ORDER : VINOD KUMAR BHARWANI, J. 1. By way of filing instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has assailed the order dt.12.10.2019 passed by the respondent No.3/Superintendent of Police, Bhiwadi [For short 'the Disciplinary Authority'] whereby he was dismissed from service after exercising the powers under Rule 19 (ii) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short 'the Rules of 1958). 2. The petitioner has also assailed the order dt.16.06.2022 passed by the respondent No.2/Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur (for short 'the Appellate Authority), whereby the appeal of the petitioner filed against the aforesaid punishment order dt.12.10.2019 was dismissed and the penalty imposed upon him of dismissal from service was upheld. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was appointed as Constable (GD) in the Rajasthan Police on 30.04.2012. In May, 2019 the petitioner was served by a letter for submitting his explanation with regard to his communications with Sonu Gurjar (Criminal). The petitioner submitted his explanation and later-on, Inquiry Officer has submitted a negative preliminary Inquiry Report. Thereafter, relying upon the preliminary Inquiry Report, the impugned order dt.12.10.2019 dismissing the petitioner from the service invoking Rule 19 (ii) of the Rules of 1958 was passed. The petitioner has also preferred an appeal which was dismissed vide order dt. 16.06.2022 without adhering to the basic provisions of the Constitution of India and the Rules of 1958. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that no opportunity of hearing was accorded to the petitioner before his dismissal from service after exercising the powers under Rules 19 (ii) of the Rules of 1958, which is ex-facie, arbitrary, illegal and is a sheer case of misuse of the powers. Counsel further contended that neither any notice to show cause nor any notice of hearing was served upon the petitioner nor any inquiry was conducted into the allegations levelled against him. Counsel also contended that the exception to the said power has been carved out in Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India whereby the authority concerned has been empowered to act without an inquiry, if he has reasons therefor which he should record in writing that the inquiry is not reasonably practicably. 5. Counsel also contended that the exception to the said power has been carved out in Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India whereby the authority concerned has been empowered to act without an inquiry, if he has reasons therefor which he should record in writing that the inquiry is not reasonably practicably. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that such reasons have nowhere been recorded in the impugned orders, either by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority. Counsel further submitted that the Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 is having the same purport as that of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. Counsel also submitted that the Appellate Authority has taken into consideration the allegations regarding the phone calls and the petitioner being in touch with the persons accused of the offence of kidnapping and murdering. Counsel submitted that such allegations, if are to be rebutted, then the petitioner should have been afforded proper and adequate opportunity by holding proper inquiry as envisaged under the Rules of 1958. Counsel further contended that the opportunity of hearing and a proper inquiry has been seriously jeopardized by the invocation of Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the basic principle is that a civil servant shall not be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without proper inquiry & information of the charges as well as without giving him proper & reasonable opportunity to take his defence in respect of those charges. 7. In support of his submissions, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel , AIR 1985 SC 1416 , (ii) Banwari La l Vs. State of Rajasthan , 2014 (4) WLC Raj.337, (iii) Risal Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Others, 2014 3 SCC 244, (iv) Lakha Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan & another, SB CWP NO.12858/2015 decided on 20.02.2018, (v) Samundar Singh Rajpurohit Vs. State of Rajasthan & another, SB CWP No.13028/2011 decided on 23.09.2013, (vi) Sudesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana & Others, 2005 11 SCC 525 , (vii) Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Others, 1991 1 SCC 362 , (viii) Reena Ran i Vs. State of Haryana & Others, 2012 10 SCC 215 and (ix) Tarsem Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & another, SB CWP No.13028/2011 decided on 23.09.2013, (vi) Sudesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana & Others, 2005 11 SCC 525 , (vii) Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Others, 1991 1 SCC 362 , (viii) Reena Ran i Vs. State of Haryana & Others, 2012 10 SCC 215 and (ix) Tarsem Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Others, 2006 13 SCC 581 respectively. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, while vehemently opposing the above-said submissions, has submitted that the petitioner was in contact with the criminal element i.e. Sonu Gurjar and the same has been established from the CDR of call details of Sonu Gurjar, therefore the misconduct of the petitioner is a forgone conclusion. The respondents are a disciplined force, and therefore, any act of indiscipline on the part of the Police Personnel needs to be taken seriously and dealt with strictly. Thus, the respondents were within their domain to have done away with the inquiry under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. 9. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. Perused the impugned orders, the judgments cited herein-above & the material made available on record. 10. The disciplinary authority in its order dt.12.10.2019 has observed as under:- 11. The ld. appellate authority has also passed an order dt.16.06.2022 whereby the appeal of the petitioner against the aforesaid order dt.12.10.2019 was dismissed while observing as under:- 12. From perusal of the aforesaid orders, it is clear that no sufficient and convening reason has been recorded by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority for not adopting the procedure given under Rules 16, 17 & 18 of the Rules of 1958. 13. In the case of Lakha Ram (supra), similar to the present case, the petitioner was accused of having contact with criminal elements. On that basis, the petitioner was dismissed from service under Rule 19(ii) without conducting any inquiry and without recording in writing the reasons for dispensing with the procedure prescribed under Rules 16, 17 & 18. The Court held such dismissal to be in violation of law and consequently set aside the dismissal orders. Relevant portion of aforesaid judgment reads as follows :- "41. The Court held such dismissal to be in violation of law and consequently set aside the dismissal orders. Relevant portion of aforesaid judgment reads as follows :- "41. After hearing learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case, alongwith the precedent laws cited at the Bar, this Court finds that in the impugned order dated 13.12.2011 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, and which has been reproduced herein above, the learned authority has not said a single word as to why the inquiry is not reasonably practicable. Furthermore, the finding of the Appellate Authority recorded in its order dated 14.05.2015, which has also been reproduced herein-above, does not speak a word about the satisfaction as to how the inquiry was not reasonably practicable. 42. The only place where the discussion can be seen is in order dated 14.05.2015, wherein there is reproduction of the comments made by the Disciplinary Authority and comment (IV),which is to the effect that the petitioner’s conduct is so bad that the respondents are entitled to invoke Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. 43. This Court further finds that the proposition is not whether what was the conduct and how far the petitioner was involved in those activities which have been attributed to him. But certainly, the constitutional mandate of Article 311(2)(b) required the respondents to record their satisfaction in writing as to why holding of inquiry was not reasonably practicable. This Court also finds that the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel (supra), which has been reproduced in the aforequoted portion of the judgment in Risal Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (supra) , clearly lays down that the condition precedent for invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India is the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 44. The detailed meaning of the words “reasonably impracticable” has been dealt with by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and it has been held that whether it is practicable to hold the inquiry or not was to be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. 45. .............................................. 46. The detailed meaning of the words “reasonably impracticable” has been dealt with by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and it has been held that whether it is practicable to hold the inquiry or not was to be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. 45. .............................................. 46. It cannot be disputed that the police force is a disciplined force and the respondents ought to be firm in imposing discipline amongst its personnel, but simultaneously the constitutional and statutory rigors provide for certain safeguards for all the civil servants / government servants, and in normal course, the Disciplinary Authority is not expected to dispense with the inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or merely in order to avoid holding of an inquiry. 47 . This Court has also carefully gone through the record and both the impugned orders, and finds that nowhere the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority has recorded its satisfaction in writing so as to invoke powers under Rule 19 (ii) of the Rules of 1958 and thus, the impugned orders suffer from basic infirmity of violating Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India as well as Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958." 14. The aforesaid order passed in the case of Lakha Ram (supra) was challenged by the respondent/department before the Division Bench of this Court by filing a D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.908/2018 but the same was dismissed in limine vide order dt.01.08.2018 and therefore, the aforesaid order attained finality. 15. Further, in the case of Arjun Singh (supra) while invoking the powers given under sub-rule (ii) of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 the services of the petitioner was dismissed without assigning any reason as to why it was not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the Rules of 1958. The Court held such dismissal against the provisions of law and consequently while setting aside the dismissal orders directed the respondent department to reinstate the petitioner in service. Relevant portion of aforesaid judgment reads as under:- "15. The Disciplinary Authority has merely observed that it is undesirable to continue the petitioner in service and therefore invoking the powers given under sub-rule (ii) of the Rules of 1958 dismissed the petitioner from service. Relevant portion of aforesaid judgment reads as under:- "15. The Disciplinary Authority has merely observed that it is undesirable to continue the petitioner in service and therefore invoking the powers given under sub-rule (ii) of the Rules of 1958 dismissed the petitioner from service. The Disciplinary Authority has not disclosed any reason in the impugned order that why it is not “reasonably practicable” to follow the procedure prescribed in the Rules of 1958. The dismissal from service of an employee is not only adverse to the petitioner but it has also a serious adverse impact on the petitioner and his family member’s livelihood. The Disciplinary Authority was under an obligation to disclose those reasons for which the procedure given under the Rules of 1958 is not reasonably practicable to follow. While invoking the powers under rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958, the Disciplinary Authority must have such a material before him which could not be countered and the allegations must be of such a nature that it became undesirable to continue an employee in service . From the facts narrated above it is very much clear that the FIR No.0626/2019 registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur has been quashed by the High court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.343/2021 vide order dated 18.02.2021. The result of quashing of the FIR is that as if no any such criminal case was ever registered against the petitioner. 16. ......................................... 17. The Disciplinary Authority has not given any specific reasons for invoking the powers given under Rule19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and has also not given any reason how it has become reasonably practicable to follow the procedure given under rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules of 1958. It is the basic principle of service jurisprudence that whenever any adverse order is passed, the concerned delinquent officer should have been allowed the proper and reasonable opportunity to show-cause and hearing. Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India also gives safeguards to the government servants from any kind of adverse order without opportunity of hearing. It is the basic principle of service jurisprudence that whenever any adverse order is passed, the concerned delinquent officer should have been allowed the proper and reasonable opportunity to show-cause and hearing. Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India also gives safeguards to the government servants from any kind of adverse order without opportunity of hearing. The facts of the case and more particularly the facts that an FIR No.0626/2019 registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur and the FIR No. 0177/2019 registered at Police Station Uchhain, District Bharatpur, which were the sole basis for passing the impugned order against the petitioner, no more subsists in view of the fact that the FIR No. 0626/2019 has been quashed by the High Court and in FIR No.0117/2019, the Investigating Agency after thorough has submitted the Negative Final Report. There was no any such material with the respondents to invoke the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and also to dismiss the petitioner from service without following the due procedure given under the Rules and without affording any opportunity of show-cause and hearing to him. The Disciplinary Authority has also not given any specific reasoning to uphold the findings given by the Disciplinary Authority. No sufficient reasons have been prescribed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority for dispensing with the inquiry procedure given under Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules of 1958 and to invoke the powers given under Rule 19(ii) of the said rules." 15. In the aforesaid judgment i.e. Arjun Singh (supra) , the disciplinary authority & appellate authority have not given any reason for not adopting the procedure given under Rules 16, 17 & 18 of the Rules of 1958. Further, the Court has given a finding at Para 25 with regard to the Rule 19 (ii) of the Rules of 1958 in the matter. The Para 25 reads as under :- "25. There are certain cases registered against the government employees in view of the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act on they being caught red handed taking the bribe. The Para 25 reads as under :- "25. There are certain cases registered against the government employees in view of the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act on they being caught red handed taking the bribe. In the matters registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the department awaits the results of the investigation followed by the conclusion of the judicial proceedings before the trial court, though the concerned employee was caught red handed taking bribe which might be a serious offence involving the moral turpitude. In such cases the respondents never invokes the powers given under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. But surprisingly the respondents have invoked the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 in the present case where the allegations are not of such a nature but are merely in regard to some transactions and that too not related to the official duty. The allegations in the FIR lodged against the petitioner warranted a detailed investigation before taking any action against the petitioner but the respondents have failed in doing so and have dismissed the petitioner from service without there being any inquiry. Such action of the respondents is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified and more particularly in view of the fact that FIR No.0626/2019 has been quashed by the High Court and the Investigating Agency has submitted Negative Final Report in connection with the allegations in FIR No.0117/2019." 16. This Court further finds that the proposition is not whether what was the conduct and how far the petitioner was involved in those activities which have been attributed to him. But certainly, the constitutional mandate of Article 311(2)(b) required the respondents to record their satisfaction in writing as to why holding of inquiry was not reasonably practicable. This Court also finds that the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel and in Risal Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., clearly lays down that the condition precedent for invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India is the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 17. The Disciplinary Authority, in its impugned order dated 12.10.2019, has not recorded any reason or satisfaction as to why the holding of an inquiry was not reasonably practicable. Likewise, the ld. 17. The Disciplinary Authority, in its impugned order dated 12.10.2019, has not recorded any reason or satisfaction as to why the holding of an inquiry was not reasonably practicable. Likewise, the ld. Appellate Authority, in its order dated 16.06.2022, has also failed to indicate any finding or reasoning demonstrating that the conduct of the inquiry was not reasonably practicable. 18. It is a settled proposition that the Police force, being a disciplined service, requires maintenance of strict discipline, and the respondents are well within their rights to ensure the same. However, the Constitutional and statutory scheme envisages certain safeguards in favour of civil servants, and therefore, the Disciplinary Authority cannot dispense with the conduct of a departmental inquiry in a casual or arbitrary manner, nor can such inquiry be waived merely to circumvent the procedural mandate of law. 19. Upon a careful examination of the record as well as the impugned orders, this Court finds that neither the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority has recorded its satisfaction in writing so as to warrant the invocation of powers under Rule 19(ii) the Rules of 1958. Accordingly, the impugned orders are vitiated by a fundamental infirmity, being in contravention of the mandate contained in Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. 20. Looking to the overall facts & circumstances of the case, upon consideration of the submissions advanced at bar, and having regard to the judicial pronouncements relied upon, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be allowed. 21. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 22. The impugned order dt.12.10.2019 passed by the disciplinary authority & also the impugned order dt.16.06.2022 passed by the Appellate Authority, are hereby quashed & set aside with all consequential benefits as if the impugned orders have not been passed against the petitioner as he is in service. 23. The respondents are directed to allow the petitioner to join the duty without any delay. 24. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.