu Velugutra @ Anjaneyalu @ Sudhakar @ Anji (A-6) became an active member of CPI (Maoist) through its frontal organization PKS (Prakuthiseela Karmika Samakya) of Andhra Pradesh and attended various classes and meetings of frontal organizations of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) conducted by Pinakapani (A-2) and Varalakshmi (A-3) during 2017-2019. The appellant, influenced by the ideologies of CPI (Maoist), intentionally conspired with Chaithanya (A-5), knowingly and intentionally travelled to Kambamala Estate in Wayanad, Kerala, with the intention to physically join CPI (Maoist) organisation. He is alleged to have joined the Kabani Dalam (squad), an armed squad of People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) under the Western Ghats Special Zonal Committee (WGSZC) of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) for the purpose of committing terrorist acts and thereby waging war against the Government of India. Being a member of proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist) and for furthering the terrorist activities of the proscribed terrorist organization CPI (Maoist), he continued in the role of member of Kabani Dalam of the CPI (Maoist) organisation with the intention of committing terrorist acts and for furthering the activities and objectives of CPI (Maoist) and thereby waged war against the Government of India. The further allegation is that being a member of proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist), he concealed his knowledge about the design of waging war against the Government of India by CPI (Maoist) from the authorities and thereby he committed offences punishable under Sections 120B, 121A, 122, 123 of IPC, Sections 18, 18B, 20, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as ‘UA(P) Act’). 3.2. The appellant was arrested on 12.05.2022 and he remains in custody. His earlier application for bail was rejected by the Special Court by order dated 18.11.2022 and the same was confirmed in Appeal by this Court by order dated 11.04.2023. Though the matter was taken up before the Apex Court, we are informed that the order was not interfered with. The appellant again approached the Special Court seeking bail and his prayer was rejected holding that there is no change in circumstances. It is in the afore circumstances that the appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008. 4. Contentions of the appellant. 4.1. Sri. Kaleeswaram Raj, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant was arrested on 12.05.2022 and he has undergone incarceration for over three years. According to the learned counsel, the learned Special Court has not even framed the charges against the appellant as of date. He urges that the prosecution is proposing to examine as many as 57 witnesses as and when the trial takes place. The trial in most likelihood will go on for years together. It is urged that the prolonged pre-trial detention of the appellant would not serve any purpose whatsoever and the same would be in gross violation of the right to life and liberty of the appellant guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is urged that the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the application without adverting to the above fact merely by holding that the bail application filed earlier stood dismissed on 18.11.2022 and the said order was confirmed by this Court as well as the Apex Court. The Court has however observed that there is no change of circumstances. The learned counsel urges that the fact that more than 2 years and 6 months have elapsed after the dismissal of the earlier bail application was not reckoned by the learned Special Court. The Court has however observed that there is no change of circumstances. The learned counsel urges that the fact that more than 2 years and 6 months have elapsed after the dismissal of the earlier bail application was not reckoned by the learned Special Court. On facts, it is submitted by the learned counsel that the gist of the allegation against the appellant is that he had recruited one Chaithanya to join the proscribed terrorist organization CPI (Maoist) and imparted training with the intention of threatening the security, unity, integrity and sovereignty of the Union of India. 4.2. The learned counsel points out that there is no case for the prosecution that the appellant had committed a terrorist act in terms of Section 15 of the UA(P) Act. Even if the allegations are accepted in its entirety and taken as proved, the appellant can only be roped in for the offences under Sections 18 and 18B which provides for entering into conspiracy and for recruiting any person or persons for terrorist act, which offence, according to the learned counsel, is punishable only for a total period of 10 years. The other allegations are for offences relating to membership of a terrorist organization punishable under Section 38 and offences relating to support given to a terrorist organization punishable under Section 39 of the UA(P) Act. 4.3. The learned counsel would also urge that It is urged by relying on the Judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb , [ AIR 2021 SC 712 ] that bail cannot be denied when there is no possibility of the trial being completed within a reasonable time after such a long incarceration of the accused. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that the Apex Court had also added that the stringent statutory restrictions contained in provisions like Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 would not oust the ability of the Constitutional Courts to grant bail when the violation of rights under Part III of the Constitution of India is strikingly apparent from the record. 4.4. 4.4. In order to substantiate his contentions that prolonged incarceration would affect the rights of the appellant, the learned counsel has also relied on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Athar Parwez v. Union of India ,[2024 KHC 6719], Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India , [ 2024 KHC 6431 ] , Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India , [ 1996 2 SCC 616 ] , Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha , [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109] and of this Court in Nassar v. Union of India , [2025 KHC Online 410] . It is urged by the learned counsel that a Division Bench of this Court in Saheer E.P v. National Investigation Agency, Ernakulam , [ 2024 KHC 639 ] had occasion to hold that constitutional courts would not fall under Section 2D of the UA(P) Act and that the statutory restrictions under Section 43D(5) of the Act would not be applicable. 5. Submissions of the learned DSGI 5.1. In response, Smt. Shalina, the learned DSGI, submitted that the contention forcefully advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant cannot be sustained under law. It is submitted that the appellant had earlier filed a Criminal Appeal before this Court, challenging the order refusing bail by the Special Court. A Division Bench of this Court by judgment dated 11.04.2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 1359 of 2022, considered all the relevant aspects, the evidence submitted along with the charge, the statement of protected witnesses and the statements of approvers and had come to the conclusion that the offences alleged against the appellant prima facie exists. According to the learned counsel, after having entered a prima facie finding with regard to the existence of a case, the embargo under Section 43D(5) of the Act would come into play and, if that be the case, unless the court enters into a finding that there is no prima facie case, bail cannot be granted. It is urged that the investigation has revealed that the appellant is an active member of Kabani Dalam of People's War Group in Andhra Pradesh and that if he is released on bail, he will continue with the underground activities and commit various offences under the UA(P) Act. 5.2. It is urged that the investigation has revealed that the appellant is an active member of Kabani Dalam of People's War Group in Andhra Pradesh and that if he is released on bail, he will continue with the underground activities and commit various offences under the UA(P) Act. 5.2. The learned DSGI took us through the final report and the accompanying records and made an attempt to convince us that the allegations against the appellant are extremely grave and not a fit case where this Court should take a lenient view and grant bail to the appellant. Much reliance is placed by the learned DSGI on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Barakatullah , [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] and it is urged that while considering an application for bail, the Courts are required to look into the nature and gravity of the alleged offences, the criminal antecedents, etc. and thereafter consider whether any prejudice has been caused to the appellant. It is submitted that if the materials/ documents relied on by the respondents show that the case against the appellant is prima facie true, the embargo under Section 43D(5) would surely be attracted. Further, the learned DSGI submitted that the learned Apex Court had exhorted that, while interpreting the provisions of counter terrorism enactments, the courts are to strike a balance between the civil liberties of the accused, human rights of the victims and the compelling interest of the State. It is urged that national security is always of paramount importance and any act in aid to any terrorist act - violent or nonviolent is liable to be restricted. 5.3. Finally, it is submitted that the appellant is a notorious habitual offender involved in terrorism and other serious crimes and has involved themselves in not less than 14 cases which include 4 murder cases and 8 dacoity, robbery cases in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In the year 2004, before the Additional Superintendent of Police, Kadapa District, Andhra Pradesh and even thereafter he got himself involved in a series of cases which include murder and dacoity and he continues to be a threat to the State. 6. In response to the submissions of the learned DSGI, Sri. In the year 2004, before the Additional Superintendent of Police, Kadapa District, Andhra Pradesh and even thereafter he got himself involved in a series of cases which include murder and dacoity and he continues to be a threat to the State. 6. In response to the submissions of the learned DSGI, Sri. Kaleeswaram Raj submitted that the assertion made by the DSGI that the appellant is involved in 14 crimes involving murder as well as dacoity are not correct. He submitted that though the assertion that he was made an accused in 14 crimes is true, the fact remains that in all the murder cases, and the cases involving dacoity, he has been acquitted of all charges by the jurisdictional court. All that remains now is Crime No. 06 of 2019 of Madanapalle II Town Police Station registered under Sections 8(1) and (2) of the PUBLIC SECURITY ACT , which is pending as C.C.No. 416 of 201 in the court of II ADMM, Madanapalle and Crime No. 606 of 2020 registered inter alia under Sections 20 , 21, 38, 39 and 40 of the UA(P) Act. 7. Analysis 7.1. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by both sides and have gone through the entire records which are made available. 7.2. Before delving further, we may have to note that immediately after the arrest of the appellant on 12.05.2022, he had filed an application seeking bail before the Special Court. The said application was dismissed by the Special Court after entering into a finding that there is a prima facie case against the appellant and that he is not entitled to be enlarged on bail. The matter was taken up before this Court and a Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 11.04.2023 re-appreciated the entire facts and came to a conclusive finding that the allegations against the appellant are grave and that there are reasonable grounds for the court for believing that the accusations against the appellant are prima facie true as understood in Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P) Act. The said judgment has become final. However, the subsequent Bail Application was filed by the appellant after his pretrial incarceration had covered over three years. 7.3. We have already narrated the specific charge as against the appellant. The said judgment has become final. However, the subsequent Bail Application was filed by the appellant after his pretrial incarceration had covered over three years. 7.3. We have already narrated the specific charge as against the appellant. It appears that the specific allegation is that he became an active member of CPI (Maoist) through its frontal organization PKS of Andhra Pradesh. It is specifically alleged that he attended various classes and meetings of frontal organisations of the proscribed terrorist organisation CPI (Maoist). It is alleged that on one occasion, he had travelled to Kambamala Estate in Wayanad with the intention of physically joining CPI (Maoist) Organisation. Another allegation is that he had joined the Kabani Dalam Squad, an armed squad of People Liberation's Guerilla Army under the Western Guards Special Zonal Committee of the proscribed terrorist organization, CPI (Maoist). Further, it is specifically alleged that the appellant had joined the said group for the purpose of committing terrorist acts and thereby waging war against the Government of India. The further allegation is that he had attempted to radicalise Chaithanya for the purpose of furthering the activities and objectives of CPI (Maoist). This essentially is the allegation against the appellant and he is facing charges for having committed offences punishable under Sections 120B, 121A, 122, 123 of IPC, Sections 18, 18B, 20, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 7.4. It needs to be noticed at this juncture there is no accusation against the appellant that he has committed any terrorist Act. He is accused of conspiring as defined under Section 18 and for recruiting any person or persons for a terrorist Act. There is also an allegation that he is a member of a terrorist organisation punishable under Section 20 of the Act. There is an allegation that the appellant associated himself or professed to be associated with a terrorist organisation, which action is punishable under Section 38 of the UA(P) Act and that he has offered support as defined under Section 39 of the UA(P) Act. Sections 18, 18B and 20 falls under Chapter IV of the UA(P) Act whereas Sections 38 and 39 falls within Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act. 7.5. Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, inserted by Act 35 of 2008 w.e.f. 31-12-2008 provides for a modified application of certain offences punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Sections 18, 18B and 20 falls under Chapter IV of the UA(P) Act whereas Sections 38 and 39 falls within Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act. 7.5. Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, inserted by Act 35 of 2008 w.e.f. 31-12-2008 provides for a modified application of certain offences punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the Act. It would be apposite to refer to Sub-sections (5), (6) and (7) of Section 43-D. “43-D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.— (1) xxxxxx xxxxx xxx (2) xxxxxx xxxxx xxx (3) xxxxxx xxxxx xxx (4) xxxxxx xxxxx xxx (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. (6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing.” 7.6. A bare reading of sub-section (5) of Section 43-D shows that apart from the fact that subsection (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, “on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure”, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UA(P) Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. (See Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab , (2024) 5 SCC 403 ) . 7.7. In view of the stringent and restrictive provisions, the accused who faced accusations under the UA (P) Act remained incarcerated for long periods of time. In some cases, the investigation dragged on for years together and in other cases, due to the voluminous nature of the evidence involved, the trial got unduly delayed. It was in one such circumstance that the Apex Court in Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb (supra), clarified that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. Reliance was placed on the judgment in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India , (1994) 6 SCC 731 wherein it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail. The Apex Court went on to observe that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P) Act per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. At the commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against the grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. At the commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against the grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P) Act being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of the constitutional right to a speedy trial (emphasis supplied). 7.8. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), the Apex Court went on to add that even in cases where charges levelled against the accused are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court was well justified in granting bail. The Supreme Court opined that there is a need to strike a balance between the State’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt, and at the same time ensure that the right of the accused guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution is well protected. While granting bail to the accused, it was further observed that Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P) Act is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS Act where the competent court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such precondition under UA(P) Act. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P) Act merely provides another possible ground for the competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion, etc. 7.9. In Sk. Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P. /b>. , (2024) 8 SCC 293 the facts were that fake currency notes were seized from the accused, a resident of Nepal, and the same resulted in the registration of a case inter alia under the UA(P) Act. 7.9. In Sk. Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P. /b>. , (2024) 8 SCC 293 the facts were that fake currency notes were seized from the accused, a resident of Nepal, and the same resulted in the registration of a case inter alia under the UA(P) Act. The accused remained in custody for a period of 9 years, and it was apparent that there was no possibility of the trial concluding within a reasonable time. While granting bail to the accused, the Apex Court held as under: 4. It is trite law that an accused is entitled to a speedy trial. This Court in a catena of judgments has held that an accused or an undertrial has a fundamental right to speedy trial which is traceable to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If the alleged offence is a serious one, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. When a trial gets prolonged, it is not open to the prosecution to oppose bail of the accused-undertrial on the ground that the charges are very serious. Bail cannot be denied only on the ground that the charges are very serious though there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude. xxxxx xxxx xxxxx 42. This Court has, time and again, emphasised that right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. In any view of the matter, K.A. Najeeb [ Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb , (2021) 3 SCC 713 ] being rendered by a three-Judge Bench is binding on a Bench of two Judges like us. 7.10. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), the Apex Court reiterated that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act or Section 37 of the NDPS Act, per se, do not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India. 7.11. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, it can be seen that at the commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against the grant of bail as enumerated under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act. However, the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P) Act being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. 7.12. In Shaheen Welfare Assn. (supra), the Apex Court had occasion to take note of the plight of the under-trials who had undergone long periods of pretrial detention. The Apex Court devised a pragmatic approach to deal with the situation. The accused were categorised according to the role played by them and the seriousness of the allegations. It would be apposite to refer to the relevant paragraphs: 10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20 (8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh case [ (1994) 3 SCC 569 ], on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh case [ (1994) 3 SCC 569 ], on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21. 11. These competing claims can be reconciled by taking a pragmatic approach. 12. The proper course is to identify from the nature of the role played by each accused person the real hardcore terrorists or criminals from others who do not belong to that category; and apply the bail provisions strictly insofar as the former class is concerned and liberally in respect of the latter class. This will release the pressure on the courts in the matter of priority for trial. Once the total number of prisoners in jail shrinks, those belonging to the former class and, therefore, kept in jail can be tried on a priority basis. That would help ensure that the evidence against them does not fade away on account of delay. Delay may otherwise harm the prosecution case and the harsh bail provisions may prove counter-productive. A pragmatic approach alone can save the situation for, otherwise, one may find that many of the undertrials may be found to have completed the maximum punishment provided by law by being in jail without a trial. Even in cases where a large number of persons are tied up with the aid of Section 120-B or 147, IPC, the role of each person can certainly be evaluated for the purpose of bail and those whose role is not so serious or menacing can be more liberally considered. With inadequate number of courts, the only pragmatic way is to reduce the prison population of TADA detenus and then deal with hardcore undertrials on priority basis before the evidence fades away or is lost. Such an approach will take care of both the competing interests. This is the approach which we recommend to courts dealing with TADA cases so that the real culprits are promptly tried and punished. 13. Such an approach will take care of both the competing interests. This is the approach which we recommend to courts dealing with TADA cases so that the real culprits are promptly tried and punished. 13. For the purpose of grant of bail to TADA detenus, we divide the undertrials into three (sic four) classes, namely, (a) hardcore undertrials whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses in particular; (b) other undertrials whose overt acts or involvement directly attract Sections 3 and/or 4 of the TADA Act; (c) undertrials who are roped in, not because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and 4, but by virtue of Section 120-B or 147, IPC, and; (d) those undertrials who were found possessing incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section 5 of TADA. 14. Ordinarily, it is true that the provisions of Sections 20 (8) and 20(9) of TADA would apply to all the aforesaid classes. But while adopting a pragmatic and just approach, no one can dispute the fact that all of them cannot be dealt with by the same yardstick. Different approaches would be justified on the basis of the gravity of the charges. Adopting this approach we are of the opinion that undertrials falling within group (a) cannot receive liberal treatment. Cases of undertrials falling in group (b) would have to be differently dealt with, in that, if they have been in prison for five years or more and their trial is not likely to be completed within the next six months, they can be released on bail unless the court comes to the conclusion that their antecedents are such that releasing them may be harmful to the lives of the complainant, the family members of the complainant, or witnesses. Cases of undertrials falling in groups (c) and (d) can be dealt with leniently and they can be released if they have been in jail for three years and two years respectively. 7.13. The Apex Court classified the accused into four clauses. Cases of undertrials falling in groups (c) and (d) can be dealt with leniently and they can be released if they have been in jail for three years and two years respectively. 7.13. The Apex Court classified the accused into four clauses. They are (a) hardcore undertrials whose release would prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses in particular; (b) other undertrials whose overt acts or involvement directly attract Sections 3 and/or 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘TADA’); (c) undertrials who are roped in, not because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and 4, but by virtue of Section 120-B or 147, IPC, and; (d) those undertrials who were found possessing incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section 5 of TADA. Section 3 of the TADA provides for punishment for terrorist acts which is in pari materia Section 15 of the UA(P) Act. Section 4 of the TADA provides for disruptive activities. Applying the principles in Shaheen Welfare (supra), the appellant would only fall in category (c) and (d). Of course, in the counter affidavit, the criminal antecedents of the appellant has been highlighted by stating that he is involved in 14 cases which include 4 murder and 8 dacoity/robbery cases in Andhra Pradesh. However, the respondents do not dispute that the appellant has been acquitted of all charges in 12 of such cases and only 2 cases now remain. This factum of acquittal is specifically highlighted by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and it is urged that it is usual practice for the law enforcement authorities to rope the appellant in cases only to be finally acquitted by the Trial Court of all charges. Both sides agree that only two cases are pending against the appellant which are Crime No. 6 of 2019 of the Madanapalli II Town Police Station and Crime No.606/2020 of the Piduguralla Police Station. 7.14. In order to ascertain whether the trial in the instant case could be expedited, we had called for a report from the Special Court. Both sides agree that only two cases are pending against the appellant which are Crime No. 6 of 2019 of the Madanapalli II Town Police Station and Crime No.606/2020 of the Piduguralla Police Station. 7.14. In order to ascertain whether the trial in the instant case could be expedited, we had called for a report from the Special Court. In the said report, it is stated that one final report and two supplementary reports have been filed against A2, A6, A7, A9 and A10 (re-ranked status) and investigation against the remaining accused is still pending as they have been absconding. It is stated that the case is being posted for hearing on charge since 26.03.2024. Three different Sessions Cases have been separately taken on file on the basis of three different final reports and all the cases have been posted on different dates. An application to club all the charges have been filed and no orders have been passed on that application. It is stated that as many as 15 other cases are pending trial and in some of the cases, directions have been issued by this Court for early disposal. The learned Sessions Judge has expressed optimism that trial of the said cases can be completed by the month of January, 2026 and if specific directions are issued, despite the pendency of older cases, the instant case can be taken up and disposed of within 9 months. From the report of the learned Sessions Judge , it is apparent that the likelihood of the case being taken up and disposed of in the near future is remote. 7.15. It would be apposite at this juncture to refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2023) 18 SCC 166 wherein the Apex Court was confronted with the prolonged incarceration of a person accused of committing offence under the NDPS Act. The Hon’ble Court referred to the observations of a learned Single Judge of this Court (Chettur Sankaran Nair. J.) in A Convict Prisoner v. State , [1993 Cri LJ 3242] and observed as under: 22. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable. J.) in A Convict Prisoner v. State , [1993 Cri LJ 3242] and observed as under: 22. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded and their living conditions, more often than not, appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31 December 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials. 23. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State 1993 Cri LJ 3242 as“a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 7.16. The Apex Court has, time and again, emphasised that right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A Constitutional Court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused - undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, however stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a Constitutional Court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our Constitutional jurisprudence. In the given facts of a particular case, a Constitutional Court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our Constitutional jurisprudence. In view of the above observation, the mere fact that during the initial stages, the Trial Court as well as this Court had come to the prima facie conclusion that there are reasonable grounds believing that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true, will not stand in the way of this Court granting bail particularly when the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is infringed owing to the long period of incarceration and the remote possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future. 8. Conclusion In view of the discussion above, the impugned order passed by the learned Special Court refusing bail to the appellant is set aside. Crl.A.No. 932 of 2025 is allowed. The appellant shall be released on bail on executing a bond for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh only) with two solvent sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the learned Special Court. It shall be open to the Special Court to impose such additional conditions as it may deem fit and necessary in the interest of justice. However, the conditions shall mandatorily include the following: a) The appellant shall remain in the State of Kerala till the trial is over. b) The appellant shall furnish to the Investigating Officer of the NIA, his place of residence in the State. c) The appellant shall report before the investigating officer, NIA, on every Saturday between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. till the end of trial. However, it would be open for the appellant to seek modification before the Trial Court and if any such application is filed the same shall be considered on its merits and appropriate orders shall be passed. d) The appellant shall use only one mobile number during the period of bail and shall communicate the said number to the Investigating Officer of the NIA. He shall remain accessible on the said number throughout the duration of bail and shall not, under any circumstances, switch off or discard the device associated with it without prior intimation. d) The appellant shall use only one mobile number during the period of bail and shall communicate the said number to the Investigating Officer of the NIA. He shall remain accessible on the said number throughout the duration of bail and shall not, under any circumstances, switch off or discard the device associated with it without prior intimation. e) The appellant shall not tamper with evidence or attempt to influence or threaten any witnesses in any manner. f) The appellant shall not engage in or associate with any activity that is similar to the offence alleged against him or commit any offence while on bail. In the event of any breach of the aforesaid conditions or of any other condition that may be imposed by the Special Court in addition to the above, it shall be open to the prosecution to move for cancellation of the bail granted to the appellant before the Special Court, notwithstanding the fact that the bail was granted by this Court. Upon such application being made, the Special Court shall consider the same on its own merits and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.