Engineer-In-Chief (R&B), CRN And Managing Director, Aprdc v. S. D. B. Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
2025-12-08
GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. 1. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arises out of an order dated 19.11.2012 passed by the Learned IX Additional Chief Judge (F.T.C),City Civil Court at Hyderabad (‘Trial Court’) dismissing the Arb.O.P.No.1559 of 2009 filed by the appellant/petitioner under section 34 (2) (iii) and (iv) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’) for setting aside an Award dated 31.03.2009 to the extent of Claim Nos.4 and 16 under Dispute No.2 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. 2. The appellant/Engineer-in-Chief (Roads & Buildings), Government of Andhra Pradesh was the claimant in Dispute No.1 in the arbitration proceedings. The respondent No.1/Contractor was the claimant in Dispute No.2. The claims arose out of an Agreement No.E-in-C (R&B) Administrative and EAPs/113/99 dated 01.03.2000 which was executed by the parties for widening and strengthening of Thokapally – Nandyal Road for a sum of Rs.109,87,51,789/- (‘Works’). The Agreement stipulated that the work was to be completed within 44 months. 3. By the impugned order, the Trial Court upheld the Award dated 31.03.2009 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and dismissed the O.P. filed by the appellant while directing the appellant to pay Rs.33,000/-towards costs to the respondent No.1. 4. The appellant has challenged the impugned order on the ground that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the Arbitral Tribunal decided on issues which were beyond the scope of submission of the parties. The appellant contends that the Arbitral Tribunal gave a decision contrary to the terms of the Agreement dated 01.03.2000. 5. The events which are relevant to the present dispute are stated below: (i) The appellant and the respondent No.1 executed an Agreement on 01.03.2000 for a contract price of Rs.109,87,51,789/- pursuant to the respondent being declared as the lowest bidder in a bid floated by the appellant for the execution of Road Works. (ii) The scheduled date for completion of the Works was 31.08.2002. The respondent No.1 completed the Works within the extended period granted by the appellant i.e., on 03.11.2003. (iii) The respondent No.1 submitted a Statement at Completion on 28.02.2004 to the Engineer appointed by the appellant viz. M/s. Louis Berger International (LBI) (‘First Engineer’) whereby additional claims amounting to Rs.30,54,97,630/- were made by the respondent No.1. (iv) On 16.06.2004, the First Engineer was replaced by another Engineer i.e., Executive Engineer (R&B) (‘Second Engineer’).
(iii) The respondent No.1 submitted a Statement at Completion on 28.02.2004 to the Engineer appointed by the appellant viz. M/s. Louis Berger International (LBI) (‘First Engineer’) whereby additional claims amounting to Rs.30,54,97,630/- were made by the respondent No.1. (iv) On 16.06.2004, the First Engineer was replaced by another Engineer i.e., Executive Engineer (R&B) (‘Second Engineer’). (v) The Claims Specialist appointed by the appellant submitted a Report i.e., Interim Payment Certificate No.42 on 10.09.2004 recommending the payment of Rs.12,48,31,909.34 ps. to the respondent No.1 in consultation with the appellant and the respondent No.1 as per Clause 53.5 of the Agreement. The appellant rejected the determination of this amount. (vi) On 08.12.2004, the appellant informed the Second Engineer that the Employer can take a decision only if the Engineer certifies the amounts considered due by the Contractor in the Statement at Completion as per Clause 60.2 of the Agreement as the First Engineer had not certified the same during their incumbency as the Engineer. (vii) On 20.04.2005, the Second Engineer certified the amount found due to the respondent No.1 to be Rs.13,76,31,668/- through the Interim Payment Certificate No.45 (‘IPC’). The appellant disputed the IPC and referred the matter to the Dispute Review Board (‘DRB’) on 29.06.2005 (‘Dispute No.1’). The respondent also referred the matter in respect of the uncertified amount of Rs.13,22,62,685/- in the Statement at Completion to the DRB on 18.10.2005 (‘Dispute No.2’). (viii) On 25.10.2005, the DRB unanimously upheld the certification given by the Engineer in respect of Dispute No.1. (ix) On 07.11.2005, the appellant invoked the Arbitration Clause No.67.3 of the Agreement. (x) On 04.01.2006, the respondent No.1 referred Dispute No.2 to arbitration and nominated its Arbitrator as per Clause 67.3 of the Agreement. (xi) On 01.02.2006, the appellant appointed its Arbitrator in respect of Dispute No.1 under Clause 67.3 of the Agreement. The appellant also confirmed the appointment of the same Arbitrator for Dispute No.2. (xii) On 11.03.2006, the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted for adjudication of Dispute Nos.1 and 2. The Arbitral Tribunal passed the Award on 31.03.2009 awarding Rs.13,76,31,668/- with interest @ 11% per annum to the respondent No.1 in respect of the Dispute No.1. (xiii) The Arbitral Tribunal also awarded Rs.31,99,693/- along with interest @ 11% per annum, inclusive of costs, to the respondent No.1 in respect of Claim No.4 and Claim No.16 of Dispute No.2.
The Arbitral Tribunal passed the Award on 31.03.2009 awarding Rs.13,76,31,668/- with interest @ 11% per annum to the respondent No.1 in respect of the Dispute No.1. (xiii) The Arbitral Tribunal also awarded Rs.31,99,693/- along with interest @ 11% per annum, inclusive of costs, to the respondent No.1 in respect of Claim No.4 and Claim No.16 of Dispute No.2. (xiv) On 19.11.2012, the appellant’s petition for setting aside the Award was dismissed by the Trial Court. (xv) On 10.04.2013, the appellant filed an Appeal against the judgment of the Trial Court before this Court, which stayed the Award subject to payment of one-third of the awarded amount. (xvi) On 03.02.2014, payment of Rs.10.18 Crores was received from the appellant. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant (petitioner before the Trial Court) submits that the Award is contrary to section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the 1996 Act i.e., the Award deals with a dispute not contemplated by and falling outside the terms of the submission to arbitration and contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration. In furtherance thereof, counsel submits that the appellant’s prayer in the Statement of Claims before the Arbitral Tribunal was to invalidate the action of the Engineer in issuing a Certificate under Clause 53.5 of the General Conditions of Contract. The Arbitral however exceeded its authority by awarding Rs.13,76,31,668/- to the respondent No.1 without any corresponding claim from either party including the respondent No.1. According to counsel, since the respondent No.1 did not neither made any reference to the Arbitral Tribunal for determining the liability of the appellant with respect to the aforesaid amount nor made any claim seeking payment of such amount, the Arbitral Tribunal could not have awarded the said amount to the respondent No.1 when the issue before the Arbitral Tribunal was regarding the validity of the premature issuance of the IPC by the Engineer without following the procedure contemplated under Clause 53 of the GCC. Counsel submits that the Award is hence arbitrary, perverse, capricious and without application of mind to the issues raised by the appellant. 7. It is also submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal violated Clause 53.4 of the GCC which requires the Tribunal assessing any claim made by the Contractor without following the procedure as laid down in Clause 53 of the GCC, to verify the same from contemporary records whether or not such records were brought to the Engineer’s notice. 8.
7. It is also submitted that the Arbitral Tribunal violated Clause 53.4 of the GCC which requires the Tribunal assessing any claim made by the Contractor without following the procedure as laid down in Clause 53 of the GCC, to verify the same from contemporary records whether or not such records were brought to the Engineer’s notice. 8. Counsel further submits that the Arbitral Tribunal could not have awarded interest since there was no claim seeking interest in Dispute No.1 where the appellant was the claimant. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 submits that the present Appeal is not maintainable since it is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court on the scope of interference under section 37 of the 1996 Act. Counsel submits that the grounds raised by the appellant for challenging the impugned order are beyond the scope of an Appeal under section 37 of the 1996 Act and that none of the grounds raised herein point to any lacunae or errors in the reasoning given by the Trial Court for dismissing the section 34 petition filed by the appellant. Counsel further submits that the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to interpret the clauses of the Arbitration Agreement and the appellate Court can only interfere with the findings of the section 34 Court on the ground of patent illegality and jurisdictional error. 10. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, the respondent No.1 as well as the material placed before us. 11. The dispute between the parties arises out of a Contract for widening and strengthening of a road which was executed on 01.03.2000 for a sum of Rs.109,87,51,789/- . The Contract was based on the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) Conditions. Clause 2 of the Conditions provides for the appointment of an Engineer for administering the Agreement. The completion date for the Project was scheduled to be on 31.08.2002. The respondent No.1/Contractor completed the work on 03.11.2003 within the extended period of time granted by the appellant. The respondent No.1 completed the work during the tenure of the First Engineer (LBI). Admittedly, in the present case, two Engineers administered the Contract and certified the payments. The First Engineer (LBI) was appointed at the beginning of the Contract i.e., from 01.03.2000 till 15.06.2004. The Second Engineer was appointed on 16.06.2004. The Contract dated 01.03.2000 contained an Arbitration Clause No.67.3.
Admittedly, in the present case, two Engineers administered the Contract and certified the payments. The First Engineer (LBI) was appointed at the beginning of the Contract i.e., from 01.03.2000 till 15.06.2004. The Second Engineer was appointed on 16.06.2004. The Contract dated 01.03.2000 contained an Arbitration Clause No.67.3. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the parties submit that there are two disputes between the parties viz. Dispute No.1 and Dispute No.2. Both the disputes relate to the certification of the Statement at Completion of the Works dated 28.02.2004 submitted by the respondent No.1/Contractor under Clause 60.10 as certified by the two Engineers. The respondent No.1 submitted its Statement at Completion of the Works to the First Engineer (LBI). The Statement at Completion was for an amount of Rs.30,54,97,630.00 ps. The First Engineer was replaced by the Second Engineer on 16.06.2004. On 10.09.2004, the First Engineer (LBI) certified a net payment of Rs.12,48,31,909.34 ps. along with a note that price escalation and accrued interest is also payable to the respondent No.1/Contractor. However, while certifying the said payment, the First Engineer/LBI rejected certain claims of the respondent No.1 and left the issue of payment of certain amounts to be determined at the time of preparation of the Final Bill which was to be certified after the expiration of the defect liability period. The appellant thereafter refused to consider the payment due to the respondent No.1 as provided in the recommendations of the First Engineer as the First Engineer had already been replaced by the Second Engineer when the recommendations had been made. Consequently, the appellant directed the Second Engineer to re-examine and certify the Statement at Completion of the Works submitted by the respondent No.1/Contractor. 13. On 20.04.2005, the second Engineer certified the Statement at Completion submitted by the respondent No.1 and recommended the payment of Rs.13,76,31,668/- including the additional amount incurred on account of price escalation and accrued interest. The Second Engineer in its recommendations also did not certify the amounts which were either not certified or left for determination by the First Engineer (LBI) and reserved them for determination at the time of preparation of the Final Bill. 14.
The Second Engineer in its recommendations also did not certify the amounts which were either not certified or left for determination by the First Engineer (LBI) and reserved them for determination at the time of preparation of the Final Bill. 14. The appellant failed to comply with the recommendations of the Second Engineer and consequently, invoked the Dispute Resolution Clause in the Agreement and referred the dispute in relation to certification of the Statement at Completion submitted by the respondent No.1 by the Second Engineer to the DRB which was termed as ‘Dispute No.1’. 15. Hence, to clarify, Dispute No.1 was in relation to the validity of the certification of the Statement at Completion submitted by the respondent No.1 under sub-Clause 60.10 of the Agreement. Dispute No.2 related to the adjudication of the claims of the respondent No.1 which were contained in the Statement at Completion but were not certified by the Engineer. Dispute No.2 was referred by the parties to the Dispute Review Board (‘DRB’) under clause 67.3 of the Agreement. 16. Clause 67.3(i) of the Agreement provides that a dispute with an Indian Contractor (the respondent No.1 in the present case) shall finally be settled by arbitration in accordance with The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and that the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three Arbitrators. As per Clause 67.3(vi), arbitration was to be held at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India. Clause 67.1 contemplates the scope of a dispute under the Contract to mean ‘any dispute’ between the Employer (the appellant’) and the Contractor (the respondent No.1) in connection with or arising out of the Contract or the execution of the Works whether during the execution or after the completion of the Works or whether before or after the repudiation or other termination of the Contract. 17. Clause 67.1 also provides that a dispute would include any disagreement by either of the parties with respect to any action/ inaction/instruction/determination/opinion/certificate or valuation of the Engineer.
17. Clause 67.1 also provides that a dispute would include any disagreement by either of the parties with respect to any action/ inaction/instruction/determination/opinion/certificate or valuation of the Engineer. Clause 67.1 further stipulates that the dispute shall first be referred to the Dispute Review Board (‘DRB’) and if either the Employer or the Contractor is dissatisfied with any Recommendation of the DRB or if the DRB fails to issue its Recommendations within 56 days after the receipt of the written request for Recommendation by the Chairman of the DRB then either the Employer or the Contractor may within 14 days after the expiry of the said 56 day period, give Notice to the other party of its intention to commence Arbitration with a copy to the Engineer for information. 18. The Notice shall further establish the entitlement of the party giving Notice, for commencement of arbitration as to the dispute and subject to Clause 67.4 of the Agreement, no arbitration in respect thereof may be commenced until such Notice is given. Clause 67.1 stipulates that if the DRB issues a Recommendation to the Employer and the Contractor within the 56-day limit and no notice of intention for commencement of arbitration as to the said dispute is given, either by the Employer or the Contractor within 14 days from the receipt of the Recommendation from the DRB, the Recommendation shall become final and binding upon the Employer and the Contractor. 19. In the facts of this case, both the Disputes were referred to the DRB under Clause 67.1 of the Agreement. The DRB issued its recommendation with regard to Dispute No.1 on 25.10.2005 by upholding the validity of the certification given by the Second Engineer in relation to the Statement at Completion. The DRB however failed to give its recommendations in relation to the Dispute No.2 referred to it by the respondent No.1 within 56 days, as stipulated under Clause 67.1 of the Agreement. 20. The appellant, being aggrieved by the Recommendations of the DRB with respect to the Dispute No.1, invoked the Arbitration Clause No.67.3 of the Agreement. The respondent No.1 also invoked the Arbitration Clause with regard to the Dispute No.2 since the DRB failed to give its recommendations with respect to the said dispute within the56-day limit. 21.
20. The appellant, being aggrieved by the Recommendations of the DRB with respect to the Dispute No.1, invoked the Arbitration Clause No.67.3 of the Agreement. The respondent No.1 also invoked the Arbitration Clause with regard to the Dispute No.2 since the DRB failed to give its recommendations with respect to the said dispute within the56-day limit. 21. Therefore in essence; Dispute No.1 was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal by the appellant aggrieved by the validation of the certification of the Statement at Completion of Rs.13,76,31,668.00ps. by the Second Engineer. The appellant’s contentions are as follows: (i) The First Engineer’s tenure had expired and hence the certification given by it was null and void. (ii) The Second Engineer’s certification was also void as the certification was given under Clause 53 of the Agreement and was unsubstantiated. Dispute No.2 was referred to arbitration by the respondent No.1/Contractor for adjudication of its Claims of Rs.13,68,63,396/- made in the Statement at Completion which had been kept pending till creation of the Final Bill. 22. By the Arbitral Award dated 31.03.2009, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded Rs.31,99,693/- against the respondent No.1’s claimed amount of Rs.13,68,63,396/- including costs towards payment of arbitrator’s fees paid by the respondent No.1 towards the unpaid share of the appellant. 23. During the course of the submissions before this Court, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant does not intend to pursue the Appeal under section 34 of the 1996 Act with regard to Dispute No.2. Hence, the appellant’s case is restricted to Dispute No.1 in the present Appeal. 24. The Supreme Court has reiterated in several decisions that under section 34 of the 1996 Act, Court shall not interfere with the Award and the reasons given therein unless the reasons are implausible to such an extent that no reasonable man would arrive at such conclusions. The decisions reinforce that the Court will only interfere where the Arbitral Tribunal has committed a manifest error in interpreting the contractual provisions, such that the interpretation also violates the public policy embargo under explanation 1 to section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act. It is settled that interpretation of the terms of the contract/arbitration agreement is completely within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal, and the Court will adopt a hands-off approach if the interpretation given is a plausible view and aligns with the intention of the parties.
It is settled that interpretation of the terms of the contract/arbitration agreement is completely within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal, and the Court will adopt a hands-off approach if the interpretation given is a plausible view and aligns with the intention of the parties. It is equally well settled that in section 34 proceedings, the Court does not sit in Appeal over the Arbitral Award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under section 34(2)(b)(ii), i.e., if the Award is against the ‘public policy of India’. Even then, the interference would not entail a review on the merits of the dispute but would be restricted to the findings of the Arbitrator where the Court finds them to be arbitrary, capricious or perverse or where the conscience of the Court is shocked or the illegality goes to the root of the matter: MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd , (2019) 4 SCC 163 and M/s. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. M/s. NHAI , (2024) 2 SCC 613 . The limited scope of interference by the Court in an application under section 34 and the concomitant embargo on such Court from re-appreciating evidence was emphasized in PSA Sical Terminals Private Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar, Port Trust Tuticorin, (2023) 15 SCC 781 25. Public Policy under Explanation 1 to section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act has been held to be the ‘fundamental policy of Indian law’ includingviolation of Indian statutes linked to public policy or public interest and disregarding orders of superior Courts in India: Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Ltd., v. NHAI , (2019) 15 SCC 131 , and Somdatt Builders-NCC-NEC (JV) v. National Highways Authority of India, (2025) 6 SCC 757 . 26. It hence follows that the scope of interference in an Appeal under section 37 of the 1996 Act would be even more curtailed since the Appellate Court would only test whether the order passed by the Trial Court under section 34 falls within the limited statutory corners of section 34 of the Act. The Appellate Court cannot treat the Appeal as an invitation to reopen the merits of the dispute which was before the Arbitral Tribunal: Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2024) 1 SCC 479 ; M/s. Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India, (2023) 15 SCC 472 27.
The Appellate Court cannot treat the Appeal as an invitation to reopen the merits of the dispute which was before the Arbitral Tribunal: Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2024) 1 SCC 479 ; M/s. Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India, (2023) 15 SCC 472 27. The bar on the Courts to render their independent findings on the interpretation of the contractual terms, over and above the interpretation given to the terms by the Arbitral Tribunal unless such interpretation is unfair or unreasonable, was also noted in National Highways Authority of India v. ITD Cementation India Limited, (2015) 14 SCC 21 . We find that the Courts have also construed the clauses in the General Conditions of the contract/arbitration agreement therein in the same manner as interpreted by the Arbitral Tribunal in the present case. 28. The comparative interpretation of the relevant Clauses is put in context from the following: (a) The Arbitral Tribunal interpreted Clause 53.1, dealing with the requirement of the Contractor to give notice of his intention to claim any additional payment pursuant to any Clause of these conditions or otherwise, to the Engineer, with a copy to the Employer, within 28 days after the event giving rise to the Claim has first arisen. (b) Clause 53.4 provides that where the Contractor fails to comply with any of the provisions of Clause 53 in respect of any Claim which he seeks to make, the entitlement of the Contractor to payment in respect thereof, shall not exceed such amount as the Engineer or Arbitrators appointed under Clause 67.3, assessing the Claim, considers to be verified by contemporary records whether or not such records were brought to the engineer’s notice as required under Clause 53.2 and 53.3. 29. The Arbitral Tribunal interpreted Clause 53.1 and Clause 53.4 to mean that even if the Contractor fails to give notice to the Engineer under Clause 53.1 for any additional payment (claim etc.), his entitlement for the same cannot be denied under Clause 53.4. The Contractor’s claim however cannot exceed the amount verified by the Engineer based on contemporary records. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly held that on 17.02.2005, the incumbent Engineer recommended to the Employer the views/recommendations of the former Engineer and Claims Specialist for payment to the Contractor under Clause 60.2.
The Contractor’s claim however cannot exceed the amount verified by the Engineer based on contemporary records. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly held that on 17.02.2005, the incumbent Engineer recommended to the Employer the views/recommendations of the former Engineer and Claims Specialist for payment to the Contractor under Clause 60.2. The Employer however did not accept the recommendations of the Engineer and instructed him to once again certify the Statement at Completion after applying his mind, and not to certify the recommendations of the former Engineer (LBI). The incumbent Engineer subsequently certified and recommended to the appellant for payment to the respondent No.1 vide a letter dated 20.04.2005. However, the Employer once again returned the recommendation to the Engineer on 11.05.2005 and referred the dispute to the DRT on 29.06.2005. 30. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly held that the Employer failed to apply its mind to the recommendations dated 10.09.2004 (given by the First Engineer/Claims Specialist) on the claims of the Contractor included in Part B of its Statement at Completion and kept returning the recommendations to the Engineer. The Arbitral Tribunal held that the certification given by the Engineer on 20.04.2005 was in accordance with the Conditions of the Contract. Hence, the Arbitral Tribunal declined to accept the prayer of the Appellant/Employer for passing an award invalidating the action of the Engineer in certifying the Statement at Completion furnished by the respondent No.1 and rejected the appellant’s Claim. The Arbitral Tribunal further directed the appellant to pay the respondent No.1/Contractor an amount of Rs.13,76,31,668/- as certified by the Engineer and recommended for payment vide letter dated 20.04.2005, inclusive of interest at 11% per annum for the delay up to 17.02.2005. 31. The view taken by the Arbitrator i.e., the claim of the Contractor cannot be rejected even in the absence of a formal notice to the Engineer under Clause 53.1, in view of Clause 53.4 which provides an overriding mechanism permitting the Engineer or any arbitrators to assess such claims, aligns with the view taken by the Courts in several decisions.
The view taken by the Arbitrator i.e., the claim of the Contractor cannot be rejected even in the absence of a formal notice to the Engineer under Clause 53.1, in view of Clause 53.4 which provides an overriding mechanism permitting the Engineer or any arbitrators to assess such claims, aligns with the view taken by the Courts in several decisions. In State of Orissa v. Larsen &Toubro Limited, AIR 2006 Ori 45 , a learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court held that Clause 53.4 provides for the Settlement of Claims raised by the Contractor, in the absence of 28 days’ notice and only restricts the payment in respect of such claim to the amount determined by the Engineer or any of the Arbitrators appointed under the Arbitration Clause, assessing the claim, considers to be verified by contemporary records. 32. In National Highways Authority of India v. ITD-SDB (JV), 2018 SCC OnLine DEL 12296, the Delhi High Court interpreted Clause 53.4 to hold that Clause 53.1, 53.2 and 53.3 of the GCC are procedural in nature and would not take away the contractor’s right to lodge a claim for additional payment with the only caveat being that the Contractor’s claim would be restricted to the amount, as quantified either by the Engineer or the Arbitral Tribunal appointed under Clause 67.3. 33. The decisions cited by the appellant do not assist its case for interference with the Award. 34. In National Highway Authority of India v. Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Limited , 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2767 , a Single Bench of the Delhi High Court clarified the ambit of ‘public policy’ for challenging an Award arising out of international commercial arbitration. In any event, the Delhi High Court reiterated that an Arbitral Award may be set aside where the Award contravenes public policy, exhibits patent illegality, or when the Arbitrator fails to adhere to the fundamental principles of natural justice. It was further held that the scope of interference in an Award arising out of international commercial arbitration was even more restricted and such an Award could only be interfered with in case of contravention to the public policy of the Country.
It was further held that the scope of interference in an Award arising out of international commercial arbitration was even more restricted and such an Award could only be interfered with in case of contravention to the public policy of the Country. In any event, the said decision involved a contention that the Arbitral Tribunal had ignored numerous documents filed by the petitioner therein highlighting the discrepancies in the payment certificate dated 31.08.2014, which formed part of their defense. 35. In Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority , (2015) 3 SCC 49 , the Supreme Court laid down the juristic principle of a ‘judicial approach’ demands that a decision be fair, reasonable, and objective. Anything arbitrary and whimsical would not amount to a reasonable, fair or objective determination. The Supreme Court further explained that a perverse decision is one that is so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same conclusion and would involve a finding based on no evidence, or a situation where the Arbitral Tribunal takes irrelevant factors into account, or ignores vital evidence to arrive at its decision. In the present case, there is no ground raised regarding a breach of the principles of natural justice by the Arbitral Tribunal or of the Award being perverse on the touchstone of Associate Builders (Supra). 36. International Construction Company v. State of AP , 13 AIR 2001 SC 833 was a decision under The Arbitration Act, 1940, and involved a condition in the Agreement between the parties therein where claims/disputes arising out of the contract were to be submitted in writing to the Superintending Engineer within 15 days from the date of the cause of action, so that the facts could be ascertained and a prompt decision be given. This decision in fact helps the respondent No.1/Contractor, since there was an admitted failure on the part of the First Engineer (LBI) to give its recommendation within 56 days in relation to the Dispute No.2 as referred by the respondent No.1. The Findings of the Arbitral Tribunal : 37. After considering the pleadings and documents of the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal gave the following findings: (i) The appellant/employer failed to resolve the issue of payment to the respondent No.1/contractor based on the recommendations of the two Engineers.
The Findings of the Arbitral Tribunal : 37. After considering the pleadings and documents of the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal gave the following findings: (i) The appellant/employer failed to resolve the issue of payment to the respondent No.1/contractor based on the recommendations of the two Engineers. The respondent No.1-contractor submitted its Statement at Completion to the First Engineer (LBI) as per the terms of the Agreement between the parties. The claims of the respondent No.1 as submitted in Part B of the Statement at Completion were examined by the authorized Claims Specialist of the First Engineer (LBI) and were accordingly recommended to the appellant/Employer on 10.09.2004. (ii) The Second Engineer also recommended these claims by his letter dated 20.04.2005. The claims of the respondent No.1, as recommended by the Engineer, were neither examined nor approved/rejected by the Employer/appellant. (iii) The appellant/Employer appointed the Second Engineer (R&B) in place of the First Engineer (LBI). The appellant/Employer instructed the Second Engineer (R&B) on 08.12.2004 to examine the Statement at Completion furnished by the respondent No.1 and certify the amount as being justified for taking further action at the Employer’s end. The incumbent/Second Engineer on 17.02.2005 reiterated the recommendations of the Claims Specialist of the First Engineer (LBI) but the employer did not accept the same and instructed him to certify the Statement at Completion once again after applying his mind and not to certify the recommendations of the First Engineer. In response to these instructions, the Second Engineer (R&B) once again certified and recommended payment of a gross amount of Rs.14,47,09,405/- to the respondent No.1 by his letter dated 20.04.2005. (iv) However, instead of resolving the issue of payment, the Employer/appellant once again returned the issue of payment to the Engineer on 11.05.2005 and then referred the matter to the Dispute Review Board (DRB) on 29.06.2005. 38. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly found that the Employer/ appellant had never applied its mind to the recommendations dated 10.09.2004 of the Claims Specialist of the First Engineer (LBI) with respect to Part B of the Statement at Completion and continued to return the IPCs to the Second Engineer (R&B).
38. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly found that the Employer/ appellant had never applied its mind to the recommendations dated 10.09.2004 of the Claims Specialist of the First Engineer (LBI) with respect to Part B of the Statement at Completion and continued to return the IPCs to the Second Engineer (R&B). The Arbitral Tribunal found that the certification made by the Second Engineer (R&B) on 20.04.2005 was as per the Conditions of the Contract and the prayer of the appellant/Employer to pass an award invalidating the action of the Engineer in certifying the Statement at Completion should be rejected as being without basis. 39. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly passed the Award dated 31.03.2009 by rejecting the prayer of the appellant to make an Award invalidating the action of the Engineer in determining and certifying the Statement at Completion furnished by the respondent No.1/contractor. The Arbitral Tribunal further directed the appellant to pay Rs.13,76,31,668/- to the respondent No.1 as certified in IPC-45 and recommended by the Second Engineer for payment vide his letter dated 20.04.2005 inclusive of interest at 11% per annum for the delay up to 17.02.2005. The Award of Rs.13,76,31,668/- was made with reference to the Statement at Completion submitted by the respondent No.1 as against Rs.30,54,97,630/- as claimed by the respondent No.1. 40. With regard to Dispute No.2, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded Rs.31,99,693/- along with interest at 11% per annum as against the respondent’s claim of Rs.13,68,63,396/-. The amount awarded under the Dispute No.2 in favour of the respondent No.1 included allowing the respondent No.1’s Claim Nos.4, 16 and costs towards payment of Arbitrators fees which were paid by the respondent No.1/Contractor for the unpaid share of the appellant. 41. Claim No.4 was for Rs.29,74,615/- towards refund of excess seigniorage charges recovered from the IPC’s. 42. The Arbitral Tribunal was of the view that the clarification issued in regard to measurement of quantities for working out the seigniorage charges by the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide Memo dated 04.02.2004 should be followed in the present case and hence, the respondent No.1 is entitled to refund of excess seigniorage charges amounting to Rs.23,16,283/- which were deducted by the appellant. 43.
43. Claim No.16 was for an amount of Rs.5,00,00,000/- towards release of bank guarantee and compensation of loss of future income due to non-release of retention money in the form of bank guarantee including bank guarantee charges and loss of interest on margin money. The Arbitral Tribunal held that 50% of the retention money was to be released by the Employer under Clause 60.6 of the Contract upon substantial completion of the Work and issuance of the Taking-Over Certificate by the Engineer and the balance 50% was to be released upon expiry of the Defects Liability Period. Since, the respondent No.1/Contractor had incurred bank guarantee charges and loss of interest on margin money, it was held that the respondent No.1 was entitled to an Award of Rs.2,59,010/-. The Arbitral Tribunal also held that the claim of Rs.5 crores towards loss of future profits is too remote and does not deserve consideration. The Arbitral Tribunal directed the appellant to release the bank guarantee for Rs.27,00,000/- forthwith. 44. The Arbitral Tribunal awarded interest at 11% to the respondent No.1 on the amount awarded from the date on which cause of action arose till date of the award. The Arbitral Tribunal also awarded interest at 11% on all the individual amounts awarded in respect of each of the claims and the interest up to the date of award awarded in respect of each claim. The Arbitral Tribunal also noted that the appellant/Employer had failed to deposit the balance share of the Arbitrators’ fees which had been deposited by the respondent No.1 in order to enable the Arbitral Tribunal to make the Award. Hence, the appellant was directed to pay an amount of Rs.6,24,400/- to the respondent No.1 towards costs. 45. As stated above, during the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellant had clarified that the appellant was not challenging the Dispute No.2 i.e., the respondent No.1/Contractor’s reference to Arbitration for adjudication of its claim of Rs.13,68,63,396/- made in the Statement at Completion. Incidentally, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded Rs.31,99,693/- against the claimed amount of Rs.13,68,63,396/-. The issue which falls for consideration before this Court is whether the appellant’s challenge to the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court on 19.11.2012 can be allowed within the statutory framework of sections 37 and 34 of the 1996 Act. 46.
Incidentally, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded Rs.31,99,693/- against the claimed amount of Rs.13,68,63,396/-. The issue which falls for consideration before this Court is whether the appellant’s challenge to the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court on 19.11.2012 can be allowed within the statutory framework of sections 37 and 34 of the 1996 Act. 46. Notably, the appellant failed to point out any discrepancy in the quantification and determination of the bill submitted by the respondent No.1. None of the grounds advert to the statutory position under section 34 of the 1996 Act including breach of principles of natural justice by the Arbitrators or the Award being patently illegal, perverse or in conflict with the public policy of India. The appellant has also not questioned the impugned order on the unreasonableness of the Arbitrators’ interpretation of the contractual Clauses. It would be clear from the above grounds that the appellant has treated the present Appeal as a re- appreciation of the merits of the disputes between the parties. The statutory bar against review on the merits of the dispute and the setting aside of an Award solely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by re-appreciation of evidence can be found in Explanation 2 to section 34(2) and the proviso to section 34(2A) under 1996 Act itself. It is clear that the Legislature envisaged a hands-off approach by the Court in respect of the facts even at the first stage of challenge under section 34. The second stage of challenge under section 37 would hence be even more circumscribed and the scope of interference more curtailed. 47. The Award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal runs into factual details after taking note of the submissions of the appellant as well as the respondent No.1. 48. The findings of the Arbitral Tribunal are similarly given with reference to the relevant facts with due regard to the relevant Clauses of the Agreement between the parties. There is nothing on record to show that the Arbitral Tribunal misapplied itself or went beyond the scope/terms of the reference or that the Award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submissions to Arbitration. Similarly, the interpretation of the contractual clauses as given by the Arbitral Tribunal is reasonable and strictly within the intention of the parties.
There is nothing on record to show that the Arbitral Tribunal misapplied itself or went beyond the scope/terms of the reference or that the Award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submissions to Arbitration. Similarly, the interpretation of the contractual clauses as given by the Arbitral Tribunal is reasonable and strictly within the intention of the parties. It is settled law that interpretation of the contractual terms is within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal and the referral Court can only interfere if the interpretation is found to be unreasonable or one which defies logic. We do not find the Arbitral Tribunal either misreading the contract or giving an arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation/construction of the relevant contractual terms. It consequently follows that the Award is a reasoned award and one which cannot be unsettled on the ground of perversity. It has not been contended that the Arbitral Tribunal failed to consider material facts/records or considered extraneous facts in arriving at its findings or even that the findings were not based on any evidence. The public policy ground is also not available to the appellant since it also has not been submitted that the making of the Award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of sections 75 or 81 of the 1996 Act or that the Award is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law or is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. Findings of the Learned Trial Court in the Impugned Order dated 19.11.2012: On Dispute No.1: 49. The Trial Court found that the appellant’s case did not pertain to a breach of the principles of natural justice in the absence of contentions like the appellant not having been given proper notice of the appointment of the Arbitrator, or of the arbitral proceedings; the appellant’s inability to present his case; or even that the arbitral award dealt with a dispute note contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the reference to arbitrator or contained a decision on matters beyond the scope of the submission to Arbitration. 50.
50. On merits, the Trial Court found that the appellant/Employer appointed the Second Engineer (R&B) in place of the First Engineer (LBI) because the appellant declined to accept the certification of the latter dated 10.09.2004 whereby the claims included by the respondent No.1 in Part B of the Statement at Completion were recommended to the appellant. On 17.02.2005, the incumbent/Second Engineer reiterated the recommendations of the First Engineer/Claims Specialist to the appellant for appropriate payment to the respondent No.1. The appellant did not accept this recommendation and again instructed the Second Engineer to certify the Statement at Completion after application of mind and not to certify the recommendations of the First Engineer. The incumbent Engineer once again certified and recommended payment of a total amount of Rs.14,47,09,405/- vide letter dated 20.04.2005 by the appellant to the respondent No.1 but the said claims of the respondent No.1 as recommended by the Engineer were neither examined nor rejected/approved by the appellant. Hence, it was held that the difference of Rs.1,27,,99,759/- in the determination by the Engineers cannot be contested and the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal confirming the certification by the Second Engineer is justified. 51. The appellant, instead of resolving the issue of payment to the respondent No.1, once again referred the matter to the Engineer on 11.05.2005 and to the Dispute Review Board (DRB) on 29.06.2005. The Trial Court hence found that the appellant could not contend that there was no dispute between the appellant and the respondent No.1 warranting the invocation of Clause 67.1 of the Agreement i.e., for reference of dispute to the DRB. Also, the appellant’s letter dated 29.06.2005 addressed to the Chairman, DRB, reflects that the appellant had furnished a statement specifying the dispute and detailed history of the case together with relevant copies of documents with a request to give their recommendations to resolve the issue of validity or otherwise of the certification of the Statement at Completion under Clause 60.10. Consequently, the appellant’s contention that the Arbitral Tribunal had no jurisdiction since the reference to the DRB was not a dispute as per Clause 67.1 was not at all tenable. 52.
Consequently, the appellant’s contention that the Arbitral Tribunal had no jurisdiction since the reference to the DRB was not a dispute as per Clause 67.1 was not at all tenable. 52. The Trial Court further agreed with the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal that even if the Contractor/respondent No.1 had not given notice to the Engineer under Clause 53.1 for any additional payment (claims etc.), the contractor’s entitlement for the same could not be denied under Clause 53.4. The Trial Court construed Clauses 53.1 and 53.4 to hold that the latter Clause specifically provides that, in the event of failure of the contractor to give 28 days’ notice, his entitlement to payment shall not exceed the amount as determined by the Engineer or the Arbitral Tribunal appointed under the Arbitration Clause, based on contemporary records. On Dispute No. 2: 53. The Trial Court found that the appellant did not contest the merits of the claims referred to by the respondent No.1 since the appellant’s contention before the Arbitral Tribunal was that the subject matter of arbitration is the obligation of the employer either to admit or deny the demanded payment in specific circumstances and the contractor in the present statement of claim is asserting some things other than that. The Trial Court specifically dealt with Claim Nos.4 and 16, i.e., refund of excess seigniorage charges of Rs.29,74,615/- and the release of Bank Guarantee and compensation for loss of future income due to non- release of retention money in the form of bank guarantee including bank guarantee charges and loss of interest on margin money, respectively. The Trial Court agreed with the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal under both these heads by holding that there is no error on the part of the Arbitrators in partly allowing Claim No.4 to the extent of Rs.23,16,283/- along with interest at the rate of 11% per annum from 01.03.2004 to 04.01.2006 and by directing the appellant/Employer to release the Bank Guarantee for Rs.27 lakhs to the respondent No.1/contractor and awarding a sum of Rs.2,59,010/- towards Bank Guarantee charges and loss of interest on margin money to the respondent No.1 to be paid by the appellant. 54.
54. On the issue of Interest, the Trial Court held that the award of interest at 11% to the respondent No.1/contractor from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date of the Award, as well as the award of interest of 11% on all amounts in respect of each of the claims and interest up to the date of Award in respect of each claim, was correct in law. The Trial Court also rejected the appellant’s contention that there was misconduct on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal in passing the Award in respect of Dispute Nos.1 and 2. The Trial Court accordingly dismissed the petition filed by the appellant under Section 34 (2)(iii) and (iv) of the 1996 Act for setting aside the Award dated 31.03.2009. 55. In any event, the Explanation 2 to section 34(2) prohibits the Courts from reviewing the matter on merits. It is also settled that the scope of interference under section 37 of the Act is narrower than in an application under section 34 of the Act. 56. The law, as settled now, is that the Appeal Court should not interfere with the order passed by a Court under section 34 of the 1996 Act unless the order as well as the Arbitral Award fall within the conditions available under section 34 of the said Act. In any event, we have already held that none of the Claims allowed by the Arbitral Tribunal, namely, for excess amount recommended by the Engineer vide Recommendation dated 20.04.2005 can be interfered with since the appellant did not raise any such objection before the Arbitral Tribunal. Moreover, there is no difference in the amounts certified by both the Engineers and the Recommendation of the second Engineer clearly stated that the prices escalation and interest is also required to be calculated in addition to the amount of Rs.12,59,76,037/- and determined the total amount to be Rs.13,76,31,668/-. 57. We also reiterate that the appellant gave up the challenge to Dispute No.2 during the course of the submissions in the Appeal on 28.08.2025. The grounds raised in the present Appeal would clearly show that the appellant admitted to a dispute while referring the same to the DRB. The appellant also insisted on adjudication of these disputes by the Arbitral Tribunal. 58.
The grounds raised in the present Appeal would clearly show that the appellant admitted to a dispute while referring the same to the DRB. The appellant also insisted on adjudication of these disputes by the Arbitral Tribunal. 58. The findings of the Arbitral Tribunal with regard to seigniorage charges to be levied on the basis of quantities certified for payment are provided under Memo No.15953/M1(2)/03-2 dated 04.02.2004 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly awarded Rs.23,16,283/-. With regard to Claim No.16, the Arbitral Tribunal relied on Clause 60.6 of the Contract under which 50% of the retention money was to be released on substantial completion and the balance of 50% upon issuance of Defect Liability Certificate. The Arbitral Tribunal awarded Rs.2,59,010/- as the respondent incurred bank guarantee charges on account of the appellant’s failure to release the money as per Clause 60.6. The Trial Court accepted and agreed with the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal. We hence do not find any error in the impugned order dated 19.11.2012 passed by the Trial Court dismissing the appellant’s petition filed under section 34 of the 1996 Act. 59. The Arbitral Award dated 31.03.2009 was replete with reasons and based on correct adjudication of material before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Trial Court accordingly found no grounds to set aside the Arbitral Award. This Court also finds no basis to arrive at a different conclusion to that of the Arbitral Tribunal and the Trial Court, both of who came to a reasonable and correct finding on the evidence before it. The Appeal is hence without any merit and should be dismissed. 60. CMA.No.273 of 2013, along with all connected applications, is accordingly dismissed. Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.